

유엔기후변화협약

제21차 당사국 총회 참가결과 자료집 (COP21)

2015. 11. 30.~12. 13, 프랑스 파리


2016. 4

대한민국 정부대표단

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I. 제21차 기후변화협약 당사국총회(COP21) 개요



1

COP21 회의개요

□ 회의 개요

- **회의명** : 제21차 유엔기후변화협약 당사국총회 (COP21)
 - ※ 협약의 최고 의사결정기구로 협약 이행을 위한 제도적·행정적 조치 및 이행상황 점검
- **일시·장소** : 11.30~12.13(정상행사 11.30, 고위급회의 12.7~8), 프랑스 파리
 - ※ 당초 12.11(금) 종료 예정이었으나, 연장되어 12.13(일) 00:030에 폐회
- **참가규모** : 196개국 정부대표(19,000여명), 국제기구(2,000여명), 민간 단체(NGO 등 6,000여명), 언론(3,000여명) 등 약 30,000명 참가
- **우리나라 참가자**
 - **정부대표** : 대통령, 환경부, 외교부, 국조실, 산업부, 기재부, 미래부 등 관계부처, 국회, 자문단 등 협상대표단 100여명 참석
 - **기타** : 지자체, 언론, 산업계, 시민단체, 연구기관 등 국내관계자 다수 참석

□ 주요 의제

- 2020년 이후 모든 국가에 적용되는 新기후체제에 대한 협정문 채택
- 신기후체제 합의문 세부 이행지침에 대한 당사국총회 결정문 채택
- 각국의 기여내용(INDC)에 대한 법적구속력 및 이행절차 확정 등

□ 회의 구성

- 제21차 유엔기후변화협약 당사국총회 (COP21)
- 제11차 교토의정서 당사국회의 (CMP11)
- 제2-12차 더반플랫폼 특별작업반 회의 (ADP2-12)
- 제43차 과학기술부속기구회의(SBSTA43)
- 제43차 이행부속기구회의(SBI43) 등

2

COP21 회의일정

< 1주차 : 11.29(일)~12.6(일) >

일 시		회 의 일 정			
11.29 (일)	17:00-18:00	ADP 개회			
11.30 (월)	10:00-11:00	COP 개회식			
	11:00-11:30	정상회의 개회식			
	12:00-21:00	정상회의			
	19:00-21:00	비공식 회의			
12.1 (화)	10:00-13:00	COP	CMP 개회	SBSTA 개회	비공식 회의
	15:00-18:00	SBI 개회 및 다자평가		비공식 회의	
	19:00-21:00	비공식 회의			
12.2 (수)	10:00-13:00	COP	CMP		비공식회의
	15:00-24:00	비공식 회의			
12.3 (목)	10:00-13:00	비공식 회의			
	15:00-21:00				
12.4 (금)	10:00-21:00	비공식 회의			
	20:30-22:25	SBSTA 폐회		SBI 폐회	
12.5 (토)	11:00-13:00	ADP 폐회		비공식회의	
	18:00-21:00	COP (ADP 결과 보고)		비공식회의	
12.6 (일)		공식일정 없음			

< 2주차 : 12.7(월)~12(토) >

일 시		회 의 일 정	
12.7 (월)	10:00-13:00	COP/CMP 고위급회의	비공식 회의
	15:00-21:00		
12.8 (화)	10:00-13:00	COP/CMP 고위급회의	비공식회의
	15:00-18:00		
	18:30-20:00	수석대표 만찬	
12.9 (수)	10:00-13:00	비공식회의	
	15:00-22:00		
12.10 (목)	10:00-13:00	비공식회의	
	15:00-18:00	COP/CMP	
12.11 (금)	10:00-13:00	비공식회의	
	15:00-18:00		
12.12 (토)	10:00-13:00	COP/CMP 폐회(결과 채택)	
	15:00-24:00		

3 대표단 명단

가. 교체수석대표

부처명	성명	직위	출장기간
환경부	윤성규	환경부장관	11.29 - 12.5

나. 교체수석대표

부처명	성명	직위	출장기간
외교부	최재철	기후변화대사	11.27 - 12.13

다. 협상대표단/자문단

부처명	성명 및 직책		출장기간
외교부	최재철	기후변화대사	11.27 - 12.13
	이형종	기후변화환경외교국 고위공무원	11.27 - 12.13
	조계연	기후변화외교과 과장	11.27 - 12.13
	이준희	녹색환경외교과 서기관	11.27 - 12.13
	박꽃님	기후변화외교과 사무관	11.27 - 12.13
	이승남	기후변화외교과 사무관	11.27 - 12.13
	장수미	기후변화외교과 사무관	11.27 - 12.13
	김진수	국제에너지안보과 사무관	11.27 - 12.13
	김효정	주본부관 환경관	11.29 - 12.5
	윤종원	주OECD대표부 대사	
	정선화	주OECD대표부 참사관	
국무조정실	임석규	녹색성장지원단 부단장	12.4 - 12.11
	양한나	기후변화대응과 과장	12.4 - 12.11
	홍가람	기후변화대응과 사무관	12.4 - 12.11
	정지운	녹색기획협력과 사무관	12.4 - 12.11
기획재정부	김회정	국제금융협력국 국장	11.25 - 11.30
	손웅기	녹색기후기획과 과장	11.22 - 12.6
	김민진	녹색기후기획과 사무관	11.29 - 12.12
	김정주	녹색기후기획과 사무관	11.22 - 12.6


부처명	성명 및 직책		출장기간
	강정훈	녹색기후기획과 연구원	11.29 - 12.12
	이대희	미래정책총괄과 과장	12.6 - 12.12
	박환조	미래정책총괄과 사무관	12.6 - 12.12
	이경연	미래정책총괄과 에디터	12.6 - 12.12
	문진영	대외경제정책연구원 전략연구팀장	12.6 - 12.12
	오형나	경희대학교 교수	12.6 - 12.12
환경부	윤성규	장관	11.29 - 12.5
	김양동	장관 수행비서	11.29 - 12.5
	주대영	국제협력관	11.29 - 12.14
	김준기	지구환경담당관	11.29 - 12.5
	박정현	지구환경담당관실 사무관	11.27 - 12.14
	이현준	지구환경담당관실 사무관	11.29 - 12.5
	이은혜	지구환경담당관실 사무관	11.29 - 12.14
	임수진	지구환경담당관실 주무관	11.27 - 12.14
	홍승용	지구환경담당관실 주무관	11.29 - 12.5
	김화진	지구환경담당관실 에디터	11.29 - 12.5
	김법정	기후대기정책과 과장	12.3 - 12.7
	최한창	기후대기정책과 사무관	11.29 - 12.14
	유승직	온실가스종합정보센터 센터장	12.2 - 12.6
	최형욱	온실가스종합정보센터 연구관	11.29 - 12.6
	정재혁	온실가스종합정보센터 계장	11.29 - 12.14
	이시진	한국환경공단 이사장	11.29 - 12.6
	조재연	한국환경공단 홍보비서실 팀장	11.29 - 12.6
	정동희	한국환경공단 기후변화대응처 팀장	11.27 - 12.12
	민미연	한국환경공단 기후변화대응처 차장	11.27 - 12.14
	황재운	한국환경공단 기후변화대응처 과장	11.27 - 12.12
	박범웅	한국환경공단 기후변화대응처 과장	11.27 - 12.14
	권오재	한국환경공단 기후변화대응처 과장	11.27 - 12.12
	김승도	한림대학교 교수	12.2 - 12.12
	이재형	고려대학교 교수	12.3 - 12.14

부처명	성명 및 직책		출장기간
	이상윤	한국환경정책평가연구원 부연구위원	11.29 - 12.11
	이승준	한국환경정책평가연구원 부연구위원	11.29 - 12.11
산업통상자원부	나승식	에너지신산업정책단장	12.6 - 12.12
	신동학	기후변화산업환경과 과장	12.6 - 12.12
	송현주	온실가스감축팀장	12.6 - 12.12
	장혜정	기후변화산업환경과 사무관	11.27 - 12.14
	한중호	온실가스감축팀 사무관	12.6 - 12.12
	임재규	에너지경제연구원 기후변화정책본부장	11.29 - 12.5
	노동운	에너지경제연구원 선임연구위원	11.29 - 12.12
	오진규	에너지경제연구원 선임연구위원	11.27 - 12.14
	김길환	에너지경제연구원 부연구위원	11.29 - 12.12
	이상준	에너지경제연구원 부연구위원	12.3 - 12.12
	허영전	에너지경제연구원 연구원	11.29 - 12.12
	변종립	한국에너지공단 이사장	12.6 - 12.8
	나을영	한국에너지공단 실장	11.29 - 12.7
	오대균	한국에너지공단 정책위원	11.29 - 12.12
	구정모	한국에너지공단 대리	12.6 - 12.12
	공승현	한국에너지공단 대리	11.29 - 12.12
	이대호	서강대학교대학원 연구원	11.27 - 12.14
	박순철	한국생산기술연구원 전문위원	11.29 - 12.12
	천유진	한국생산기술연구원 연구원	11.29 - 12.03
	안윤기	포스코경영연구소 상무보	12.6 - 12.11
미래창조과학부	박재문	연구개발정책실장	11.27 - 12.1
	백일섭	원천기술과장	11.27 - 12.5
	황동민	원천기술과 사무관	11.27 - 12.11
	성창모	녹색기술센터 소장	11.29 - 12.8
	정태용	연세대학교 교수	12.3 - 12.9
	박문희	대성청정에너지연구소	11.28 - 12.5
	민동준	연세대학교 교수	12.6 - 12.9

부처명	성명 및 직책		출장기간
	고영주	한국화학연구원 본부장	11.26 - 12.5
	박민희	한국에너지기술연구원 선임연구원	11.29 - 12.12
	정환수	한국CCS연구개발센터 팀장	12.5 - 12.11
	우아미	녹색기술센터 연구원	11.26 - 12.12
	오채운	녹색기술센터 선임연구원	11.29 - 12.12
	이화영	녹색기술센터 연구원	11.29 - 12.12
	김수은	한국원자력연구원 연구원	12.5 - 12.12
국토교통부	윤영중	미래전략담당관실 과장	12.6 - 12.11
	김상수	항공기술과 과장	11.29 - 12.6
	서삼호	미래전략담당관실 사무관	12.6 - 12.11
	장 철	항공기술과 주무관	11.29 - 12.6
	박상준	한국교통연구원 부연구위원	12.6 - 12.11
	조준행	한국교통연구원 연구위원	11.29 - 12.6
해양수산부	정철락	해양수산부 해사산업기술과 사무관	11.29 - 12.12
	전우석	선박안전기술공단 책임검사원	11.29 - 12.12
농림축산식품부	박다움	농업통상과 농업주사	11.28 - 12.5
	한기연	창조농식품정책과 행정주사	11.28 - 12.5
법무부	양리원	국제법무과 전문위원	12.6 - 12.12
산림청	임종수	국립산림과학원 연구사	11.29 - 12.13
	송민경	국립산림과학원 연구사	12.05 - 12.13
	윤평화	국제협력담당관실 사무관	11.29 - 12.13
	이현주	산림정책과 사무관	11.29 - 12.5
기상청	기미옥	기후정책과 사무관	11.29 - 12.5
	권원태	국립기상과학원 연구위원	12.5 - 12.12
농촌진흥청	이종식	국립농업과학원 농업연구관	11.29 - 12.7
	박성진	국립농업과학원 농업연구사	11.29 - 12.7
	박규현	강원대학교 교수	11.29 - 12.7

※ 대표단의 출장기간은 출장계획상 기간이며, 협상 일정 변경에 따른 변동 가능

II. 제21차 당사국총회(COP21) 주요결과



1 신(新)기후체제 협상 주요결과

- ◇ '파리 협정(Paris Agreement)' 채택을 통해 신기후체제 출범에 합의
- ◇ 협정 채택 후속조치 및 2020년 이전 기후대응 강화에 대한 결정문 채택

□ 국제사회 공동의 장기목표 설정

- (감축) 지구 평균기온 상승을 산업화 이전 대비 2℃ 보다 상당히 낮은 수준으로 유지하고, 1.5℃로 제한하기 위한 노력
 - 온도목표 달성을 위해 글로벌 차원의 배출정점 조속히 도달 노력 하되, 개도국은 정점 도달에 더욱 시간이 소요됨을 인정
 - 금세기 하반기 內 온실가스 배출과 흡수의 균형* 달성
 - * 실질적으로 온실가스 순배출량 無(탄소중립)으로 해석되나, 구체적 의미에 대해 논란의 여지가 남아 있음
- (적응) 기후변화에 대한 회복력 강화, 취약성 저감, 적응역량 증진
- (재원) 저탄소 배출, 기후회복력 증대를 위한 재원 마련

□ 모든 국가 5년 단위로 감축 기여방안(NDC) 제출

- (NDC) 선진·개도국 구분 없이 모든 국가가 스스로 결정한 NDC를 5년 단위로 제출하고 이행하기로 합의
 - 2015년 INDC 제출국은 1차 NDC를 제출한 것으로 간주
 - 2020년에 2030년 목표 신규 제출 또는 既 제출내용 재확정
- (구속력) NDC 제출은 의무로 하되, 이행은 각국이 자체적으로 담보
- (감축유형) 선진국은 절대량 방식을 유지하고, 개도국은 국별 여건 감안, 경제 전반을 포괄하는 감축 목표를 점진적으로 채택 독려
- (진전원칙) 次期 NDC는 이전 수준보다 진전되고, 최고의 의욕수준 반영
- (장기전략) 모든 국가에 2050년 장기 저탄소개발 전략을 2020년까지 제출 제안
- (시장메커니즘) 유엔기후변화협약 중심의 메커니즘 설립, 이외에도 당사국 간의 자발적 협력 인정

□ 이행점검 및 검토 절차 도입

- (종합점검) 2023년부터 5년 단위로 파리협정 이행 전반에 대한 국제사회 차원의 종합적 이행 점검 (Global Stocktaking) 실시
- (보고·검토) 모든 국가에 온실가스 인벤토리, 감축목표 달성 성과, 개도국 지원 제공·수혜 내용 등에 대해 보고·검토 의무 부여
 - 다만 개도국에는 보고 범위, 주기, 검토 범위 등 유연성 부여

□ 기후변화 적응에 대한 각국 노력 촉진

- (적응이행) 모든 국가가 국가적응계획 수립·이행 등 적응 행동을 적절히 이행, 적응계획과 이행내용 등에 대한 보고서를 제출
- (손실 및 피해) 손실 및 피해 대응의 중요성을 인정, 향후 국제협력 강화

□ 협약이행을 위한 개도국 지원

- (재원) 개도국의 기후변화 대응을 위한 선진국의 재원 공급 의무를 규정하고, 선진국 이외 국가들의 자발적인 재원 공급을 장려
 - 이전보다 진전된 재원 조성 노력 필요성을 확인
- (기술) 감축·적응을 위한 기술 개발·이전의 중요성에 대해 장기비전 공유, 기술협력 확대를 위한 기술 프레임워크 수립
 - ※ 기술혁신의 중요성 강조 및 기술메커니즘 명문화, 개도국에 대한 R&D 협력 강화 등
- (역량배양) 역량증진을 위해 '파리위원회' 설립

□ 후속조치

- (서명·발효) 55개 국가, 글로벌 배출량의 55% 이상 비준시 발효
 - '16.4.22일 미국 뉴욕에서 유엔사무총장 주재로 고위급 협정 서명식을 개최하고, 이후 1년간 각국에 서명 개방
 - ※ '16.4.22~'17.4.21일간 각국에 서명을 개방하며, 수탁자는 유엔사무총장으로 지정
- (후속회의) 후속조치 논의를 위해 「파리협정 특별작업반(APA)」 신설
 - '16년부터 부속기구회의(SB)와 연계하여 APA 회의 개최

2 대표단 주요활동

□ 선진·개도국간 중재노력을 통해 협상타결에 기여

- 특별 정상행사에서 VIP 연설(11.30), 환경부장관의 환경건전성그룹(EIG) 대표 발언(12.1) 등을 통해 우리 의견 적극 개진
 - 신기후체제 타결과 기후변화 대응을 위한 국제사회의 강력한 연대 표명
 - 개도국의 기후변화 대응 지원 측면에서 우리의 선진 기술과 녹색기후기금(GCF) 등을 통한 우리의 가교역할 부각
- 각국의 장기 저탄소 개발전략 자발적 제출, 투명성 증진을 위한 개도국 지원 방안, 기후재원과 기술협력 확대 방안 등을 제시하여 협상 진전에 기여
 - 환경건전성그룹(EIG) 회원국, COP21 의장단, 여타 협상그룹과의 협의 등을 통해 우리 입장 반영 노력

□ 기후변화 주요국, 관련 국제기구와 연대 강화

- (양자면담) 환경부장관은 중국 기후변화특사, 에콰도르 환경장관 등과 면담을 통해 신기후체제 출범에 대비한 정책협력 방안 협의
- (국제기구) 반기문 UN 사무총장과의 면담을 통해 협상동향에 대한 의견을 교환하고, 우리나라의 가교역할 강화 방안 논의
 - 그 외 아시아개발은행(ADB) 부총재, 생물다양성협약(CBD) 사무총장 등 국제기구 대표와 면담을 통해 협력 증대 방안 모색
- 기술메커니즘 기술집행위원회(TEC) 위원에 국내 연구자(녹색기술센터 성장모소장) 진출이 확정, 한국의 선도적인 기후기술 협력 기반을 마련

□ 한국관(Pavilion) 운영을 통한 국가정책 및 기후기술 홍보

- SBS TV, 프랑스 Le Petit Journal, UNFCCC 뉴스룸 등 언론 취재
- 반기문 유엔사무총장, 유도유노 前 인도네시아 대통령, 대만·폴디브·모리셔스 환경장관 등 주요인사 방문


3 평가 및 시사점

□ 모든 국가에 적용되는 신(新)기후체제 출범

- 모든 국가가 스스로 기여방안(NDC)을 결정하여 참여하는 **상향식 신기후체제 구축**
 - 단, 신기후체제도 기후협약 원칙인 **공통의 그러나 차별화된 책임** 원칙이 반영되고, **국별 다양한 여건**을 감안하도록 결정
- 우리나라의 **경제적 위상**(13년 GDP 세계 14위), **온실가스 배출수준**(12년 기준 세계 7위) 및 **산업구조** 등을 종합적으로 고려한 **NDC 강구·이행 필요**

□ 2°C 목표 달성을 위한 NDC 점진적 강화 체계 형성


- **5년 단위**로 국제사회 차원의 종합적 **이행 상황**을 점검하고, **진전의 원칙** 적용에 따라 **NDC도 점진적으로 강화**되어야 할 것으로 예상
- ※ 각국 감축목표 이행여부를 투명하게 관리하기 위한 배출량 accounting 체계 강화 필요



□ 국제탄소시장 형성기반 마련 및 기술협력 강화

- 협정문에 감축목표 달성을 위해 다양한 국제탄소시장 메커니즘을 **활용**할 수 있도록 규정한 바, 우리나라의 관련 논의 적극 참여 필요
- 감축 및 적응을 위한 **기술 협력의 중요성**이 강조되고 이를 위한 구체적인 이행 방안이 마련된 바, 향후 관련 기술 메커니즘에 능동적 대응

III. COP21 결과에 대한 주요국 정부 및 언론 반응



1

주요국 반응

< 중 합 >

- 파리 협정의 “역사적(historic)” 채택에 대해 주요국 모두 환영
 - 기후변화협약 역사상 최초로 2℃ 목표에 대한 “모든 당사국”에 감축의무를 부여한다는 점을 주목
 - EU·美·獨·日 등 주요 선진국은 합의 도출에 대한 자국의 역할을 강조하며, 청정에너지로의 전환 강조 및 관련 산업 발전에 대한 기대감 표명
 - 중국은 선진-개도국 간 공정한 책임 분배가 이루어진 것에 의미 부여 및 자국 상황, 개발 단계 등을 고려하여 국제사회에서의 책임을 다할 것을 강조
 - 인도는 파리 협정을 “기후 정의(Climate Justice)” 측면에서 형평성 및 CBDR 원칙을 강조하며 선진국의 지원 확보 부분을 높이 평가

□ 유럽연합(EU)

- 유럽연합은 정상회의* 결정문을 통해 전지구적·법적 구속력을 지닌 최초의 기후 합의문인 “파리 협정” 채택 환영
 - * 유럽연합 정상회의(‘15.12.17-18, 벨기에 브뤼셀)
- 유럽연합 집행위원회는 파리협정을 의욕적이고 균형 잡혔으며, 21세기 첫 번째 주요한 다자 결정으로 평가하고, 2℃ 목표 달성을 위해 세계가 기후행동을 취할 것으로 발표(12.12, 공식 보도자료)
- EU는 교토의정서의 제한적인 참여와 2009년 코펜하겐 합의 실패를 교훈삼아 파리협정 채택을 위해 선진-개도국간 폭넓은 연합 구축을 위한 가교 역할을 하였음을 자평
- 파리협정을 통해 청정에너지로의 전환에 대한 기대감 표명
- 오늘 세계가 기후변화 대응을 위해 단결하였으며, 우리 후손에게 안전하고, 공정한 세계를 물려줄 수 있는 마지막 기회를 잡았다고 언급(Jean-Claude Juncker 유럽연합 위원장)
- 유럽이 법적 구속력 있는 기후협정을 이끌어냈으며, 주요목적인 장기 목표, 5년 주기 검토, 투명성이 협정에 포함되어 있음을 언급, 협정을 통한 필요 국가에 대한 지속적인 지원을 재확인(Miguel Arias Cañete 유럽연합 기후행동 및 에너지 위원회 위원)

□ 미국

- Obama 대통령은 파리협정에 대해 “세계가 필요로 했던 강력한 (robust) 협정을 도출해냈다”고 표현하며 하나뿐인 지구를 지킬 수 있는 최고의 기회라고 평가(CNN)
- 미국 백악관은 최초로 모든 당사국이 참여한 역사적으로 가장 의욕적인 기후변화 협정을 채택하였음을 발표하고, 장기적이고 견고한 글로벌 체제를 구축하였다고 평가(12.12, 공식 보도자료)
 - 파리협정은 187개 당사국이 제출한 2020년 이후 기후행동 목표를 기반으로 구축되었으며, 개도국의 청정하고 기후 회복력 있는 성장의 지원에 대한 강력한 확신을 제공
 - 2℃를 목표로 한 새로운 협정은 세계 경제의 청정에너지로의 전환에 대한 강한 신호를 민간 부문에 제시
 - 모든 당사국이 성공적이고 의욕적인 국가 기후목표를 제출하였고, 엄격하고 표준화된 검토절차를 통해 이행사항 보고를 약속

□ 독일

- Angela Merkel 총리는 성명서를 통해 기후협정 채택이 역사적이며, 기후행동에 대해 전세계에 의무를 최초로 부여하였음을 밝히며 환영(12.12, 독일 외교부 홈페이지)
- 독일 연방환경부는 모든 국가들이 감축노력을 하는 최초의 기후협정이 채택되었으며, 협정을 통해 국제사회가 국제적으로 구속력 있는 목표를 설정한 것을 긍정적으로 평가(12.12, 공식 보도자료)
 - 국제법 하의 협정에 2℃ 목표가 최초로 규정되었으며 추가적으로 모든 국가들은 1.5도씨 목표를 달성키 위해 노력하여야 하며, 이는 화석연료와의 작별이며 탈탄소화를 의미한다고 평가(Barbara Hendricks 연방환경부 장관)
 - 독일은 파리 협정 이행을 위한 2050년까지의 국가 기후행동계획을 2016년 중반까지 수립 예정(Reuters)

□ 중국

- 중국 외교부, 12월 12일 파리 협정이 채택되자 “국제 협력의 새로운 시작”이라고 표현하며 선진국과 개도국 간의 공정한 책임 분배가 이루어졌다고 평가하고 기후변화 대응을 위한 국제사회와의 협력 의지를 밝힘(xinhuanet)
- Xie Zhenhua 기후변화 특사는 파리 당사국 총회가 세계 기후변화 대응의 주요한 포인트이며, 협정을 통해 인류는 기후변화대응과 지속가능한 개발을 해야 하며, 중국은 자국의 상황, 개발 단계 및 실제 역량에 따라 국제사회에서의 책임을 다할 것을 강조

□ 일본

- 일본 정부는 기후변화와 관련하여 모든 국가가 참여하는 공정하고 효과적이며, 새로운 법적 체제인 파리협정이 채택되었으며, 이에 대해 가치가 높다고 평가(12.13, 일본 외무성 홈페이지)
- Abe 총리는 11월 30일 정상회의에 참석하여 파리협정의 중요성을 강조하고 일본이 제출한 의욕적인 INDC 및 국가적응계획에 대한 지속적인 이행을 약속하고, 현재 공약수준보다 더 많은 1.3조 엔(¥)의 기후재원을 2020년에 제공할 것을 언급
- 모든 당사국에 적용되는 효과적이며 법적인 협정 도출, 장기 목표 설정의 필요성, 목표에 대한 검토 메카니즘이 협정에 포함되어야 함을 언급(Tamayo Marukawa 환경성 장관 일본 대표 연설)
- 일본 정부는 협상과정에 능동적으로 참여하였으며, 공정하고 효과적이며 모든 당사국에 적용 가능한 새로운 체제에 대한 다양한 제안을 하였음을 강조

□ 인도

- Narendra Modi 인도 총리는 기념비적인 파리 기후협정은 “기후 정의(Climate Justice)가 승리한 것”이며, 세계가 녹색 미래를 지향하고 있음을 나타낸다고 환영(인도 NDTV)
 - 인도 기후협상을 이끈 Javadekar 환경부 장관은 협정의 목적은 기후변화협약 이행의 가속화이며, 인도와 개도국 개발의 필요성을 인지하고 있으며, 이를 통해 인도의 우려가 해소되었음을 밝힘
 - 인도는 기후변화 체제에서 형평성과 CBDR 원칙을 중시하였으며, 협정을 통해 자국의 이익을 보호하였다는 내용의 서면 답변서를 국회 상원에 제출
 - 선진국의 역사적 책임에 못 미치는 감축 목표 제출로 아쉬움이 남지만 협정을 통해 개도국은 선진국으로부터 자원, 기술이전 및 역량배양 등 지원을 받을 것이며, 감축행동에 대해 선진국과 개도국간 차별화를 유지하였다고 언급
 - 장관은 또한 EDGAR 보고서*를 인용하며 인도의 일인당 배출량은 미국 16.5 tCO_{2e}, 유럽연합 6.69tCO_{2e} 보다 훨씬 적은 1.8 tCO_{2e}임을 강조
- * 유럽위원회 공동연구센터 2015년 발간, v4.3 report

2 주요 외신 반응

□ The New York Times (뉴욕타임즈, '15.12.14)

- 덴마크 코펜하겐(COP 19, 2009)의 실패를 반면교사한 Obama 대통령의 기후변화 대응에 대한 강력한 의지와 파리협정 합의 도출에 있어서 프랑스의 외교력 높이 평가
- (美·中 주도의 지정학적 변화) Obama 대통령은 재임 후 석탄화력발전소의 온실가스 배출 감축 규정을 포함한 강력한 조치를 실행(청정발전계획, 2015)하였으며, 중국은 심각한 대기오염 해결을 위해 석탄 사용 감축 조치를 취함
 - 2014년 Obama 대통령과 Xi Jinping 국가주석은 지난 20년간 교착상태에 빠진 기후협상을 구해내는 「기후변화 및 청정에너지 협력에 관한 미·중 공동선언」을 발표, 중국의 입장 변화가 파리 총회 이전에 184개국의 INDC 제출에 모멘텀 제공
- (지구 온난화에 대한 인식변화) 기후변화로 인한 위협을 미래가 아닌 즉각적인 것으로 인지하며, 기후변화와 기상이변간의 직접적인 연관성에 대한 과학적 연구가 진행
- (프랑스의 예술적 외교술) 프랑스는 실패를 방지하기 위해 주요 이슈에 대한 가교 역할을 지난 1년간 수행하였으며, 국력에 관계없이 모든 당사국의 주장에 주의를 기울임

□ BBC (비비씨, '15.12.13)

- 파리 협정이 모든 당사국에 감축 의무를 부여하는 최초의 합의임을 강조하면서도, 각 당사국의 배출 감축목표 제출과 이에 대한 정기적 검토는 법적 구속력을 갖지만, 각 국가들이 제시한 목표는 구속력이 없는 협정의 “부분적 법적 구속력(partly legally binding and partly voluntary)”에 주목

- 美, 中, 최빈개도국 주요 인사는 완벽하진 않지만 지구와 인류를 보호하는데 있어서 최선의 결과물이 도출되었다고 평가
- 파리협정의 주요 항목으로 글로벌 차원의 조속한 온실가스 배출 정점 도달, 2℃ 목표 설정 및 1.5℃ 제한을 위해 노력, 매5년마다 이행점검, 2020년까지 개발도상국 지원을 위한 1,000억불 재원 조성 포함을 선정

□ Xinhua (신화, '15.12.15)

- 모든 당사국이 합의한 파리 협정 채택의 역사적 의의와 함께, COP21이 2020년 이후 기후변화 대응을 위한 인류의 새 장(章)이 되었음을 강조
- 당사국은 '형평성', '공통의 차별화된 책임(CBDR)', '상이한 능력' 원칙을 기반으로 2℃ 목표를 설정하고, 1.5℃로 제한하기 위해 노력기로 합의
- 당사국들은 개발도상국을 위해 2020년까지 1,000억불 조성에 대한 명확한 로드맵을 준비하고, 2025년까지 새로운 재원 목표를 제시기로 합의
- “COP 21 개최전과 회기 중 ‘감축’과 ‘적응’에 대한 재원 불균형이 있었지만, 파리 협정하 가장 취약한 부분에 대한 재원 지원이 명확히 새로운 수준에 도달하였다”는 Christina Figueres UNFCCC 사무총장의 의견 언급
- 선진국에만 감축의무를 부여한 교토의정서의 하향식 방식과는 달리 파리협정은 상향식 방식을 채택하였으며, 글로벌 배출량의 95%에 해당하는 180개 이상의 국가가 INDC를 제출

□ Reuters (로이터, '14.12.15)

- 6년전 코펜하겐 이후 200여 당사국은 파리에서 탄소 배출량 감축에 대한 조약 체결을 재논의, 코펜하겐의 실패를 재연 할 수 있다는 불안감 속에서 프랑스 외교력의 도움을 받아 협정 채택
 - 의장국인 프랑스와 반기문 UN사무총장은 COP 21 개최 전 러시아, 베네수엘라와 같은 합의 도출이 쉽지 않은 국가들을 개별적으로 접촉 및 협상에 관여토록 요청하여, 파리 협정문 도출에 정치적 힘을 제공
- EU는 2011년 군소도서국과 함께 '야심찬 온실가스 감축을 위한 연대(high Ambition Coalition)'를 설립하였으며, 미국의 참여로 1.5℃ 목표에 대한 논의가 가능해졌으며, 협정문에도 포함
- 당사국 총회 기간 중 Obama 대통령과 Xi Jinping 국가주석은 전화 회의를 통해 협정 체결의 장애물에 대해 논의하고 공감대 형성

□ The guardian (가디언, '15.12.12)

- 당사국들은 기후변화로 인한 최악의 상황을 피하기 위해 세계 최초로 전세계가 참여하는 온실가스 감축 협정을 채택하여 화석 연료 시대의 종말을 알림
 - 협정은 전반적으로 법적 구속력이 있지만, 개별 당사국이 제출한 온실가스 감축공약이나 기후재원의 경우 구속력이 없으며, 미국 의회의 승인이 필요 없는 수준의 법적 구속력을 보유토록 설계
- 각국 정부와 기업 CEO들은 협정이 이번 세기 중반까지 '순 배출량 제로'라는 새로운 목표를 설정하여 글로벌 시장에 강력한 신호를 제시하였으며, 화석연료에서 청정에너지 기반 경제로의 전환을 촉진할 것임을 언급
- 일부 비평가들은 파리협정이 기후변화로 인한 손실과 피해에 대한 소송의 근거로 사용되는 것을 제한한 미국을 규탄
 - 기후취약국은 협정문에 1.5℃를 포함하는 것을 조건으로 미국이 강경 입장을 보인 손실과 피해에 대해 협정에서 약한 수준의 언급을 수용

◆ (The New York Times) A Climate Deal, 6 Fateful Years in the Making

(By CORAL DAVENPORT, Dec 13, 2015)

PARIS — It took almost two weeks for negotiators from 195 countries to finally pass the landmark climate accord this weekend after several espresso-fueled all-nighters and long, passionate debates over the meaning of a single word, such as “shall.”

But the story of how the deal came together started long before that — in December 2009, with the failure of the last such summit meeting, in Copenhagen.

That gathering was, in hindsight, a case study in how not to do a deal. The hosts of the event had set a stern tone, with concrete barricades, concertina wire, and steel cages to house protesters who stepped out of line.

Connie Hedegaard, Denmark’s minister of climate and energy, was blunt in her approach, “putting pressure on all governments to make the political price of being an obstacle so high that no one will pay it,” she said at the time.

In the tense final hours, world leaders from a handful of large countries took the negotiations into their own hands, leaving smaller countries fuming. Little emerged from the talks, other than acrimony and suggestions that perhaps such summit meetings were ultimately futile. “After Copenhagen, many world leaders believed that the United Nations process would no longer work for tackling climate change,” Secretary General Ban Ki-moon of the United Nations said in an interview. “It was deeply disappointing. It was painful.”

So what changed from Copenhagen to Paris? In short, three things: a fundamental change in the geopolitics of climate change; a shift in the perception of global warming from a distant warning to an immediate threat; and the art of French diplomacy during the event and in the months beforehand to soften the sharp elbows of negotiators and reduce the chances that major points of contention might kill a deal again. In particular, they made sure that each country, regardless of its size or wealth, felt its voice would be heard.

“It was a wonderful surprise that after the incredible disappointment of Copenhagen, these 195 countries could come to an agreement more ambitious than anyone imagined,” said Jim Yong Kim, the World Bank president, who has been closely engaged in the talks. “This never happens.”

The talks in Copenhagen were handicapped before they even began, as major countries viewed President Obama with deep skepticism. The reputation of the United States on

climate change had suffered because of its decision, under President George W. Bush, to withdraw from the world's first climate treaty, the Kyoto Protocol.

Americans had historically demanded action from other nations while doing little at home, despite the country's status as the world's largest greenhouse-gas polluter through recent decades. And the United States was locked in an impasse with China, the world's other largest polluter, as each country waited for commitments from the other before acting itself.

Mr. Obama, still early in his first term and having just won the 2009 Nobel Peace Prize, promised other world leaders in Copenhagen that all this would change under his administration. He assured them that Congress was on the verge of passing a sweeping new climate change bill, sponsored by Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts.

But Mr. Obama's pledges won him little credibility. He was treated dismissively by the Chinese premier, Wen Jiabao, who sent him progressively lower-level officials for the final negotiations. In the strained closing hours of the conference, Mr. Obama burst into a meeting with Mr. Wen and other leaders, where they worked all night on laptops to hammer out the terms.

Ms. Hedegaard had signaled a few months before the talks began that failure was not an option for the deal. "China and other emerging nations must accept it even if it isn't fair," she said.

But force of will would not carry the day, and the late back-room deal failed to win the consensus required for a legally binding agreement, as a handful of countries, including Venezuela, Bolivia and Cuba, blocked its passage. "The rich are destroying the planet," said Hugo Chávez, the Socialist president of Venezuela, during the talks. "Perhaps they think they're going off to another one after they've destroyed this one."

Soon after Mr. Obama returned home, Mr. Kerry's climate change bill failed in the Senate. And for the rest of his first term, Mr. Obama put the issue of climate change on the back burner.

That changed after his re-election. Even Mr. Obama's own aides were surprised when he told them in early 2013 that he intended to put climate change at the heart of his second term. In his first State of the Union address after his re-election he warned Republicans on climate change, saying, "If Congress doesn't act, I will."

This enraged Republicans and drew criticisms of abuse of executive power. The following year, the Environmental Protection Agency issued aggressive new regulations to cut greenhouse gases from coal-fired power plants. Those rules — which could lead to the

shutdown of hundreds of plants and freeze construction of future plants — stand as the most significant action taken by any American president on climate change.

Republicans declared that Mr. Obama was waging a “war on coal.” But those actions also fundamentally altered the perception of the United States in international climate talks.

“It changed the game,” said the French climate change envoy, Laurence Tubiana.

China’s views on climate change shifted, as well. The vast expansion of coal-fired power plants that was fueling China’s rapid economic growth was also choking its cities with pollution.

With public anger rising over record levels of toxic smog, Chinese officials began to take steps to curb China’s use of coal.

Paying close attention to that shift was Mr. Kerry, now secretary of state. He saw an opportunity to broker a deal, and to try to pave the way toward a broader agreement in Paris.

Throughout 2014, Mr. Kerry held a series of meetings in Beijing focused on climate change. In October 2014, he invited the top Chinese environment official, Yang Jiechi, to a private lunch at the Legal Seafoods restaurant overlooking Boston Harbor. They spoke for three hours about the changes that had already influenced their pollution politics at home and discussed the possibility of turning that into new policy on the world stage.

The next month, Mr. Obama visited Beijing, where he and President Xi Jinping of China announced that they would move forward jointly on plans to reduce their greenhouse gas pollution.

That announcement broke the deadlock that had stalled climate change negotiations for over 20 years.

The following month in Lima, Peru, negotiators wrote a first draft of what would ultimately become the Paris Agreement. In language modeled on the agreement between the United States and China, the Lima pact required every country to submit its own climate change plan before meeting in Paris.

“The China announcement changed everything,” said Mr. Kerry in an interview. “It changed people’s thinking about this. Without the China announcement, you wouldn’t have 184 nations ready to come to Paris, the homework done, the table set.”

The planet itself was changing. From the time lawmakers began pushing for climate change policies in the 1980s, the issue had loomed largely as a future existential threat. But in recent years, scientific studies have started to draw a direct link between climate change and certain weather events, such as the 2010 extreme heat wave and forest fires in Russia; crippling droughts in Texas in 2012 and Australia in 2014; flooding in Miami; and storm surges across the Pacific.

“Since Copenhagen, there has been a virtual torrent of studies that assess the link between the buildup of greenhouse gases and specific events,” said Michael Oppenheimer, a climate scientist at Princeton University. “The more real climate change is to the average person, the more real it is to policy makers in terms of making decisions about saving lives and cleaning up after disasters.”

All those moments led up to Paris — where elements of French diplomacy helped to seal the deal.

Like Mr. Obama, the French president, François Hollande, wanted to forge a legacy on climate change, and he wanted a landmark accord to bear the name of his capital city. Given the troubled history of climate talks, the host government was widely viewed as playing a crucial role in the outcome. French officials, led by Mr. Hollande, Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius, and Ms. Tubiana, the climate envoy, wanted to ensure that they avoided the mistakes of the Danes.

In the year leading up to the talks, Ms. Tubiana traveled the world and met with her counterparts long before they arrived for the negotiations. Mr. Fabius, the poised and gracious public broker of the talks, helped smooth out difficulties behind the scenes.

The biggest point of contention was over a push by the United States for an aggressive system to verify that countries were living up to their emissions pledges. China and India argued that outside verification would be too intrusive.

Developing countries insisted that rich countries be required to pay them to adapt to the ravages of climate change. That provision remains in the text, but in a preamble section that is not legally binding.

Unlike the Copenhagen talks that were marked by frequent walkouts, the Paris talks remained on an even keel. Negotiators from over 100 countries repeatedly said that they hoped that at the end of the two weeks, they would reach a deal.

The French were also mindful that tempers flare and decision-making deteriorates when people are hungry and tired. Having released a draft of the agreement on Thursday night — precipitating an all-night negotiating session — the French said they would not release

another one until Saturday morning, thus guaranteeing that negotiators would have Friday night to catch up on sleep. And on the brink of releasing that Saturday draft, which turned out to be the final one, the French suddenly called a lunch break.

“It was a very specific constellation of events,” said Mr. Kim, the World Bank president. “This doesn’t happen if the French aren’t working on this for a year. It doesn’t happen if Obama doesn’t spend the time building relations with Xi. It doesn’t happen without the Chinese-U.S. announcement. But it represents the biggest shift we have ever seen on this global crisis.”

◆ (BBC) COP21 climate change summit reaches deal in Paris

(Dec 13, 2015)

A deal to attempt to limit the rise in global temperatures to less than 2C has been agreed at the climate change summit in Paris after two weeks of intense negotiations.

The pact is the first to commit all countries to cut carbon emissions.

The agreement is partly legally binding and partly voluntary.

Earlier, key blocs, including the G77 group of developing countries, and nations such as China and India said they supported the proposals.

President of the UN climate conference of parties (COP) and French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius said: "I now invite the COP to adopt the decision entitled Paris Agreement outlined in the document.

"Looking out to the room I see that the reaction is positive, I see no objections. The Paris agreement is adopted."

COP21: In summary

As he struck the gavel to signal the adoption of the deal, delegates rose to their feet cheering and applauding.

President Barack Obama has hailed the agreement as "ambitious" and "historic", but also warned against complacency.

"Together, we've shown what's possible when the world stands as one," he said.

And although admitting that the deal was not "perfect", he said it was "the best chance to save the one planet we have".

China's chief negotiator Xie Zhenhua said the deal was not perfect. But he added that "this does not prevent us from marching historical steps forward".

Nearly 200 countries took part in the negotiations to strike the first climate deal to commit all countries to cut emissions, which would come into being in 2020.

The chairman of the group representing some of the world's poorest countries called the deal historic, adding: "We are living in unprecedented times, which call for unprecedented

measures.

"It is the best outcome we could have hoped for, not just for the Least Developed Countries, but for all citizens of the world."

Key points

The measures in the agreement included:

- To peak greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible and achieve a balance between sources and sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century
- To keep global temperature increase "well below" 2C (3.6F) and to pursue efforts to limit it to 1.5C
- To review progress every five years
- \$100 billion a year in climate finance for developing countries by 2020, with a commitment to further finance in the future.

Ahead of the deal being struck, delegates were in a buoyant mood as they gathered in the hall waiting for the plenary session to resume.

Mr Fabius was applauded as he entered the hall ahead of the announcement.

Earlier, French President Francois Hollande called the proposals unprecedented, while UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called on negotiators to "finish the job".

However, the celebratory mood has not been shared among all observers.

'Almost nothing binding'

Nick Dearden, director of campaign group Global Justice Now, said: "It's outrageous that the deal that's on the table is being spun as a success when it undermines the rights of the world's most vulnerable communities and has almost nothing binding to ensure a safe and liveable climate for future generations."

Some aspects of the agreement will be legally binding, such as submitting an emissions reduction target and the regular review of that goal.

However, the targets set by nations will not be binding under the deal struck in Paris.

Observers say the attempt to impose emissions targets on countries was one of the main reasons why the Copenhagen talks in 2009 failed.

At the time, nations including China, India and South Africa were unwilling to sign up to a condition that they felt could hamper economic growth and development.

The latest negotiations managed to avoid such an impasse by developing a system of Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs).

In these, which form the basis of the Paris agreement goal of keeping global temperature rise "well below" 2C (3.6F) above pre-industrial levels, nations outline their plans on cutting their post-2020 emissions.

An assessment published during the two-week talks suggested that the emission reductions currently outlined in the INDCs submitted by countries would only limit global temperature rise by 2.7C.

Nick Mabey, chief executive of climate diplomacy organisation E3G, said the agreement was an ambitious one that would require serious political commitment to deliver.

"Paris means governments will go further and faster to tackle climate change than ever before," he said.

"The transition to a low carbon economy is now unstoppable, ensuring the end of the fossil fuel age."

◆ (Xinhua) Yearender: Paris Agreement paves way for cleaner future

(By. Mu Xuequan, Dec 14, 2015)

PARIS, Dec. 14 (Xinhua) -- The historic Paris Agreement adopted here on Saturday with no objection by the 196 parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) during the 21st session of the Conference of the Parties (COP21) is seen as a new chapter for humanity in tackling climate change issues after the year 2020.

The Paris Agreement runs to 32 pages with 29 articles, including objective, mitigation, adaptation, loss and damage, finance, technology development and transfer, capacity building, and transparency of action and support.

On the basis of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, the Paris Agreement aims to hold the global average temperature rise to below 2.0 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels and strives to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels.

Taking into account the needs and priorities of developing countries, the parties agreed to work to define a clear roadmap on ratcheting up climate finance to 100 billion U.S. dollars by 2020 while also setting a new goal before 2025 on the provision of finance from the 100-billion-U.S.-dollar floor.

"We have seen unparalleled announcements of financial support for both mitigation and adaptation from a multitude of sources both before and during the COP. Under the Paris Agreement, the provision of finance from multiple sources will clearly be taken to a new level, which is of critical importance to the most vulnerable," said UNFCCC executive secretary Christiana Figueres.

Unlike the top-down approach of the Kyoto Protocol, which is a compulsory order to developed countries to cut emissions, the new Paris Agreement, the second legally binding document under the UNFCCC, adopts a bottom-up approach.

More than 180 countries, which contribute to 95 percent of the total world carbon emissions, have submitted their own intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs).

Under the Paris Agreement, every country should participate in the global actions to tackle climate change issues with their own INDCs. From the year 2023, all parties are required to assess their progress in implementing their INDCs. This will allow each nation to reinforce international cooperation as a means to ensure the long-term goal of addressing climate change are met.

China's Special Representative on Climate Change Xie Zhenhua called on developed countries to abide by their promises to provide finance, technology development and transfer, and capacity building to developing countries.

Xie stressed that China, as a responsible developing country, would take international obligations commensurate with its own national condition, development stage and actual capacity.

"China is willing to work together with all parties, in accordance with the principles of the UNFCCC, toward implementing the Paris Agreement and establishing a global climate governance system for win-win cooperation," Xie affirmed.

At the opening ceremony of the Paris climate summit, Chinese President Xi Jinping said China would adopt new policy measures to improve the industrial mix, build a low-carbon system, develop green building and low-carbon transportation, and establish a nationwide carbon-emission trading market.

While showing China's resolve to address the challenge, Xi's speech also displayed the wisdom of reaching an agreement with the "win-win" mentality.

During a phone conversation with his French counterpart Francois Hollande on Monday, President Xi Jinping said China and France should work with all parties to effectively carry out the newly-adopted, historic climate accord.

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon hailed the adoption of the agreement: "What was once unthinkable is now unstoppable," saying it demonstrated solidarity.

"For the first time, every country in the world has pledged to curb emissions, strengthen resilience, and join in a common cause to take climate action," Ban said.

"You have concluded not just any agreement. It is an ambitious, universal and legally-binding agreement," Hollande told the ministers and negotiators from the 196 parties of the UNFCCC.

"We had been waiting for this agreement a long time, for 40 years," Hollande said.

There is no doubt that the Paris conference was a success. Not only was an historic agreement on climate change adopted, but it shows global interests and national interests are bound together, and the climate change issue requires global cooperation.

◆ (Reuters) How the world learned its lesson and got a climate deal

(By. Richard Valdmanis and Emmanuel Jarry, Dec 14, 2015)

It was an agreement born from a fear of failure, delivered by the smoothness of French diplomacy.

Six years earlier, countries had bitterly walked away from global climate talks in Copenhagen without a deal. The decision to reassemble in Paris to try again at getting almost 200 countries to sign a pact on cutting carbon emissions was a gamble: another collapse could the end world's ability to forge a common approach to dealing with climate change.

And no political leader wanted his reputation stained by a repeat of the debacle in Copenhagen.

So there was no detail of hospitality too small for the French hosts this time, no country negotiator who would go unflattered by Laurent Fabius, the French foreign minister who presided over the conference.

Fabius had been the youngest French prime minister in history in the 1980s; now he was an elder statesman looking to carve a bigger place in it. Over two weeks under the global spotlight, his sonorous voice and relentless optimism would come to define the public tone of the proceedings.

But behind the scenes, the talks witnessed the confrontations and five-past-midnight compromises to be expected when sleep-deprived negotiators from almost every country in the world are supposed to come to a consensus.

They ultimately found it, remarkably only one day later than planned. But the path to the standing ovations at the end was strewn with disputes over money, the emergence of an effective new climate coalition of states, and hours of wrangling over what "should" or "shall" be done.

FRENCH WAYS

For the survivors of Copenhagen, the key to success in Paris would be preparation.

UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon complained that the political leaders had not been well-prepared for the Copenhagen meeting, and this time he and the French conducted extensive advance work to get other leaders personally engaged.

They also decided that, if leaders were to come to Paris, they would do so at the beginning to lend the talks some political oxygen, rather than arriving for a scramble at the end.

So on Nov. 30, the sprawling conference hall near the Le Bourget airfield on the outskirts of Paris hosted world leaders, who were supposed to deliver three minutes of encouragement. Fabius wandered the conference center before they arrived, tapping microphones and checking the video monitors under a podium made of recycled wood.

“Ah, we have Prince Charles,” he said to an aide, consulting the speakers’ list.

The opening day speeches were seen as a success. UN officials were relieved at the relatively cooperative tone from Russian President Vladimir Putin who was among several leaders who assured Ban privately before the outset that Russia would not block a deal, UN officials said later.

Fabius pulled together a team of officials and diplomats from across the French civil service to facilitate the talks. “He treated it less like a climate negotiation and more like a trade deal,” said one UN veteran of past climate talks.

He also constantly praised delegates for their hard work and insights, before telling them exactly what schedule of debate they had to follow to finish by their self-imposed deadline of Friday, Dec. 11.

He gave the job of writing the accord’s preamble to Venezuela’s minister Claudia Salerno, whose country had been perhaps the harshest critic of the Copenhagen process that was seen as a collusion of big powers dictating to small countries, making her personally vested in finding compromises.

Not all developing countries were easily won over, however. A central sticking point throughout the talks was the degree to which the agreement would be legally binding on countries, especially the rich ones who are expected to provide the hundreds of billions of dollars in funding to cover the transition to a low carbon future.

The differences were expressed in wrangles over wording. Hard, legally binding commitments were proceeded in the text as items that countries “shall” do.

Those items that were simply good intentions fell into the “should” do category.

HALF A DEGREE CLOSER

Facing unbudging demands to put their financial commitments into legal language, U.S.

negotiators knew they had to break the poor vs. rich country divide. Their tactic was to sign up to a loose coalition of countries called the High Ambition Coalition.

The European Union takes credit for starting the group as far back as 2011, when it was a loose alliance between the EU and small island states.

As Paris approached, it expanded to include African, Caribbean and Pacific nations, developing an agenda that included the goal of keeping the global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees Celsius (2.7 Fahrenheit) over pre-industrial levels by the end of the 21st century.

The number had almost been banished from serious discussion ahead of Paris. But the American decision to “join” the High Ambition Coalition brought the 1.5 goal back into play, sweetened with pledges of hundreds of millions of dollars to help island and developing states mitigate the ill-effects of climate change.

Although the promise is only aspirational, the re-emergence of references to 1.5 degrees in the Paris text brought several influential developing countries into the U.S. camp. Soon Canada joined, then Australia and Brazil, a collection of wealthy, heavy-polluting western countries marching into the plenary hall alongside the Marshall Islands.

China’s negotiators dismissed the High Ambition Coalition as a stunt. “This is a kind of performance by some members,” said Liu Zhenmin, deputy head of the China delegation. But the solidarity of the developing nation bloc was broken.

LAST BRIDGES AND HICCUPS

Climate change summits have developed a particular theater of their own. In one moment, it was possible to see actor Alec Baldwin expressing his fears for the planet to journalists, across from an Indonesian pavilion hosting a party to show off its pilot green energy hospitals.

But much of the real work was done by people not even at Le Bourget. After visiting at the start, U.S. President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping discussed roadblocks by telephone, and the two countries appeared to be mostly on the same page.

Other housekeeping of the text was taken care of. Negotiators insured that a specific reference to climate effects on “occupied territories” was taken out to keep the politics focused on climate issues.

By Saturday, Fabius the pieces were falling into place. “I think we’re done here,” said a happy Marshall Islands foreign minister Tony de Brum on Saturday morning.

There was to be one last hiccup. The final text had settled on 143 items prefaced by “shall,” 40 with “should.” But in one section, the words appeared to have been flipped.

Suddenly, there was a delay in the hall where delegates had convened amid smiles and air kisses to seal the deal.

Fabius and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry left the room, replaced by rumors of trouble. But then the French minister was back. A technical glitch, he explained, brought on by the fatigue of a drafter.

The organizers announced corrections to a few typographical errors, and tellingly switched one last “should” for a “shall” before Fabius swiftly brought the gavel down.

(Writing by Richard Valdmanis and Bruce Wallace; Additional reporting by Alister Doyle, Valerie Volcovici, Barbara Lewis, David Stanway and Nina Chestney in Paris; editing by Anna Willard)

◆ **(Guardian) Paris climate deal: nearly 200 nations sign in end of fossil fuel era**

(By. Suzanne Goldenberg, John Vidal, Lenore Taylor, Adam Vaughan and Fiona Harvey, Dec 12, 2015)

Governments have signalled an end to the fossil fuel era, committing for the first time to a universal agreement to cut greenhouse gas emissions and to avoid the most dangerous effects of climate change.

After 20 years of fraught meetings, including the past two weeks spent in an exhibition hall on the outskirts of Paris, negotiators from nearly 200 countries signed on to a legal agreement on Saturday evening that set ambitious goals to limit temperature rises and to hold governments to account for reaching those targets.

Government and business leaders said the agreement, which set a new goal to reach net zero emissions in the second half of the century, sent a powerful signal to global markets, hastening the transition away from fossil fuels and to a clean energy economy.

The deal was carefully constructed to carry legal force but without requiring approval by the US Congress - which would have almost certainly rejected it.

After last-minute delays, caused by typos, mistranslations and disagreements over a single verb in the highly complicated legal text, Laurent Fabius, the French foreign minister, brought down a special leaf-shaped gavel to adopt the agreement. The hall erupted in applause and cheers. "It is a small gavel but I think it can do a great job," Fabius said.

François Hollande, the French president, who had invested enormous capital and diplomatic effort in shepherding the agreement, said countries had a rare chance to make history. "We are at a decisive point in time," he said.

Fabius said: "It is my deep conviction that we have come up with an ambitious and balanced agreement. Today it is a moment of truth."

The agreement was equally a victory for the United Nations, which spent four years overcoming political inertia and the deep divisions between rich and poor countries, to put together the ambitious deal. "I used to say: we must, we can, we will," Christiana Figueres, the UN climate chief who guided the talks, tweeted. "Today we can say we did."

The US president, Barack Obama, hailed the agreement as "a tribute to strong, principled American leadership" and a vital step in ensuring the future of the planet.

"This agreement represents the best chance we have to save the one planet that we've got," he said, but added that the deal "was not perfect. The problem's not solved because of this accord."

Miguel Arias Cañete, the EU's climate commissioner, said the agreement had re-affirmed confidence in the UN process.

"This was the last chance [for the UN process]," he added, "and we have taken it."

Al Gore, the former US vice-president who helped draft the 1997 Kyoto climate treaty, was in the hall. He appeared visibly moved when the agreement was gavelled in and said the accord would have a powerful effect on the economy.

"This universal and ambitious agreement sends a clear signal to governments, businesses, and investors everywhere: the transformation of our global economy from one fuelled by dirty energy to one fuelled by sustainable economic growth is now firmly and inevitably underway," Gore said in a statement.

Six years after the chaotic ending of the Copenhagen climate summit, the agreement now known as the Paris Agreement for the first time commits rich countries, rising economies and some of the poorest countries to work together to curb emissions.

Rich countries agreed to raise \$100bn (£66bn) a year by 2020 to help poor countries transform their economies. The overall agreement is legally binding, but some elements – including the pledges to curb emissions by individual countries and the climate finance elements – are not.

The deal was also hailed for delivering a clear message to business leaders. The International Investors Group on Climate Change, a network managing €13tn of assets, said the decision would help trigger a shift away from fossil fuels and encourage greater investments in renewable energy.

"Investors across Europe will now have the confidence to do much more to address the risks arising from high carbon assets and to seek opportunities linked to the low carbon transition already transforming the world's energy system and infrastructure," the group said.

Jennifer Morgan, of the environmental thinktank, the World Resources Institute, said the long term goal was "transformational" and "sends signals into the heart of the markets".

The deal set a high aspirational goal to limit warming below 2C and strive to keep

temperatures at 1.5C above pre-industrial levels – a far more ambitious target than expected, and a key demand of vulnerable countries.

It incorporates commitments from 187 countries to reduce emissions, which on their own would only hold warming to between 2.7C and 3C.

But it sets out procedures for review at regular intervals to deepen emissions cuts, with countries aiming to peak global greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible, and then rapidly scale down in the second half of this century.

Critics said the agreement would still condemn hundreds of million of people living in low-lying coastal areas and small islands, after US negotiators demanded the exclusion of language that could allow the agreement to be used to claim legal liability for climate change. But supporters said the negotiations took a significant step forward in getting countries to act together on a global challenge of immense complexity.

Saturday's agreement was the product of years of preparation, two weeks of intense negotiations, capped off by three sleepless nights, with Barack Obama and Hollande phoning other leaders to bring them on side with the deal.

Accounts from behind the closed doors of negotiating session described tense exchanges between oil-producing countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Russia, and a rapidly constituted US- and Europe-backed High Ambition Coalition, which kept up the pressure for a strong temperature goal and regular reviews of emission-cutting plans.

The French hosts also won praise from negotiators for using a mixture of informal huddles, or indabas, and traditional shuttle diplomacy to bring the deal home.

The text commits countries to peak greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible, and to seek a balance between human-caused emissions and removals by carbon sinks.

"This means bringing down greenhouse gas emissions to net zero within a few decades," said John Schellnhuber, director of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, and a climate adviser to the Vatican.

But he added that countries would have to move aggressively, peaking before 2030 and eliminating emissions by 2050 through reforestation and technologies such as carbon capture and storage.

For vulnerable countries, the high ambition of the 1.5C goal was offset by the weakening of the agreement when it came to dealing with irreparable damage of climate change.

"The idea of even discussing loss and damage now or in the future was off limits. The Americans told us it would kill the COP," said Leisha Beardmore, the chief negotiator for the Seychelles. "They have always been telling us: 'Don't even say that'."

Even so, campaign groups were broadly positive about the outcome. Given intense pressure from oil-producing countries, negotiators managed to craft a text that was far more ambitious than expected.

The universal nature of the agreement was a radical departure from the Kyoto Protocol, the 1997 agreement that drew sharp divisions between the obligations of wealthy and developing countries but ultimately failed to lower emissions.

Unlike Kyoto, the agreement reached on Saturday depends on political will, with countries setting their own climate action plans.

Rich countries promised that by 2025 they would set a new goal for climate finance "from a floor of \$100bn per year", the figure first pledged at the Copenhagen climate talks six years ago. However, the commitment was offered as a non-binding decision that accompanied the binding text.

All the countries agreed on demands from the US and European Union for five-year reviews of their emissions reductions – an exercise that had been resisted by China.

3 국내 언론 반응

< 종합 >

- 프랑스 파리에서 개최된 제21차 기후변화협약 당사국총회(COP21)에서 세계 195개국 정부 대표들은 모든 국가에 적용되는 신기후체제 합의문인 '파리협정(Paris Agreement)'을 채택
 - 2주간에 걸친 협상 끝에 "파리 협정"을 채택하고 예정되었던 종료시한을 하루 넘겨 12일(토) (파리 현지시간) 폐막
 - 박근혜 대통령은 당사국총회 '기후변화 정상회의'(Leaders' Event) 기조연설에서 "에너지 신산업을 통해 2030년까지 100조원의 신시장과 50만 개의 일자리를 창출하고, 자발적 온실가스 감축 목표(INDC)를 달성해나가겠다"고 밝혔으며,
 - 윤성규 환경부 장관은 환경건전성그룹(EIG) 대표 기조발언을 통해 각국이 제출한 목표치를 달성하려면 법적 구속력을 갖춘 글로벌 체계를 만들어야 함을 역설
- 금번 총회를 통해 국제사회 공동의 장기목표로 지구 평균기온 상승을 2℃ 보다 상당히 낮은 수준으로 유지고, 온도 상승을 1.5℃ 이하로 제한하기 위해 노력하기로 합의
 - 국가별 기여방안(NDC)은 공통의 차별화된 책임 및 국별 여건을 감안하여 스스로 정하는 방식을 채택하였으며, 매 5년마다 상향된 목표를 제출하고 이행 전반에 대한 종합적인 이행점검을 도입

□ 보도 기사

○ 회의 진행 및 결과에 대한 정보 전달

- 박 대통령 "에너지 신산업 100조원 시장 창출"(15.12.1, 중앙일보)
- 박 대통령 "에너지 신산업으로 온실가스 감축 앞장서겠다"(15.12.1, 한국일보)
- "이상기후 막을 新산업, 100조 시장·50만 일자리 창출"(15.12.1, 조선일보)
- 윤성규 장관 "新기후체제, 법적 구속력 갖춰야"(15.12.3, 동아일보)
- 윤성규 장관 "온실가스 감축 목표 더 강화해야"(15.12.3, 한국일보)
- 신기후체제 협상 극적 타결. "파리 협정" 채택(15.12.13, 부처 공동 보도자료)

- 막판 진통 끝 극적 합의..."합의 이행이 관건"관건"(15.12.13, YTN)
- 온난화 막기 위한 '파리 협정' 타결...엇갈린 반응(15.12.13, SBS)
- '파리 협정' 마침내 최종 타결..."온도상승 2℃보다 훨씬 작게"(15.12.13, KBS)
- '파리협정' 체결, 전 세계 참여한 신기후체제 출범(15.12.13, MBC)
- 지구 온도 상승폭 2℃보다 훨씬 낮게... "화석연료 時代의 종언"
"(15.12.14, 중앙일보)
- 온실가스 감축, 5년마다 보고 의무화... 더 높은 목표 내놔야(15.12.14, 동아일보)
- 개도국 참여 이끈 '신기후체제' 선언...'재원'보상이 관건(15.12.14, 전자신문)
- 온실가스 감축 로드맵 '국내전쟁' 시작(15.12.14, 내일신문)
- '新기후체제' 신재생에너지 1,100조시장 열린다(15.12.14, 헤럴드경제)
- 각국 정부·기업 실천노력에 '파리기후협정' 실효성 달려(15.12.15, 파이낸셜뉴스)

○ 협상 결과의 부정적인 측면 부각

- 유엔기후변화협약 위반 벌칙은 "이름 공개 망신"뿐?(15.12.8, 뉴시스)
- '파리 기후협약' 타결...환경운동가들 "매우 실망"(15.12.13, SBS)
- [파리 기후체제 출범]온실가스 줄여도 2.7도 상승..."현 목표만으론
재앙 못 막아"(15.12.13, 경향신문)
- "정부안보다 세진 CO₂ 감축 ... 5년마다 목표치 강화 웬말"(15.12.14, 중앙일보)
- 저탄소 사회 출발점...제조업 중심 산업구조 재편 '발등의 불' (15.12.14, 한국일보)
- "1.5도도 수몰위기 섬나라 못구한다"...파리협정 무용론 제기(15.12.15, 연합뉴스)
- 환경-산업-기재부 정책마찰부터 풀어야(15.12.15, 동아일보)
- "CO₂ 허리띠, 어떻게 더 졸라매나"(15.12.15, 동아일보)
- "파리협정 개도국 지원도 말잔치 될 가능성"(15.12.15, 한국경제)

○ 한국관(파빌리온) 관련 보도자료

- 석탄재로 시멘트를...첨단 환경기술에 감탄사 연발(‘15.12.3, 한국일보)
- 기후변화총회 세미나...“시민의 노력이 지구 살린다”(‘15.12.3, 연합뉴스)
- 에너지 절약 정책으로 ‘파리의 연인’된 서울·제주(‘15.12.7, 서울신문)
- 개도국에 적용 가능한 기술 195건 수출상담(‘15.12.14, 파이낸셜뉴스)

파리기후총회, 녹색 미래의 기회



비즈 칼럼

윤 성 규
환경부 장관

“기후가 우리의 미래다”

온난화로 해수면이 상승하면서 이번 세기 중반 섬나라 전체가 바다 밑으로 가라앉을 것으로 우려되는 남태평양 소재 키리바시 공화국의 아노테 통 대통령이 8월 방한했을 때 지구촌에 호소한 절규다. 인류는 마지막 빙하기의 한복판이었던 6만 년을 전후해 출현한 이래로 산업화 시대가 시작될 때까지 4℃ 정도의 기온상승에 적응해왔다. 그 이후 지금까지 0.85℃ 더 상승한 데 이어 이번 세기 말까지는 3.7℃ 또 오른다고 ‘기후변화에 관한 정부 간 협의체(IPCC)’는 내다봤다. 인류가 이제까지 적응해온 온난화 속도보다 250배 이상 빠른 속도로 기온이 상승한다면 지구 생태계가 적응해낼 수 있을지 의문이다.

IPCC는 인류사회가 지속하려면 산업화

이후 이번 세기 말까지 2℃ 이내로 기온상승을 억제해야 한다면서 앞으로 더 내보낼 수 있는 온실가스(이산화탄소로 환산) 여력도 1조t 정도라고 밝혔다. 이 한도를 지켜내기 위한 지구촌의 절박한 논의가 이달 말부터 2주간 프랑스 파리에서 열린다. 제21차 UN기후변화협약 당사국총회다.

선진국에만 온실가스 의무감축을 부과해온 2005년부터 2020년까지의 교토의정서체제에 후속으로 세계 모든 국가에 사실상 의무감축을 부과하는 신기후체제에 관한 협정문 채택이 주의제다. 미국, 캐나다 등 선진국마저 중도에 등을 돌린데다 온실가스배출 주요국으로 등장한 중국, 인도 등 신흥개도국이 적용 제척돼 전세계 배출량의 20%정도만을 대상으로 하는 교토의정서체제로는 2℃ 억제가 불가능하다. 이에 따라 2013년 제19차 총회에서는 전 세계 모든 국가가 참여하는 신기후체제의 채택을 위한 사전조치의 일환으로 각국으로 하여금 온실가스감축기여의향서(INDC)를 올해 총회 이전까지 UN에 제출토록 했다. 현재 178개국이 제출했다. 제출분을 기준으로 할 때 감축하고도 내보낼 온실가

스량이 2030년까지 무려 7480억t에 달해 2100년까지 1조t 이내로 이를 억제하려면 가야할 길이 험난하기만 하다.

파리총회 첫날인 11월 30일 한국, 미국 등 140개국 정상이 기조연설을 한다.한국은 선진국과 개도국 간 견해차가 큰 자원 등의 분야에서 가교역할을 할 수 있을 것이다. 경제성장과 기후변화 대응을 동시에 이루어낸 좋은 사례로 국제사회에 각인되고 있기 때문이다. 또한 박근혜 대통령이 지난해 9월 유엔기후정상회의의 시 녹색기후기금(GCF)에 1억달러 기여를 공약함에 따라 기후변화협상 리더십을 확실히 할 수 있게 됐다. UN 기후변화 특사이자 아일랜드 대통령인 매리 로빈슨이 ‘2차 세계대전 이후 가장 중요한 해’라고 언급한 2015년의 황혼녘에 출범할 신기후체제는 한국에겐 위기가 될 수도, 기회가 될 수도 있다. 신기후체제에 선제로 응전하면 우리의 미래 세대가 현재대로 못지않게 그들의 꿈과 끼의 나라를 마음껏 펼쳐 행복해질 수 있는 저탄소 녹색경제의 구현을 앞당길 수 있고 나아가 지속발전이 가능한 선진국으로 우뚝 서게 될 것이다.

파리기후협정 '휘슬'... 우리가 먼저 뛰자



목석 칼럼

전연만
환경부 차관

파리에서 개최한 제21차 유엔기후변화협약 당사국총회에 참가한 197개 당사국은 치열한 격론 끝에 12월 12일 오후 7시 30분(파리 현지시간)에 파리협정 채택에 합의했다. 2020년 민로 예정인 기존의 교토 의정서 체제를 대체하는 것이다.

2009년 코펜하겐 합의문 채택이 실패한 후 실효 6년 만에 이룬 역사적인 성과물이다. 마침내 전지구 차원의 기후변화 대응을 위해 모든 국가가 참여하는 신기후 체제가 출범하게 된 것이다.

이번 당사국총회는 장기목표 설정, 재정지원 확대, 온실가스 배출의 역사적 책임과 처분화 등에 대한 선진·개도국 간 끝없는 대립으로 결과물을 채택하더라도 내용은 빈약할 것이란 전망이 지배적이었다.

그러나 이번 파리협정은 당초 예상을 뛰어넘어 기후변화 대응 노력을 체계적

으로 관리할 수 있는 틀을 마련했다는 점에서 매우 의미가 크다고 할 수 있다.

파리협정은 크게 3가지 측면에서 평가할 수 있다. 첫째, 모든 국가의 자발적 참여를 근간으로 하는 상향식 체제를 지향한다는 점이다.

둘째, 지구평균온도 상승 2℃이내 억제라는 장기목표를 설정하고, 각국은 5년마다 기여방안을 제출하게 되며, 전지구 차원의 종합적 이행점검을 5년마다 실시해 장기목표 달성을 평가하고 환류하는 시스템을 구축했다는 점이다.

셋째, 온실가스 감축목표를 달성하기 위해 다양한 국제탄소시장 메커니즘의 활용이 가능하게 됐고, 기술협력 강화기반이 구축했다는 점이다.

이러한 긍정적 평가에도 불구하고 파리협정이 의무이행 담보면에서 미흡하다는 일부 비판이 있다. 각국의 기여방안 제출은 의무적이지만 그 내용과 목표는 그렇지 않으며, 기후변화로 인한 손실과 피해를 언급하고 있으나 보상과 책임규정이 미비할 뿐만 아니라, 개도국의 기후변화 대응에 필수적인 선진국의 재

정지원 확대에 대한 명확한 로드맵을 제시하지 않고 있다는 점이다.

앞으로 이러한 문제점들은 향후 개최될 후속회의를 통해 자해롭게 보완해 나갈 것으로 본다. 우리나라도 이러한 논의에 적극적으로 참여해 입장을 반영해 나가기야 할 것이다.

이번 파리협정 채택으로 국제사회에

탄소 감축 세부계획 서둘러 민간기업 해외진출 지원해 경제활성화 기폭제 되어야

서는 저탄소 기후탄력적 경제로의 패러다임 전환을 가속화할 것으로 예상된다. 이에 발맞춰 우리나라도 정부부처·산업계·학계가 모두 머리를 맞대고 환경 및 산업정책 전반을 재점검하고 국내외 대응방안을 마련해야 할 것이다. 앞서 우리나라는 지난 6월에 2030년을 기준으로 BAU(배출전망치) 대비 37%를 감축하겠다는 목표를 제시한 바 있다.

먼저 국내 대응체계를 강화하기 위해 부문별 감축목표, 해외감축 활용방안 등에 대한 세부이행 계획을 수립해야 하고, 2030 에너지산업 육성전략의 이행, 배출권거래제 내실화 등 국내 부담 완화를 위한 감축 수단을 마련해야 한다. 그리고 남북협력사업 등 국제탄소시장 메커니즘에 포함할 가능성이 높은 분야에서 시범사업을 발굴하는 한편, 녹색기후기금(GCF), 아시아개발은행(ADB)과 같은 국제기구를 활용해 민간기업의 해외진출을 지원해 나가기야 할 것이다.

박근혜 대통령이 밝혔듯이 기후변화 대응은 '부담이 아닌 새로운 기회'다.

신기후체제 출범에 선제적이고 현명하게 대처함으로써 국제사회에서 우리나라가 기후변화대응 선도국으로 자리매김할 수 있도록 하는 동시에, 기후변화 대응을 우리경제 활성화의 기폭제로 활용하도록 해야 할 것이다.

보 도 자 료			
관계부처 합 동 행복한 대한민국을 여는 정부 3.0	보도일시	배포 즉시 보도하여 주시기 바랍니다.	
	담당부서	환경부 지구환경(담)	김준기 과장/ 박정현 사무관 044-201-6581/6586
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		외교부 기후변화외교과	조계연 과장/ 박꽃님 사무관 02-2100-7859/7858
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	배포일시	2015. 12. 12.(토)	

신기후체제 협상 극적 타결... “파리 협정” 채택

- ◇ 모든 국가에 적용되는 새로운 기후변화 대응체제 출범
- ◇ 장기목표 설정, 매 5년마다 상향된 감축목표 제출 등 합의

- 프랑스 파리에서 개최된 제21차 기후변화협약 당사국총회(COP21)는 2주간에 걸친 협상 끝에 신기후체제 합의문인 “파리 협정(Paris Agreement)”을 채택하고 12일(토) 19시 30분경(파리 현지시간) 예정되었던 종료시한을 하루 넘겨 폐막했다.
- 파리협정은 2020년 만료 예정인 기존의 교토의정서 체제를 대체하는 것으로, 본 협정이 발효되면 선진국의 선도적 역할이 강조되는 가운데 모든 국가가 전지구적인 기후변화 대응에 참여하게 된다.
- 선진국과 개도국의 의무 차등화 문제, 개도국 재정지원의 제공 주체와 방식, 글로벌 장기목표 설정 방안 등에 대한 각국의 의견이 대립하면서 새벽까지 이어지는 각료급 비공식 협의회에서 격론 끝에 당사국간 합의가 도출되었다.

- 합의문 도출 과정에서 개도국은 기후변화에 대한 선진국의 역사적 책임을 들어 선·개도국 이분법 체계가 지속되어야 하며, 개도국의 감축 노력 참여에 상응하는 선진국의 재원 지원 및 기술이전 의무 강화를 강조한 반면,
- 선진국은 개도국의 증가하는 책임을 강조하고, 감축 목표의 이행을 주기적으로 점검하여 목표를 상향 조정할 수 있는 강력한 이행 및 점검체제 구축을 주장하였다.

□ 이번에 타결된 파리 협정의 주요내용은 다음과 같다.

- (장기목표) 국제사회 공동의 장기목표로 산업화 이전 대비 지구 평균기온 상승을 2℃ 보다 상당히 낮은 수준으로 유지하는 것으로 하고, 온도 상승을 1.5℃ 이하로 제한하기 위한 노력을 추구한다.
 - 또한 글로벌 차원의 조속한 온실가스 배출정점 도달을 목표로 하되, 개도국은 정점 도달에 시간이 더욱 걸림을 인정하였다.
 - 다만, 목표를 달성함에 있어 각국의 다양한 여건을 감안하고, 공통의 그러나 차별화된 책임과 각국의 상이한 역량을 고려하도록 한다.
- (감축) 국가별 기여방안(NDC)은 스스로 정하는 방식을 채택하여, 매 5년마다 상향된 목표를 제출하되 공통의 차별화된 책임 및 국별 여건을 감안할 수 있도록 하였다.
 - 모든 국가가 차기 감축목표 제출시 이전 수준보다 진전된 목표를 제시하고, 최고 의욕수준을 반영해야 한다는 진전 원칙을 규정하였다.
 - 감축목표 유형과 관련, 선진국은 절대량 방식을 유지하며, 개도국에게는 국별 여건을 감안하되, 부문별 감축 목표가 아닌 경제 전반을 포괄하는 감축 목표를 점진적으로 채택하도록 하였다.
 - 또한 모든 국가가 장기 저탄소 개발 전략을 마련하고, 이를 2020년까지 제출하는 것을 노력하도록 요청하였다.

- (탄소시장) 온실가스 감축목표의 효과적 달성을 위해 UN 기후변화 협약 중심의 시장 이외에도 당사국 간의 자발적인 협력도 인정하는 등 다양한 형태의 국제 탄소시장 매커니즘 설립에 합의하였다.
- (이행점검) 5년 단위로 파리협정 이행 전반에 대한 국제사회 공동 차원의 종합적인 이행점검(Global Stocktaking)을 도입하여 2023년에 이를 처음 실시하게 된다.
 - 이행 점검을 위하여 국가 온실가스 인벤토리, 감축목표 달성 경과 등에 대한 보고가 의무화되며,
 - 보고내용에 대한 전문가 검토와 다자협의를 거치도록 하여 각국의 이행을 투명하게 관리하는 절차를 강화하되, 개도국에게는 일정 정도 유연성을 허용했다.
- (적응) 온실가스 감축 뿐 아니라 기후변화에 대한 적응의 중요성에 주목하고, 기후변화의 역효과로 인한 '손실과 피해' 문제를 별도 조항으로 규정하였다.
 - 모든 국가는 국가적응계획을 수립하고, 이러한 적응계획과 이행 내용 등에 대한 보고서를 제출하여 각국의 적응 정책, 이행사례 등에 대한 정보를 공유할 것을 명시하고 있다.
- (재원) 개도국의 이행지원을 위한 기후재원과 관련하여 선진국의 재원공급 의무를 규정하고, 선진국 이외 국가들의 자발적 기여를 장려한다.
 - 한편, 공공기금을 포함한 다양한 분야로부터의 재원조성에서 선진국의 선도적인 노력을 강조하고, 이전보다 진전된 재원조성 노력이 필요하다고 규정하였다.
 - 공공재원 공급 관련 사전·사후적 정보제공에 대한 선진국의 의무를 규정하고, 개도국들의 자발적 정보제공을 장려하였다.

○ (기술) 신기후체제에서 개도국이 감축 의무에 동참하는 것은 이에 필요한 기후기술 지원을 전제하고 있는 바, 기술의 개발 및 이전에 관한 국가들 간의 협력이 확대, 강화되도록 규정되었다.

- 특히 이러한 기술 협력이 기술메커니즘*에 의해 이루어짐이 명문화 되었으며, 기술 협력에 대한 재정 지원 및 혁신을 촉진하기 위한 R&D 협력과 기술 접근 강화에 합의하였다.

* 기술협력 정책을 담당하는 기술집행위원회(TEC, Technology Executive Committee)와 이행기구인 기후기술센터·네트워크(CTCN, Climate Technology Center and Network)로 구성

□ 파리 협정은 55개국 이상, 글로벌 온실가스 배출량의 총합 비중이 55% 이상에 해당하는 국가가 비준하는 두 가지 기준을 충족하면 발효된다.

※ '16.4.22일 미국 뉴욕에서 유엔사무총장 주재로 파리협정에 대한 **고위급 협정 서명식** 개최 예정

□ 한편, 파리 금번 총회에서 UNFCCC 기술메커니즘의 정책결정기구인 기술집행위원회(Technology Executive Committee)에 한국인인 녹색 기술센터 성장모 소장이 위원으로 선출되어 한국의 보다 능동적인 참여가 가능할 것으로 보인다. 끝.

첨부1: Post-2020 신기후체제 협상결과 상세 내용

첨부2: 정부대표단 주요활동

별첨1: 파리 협정(Paris Agreement) 원문(www.unfccc.int 확인 가능)

 공공누리 공공지식물 자유이용허락	이 보도자료와 관련하여 보다 자세한 내용이나 취재를 원하시면 외교부 기후변화외교과 박꽃님사무관(☎ 02-2100-7858), 또는 환경부 지구환경담당관실 박정현 사무관(☎ 044-201-6586)에게 연락주시기 바랍니다.

□ 글로벌 장기목표

- (감축) 지구 평균기온 상승을 산업화 이전 대비 2℃ 보다 상당히 낮은 수준으로 유지하고, 1.5℃로 제한하기 위한 노력
 - 목표 달성을 위한 조속한 글로벌 차원의 배출정점 도달
- (적응) 기후변화에 대한 회복력 강화, 취약성 저감, 적응역량 증진
- (재원) 저탄소 배출, 기후회복력 증대를 위한 재원 마련

□ 감축(Mitigation)

- (감축의무) 선진국은 선도적 역할을 유지하고 개도국을 포함한 모든 국가가 스스로 결정한 기여방안을 5년 단위로 제출하고 이행하기로 합의
- (구속력) 기여방안 제출은 의무로 하되, 이행은 각국이 국내적으로 노력
 - 각국 기여방안의 구체적 내용은 파리협정 外 별도 등록부로 관리
- (감축유형) 선진국은 절대량 방식을 유지하고, 개도국은 국별 여건 감안, 경제 전반을 포괄하는 감축 목표를 점진적으로 채택 독려
- (진전원칙) 모든 국가가 차기 기여방안 제출시 이전 수준보다 진전되고 최고 수준의 의욕수준 반영하되, 공통의 그러나 차별화된 책임 원칙, 국별 여건 등 감안
- (장기전략) 모든 국가가 2020년까지 장기 저탄소 개발 전략 제출 노력하되, 공통의 그러나 차별화된 책임, 국가 역량, 국별 여건 감안

□ 시장메커니즘

- UN 기후변화협약 중심의 시장 이외에도 당사국 간의 자발적인 시장 형태도 인정하는 등 다양한 형태의 국제 탄소시장 매커니즘 설립 합의
 - 환경적 건전성과 이중계산 방지 등의 원칙을 반영하고, 이행에 필요한 절차, 지침 등은 향후 후속논의를 통해 개발 예정

□ 적응(Adaptation)

- (적응이행) 모든 국가가 국가적응계획 수립·이행 등 적응 행동을 적절히 이행하며, 적응계획과 이행내용 등에 대한 보고서를 제출
 - 각국의 적응 정책, 이행사례 등에 대한 정보 공유 등 협력 강화
- (손실 및 피해) 기후변화로 인한 손실 및 피해 대응의 중요성을 인정하며, 향후 관련 분야 국제협력 강화

□ 이행수단 지원

- (재원) 개도국의 기후변화 대응을 위한 재원 공급 의무 주체를 설정하고, 향후 지원규모 확대, 재원 지원에 관한 투명성 향상을 규정
 - (공급주체) 개도국의 기후변화 대응을 위한 선진국의 재원 공급 의무를 규정하고, 선진국 이외 국가들의 자발적인 재원 공급을 장려
 - (재원조성) 다양한 분야로부터의 재원조성에서 선진국의 선도적인 역할을 강조하고, 이전보다 진전된 재원 조성 노력 필요성을 확인
 - (정보제공) 공공재원 공급 관련 사전·사후 정보제공에 대한 선진국의 의무를 규정하고, 선진국 이외 국가들의 자발적 정보제공을 장려
- (기술) 감축과 적응에 있어 기술이 핵심이라는 장기 비전 공유, 기술협력 확대·중장기 전략 마련을 위한 기술 프레임워크 수립
 - (장기 비전) 온실가스 감축 및 기후변화 대응력 강화를 위한 기술 개발·이전의 중요성에 대해 국가들 간 장기적인 비전을 공유
 - (프레임워크) 기술 개발·이전을 촉진하기 위한 기술메커니즘의 활동에 지침을 주기 위해 '기술 프레임워크'를 수립
 - 실질적 프로젝트를 통한 기술수요평가의 이행 강화 및 이를 위한 재정·기술적 지원, 이전가능 기술에 관한 평가 등 촉진
 - (기술 혁신) 효과적·장기적인 기후변화대응에 혁신이 중요, 이를 위한 R&D 협력 및 기술 접근 확대를 기술, 재정 메커니즘을 통해 지원
 - (기술메커니즘) 기후변화대응 기술협력은 기술 메커니즘에 의해 수행
 - 메커니즘을 강화, 연구개발실증 및 내생적 역량 제고에 추가적 노력

- (협력 강화) 기술 개발·이전에 관한 협력을 강화하며, 이를 위해 선진국이 재정 지원을 포함하여 지원을 제공
- (역량배양) 개도국의 효과적인 기후대응 역량 증진을 위해 협력하며, 역량배양에 대한 파리 위원회 설립

□ 국제사회 종합 이행점검 및 개별 INDC 이행 투명성 강화

- (종합점검) 2023년부터 5년 단위로 파리협정 이행 전반에 대한 국제사회 차원의 종합적 이행점검(Global Stocktaking) 실시
 - 종합점검은 개별 국가 단위가 아닌 전지구적 단위의 감축·적응·재정지원 현황 점검이며, 포괄적이며 촉진적 방식으로 시행 규정
- (이행보고·검토) 각 국의 온실가스 감축과 지원에 대해 이행 보고하고 점검을 받되, 개도국에게는 보고 범위, 주기, 검토 범위 등 유연성 부여

□ 후속조치

- (서명·발효) 55개 국가, 글로벌 배출량의 55% 이상 비준시 발효
 - '16.4.22일 미국 뉴욕에서 유엔사무총장 주재로 고위급 협정 서명식을 개최하고, 이후 1년간 각국에 서명 개방
 - ※ '16.4.22~'17.4.21일간 각국에 서명을 개방하며, 수탁자는 유엔사무총장으로 지정
- (후속회의) 후속조치 논의를 위해 「파리협정 특별작업반(APA)」 신설
 - '16년부터 부속기구회의(SB)와 연계하여 APA 회의 개최
- (INDC) 미제출국은 제22차 당사국총회('16.11월, 모로코) 이전 조속히 제출할 것을 촉구
 - ※ '16.4.4일까지 추가 제출된 내용을 반영하여 UNFCCC 사무국에서 INDC의 총량적 효과에 대한 종합보고서 업데이트본을 '16.5.2일까지 발표 예정

□ 2020년 이전 기후대응 강화

- 교토의정서 2차 공약기간에 대한 도하개정 비준 촉구 (우리나라는 '15.5월 비준)
- '17.11월 제23차 당사국총회 계기 당사국간 감축 경험 공유, 정책 이행 촉진 협력을 위한 정책대화 실시
- '16~'20년간 고위급 행사, 기술적 검토 절차 등을 통해 기후대응 강화 방안 모색
 - 감축과 적응 분야에 대해 대한 다양한 정책사례, 관련 정보 등 공유

□ 선진·개도국간 중재노력을 통해 협상타결에 기여

- (기조연설) 특별 정상행사에서 VIP 연설(11.30), 환경부장관의 환경 건전성그룹(EIG) 대표 발언(12.1) 등을 통해 우리 의견 적극 개진
 - 신기후체제 타결을 위한 전세계 정상들의 정치적 의지 결집에 힘을 더하고, 기후변화 대응을 위한 국제사회의 강력한 연대를 표명
 - 개도국의 기후변화 대응 지원 측면에서 우리의 선진 기술과 녹색 기후기금(GCF) 등을 통한 우리의 가교역할 부각
- (협상참여) 각국의 장기 저탄소 개발전략 자발적 제출, 투명성 증진을 위한 개도국 지원 방안, 기후재원에 대한 선진·개도국 중재안, 기술 메커니즘 강화를 통한 협력 확대 방안 등을 제시하여 협상 진전에 기여
 - 환경건전성그룹(EIG) 회원국, COP21 의장단, 여타 협상그룹과의 협의 등을 통해 우리 입장 반영 노력


□ 기후변화 주요국, 관련 국제기구와 연대 강화

- (양자면담) 환경부장관은 중국 기후변화특사, 에콰도르 환경장관 등과 면담을 통해 신기후체제 출범에 대비한 정책협력 방안 협의
 - 미래부 연구개발정책실장은 기술메커니즘(CTCN) 사무국장 면담을 통해 기술 협력 확대 방안 논의(개도국 기술 매칭 시 한국 기후기술 DB 활용 등)
- (국제기구) 반기문 UN 사무총장과의 면담을 통해 협상동향에 대한 의견을 교환하고, 우리나라의 가교역할 강화 방안 논의
 - 그 외 아시아개발은행(ADB) 부총재, 생물다양성협약(CBD) 사무총장 등 국제기구 대표와 면담을 통해 협력 증대 방안 모색
 - 기술메커니즘 기술집행위원회(TEC) 위원에 국내 연구자(녹색기술센터 성장모 소장) 진출이 확정, 한국의 선도적인 기후기술 협력 기반을 마련

□ 한국관(Pavilion) 운영을 통한 국가정책 및 기후기술 홍보

- 우리나라 INDC, 배출권거래제, 적응대책 등 정책 홍보물 전시·배포
- 출연(연)·민간의 기후변화대응 기술 전시(Water, Wastes, Urban&Transporation, Energy, 4개 분야) 및 기술상담코너 운영(9일간 총195건)
- 비산업부문 감축, 국제협력, 기후금융, 기후변화대응 기술개발 및 글로벌 기술협력 등 세미나 총 26회(2,000여명 참석) 개최
- SBS TV, 프랑스 Le Petit Journal, UNFCCC 뉴스룸 등 언론 취재
- 반기문 유엔사무총장, 유도유노 前 인도네시아 대통령, 대만·몰디브·모리셔스 환경장관 등 주요인사 방문

Ⅳ. 주요국 수석대표 연설문



**Secretary-General's speech to COP21 Leaders Summit
Paris, 30 November 2015**

Your Excellency Mr. François Hollande, President of France,
Distinguished Heads of State and Government,
Your Excellency Mr. Laurent Fabius, President of COP21,

Excellencies,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

You are here today to write the script for a new future.

A future of hope and promise -- of increased prosperity, security and dignity for all.

In September, you adopted an inspiring new sustainable development agenda with ambitious goals endorsed by all.

You showed your commitment to act for the common good.

It is now time to do so again.

More than 150 world leaders have come to Paris and are here together in one room, with one purpose.

A political moment like this may not come again.

We have never faced such a test.

But neither have we encountered such great opportunity.

You have the power to secure the well-being of this and succeeding generations.

I urge you to instruct your negotiators to choose the path of compromise and consensus. Bold climate action is in the national interest of every single country represented at this conference.

The time for brinksmanship is over.

Let us build a durable climate regime with clear rules of the road that all countries can agree to follow.

Paris must mark a turning point.

We need the world to know that we are headed to a low-emissions, climate-resilient future, and that there is no going back.

The national climate plans submitted by more than 180 countries cover close to 100 per cent of global emissions.

This is a good start. But we need to go much farther and much faster if we are to limit global temperature rise to below 2 degrees Celsius.

The science is clear.

Even a 2-degree rise will have serious consequences for food and water security, economic stability and international peace.

That is why we need a universal, meaningful agreement here in Paris.

I see four criteria for success.

First, the agreement must be durable

It must send a clear signal to markets that the low-emissions transformation of the global economy is inevitable, beneficial and already under way.

It must provide a long-term vision that anchors the below-2-degrees-Celsius goal, and recognizes the imperative to strengthen resilience.

The world's Small Island Developing States have even less room to manoeuvre, and are desperately asking the world to keep temperature rise to 1.5 degrees.

Second, the agreement must be dynamic.

It must be able to accommodate changes in the global economy, and not have to be continually renegotiated.

Differentiation can and should be applied in a varied manner across the many elements of the agreement, in a way that does not undermine the integrity of the collective effort.

The agreement must strike a balance between the leadership role of developed countries and the increasing responsibility of developing countries, in line with their capabilities and respective levels of development.

The third requirement for success is an agreement that embodies solidarity with the poor and most vulnerable.

It must ensure sufficient and balanced adaptation and mitigation support for developing countries.

Fourth, the agreement must be credible.

Current ambition must be the floor, not the ceiling, for future efforts.

Five-year cycles, beginning before 2020, are crucial.

All countries should agree to move towards quantified, economy-wide emission reduction targets over time, with flexibility for developing countries with limited

capacity.

Developed countries must keep their pledge to mobilize \$100 billion dollars a year by 2020.

This same amount should serve as the floor for post-2020 finance commitments.

A new agreement must also include a single transparent framework for measuring, monitoring and reporting progress.

And countries with low capacity should receive flexibility and support so they can meet the requirements of this new system.

Excellencies,

This is a pivotal moment for the future of your countries, your people and our common home.

You can no longer delay.

Let me be clear: The fate of a Paris agreement rests with you.

We cannot afford indecision, half measures or merely gradual approaches. Our goal must be transformation.

The transition has begun. Enlightened investors and innovative businesses are striving to create a climate-friendly economy. But they need your help in accelerating this essential shift.

The peoples of the world are also on the move. They have taken to the streets, in cities and towns across the world, in a mass mobilization for change.

I met with several key civil society groups yesterday. It is clear to me that they have come to Paris filled with energy and emotion – and that they expect each and every one of you to show leadership equal to the test.

History is calling.

I urge you to answer with courage and vision.

Thank you.

Discours du Président de la République M. Francois Hollande
Ouverture du « Leaders' event » COP21
Paris-Le Bourget, 30 novembre 2015,

Monsieur le Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies,
Mesdames et Messieurs les chefs d'état et de gouvernement,
Madame la secrétaire exécutive de la CCNUCC,
Mesdames et Messieurs les ministres,

Aujourd'hui, la France accueille le monde entier. 150 chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement. Et des milliers de délégués venus de tous les continents.

Jamais une conférence n'avait accueilli autant d'autorités, venues d'autant de pays. Jamais l'enjeu d'une réunion internationale n'avait été aussi élevé puisqu'il s'agit de l'avenir de la planète, l'avenir de la vie.

Et pourtant, il y a deux semaines, c'est la mort que semait un groupe de fanatiques dans les rues de Paris.

Je veux vous exprimer la reconnaissance du peuple français pour toutes les marques de soutien qui ont afflué depuis le 13 novembre.

Les évènements tragiques nous affligent mais plus encore nous obligent. Ils nous forcent à nous concentrer sur l'essentiel. Votre présence soulève un immense espoir que nous n'avons pas le droit de décevoir. Car ce sont des peuples et des milliards d'êtres humains qui comptent sur nous.

Je n'oppose pas la lutte contre le terrorisme et la lutte contre le réchauffement climatique. Ce sont deux grands défis mondiaux que nous devons relever. Parce que nous devons laisser à nos enfants plus qu'un monde libéré de la terreur. Nous leur devons, une planète préservée des catastrophes.

2015 a été l'année de tous les records : record de température, record de concentration de CO₂ dans l'atmosphère, record du nombre d'événements climatiques extrêmes, sécheresse, inondations, cyclones, fonte des glaces, hausse du niveau de la mer, acidification des océans.

Les victimes de ces phénomènes se comptent par millions, et les dommages matériels par milliards

Aucun pays, aucune région n'est à l'abri des effets du dérèglement climatique causé par les activités humaines mais comment accepter que ce soit les pays les plus pauvres, ceux qui émettent le moins de gaz à effet de serre qui soient les plus vulnérables. C'est donc au nom de la justice climatique, que nous devons agir.

Prenons conscience de la gravité de la menace sur les équilibres du monde. Le réchauffement annonce des conflits comme la nuée porte l'orage.

Il provoque des migrations qui jettent sur les routes plus de réfugiés que n'en génèrent les guerres. Des Etats risquent de ne pas pouvoir satisfaire les besoins vitaux de leurs populations avec des risques de famine, d'exode rural massif et d'affrontement pour accéder à l'eau.

Bref ce qui est en cause une fois encore, c'est la paix.

Et pourtant une espérance s'est levée à travers la préparation de la COP 21.

La communauté internationale s'est dotée en septembre dernier d'un agenda complet, à travers les objectifs du développement durable adoptés en septembre dernier à l'ONU.

190 Etats ont formulé de plans d'action pour réduire les émissions de gaz à effet de serre et s'adapter aux dérèglements climatiques dans leur région respective.

Les collectivités locales, les entreprises, les investisseurs, les citoyens, toutes les grandes religions, se sont engagés pour le climat.

A cette prise de conscience, à cette mobilisation s'ajoutent les progrès fulgurants réalisés dans les énergies propres et renouvelables qui ouvrent la perspective d'une

économie moins carbonée, avec des villes vertes et des espaces naturels mieux protégés. Nous sommes désormais capables de définir une stratégie d'adaptation aux impacts des dérèglements climatiques.

La France a jeté toutes ses forces dans ce combat, et mobilisé l'ensemble de son gouvernement, à commencer par le Ministre des Affaires étrangères Laurent Fabius, dont je veux ici saluer la ténacité. J'ai moi-même visité les régions les plus affectées par le changement climatique. J'en suis revenu avec une même conviction : celle d'assurer un développement durable et équitable sans pour autant compromettre l'environnement global et les ressources limitées de notre planète. C'est cette équation fondamentale que nous avons à résoudre.

Et si j'ai voulu que les chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement du monde entier soient rassemblés dès le début de cette COP21 c'est pour donner à cette conférence un souffle et une ambition à la hauteur de l'enjeu car le 12 décembre un Accord de Paris, universel, contraignant et différencié doit être conclu.

A quelles conditions pourra-t-on estimer que nous aurons collectivement, rempli notre mission ? J'en vois trois.

La première, c'est que nous dessinions une trajectoire crédible permettant de contenir le réchauffement global en dessous des 2° Celsius, ou 1,5°C si possible. Il faudra pour y parvenir nous fixer un horizon de long-terme, prévoir une évaluation régulière de nos progrès au regard des dernières conclusions de la science, et mettre en place un mécanisme de révision à la hausse de nos engagements, avec des rendez-vous tous les 5 ans.

La deuxième condition, c'est que nous apportions au défi climatique une réponse solidaire. Aucun Etat ne peut se soustraire à ses engagements mais avec un principe de différenciation qui tienne compte des niveaux de développement et des situations. Aucun territoire ne doit être laissé seul face au dérèglement et notamment les plus vulnérables. Je pense à ces îles qui peuvent à brève échéance purement et simplement disparaître.

Tirons en les conclusions : l'accord doit être universel.

Les pays développés doivent assumer leurs responsabilités historiques, les pays émergents accélérer leur transition énergétique, les pays en développement être accompagnés dans leur adaptation aux impacts climatiques. D'où la nécessité de dégager des financements pour favoriser les transferts de technologie. L'objectif des 100Mds doit non seulement être atteint mais dépassé avec des garanties sur l'origine des ressources et leurs disponibilités.

Enfin, la troisième condition d'un accord à Paris, c'est que nos sociétés se mettent en mouvement. L'ensemble des dirigeants locaux, des investisseurs, des acteurs économiques et sociaux, des citoyens, doivent comprendre que la donne a changé. Ce sont eux aussi qui détiennent les clés de du défi climatique.

Je rends hommage ici à tous les pionniers de la cause écologique, aux précurseurs qui, il n'y a pas si longtemps encore, devaient affronter incrédulité et dédain pour leurs alertes et leurs propositions.

En quelques années, les esprits ont profondément évolué.

Les entreprises et les acteurs financiers hier réticents sont désormais prêts à s'engager et à modifier leur comportement. Faut-il encore leur envoyer les signaux indispensables. C'est l'enjeu de l'introduction progressive du prix du carbone pour que les émissions de gaz à effet de serre aient un coût qui corresponde aux dommages infligés à la planète. Et que les choix d'investissement s'en trouvent peu à peu modifiés permettant aux technologies propres d'être accessibles à tous.

Mesdames et Messieurs les chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement.

Pour résoudre la crise climatique, les bons sentiments, les déclarations d'intentions ne suffisent pas. Nous sommes au bord d'un point de rupture.

Paris doit être le point de départ d'une profonde mutation énergétique, économique, sociétale. Nous ne pouvons plus considérer la nature comme un vulgaire et inépuisable réservoir de ressources destiné à notre seul accomplissement.

Cette transformation est à la fois une obligation morale et une opportunité mondiale. Elle ouvre des possibilités de développement grâce à l'émergence d'une économie décarbonée avec des énergies renouvelables, des modes de transport propre, le

recyclage des déchets, l'agro écologie, la préservation de la biodiversité, l'accès de tous aux biens publics mondiaux.

Ainsi en rendant l'électricité accessible à tous et notamment en Afrique, c'est plus que de la lumière qui sera apportée, c'est la connaissance, l'éducation et le développement.

Nous sommes en ce premier jour de la COP au pied du mur. Ce mur est l'addition de nos égoïsmes, de nos appréhensions, de nos résignations. Il est construit sur l'indifférence, sur l'insouciance, sur l'impuissance. Il n'est pas infranchissable. Tout dépend de nous.

Sur nos épaules repose l'espoir de toute l'humanité.

Je mesure combien combiner l'impératif de l'urgence et les choix du long terme est un exercice difficile. Mais il n'est pas impossible. Notre plus grand défi, c'est de passer d'une mondialisation basée sur la compétition à un modèle basé sur la coopération, où il sera plus rentable de protéger que de détruire. Nous devons penser la planète comme un espace unique. Nous devons établir un pacte d'équité entre le Nord et le Sud et un partenariat entre la Nature et l'Homme.

C'est pourquoi nous sommes réunis, nous les dirigeants de la planète. Paris est un rendez-vous exceptionnel. Nous allons décider en quelques jours pour quelques décennies.

Le plus grand danger n'est pas que notre but soit trop élevé et que nous le manquions, mais qu'il soit trop bas et que nous l'atteignons.

Alors plaçons, le plus haut possible, notre ambition pour que nous puissions au moins l'approcher.

C'est en visant haut que l'on décidera pour longtemps de la vie sur notre planète.

21ème Conférence des Nations Unies sur les changements climatiques

Discours d'ouverture
Paris, 11 h00, 30 novembre 2015

Intervention de M. Laurent Fabius,
Ministre des Affaires étrangères et du Développement international
Président de la COP21

Seul le prononcé fait foi

Monsieur le Président de la République Française,
Monsieur le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies,
Mesdames et Messieurs les Chefs d'Etat et de Gouvernement,
Mesdames et Messieurs les Délégués,

La semaine dernière, sachant que j'allais présider cette COP21, les personnes que j'ai rencontrées m'ont toutes posé la même question : la Conférence de Paris sera-t-elle un succès?

La première condition du succès est déjà remplie, grâce à vous. Vous êtes près de 150 Chefs d'Etat et de Gouvernement rassemblés ici, malgré la tourmente. Dans l'enceinte de notre Conférence, plusieurs milliers de délégués et de responsables de la société civile et à travers le monde, des millions. Par votre mobilisation, vous montrez que la civilisation et la solidarité sont plus fortes que la barbarie. Merci.

La deuxième condition du succès, j'ai confiance qu'elle sera également remplie. Nous avons voulu réunir à Paris pour le climat les acteurs non gouvernementaux de la planète : les villes, les régions, les entreprises, les organisations non gouvernementales, les forces sociales et économiques, les particuliers. En lien avec l'ONU dont le Secrétaire général s'est totalement mobilisé, le déroulement de cette Conférence a été construit dans cet esprit : les décisions des Gouvernements sont capitales –, mais celles des acteurs non gouvernementaux aussi. Ici même, dans les heures et les jours qui viennent, seront annoncés des engagements concrets et importants par des centaines de collectivités territoriales et d'entreprises. Des initiatives puissantes seront lancées, parfois en partenariat public-privé, notamment

dans le domaine de l'innovation pour les technologies propres, de l'énergie solaire ou du prix du carbone. Toutes ces actions sont prometteuses pour la lutte contre le réchauffement climatique. Une lutte qui est à la fois une contrainte vitale et une opportunité essentielle pour un développement durable qui concilie économie, éthique et écologie.

Reste la troisième condition du succès, la plus difficile : à l'issue de la Conférence, dans 11 petits jours, nous devons parvenir à un accord climatique universel et ambitieux. Cet accord devra être différencié, juste, durable, dynamique, équilibré, juridiquement contraignant et faire en sorte qu'à l'horizon 2100 la température, du fait des émissions de gaz à effet de serre, ne s'élève pas de plus de 2°, voire 1,5°, par rapport à l'ère préindustrielle. Chacun de ces termes renvoie à des dispositions précises sur lesquelles dans le passé nous n'avons pas pu totalement conclure. C'est l'enjeu des discussions que vos ministres et négociateurs vont avoir. Il nous faudra ne pas perdre notre temps dans des débats de procédure, traiter la substance et trouver ensemble des solutions. Comme Président de la COP, je devrai être à l'écoute de chacun, impartial, et agir pour un ambitieux compromis.

Plusieurs signes sont encourageants. La prise de conscience qu'un accord est indispensable a beaucoup progressé, stimulée par le constat que 2014 fut l'année la plus chaude jamais enregistrée et que 2015 sera pire. Les travaux des scientifiques établissent de façon incontestable le diagnostic et le pronostic. L'engagement de grandes autorités spirituelles et religieuses est fort et celui des gouvernements va en général dans le bon sens.

En témoigne le nombre des contributions nationales des Etats, les fameuses INDC. A ce jour, 183 INDC ont été publiées, représentant plus de 95 % des émissions mondiales de gaz à effet de serre. Certes elles diffèrent par leur ambition, mais le fait même que la quasi-totalité des pays ait accompli cette démarche montre une évolution remarquable et permet d'anticiper les progrès qui seront nécessaires dans le futur. Car attention ! Le total de ces contributions nous éloigne des 4°, 5° ou 6° de réchauffement évoqués par le GIEC dans les scénarios inacceptables de l'inaction, mais cela ne suffira pas pour rester sous les 1,5° ou 2° maximum. D'où le caractère crucial des mécanismes de rendez-vous périodiques et d'amélioration que nous pourrons, je l'espère, inclure dans notre accord.

J'insiste, enfin, sur un aspect : un accord climatique mondial, ce n'est pas une exigence que les pays développés imposeraient aux pays en développement ; c'est une exigence universelle à laquelle nous devons répondre ensemble. La solidarité climatique doit encore progresser ; la mobilisation des financements et des technologies en faveur des pays du Sud également. L'accord de Paris doit être aussi un pacte pour la justice et contre les inégalités. En tant que Président de cette Conférence, j'aurai pour mission d'y veiller.

Sur tous ces points, nous souhaitons –mes collègues ministres et négociateurs avec moi – qu'en ce premier jour vous donniez l'impulsion politique indispensable : que vos interventions soient si fortes qu'elles interdisent toute autre issue que le succès!

Mesdames et Messieurs les Chefs d'Etat et de Gouvernement,

La France transmettra fin 2016 le témoin à nos amis marocains, de même que nous l'avons reçu de nos amis du Pérou qui ont accompli un remarquable travail. Mais en cette année 2015, il y a urgence. Les gaz à effet de serre continuent en effet de s'accumuler dans l'atmosphère, au point d'aboutir, si rien n'était fait ou pas assez vite, à une situation irréversible. Ici, maintenant, il existe un « momentum » particulier. C'est à cette Conférence-ci que la COP de Durban en 2011 a confié expressément la tâche de parvenir à un accord. La COP21 doit être un basculement, un tournant. Tout ne se résoudra sans doute pas à Paris ; mais on ne résoudra rien sans Paris.

En cet instant, j'ai dans ma mémoire et dans le coeur les récits et les visages que j'ai croisés ces derniers mois en préparant la COP : au Bangladesh cette femme âgée, fatiguée et digne, qui avait dû déménager 9 fois à cause des inondations et qui m'a demandé si la COP21 allait changer cela ; au Grand nord cet ingénieur qui m'a montré les écroulements apocalyptiques de la banquise et leurs conséquences ; à Cochabamba, ce paysan bolivien pleurant les dégâts entraînés par le non-respect de la Terre mère et qui espère pouvoir nous faire confiance ; en Afrique cette jeune femme – car ce sont les femmes et les pauvres qui sont les premières victimes – décrivant l'assèchement spectaculaire du lac Tchad et ses incidences funestes. De nos réponses, de nos engagements ici, dépendra leur vie et celle de centaines de millions de nos frères et soeurs en humanité.

Mesdames et Messieurs les Chefs d'Etat et de Gouvernement,

A l'entrée de cette salle, vous avez peut-être vu en levant les yeux une très grande photographie. Elle symbolise l'enjeu de notre Conférence. Sur le côté gauche de la photo, un arbre qui a perdu toutes ses feuilles, remplacées par des sacs plastiques, une sorte de squelette dans un environnement devenu inhumain. A droite de la photo, le portrait d'un enfant harmonieux qui s'éveille. Et au milieu, un papillon, porteur d'espoir. Nous en sommes là. Ou bien nous échouons à Paris : désolation. Ou bien nous concluons un accord ambitieux pour agir contre le réchauffement climatique et un bel avenir est ouvert.

Je crois au succès. J'y crois parce que je l'espère. J'y crois parce que nous savons tous que la lutte contre le réchauffement climatique est plus encore qu'une question environnementale, c'est une condition essentielle pour alimenter en nourriture et en eau la planète, pour sauver la biodiversité et protéger la santé, pour lutter contre la pauvreté et les migrations massives, pour dissuader les guerres et encourager la paix, et en définitive pour donner ses chances au développement soutenable et à la vie.

En cette fin d'année 2015, il revient à la France avec vous tous d'aider à relever deux des principaux défis du siècle : lutter contre le terrorisme et lutter contre le dérèglement climatique. Les générations présentes nous pressent d'agir ; les générations futures jugeront nos actions ; nous ne pouvons pas encore les entendre, mais d'une certaine façon elles nous regardent déjà. Le mot « historique » est souvent galvaudé ; aujourd'hui, il ne l'est pas. Ensemble, faisons de la Conférence de Paris le succès historique que le monde attend.

REMARKS AT THE CLIMATE SUMMIT

**President Park Geun-hye
Republic of Korea
November 30 2015, Paris**

The next two weeks are bound to be nothing short of historic.

Last year, the concentration of carbon dioxide in the earth's atmosphere reached record levels.

We simply cannot afford to dither any longer.

We must marshal the collective will and capacities of the entire world and make absolutely sure that this Climate Change Conference (COP21) gives birth to a new climate regime.

Korea will take active part in this new climate regime in three ways.

First, we will spearhead efforts to cut carbon emissions through new energy industries.

Korea has submitted an ambitious target of reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by 37% from the business-as-usual (BAU) level by 2030. This is despite the fact that Korea's energy efficiency level is already amongst the highest in the world and the large share of manufacturing in Korean economy.

Last week, we unveiled the 'Strategy for Nurturing New Energy Industries 2030.' Under this strategy, we will open a 'prosumer' market for electricity that would allow people to freely sell the power that they have produced and saved through renewable equipment, energy storage systems, or electric vehicles.

Net zero buildings will be mandated in phases and large plants will eventually be transformed into smart factories that harness ICT.

Korea's best known island, Jeju will transition into a carbon free island by replacing its entire fleet of cars with electric vehicles and meeting 100% of its energy needs through renewable energy sources.

These efforts would enable us to unlock a new market in the neighborhood of 100 billion dollars by the year 2030 and generate some 500,000 jobs, as we meet our INDC target.

Second, we are committed to sharing new technology and business models with developing countries.

In early November, the Green Climate Fund Board approved a project applying Korea's eco-friendly energy independent island model as one of the first batch of projects to receive GCF funding. It is a model that replaces diesel-based generators in a plant in the Amazon region with a combination of photovoltaic and energy storage systems that not only reduces the carbon footprint but also supplies electricity around the clock.

The smart farm model that Korea is pushing forward as another business model for GCF financing, should also prove to be effective in developing countries.

By integrating ICT and renewable energy equipment to greenhouses, the room temperature and humidity could be automatically controlled, which could raise crop yields and quality.

The use of new, renewable energy will also cut carbon emissions.

In this vein, Korea will continue to develop business models that are suited to the needs of developing countries and vigorously disseminate those models through the GCF.

Third, we will join discussions to set up a global carbon market with enthusiasm.

The market for carbon will no doubt play a critical role under the new climate

regime.

By building on our own experience with an Emissions Trading Scheme, Korea will engage strongly in international discussions to help create a global carbon market that has both developed and developing countries actively on board.

Fellow leaders,

Paris Conference is not a final destination.

It is a new beginning.

Much like the saying 'well begun is half done,'
all goes well that starts well.

Let us rally together for a new climate regime.

Thank you.

Remarks by President Obama at the First Session of COP21

**Le Bourget
Paris, France**

12:47 P.M. CET

PRESIDENT OBAMA: President Hollande, Mr. Secretary General, fellow leaders. We have come to Paris to show our resolve.

We offer our condolences to the people of France for the barbaric attacks on this beautiful city. We stand united in solidarity not only to deliver justice to the terrorist network responsible for those attacks but to protect our people and uphold the enduring values that keep us strong and keep us free. And we salute the people of Paris for insisting this crucial conference go on -- an act of defiance that proves nothing will deter us from building the future we want for our children. What greater rejection of those who would tear down our world than marshaling our best efforts to save it?

Nearly 200 nations have assembled here this week -- a declaration that for all the challenges we face, the growing threat of climate change could define the contours of this century more dramatically than any other. What should give us hope that this is a turning point, that this is the moment we finally determined we would save our planet, is the fact that our nations share a sense of urgency about this challenge and a growing realization that it is within our power to do something about it.

Our understanding of the ways human beings disrupt the climate advances by the day. Fourteen of the fifteen warmest years on record have occurred since the year 2000 -- and 2015 is on pace to be the warmest year of all. No nation -- large or small, wealthy or poor -- is immune to what this means.

This summer, I saw the effects of climate change firsthand in our northernmost

state, Alaska, where the sea is already swallowing villages and eroding shorelines; where permafrost thaws and the tundra burns; where glaciers are melting at a pace unprecedented in modern times. And it was a preview of one possible future -- a glimpse of our children's fate if the climate keeps changing faster than our efforts to address it. Submerged countries. Abandoned cities. Fields that no longer grow. Political disruptions that trigger new conflict, and even more floods of desperate peoples seeking the sanctuary of nations not their own.

That future is not one of strong economies, nor is it one where fragile states can find their footing. That future is one that we have the power to change. Right here. Right now. But only if we rise to this moment. As one of America's governors has said, "We are the first generation to feel the impact of climate change, and the last generation that can do something about it."

I've come here personally, as the leader of the world's largest economy and the second-largest emitter, to say that the United States of America not only recognizes our role in creating this problem, we embrace our responsibility to do something about it.

Over the last seven years, we've made ambitious investments in clean energy, and ambitious reductions in our carbon emissions. We've multiplied wind power threefold, and solar power more than twentyfold, helping create parts of America where these clean power sources are finally cheaper than dirtier, conventional power. We've invested in energy efficiency in every way imaginable. We've said no to infrastructure that would pull high-carbon fossil fuels from the ground, and we've said yes to the first-ever set of national standards limiting the amount of carbon pollution our power plants can release into the sky.

The advances we've made have helped drive our economic output to all-time highs, and drive our carbon pollution to its lowest levels in nearly two decades.

But the good news is this is not an American trend alone. Last year, the global economy grew while global carbon emissions from burning fossil fuels stayed flat. And what this means can't be overstated. We have broken the old arguments for inaction. We have proved that strong economic growth and a safer environment no longer have to conflict with one another; they can work in concert with one another.

And that should give us hope. One of the enemies that we'll be fighting at this conference is cynicism, the notion we can't do anything about climate change. Our progress should give us hope during these two weeks -- hope that is rooted in collective action.

Earlier this month in Dubai, after years of delay, the world agreed to work together to cut the super-pollutants known as HFCs. That's progress. Already, prior to Paris, more than 180 countries representing nearly 95 percent of global emissions have put forward their own climate targets. That is progress. For our part, America is on track to reach the emissions targets that I set six years ago in Copenhagen -- we will reduce our carbon emissions in the range of 17 percent below 2005 levels by 2020. And that's why, last year, I set a new target: America will reduce our emissions 26 to 28 percent below 2005 levels within 10 years from now.

So our task here in Paris is to turn these achievements into an enduring framework for human progress -- not a stopgap solution, but a long-term strategy that gives the world confidence in a low-carbon future.

Here, in Paris, let's secure an agreement that builds in ambition, where progress paves the way for regularly updated targets -- targets that are not set for each of us but by each of us, taking into account the differences that each nation is facing.

Here in Paris, let's agree to a strong system of transparency that gives each of us the confidence that all of us are meeting our commitments. And let's make sure that the countries who don't yet have the full capacity to report on their targets receive the support that they need.

Here in Paris, let's reaffirm our commitment that resources will be there for countries willing to do their part to skip the dirty phase of development. And I recognize this will not be easy. It will take a commitment to innovation and the capital to continue driving down the cost of clean energy. And that's why, this afternoon, I'll join many of you to announce an historic joint effort to accelerate public and private clean energy innovation on a global scale.

Here in Paris, let's also make sure that these resources flow to the countries that need help preparing for the impacts of climate change that we can no longer avoid.

We know the truth that many nations have contributed little to climate change but will be the first to feel its most destructive effects. For some, particularly island nations -- whose leaders I'll meet with tomorrow -- climate change is a threat to their very existence. And that's why today, in concert with other nations, America confirms our strong and ongoing commitment to the Least Developed Countries Fund. And tomorrow, we'll pledge new contributions to risk insurance initiatives that help vulnerable populations rebuild stronger after climate-related disasters.

And finally, here in Paris, let's show businesses and investors that the global economy is on a firm path towards a low-carbon future. If we put the right rules and incentives in place, we'll unleash the creative power of our best scientists and engineers and entrepreneurs to deploy clean energy technologies and the new jobs and new opportunities that they create all around the world. There are hundreds of billions of dollars ready to deploy to countries around the world if they get the signal that we mean business this time. Let's send that signal.

That's what we seek in these next two weeks. Not simply an agreement to roll back the pollution we put into our skies, but an agreement that helps us lift people from poverty without condemning the next generation to a planet that's beyond its capacity to repair. Here, in Paris, we can show the world what is possible when we come together, united in common effort and by a common purpose.

And let there be no doubt, the next generation is watching what we do. Just over a week ago, I was in Malaysia, where I held a town hall with young people, and the first question I received was from a young Indonesian woman. And it wasn't about terrorism, it wasn't about the economy, it wasn't about human rights. It was about climate change. And she asked whether I was optimistic about what we can achieve here in Paris, and what young people like her could do to help.

I want our actions to show her that we're listening. I want our actions to be big enough to draw on the talents of all our people -- men and women, rich and poor -- I want to show her passionate, idealistic young generation that we care about their future.

For I believe, in the words of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., that there is such a thing as being too late. And when it comes to climate change, that hour is almost upon

us. But if we act here, if we act now, if we place our own short-term interests behind the air that our young people will breathe, and the food that they will eat, and the water that they will drink, and the hopes and dreams that sustain their lives, then we won't be too late for them.

And, my fellow leaders, accepting this challenge will not reward us with moments of victory that are clear or quick. Our progress will be measured differently -- in the suffering that is averted, and a planet that's preserved. And that's what's always made this so hard. Our generation may not even live to see the full realization of what we do here. But the knowledge that the next generation will be better off for what we do here -- can we imagine a more worthy reward than that? Passing that on to our children and our grandchildren, so that when they look back and they see what we did here in Paris, they can take pride in our achievement.

Let that be the common purpose here in Paris. A world that is worthy of our children. A world that is marked not by conflict, but by cooperation; and not by human suffering, but by human progress. A world that's safer, and more prosperous, and more secure, and more free than the one that we inherited.

Let's get to work. Thank you very much. (Applause.)

END 1:01 P.M. CET

Jean-Claude Juncker

Président de la Commission européenne

Intervention pour l'ouverture de la

COP21

Paris, 30 novembre 2015

Monsieur le Président de la République française, Cher François, Mesdames et Messieurs les chefs d'Etats ou de gouvernement, Mesdames et Messieurs les Ministres, Mesdames et Messieurs, chers amis,

Je voudrais tout d'abord redire ici toute ma solidarité aux autorités françaises, aux Parisiens et à tous les Français. Et rendre aussi hommage à leur capacité de résilience.

J'ai lu et entendu de multiples témoignages de cette volonté, plus forte que tout, de continuer à vivre ensemble et libres.

Je pense par exemple à cet homme disant à l'intention des terroristes responsables de la mort de sa femme, la mère de leur enfant: "*Nous allons jouer comme tous les jours et toute sa vie ce petit garçon vous fera l'affront d'être heureux et libre.*"

Assurer, quoi qu'il arrive, le bonheur d'un enfant c'est la responsabilité d'un père.

Assurer un monde stable pour des millions d'enfants à travers le monde c'est notre responsabilité de dirigeants politiques.

[Prévenir les risques d'instabilité]

Les changements climatiques redessinent notre planète et amplifient des risques d'instabilité: insécurité alimentaire, problèmes d'approvisionnement en eau, propagation de

maladies infantiles, pauvreté. Ils peuvent déstabiliser des régions entières et être à l'origine de migrations forcées massives et de conflits pour l'accès aux ressources.

Nous ne pourrons pas dire aux générations futures que nous ne savions pas. Parce que tout cela nous le voyons déjà à l'œuvre.

Nous connaissons les menaces, nous pouvons les prévenir.

C'est une question de volonté politique et d'action. Et c'est tout l'enjeu de cette conférence.

[De nouvelles sources de croissance]

Nous devons et pouvons léguer aux jeunes d'Afrique, des Amériques, d'Asie, d'Océanie et d'Europe, un monde plus stable et un environnement plus sain, des sociétés plus justes et des économies plus prospères.

Et ce n'est pas un doux rêve d'illuminé. C'est une réalité qui est à portée de main.

En Europe, en 2007, nous avons décidé de réduire de 20% nos émissions de CO₂ d'ici à 2020, comparé à 1990. Elles ont déjà chuté de 23% alors que le produit intérieur brut a augmenté de 46%. Nous visons maintenant une réduction des émissions d'au-moins 40 % d'ici à 2030.

Les villes européennes et, en fer de lance, des entreprises innovantes ouvrent la voie en matière d'efficacité énergétique et de développement d'énergies renouvelables.

La transition énergétique dessine un monde nouveau, un monde sobre en carbone et riche en opportunités pour de nouveaux emplois; une meilleure qualité de vie; une compétitivité économique accrue et une plus grande sécurité énergétique.

Une évolution similaire vers une nouvelle économie est en marche à travers le monde. Nous devons l'accélérer. Parce que l'horloge tourne de plus en plus vite. Il nous faudrait au moins 4 planètes pour maintenir notre façon actuelle de vivre, produire et consommer. Nous n'en avons qu'une.

Alors nous devons nous organiser autrement. Et notre chance c'est que si les ressources de ce monde sont épuisables; la créativité humaine est inépuisable.

[Pour une réponse mondiale solidaire, durable et vérifiable]

La transition ne sera pas facile pour tous. Il faut s'entraider. En 2014, l'Europe a affecté 14,5 milliards d'euros pour l'action climatique dans les pays en développement. Nous poursuivrons sur cette voie et nous ferons plus dans les années à venir. Pour la période 2014-2020, au moins 20 % du budget de l'Union européenne, y compris celui pour le développement, sera

consacré à l'action pour le climat. Nous confirmons donc notre rôle de premier plan en matière de financement de la lutte contre le changement climatique. Je suis confiant que nous ne serons pas les seuls à le faire aujourd'hui.

Une nouvelle dynamique mondiale est là. Les contributions sont nombreuses et elles doivent venir de tous. Toutefois le compte n'y est pas encore pour limiter à au moins 2 degrés le réchauffement climatique.

Et de belles promesses ne suffiront pas. Il nous faut un accord contraignant, solide, durable, traduisant une vision sur le long terme d'une économie neutre en carbone, et dont la mise en œuvre sera suivie périodiquement et adaptée pour augmenter le niveau d'ambition si nécessaire.

Chaque jour, nos citoyens, nos entreprises, petites et grandes, nos sociétés civiles font de la transition énergétique une réalité. Pour que leurs efforts portent loin, ils ont besoin de cet accord solidaire et responsable. Nous devons le leur donner, ici et maintenant, à Paris.

C'est notre humanité commune qui est en jeu.

Speech by Prime Minister Abe at COP21 (draft)

(Introduction)

First of all, I express my deepest condolences to the victims of the recent terrorist attacks that occurred in Paris. I extend my respect for and show my solidarity with President Hollande, both the Government and people of France who refused to submit to terrorism by opening COP21.

Today we must demonstrate our ability to overcome overwhelming challenges with our solidarity no matter how different our nations or cultures are.

(Significance of the Paris Agreement)

Eighteen years ago, the Kyoto Protocol, an important step to counter global warming, was adopted. Global average temperature, however, has been on the gradual rise ever since. We have witnessed frequent occurrence of extreme weather-related disasters worldwide such as heavy rain and drought. Beautiful islands now face the risk of submersion. The Earth is the sole homeland to our humankind. We must hand it down safely to the generations of our children and grandchildren. Now is high time to build a new international framework, which developed and developing countries join together.

(Constructive proposal for the international framework)

Many point out that the present INDCs submitted by countries alone are unlikely to achieve the below 2°C objective. I would like the Paris Agreement to include the setting of a long-term goal as well as the establishment of a common process for the review of nationally determined mitigation contributions.

Japan on its part will steadily implement its already-submitted, ambitious INDC and its national adaptation plan.

(Japan's new set of contribution: Actions for Cool Earth (ACE) 2.0 (support to developing countries, innovation))

Japan has announced the "Actions for Cool Earth 2.0," namely, "ACE 2.0". This is a reinforcement of Japan's contribution to climate change actions which was presented as "ACE" in 2013.

The first component of the contribution is our support to developing countries. We cannot overlook the difficulties of those developing countries suffering from negative impacts of climate change. Japan will provide, in 2020, approximately ¥1.3 trillion of public and private climate finance, 1.3 times up from the current level, to developing countries. I believe the increased finance from Japan, if added to the accumulated contributions by countries and international organizations clarify a pathway to the achievement of the commitment made at COP15:

the mobilization by 2020 of \$ 100 billion in climate finance per year to developing countries.

We will enrich the livelihood of people living on the Earth, while we reduce greenhouse gas emissions. We will take geothermal energy from the center of the Earth and deliver clean electricity to people in Africa. We shed light generated from sunlight in those areas not yet covered with the power grid. We pass on what cities in Japan have gone through to various emerging Asian cities that are experiencing rapidly growing concentration of population. We provide necessary equipment and know-hows so that people of island states in the Pacific can evacuate with ample time available before a typhoon approaches. These are several fields of activities in which Japanese companies have been engaged for a long time and have sophisticated their skills. I am all confident that we can be of great help for every one of you.

Japan has contributed \$1.5 billion to the Green Climate Fund (GCF). I would like to see the fund made available for the support to developing countries as soon as possible. I will ensure Japan's involvement in the work of GCF from the project-forming stage for swift implementation of the next year's support of \$2.5 billion.

The second component of Japan's new set of contribution is innovation. The key to acting against climate change without sacrificing economic growth is the development of innovative

technologies. To illustrate, there are technologies to produce, store and transport hydrogen towards realizing CO₂-free societies, and a next-generation battery to enable an electric car to run 5 times longer than the current level. By next spring Japan will formulate the “Energy and Environment Innovation Strategy.” Prospective focused areas will be identified and research and development on them will be strengthened.

The “Mission Innovation,” proposed by the interested countries, is in line with what Japan has consistently worked on, and I hereby express Japan’s intention to join the initiative.

In addition, many of the advanced low-carbon technologies do not generally promise investment-return to developing countries. Japan will, while lowering burdens of those countries, promote diffusion of advanced low carbon technologies particularly through implementation of the Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM).

(Conclusion)

We, the leaders of the world, have all gathered here in Paris despite the challenges posed by terrorist attack. Let all of us achieve an agreement on new framework and show our solidarity.

**Work Together to Build a Win-Win, Equitable and Balanced
Governance Mechanism on Climate Change**

Speech by H.E. Xi Jinping

President of the People's Republic of China

At the Opening Ceremony of The Paris Conference on Climate Change

Paris, 30 November 2015

President Hollande,

Dear Colleagues,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Dear Friends,

Today, we are gathering here in Paris for the opening ceremony of the United Nations Conference on Climate Change. Our presence shows that terrorism cannot hold back mankind's efforts to address climate change and pursue a better future. Let me take this opportunity to express my sincere sympathy to the French people and my gratitude to President Hollande and the French government for their meticulous preparations for this conference.

Thanks to joint efforts of all parties since the *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change* entered into force over 20 years ago, global actions on climate change have made progress although there are still numerous difficulties and challenges. This Paris Conference is hence convened to strengthen implementation of the UNFCCC and bring about a comprehensive, balanced, ambitious and binding agreement on climate change. The conference is also expected to come up with equitable, reasonable and effective global solutions to climate change and explore pathways and governance models for mankind to achieve sustainable development. The French writer Victor Hugo once observed in *Les Misérables* that "supreme resources spring from extreme resolutions." (Les ressources supêmes sortent des résolutions extrêmes.) I believe that with all parties making joint efforts with sincerity and confidence, the Paris Conference will yield satisfying results and meet the high

expectations of the international community.

Dear Colleagues,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

A successful international agreement should not just address immediate challenges but more importantly, it should also present a vision for the future. The Paris agreement should focus on strengthening post-2020 global actions on climate change and boost global efforts to pursue sustainable development.

- **The Paris agreement should help meet the goals of the UNFCCC and chart the course for green development.** The agreement should follow the principles and rules set out in the UNFCCC and contribute to its full and effective implementation. The agreement should put effective control on the increase of atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases and set up incentive mechanisms to encourage countries to pursue green, circular and low-carbon development featuring both economic growth and an effective response to climate change.
- **The Paris agreement should help galvanize global efforts and encourage broad participation.** The agreement should provide institutional arrangements that propel countries to make concerted efforts. Besides governments, it should also mobilize businesses, non-governmental organizations and all players in society to participate in international cooperation on climate change, thus raising public awareness of pooling resources on climate change.
- **The Paris agreement should help increase input of resources to ensure actions on climate change.** To obtain financial and technical support for capacity building is essential for developing countries to address climate change. Developed countries should honor their commitment of mobilizing US\$100 billion each year before 2020 and provide stronger financial support to developing countries afterwards. It is also important that climate-friendly technologies should be transferred to developing countries to help them build green economy.
- **The Paris agreement should accommodate the national conditions of various countries and lay emphasis on practical results.** It is imperative to respect differences among countries, especially developing countries, in domestic policies,

capacity building and economic structure. A one-size-fits-all approach must be avoided. Addressing climate change should not deny the legitimate needs of developing countries to reduce poverty and improve their people's living Standards. Special needs of the developing countries must be well attended to.

Dear colleagues,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

The Paris Conference is not the finishing line but a new starting point. As an important part of global governance, the global efforts on climate change can be taken as a mirror for us to reflect on what models to have for future global governance and how to build a community of shared future for mankind. Much valuable inspiration may thus be drawn.

- **We should create a future of win-win cooperation, with each country making contribution to the best of its ability.** For global issues like climate change, a take-more-give-less approach based on expediency is in nobody's interest. The Paris Conference should reject the narrow-minded mentality of "zero sum game" and call on all countries, the developed countries in particular, to assume more shared responsibilities for win-win outcomes.
- **We should create a future of the rule of law, fairness and justice.** It is imperative to enhance the standing and role of international law in global governance, ensure effective observance and implementation of international rules, uphold democracy, equity and justice, and build international rule of law. Given the difference between developed and developing countries in historical responsibility, developing stage and coping capability, the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, instead of being obsolete, must continue to be adhered to.
- **We should create a future of inclusiveness, mutual learning and common development.** Facing global challenges, countries need to increase dialogue and exchange best practices. We should draw on each other's strengths to achieve common development through mutual learning, and deliver benefits to all our people. At the same time, we should be prepared to accept harmony without uniformity, allowing individual countries to seek their own solutions that best suit their respective national conditions.

Dear colleagues,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

China has been actively engaged in the global campaign on climate change. China is both sincere and determined to contribute its share to the success of the Paris Conference.

In the past few decades, China has seen rapid economic growth and significant improvement in people's lives. However, this has taken a toll on the environment and resources. Having learned the lesson, China is vigorously making ecological endeavors to promote green, circular and low-carbon growth. We have integrated our climate change efforts into China's medium- and long-term program of economic and social development. We attach equal importance to mitigation and adaption, and try to make progress on all fronts by resorting to legal and administrative means, technologies and market forces. China's installed capacity of renewable energy accounts for 24% of the world's total, with the newly installed capacity accounting for 42% of the global total. China tops the world in terms of energy conservation and utilization of new and renewable energies.

"All things live in harmony and grow with nourishments." Chinese culture values harmony between man and nature and respects nature. Going forward, ecological endeavors will feature prominently in China's 13th Five-Year Plan. China will work hard to implement the vision of innovative, coordinated, green, open and inclusive development. China will, on the basis of technological and institutional innovation, adopt new policy measures to improve industrial mix, build low-carbon energy system, develop green building and low-carbon transportation, and build a nation-wide carbon emission trading market so as to foster a new pattern of modernization featuring harmony between man and nature. In its Intended Nationally Determined Contributions, China pledges to peak CO₂ emissions by around 2030 and strive to achieve it as soon as possible, and by 2030, reduce CO₂ per unit of GDP by 60-65% over the 2005 level, raise the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to about 20% and increase forest stock by around 4.5 billion cubic meters over 2005. This requires strenuous efforts, but we have confidence and resolve to fulfill our commitments.

China upholds the values of friendship, justice and shared interests, and takes an

active part in international cooperation on climate change. Over the years, the Chinese government has earnestly fulfilled its policy commitments of South-South cooperation regarding climate change to support developing countries, especially the least developed countries, landlocked developing countries and small island developing states, in confronting the challenge of climate change. In a show of greater support, China announced in September the establishment of an RMB 20 billion South-South Climate Cooperation Fund. Next year, China will launch cooperation projects to set up 10 pilot low-carbon industrial parks and start 100 mitigation and adaptation programs in other developing countries and provide them with 1,000 training opportunities on climate change. China will continue to promote international cooperation in such areas as clean energy, disaster prevention and mitigation, ecological protection, climate-smart agriculture, and low-carbon and smart cities. China will also help other developing countries to increase their financing capacity.

Dear Colleagues,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

Tackling climate change is a shared mission for mankind. All eyes are now on Paris. Let us join hands to contribute to the establishment of an equitable and effective global mechanism on climate change, work for global sustainable development at a higher level and bring about new international relations featuring win-win cooperation.

Thank you.

EIG Opening Statement for COP21 and CMP11
Paris, France, 1 December 2015

Thank you, Mr. President

I have the honour to deliver this statement on behalf of the Environmental Integrity Group, comprising Liechtenstein, Mexico, Monaco, the Republic of Korea and Switzerland.

Let me first thank the government and the people of France as well as the authorities and the people of Paris for hosting this Conference of the Parties. We also express our full solidarity to the French people in grief after the Paris terror attacks. Let me assure you that the French presidency has our full support in guiding us through this two weeks in order to deliver an outcome that sends a strong signal to the outside world.

The last months proved us that we are capable of addressing global climate change collectively: over 90% of the Parties to the Convention submitted their INDCs. This is unprecedented and a crucial step into the right direction. However, we should not forget that the hard work is yet to be done. The implementation of these and future commitments demands an increase of national and international efforts in order to reach the below 2°C-target. For this to be reached effectively, we need a legally-binding global framework that enables robust action by all Parties.

Mr. President, we did not come to Paris to adopt just some kind of an agreement. We came to Paris to adopt an agreement that is worth the time and energy spent. We came to Paris to adopt an ambitious, robust, dynamic and durable new agreement applicable to all that will set us on the pathway towards low-carbon and resilient societies and economies.

In order to adopt a durable and dynamic agreement, we need to take a pragmatic

and flexible approach to differentiation whereby all Parties have obligations in accordance with their responsibilities, capabilities and national circumstances.

To ensure the robustness of the agreement we need common rules and a unified transparency system that allows for a global aggregation of emissions without overburdening countries with limited capacities. Furthermore, we need a mechanism to continuously increase our ambition over time in all areas of the agreement.

We recognize the crucial role of the mobilization of climate finance and support to developing countries, in particular the poorest and most vulnerable, to implement the agreement. Over time all finance flows should promote and be consistent with the urgently needed transformation to low-carbon and climate-resilient economies.

The journey needs to continue after Paris: besides important elements to be decided here in Paris, we should set up a robust work program for the operationalization of the Paris agreement to make it fit for purpose from 2020. Furthermore, we need to continue to strengthen the international regime up to 2020.

Mr. President, the EIG came to Paris well prepared and ready to work hard with all Parties and the French presidency during these two weeks to reach such an ambitious global agreement.

Thank you Mr. President

**Joint COP 21/CMP 11 opening statement
Paris, 30 November 2015**

Dear Presidents, Distinguished Colleagues, Dear Friends,

This statement is made on behalf of the European Union and its Member States.

First of all, we would like to express our condolences to our host country, to all Parisians, and to all countries that have been the victims of senseless violence. We hope that COP21 can be a symbol of the determination of nations to work together across continents, faiths and borders towards a better future.

We would like to congratulate Peru for its successful steering of the UNFCCC process throughout the last year. You have made it possible for us to arrive to the point we are at now – very close to a good Paris outcome. We now welcome France – you have to take the baton for the final lap, bringing us to a result here that will herald the turning point in global climate action.

We are therefore truly happy to be in Paris after all the years of working towards this moment. We look forward to the culmination of our work here, to the adoption of a fair, effective, durable, global and ambitious Paris agreement and decisions putting our economies and societies onto a pathway that is compatible with achieving the ultimate objective of the Convention. In parallel we hope to progress the agenda items for the COP and the CMP significantly, solving outstanding issues and presenting an overall result of Paris to our citizens that we can be proud of.

Since the last COP in Lima, the political landscape has changed dramatically – almost all countries that are part of the UNFCCC have presented INDCs, demonstrating unprecedented determination to tackle one of the greatest global challenges that humanity faces of all time, climate change. Over 95% of global emissions are now covered by these plans, which are based on important domestic discussions on the policies and measures needed to achieve them, on how to

cooperate internationally to accelerate the implementation of the INDCs, and on the recognition that acting on climate change actually supports, and does not hamper economic development.

On the issue of climate finance, and the delivery on the Copenhagen pledge of USD 100bn by 2020, a recent report by the OECD and CPI shows that very significant public and private climate finance has been mobilised in support of developing countries - USD 62bn in 2014 and USD 52bn in 2013. Among the donors the EU and its Member States alone mobilised €14.5bn public climate finance in 2014, an increase compared to 2013. The EU and its Member States will further scale up climate finance by 2020, to ensure together with other developed countries that the goal of USD 100bn by 2020 is achieved. We will also make efforts to channel a substantial share of public climate finance towards adaptation, with a particular focus on support to the most vulnerable countries with least resources. Last year in Lima we welcomed the initial capitalisation of the Green Climate Fund (GCF) – and this year we particularly welcome the announcement of support for its first projects. The EU and its Member States have committed USD 4.7bn to the GCF – close to half of the funding of the GCF (46%). We recognise that post-2020 climate finance in the context of meaningful mitigation and transparency is a vital part of the Paris Agreement. The mobilisation of climate finance is central for a shift towards low-emission and climate-resilient economies and societies. In the Paris outcome we think that improved transparency is not only vital on action, but also support.

We also note the work of the Adaptation Committee in assisting the COP in reaching our shared objectives. The importance of capacity building has never been clearer, and the EU and its Member States are supporting a wide array of initiatives in this respect, including on gender responsiveness. The Warsaw Mechanism on Loss and Damage has also seen progress this year, and we welcome the initialisation of the work of the Executive Committee.

In respect of the CMP agenda, in Doha, the EU and its Member States agreed to join the second commitment period to the Kyoto Protocol as a bridge towards a post-2020 global climate change agreement. The legislation necessary for the EU to formally ratify the Doha Amendment has already been adopted in July 2015 and currently, the EU and its Member States are already successfully implementing the

domestic legislation which will deliver our 2nd commitment period target of 20% from 1990 levels by 2020. Meanwhile here in Paris we expect to see the formal adoption of the rules set for the technical implementation of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. It is crucial for us to have legal certainty about the specific rules which will apply to MRV and accounting obligations for the second commitment period.

The EU places great value on the positive momentum created by high-level ministerial events, including the June 2014 ministerial roundtable on increased ambition of Kyoto Protocol commitments. To this effect, the report of the secretariat on the high-level ministerial round table on increased ambition of Kyoto Protocol commitments has provided useful information. The EU considers that this process has ended now and that the CMP plenary should take note of the report without further consideration. However the lessons for this process will be hugely relevant for the new Paris agreement, in which the 5 yearly reviews are a central element and key for overall credibility.

We have heavy agendas and a lot to do, the EU is ready to work constructively to ensure smooth running and efficient handling of our programme. Paris must deliver. Now, more than ever, it is important for all of us here to show the world that we can work together to find solutions to our common challenges and pathways to shared opportunities.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR NOZIPHO MXAKATO-DISEKO FROM SOUTH AFRICA ON BEHALF OF THE GROUP OF 77 AND CHINA, AT THE OPENING PLENARY OF THE 21st CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE (COP21). PARIS, FRANCE, 30 NOVEMBER 2015

Excellencies

Distinguished representatives

Ladies and gentlemen

1. I have the honour to deliver this statement on behalf of the Group of 77 and China.
2. Let me congratulate France as the COP21 President and express our gratitude for your warm hospitality. You can count on the full support of our Group to secure the successful work of this COP. We wish to assure you of the Group's support and our readiness to engage constructively with all Parties.
3. I would also like to take this opportunity to acknowledge the excellent work done by Peru as President of COP20 and to thank them most sincerely for their efforts over the past year.

Mr. President

4. Warming of the climate system is unequivocal. Concentrations of greenhouse gases have increased and as a result the atmosphere and ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow and ice have diminished, sea level has risen, and the impacts are being felt in particular by developing countries.
5. Although developing countries have the least responsibility for climate change, they are the hardest hit and least able to respond.

Mr President

6. The implementation of existing commitments under the Convention is of crucial

importance. The COP provides an opportunity every year for the Parties to assess the progress made in the implementation of the Convention. In this regard, we need to use the COP to do introspection on the lessons learnt, as we are at the threshold of adopting a new universal agreement under the Convention that is set to catalyse the achievement of its objective.

7. Very important work on implementation is undertaken in the subsidiary bodies of the Convention and these should not be overshadowed by our focus on future commitments that will only take effect from 2020. We cannot lose the five years between now and 2020 by shifting our focus away from the urgent work that needs to progress in the subsidiary bodies to implement existing commitments.
8. Developed countries must take the lead in the lead up to the post-2020 era by honouring and accelerating the implementation and increase the ambition of their existing commitments on mitigation and provision of finance, technology development and transfer and capacity building support to developing country Parties. The fact is that many commitments by developed countries, related to the pre-2020 period still, remain unrealised, including the nearly three-year delay in ratifying the Doha Amendment and increasing the emission reduction targets to at least 25-40% by 2020. There is also, as yet, no clarity on how the six-year old commitment by developed countries of providing the US\$100 billion per year by 2020 to developing countries will be achieved.
9. We take note on the progress of the work on adaptation, particularly the Nairobi Work Programme, National Adaptation Plans and the Adaptation Committee. While we continue to assess the climate change impacts and vulnerabilities to various regions, it is important to take into account the need for planning processes and implementation of adaptation action, as well as commensurate support that is responsive to adaptation needs, and which transcend beyond planning levels and realise enhanced adaptation action at all levels. Greater focus on priorities and needs of adaptation enables a coherent and comprehensive response to climate change, not only in terms of mitigation, but also by tackling its impacts as a key variable to be considered in the Paris agreement and in national development agendas.
10. We welcome the report of the Adaptation Committee and the effort to make

balanced progress in all its work areas. We take note of the future workplan of the Committee and look forward to discussing it in the Contact Group. We also welcome the work completed on means of implementation for adaptation and we hope that its outcome translate into something that can expedite support for developing countries. We are prepared to engage with partners in reviewing the recommendations to the COP contained in the report.

11. The G77 welcomes the report of the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts. The work of the WIM and on loss and damage under this Convention is of critical important to the Group. In order for this mechanism to be meaningful, it must address the needs and challenges faced by developing countries emerging from extreme and slow-onset events. We urge developed country Parties to make available resources in view of the ambitious nature of the of the initial two-year workplan of the Executive Committee.
12. On finance, we reiterate that nothing under this Convention will be achieved without the provision of means of implementation to enable developing country Parties address climate change. Finance, including for the transfer of technology and capacity building is a crucial and key element of the Paris outcome. The outcome regarding finance must provide clarity on the level of financial support that will be provided by developed country Parties to developing country Parties to allow for enhanced implementation of the Convention in the post-2020 period, as well as existing commitment on pre-2020 finance. We require a substantial scaling up of finance from the 2020 base level of US\$100 billion and Annex I country Parties and other developed countries included in Annex II have the principal responsibility in providing support. This includes setting short-term collective goals for the post-2020 period that go beyond this floor, and are revised upwards every 5 years, while ensuring that the finance is new, additional, predictable and sustainable with an equal allocation between adaptation and mitigation. The financial mechanism of the Convention must serve as the financial mechanism of the legal agreement. The related funds established under the Kyoto Protocol and under the financial mechanism of the Convention must also serve as instruments of the new legal agreement.
13. On long-term finance, we need a decision that sets a clear pathway towards

achieving the US\$100 billion goal by 2020 and flows of finance, in particular for adaptation, under the financial mechanism of the Convention and the specialised funds. These should scale up, particularly in the context of increasing climate risks faced by developing countries. The decision in Paris must lay the foundations for the Long-Term Finance Ministerial session on the agreed thematic cluster of issues to be held at COP22 in Morocco.

14. Furthermore, in the work on transparency, it is important that progress is made on both transparency of action, as well as transparency of support, as an opportunity to improve our collective understanding of the different elements that encompass the response to climate change.
15. Various aspects of finance are discussed in a fragmented way across the Convention bodies. We believe that it will help the process if the linkages between all matters related to finance, whether it is under the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol or under the ADP can be discussed in a more comprehensive and coherent manner.

Mr President

16. Technology transfer is a key component for developing countries to be able to effectively address climate change. Effective mitigation and adaptation actions will depend on access to technology, including the development of endogenous technologies by developing countries. The Technology Mechanism has an important role to play in order to support the rapid transfer of technologies to developing countries, helping them innovate and develop their own technologies.
17. We would like to see concrete enhanced actions on technology development and transfer, accelerated and scaled up by the technology mechanism. In this regards, we believe it is crucial for the technology mechanism to strengthen its effective coordination with the financial mechanism, as well as to strengthen the linkages with relevant organisations.
18. We reaffirm that the process and outcome of the ADP should be in faithful to the Durban mandate focusing on the pre-2020 ambition gap, as well as the conclusion of the Paris agreement, which must be under the Convention and guided by and be in full accordance with all principles and provisions of the

Convention, in particular the principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities. The Paris agreement is to enhance the implementation of the Convention and must address the core elements mandated by the Durban decision (mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology development and transfer, capacity-building and transparency of action and support), as well as loss and damage and response measures in a comprehensive and balanced manner. Urgent action on the pre-2020 period is essential to build trust and create a platform for the post-2020 agreement.

Finally, Mr President

19. We want to express our support to you in guiding us to a successful conclusion of this conference through a transparent, inclusive and Party-driven process. The Group is committed to playing a positive and constructive role.

I thank you.

**Statement at the High-Level Segment
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change COP 21, Paris**

Republic of Korea

December 2015

(Mr. President,)
Excellencies,
Distinguished Delegates,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is a great honour for me to address this historic Conference which is seeking to adopt the post-2020 new climate regime.

First of all, on behalf of the people of the Republic of Korea, I would like to express my condolences to the victims and their families who suffered from the horrific terrorist attack in Paris. I would also like to convey my sincere gratitude to the Government and the people of France who have spared no effort to ensure the success of this Conference.

disasters do not respect national borders - they are occurring almost every day, and having ever more severe consequences. This reality is an urgent reminder of the pressing need to conclude a new agreement here in Paris. In this regard, I welcome the Draft Paris Outcome completed by the ADP last week. I believe that it will indeed be a good basis for our work to adopt an ambitious new climate agreement this week.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The new climate regime should serve as a platform for our endeavors toward reaching the common goal of holding the global temperature rise below 2°C. To do so, the new regime should meet the following requirements.

First, all countries should take climate action to achieve the long-term common goal, in light of their different circumstances and capabilities. The international community should provide support, including technology and capacity building, to ensure the active participation of developing countries in taking climate action.

Second, in accordance with the Paris agreement, all Parties should formulate and faithfully implement their INDCs, while seeking to make these more ambitious over time. This process will be instrumental in facilitating the global transformation toward low-emission, climate-resilient economies.

Third, the new climate regime should be a solid foundation, on which all stakeholders, including local governments, businesses and civil society organizations, cooperate together to combat climate change.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Korea has strived to play a constructive role in establishing the new climate regime. We submitted a fair and ambitious INDC in a timely manner. We have earnestly tried to set a valuable example in terms of making climate change a fresh opportunity to create future drivers of growth through the development of technology and innovation.

Korea is working with developing countries in coping with climate change, cooperating with the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI). We are also rendering support to more than forty countries for the establishment of their national greenhouse gas inventory systems.

Furthermore, Korea has been seeking to contribute to capacity building to cope with climate disasters resulting from extreme weather events.

We hosted the 6th International Wildland Fire Conference (IWFC) in Pyeongchang last October, working with the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction (UN ISDR) and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).

The Pyeongchang Declaration, the outcome from the 6th International Wildland Fire Conference (IWFC), appeals to the international community to consider the systematic application of the principles of Integrated Fire Management (IFM). In such ways, we will be able to maintain and increase terrestrial carbon stocks, and reduce unnecessary emissions of pollutants. In accordance with the Declaration, Korea along with ASEAN-ROK Forest Cooperation (AFoCO), will increase support for a wildland fire management training programme in Asian countries.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

There are now only three days left before we reach the deadline for concluding the new agreement. Now is a time for action – responsible action.

Thank you.

Opening statement for the High-level segment of the twenty-first sessions of the Conference of the Parties and the eleventh session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol delivered by Carole Dieschbourg and Miguel Arias Cañete on behalf of the European Union and its Member States

Paris, 7 December 2015

Carole Dieschbourg, Minister for the Environment, Luxembourg

Monsieur le Président, chers collègues, Mesdames, Messieurs.

Nous avons l'honneur de parler pour l'Union Européenne et ses Etats Membres.

Nous sommes venus à Paris pour ouvrir un nouveau chapitre de la lutte universelle contre le changement climatique et ses répercussions.

Mr President; Dear colleagues, Ladies and Gentlemen,

We have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union and its Member States.

We came here to Paris to open a new chapter in the global fight against climate change and its impacts.

We should be aware of our mission: during the next days we speak not only about numbers, about percentages and statistics. Behind the numbers are human lives – there are human destinies, it is about our planet. We have a big responsibility to deliver.

The new Agreement is now within reach. We have an opportunity to go down in history as ministers who together set the global economic development on a more sustainable course, on a course which leads to global stability and wellbeing.

We have been negotiating under the Convention for twenty years. We have made some steps forward, but they are clearly not enough. Global greenhouse gas emissions are still rising.

We need to stop this – and we need to act now!

We need a solid and ambitious agreement, applicable to all, to finally stem these

dangerous trends.

Mr President,

Our message today is simple: **we are confident we can rise to the challenge, if we all show openness and willingness to compromise.**

The world is now ready. Our leaders have signed off on 185 INDCs covering more than 95 % of emissions. Almost 150 Heads of State and Government came here last Monday to reconfirm their determination.

We also have strong support from the business community and civil society all over the world in all the activities and measures reflected in the Lima-Paris Action Agenda.

We would fail them if we left Paris without a robust agreement which has a long-term goal, assures transparency and upward review cycles.

We are confident because we now know that climate action is not only compatible with economic development – it's even the condition for further economic and human development.

We have evidence from around the globe that all points to the opportunities that come with transitioning to low carbon economy. Climate action carries multiple benefits – improved human health, access to sustainable energy; safer food and water supply – exactly the themes that countries highlighted most when presenting adaptation elements in their INDCs.

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development also recognises the intrinsic links between development and climate. And there is also the existing experience we have - since 1990, the European Union has cut its emissions by 23 per cent while growing our economy by 46 per cent. Now, we have set ourselves an even more ambitious target of at least 40 per cent reduction by 2030.

We know from experience that climate action is not a punishment or a straitjacket – it's a moral obligation and an economic opportunity.

Mr President,

We are also confident because we think the INDCs are only the beginning.

It can be very hard to design a climate policy for the first time. However, as we progress with implementation, we also realise the gains.

The Lima Paris Action Agenda of the Peruvian and French COP Presidencies shows that there is a vast amount of willingness from all stakeholders, including cities and businesses, to act. The role of non-state actors and regions has to be recognized in the agreement.

And we are confident because we know we can mobilise the necessary means. Climate finance, domestic and international, is flowing to both adaptation and mitigation. Not only are developed countries on track for the \$100 billion goal by 2020, but it is encouraging to see that South-South cooperation is also picking up.

With the Paris Agreement, we will be able not only to continue mobilising billions in public money, but also reorient trillions in private finance.

Let us seize the opportunities now and work together for a solid agreement. Let us realize that there is more that connects us than could possibly divide us. Let us show courage and commitment.

Miguel Arias Cañete, Commissioner for Climate Action and Energy, European Commission

Mr President,

The European Union came to Paris with a very clear objective: to conclude a **fair, inclusive, dynamic, durable and ambitious legally binding climate agreement** that will stop climate change over the century.

Paris is a historic opportunity that we cannot miss.

We must translate the momentum we have seen on the road to Paris into an **ambitious agreement**.

The European Union wants to sign an ambitious agreement and **not just any kind of agreement**.

We need a **robust agreement**.

We need a **credible agreement**.

We need an agreement **fit for purpose** and **fit for the future**.

We owe this to the outside world: our citizens and our children.

To succeed, we need every country doing its very best and the world moving together in the same direction. The world has changed for the better, and everyone needs to take responsibility.

For the European Union, the **credibility** of the deal will depend on our collective ambition.

First, mitigation ambition:

In order to really reduce global emissions, the agreement must have:

- A global vision for a long-term operational goal in line with science. This goal will tell us how and when we need to increase the ambition to meet our target;
- A regular review every five years to consider the progress made and raise our collective ambition. This is essential since we know that initial contributions will

not be enough to keep temperature increase within the below 2 degrees objective.

- A robust transparency and accountability system to ensure that what is promised will be delivered.

These elements are necessary to give the world the confidence that , we the governments, are determined to do what it takes to stop catastrophic climate change.

Second, adaptation ambition.

Beyond emissions reductions, this agreement must help countries, especially those most vulnerable, **adapt to climate change impacts.**

The European Union is the world's leader provider of climate finance with more than half of the total global climate finance.

Our message to the most vulnerable countries is very clear: **you can count on the European Union.**

We have done a lot in the past, and we will continue to do more.

Together, we must conclude a balanced agreement that will help us reduce emissions while helping the most vulnerable to adapt to the existing climate impacts.

Mr President,

These are not just the European Union's priorities.

Only a week ago here in Paris, we heard the global leaders call for these elements by and large in unison.

We have confidence in your leadership and in our collective wisdom and determination.

The European Union come here to Paris to seal an ambitious deal.

We look forward to the next few days.

Let us get the job done. Together.

COP21 閣僚級セッション
丸川環境大臣ステートメント（案）

（はじめに）

Thank you, Mr. President and distinguished delegates.

First of all, I would like to express my deepest condolences on the lives taken away and the injured by those horrible terror attacks. In the meantime, let me express my sincere gratitude to France for the excellent leadership as the COP21 Presidency. Japan also dedicates all of our efforts for the successful outcomes in the Paris agreement.

（新たな枠組みに対する考え）

Climate change is an urgent threat for human beings and the planet. It is a sign of the progress in our global efforts that the INDCs covering more than 95% of the total emission have submitted.

been

On the other hand, it is indicated that further mitigation efforts beyond the INDCs are required for achieving the 2-degree goal. In terms of global emission reduction, we need to make the framework applicable to all and effective as much as possible.

The Paris Agreement should enhance our ambition to reduce emissions over time by setting a global long term goal, a cycle whereby all Parties revisit and update their mitigation contribution every 5 years, and a unified but flexible transparency system that requires every country to report and to be reviewed on the progress of its implementation. We also support provisions of Global Stocktake in the legal agreement. It is important that each party utilizes the outcome of the global stocktake when developing its future actions.

（我が国の貢献：国内）

Japan steadily undertakes the emission reduction action in accordance with the long term goal which we have expressed in our future vision internationally and domestically. We submitted a target of 26% emission reduction of GHG by 2030. We will steadily implement the measures to achieve the target. We will establish a Plan for Global

Warming Countermeasures as soon as possible based on the COP21 agreement. Beyond that, we have the long term goal of emission reduction of GHG by 2050 in the Basic Environmental Plan. We address the climate change issue, through the transformation of the economy and social systems and lifestyles.

We utilize the tax revenue from the “Carbon Tax as Global Warming Measures,” which we introduced in 2012, to improve energy efficiency and to promote renewable energy nation-wide. We also attempt to develop and promote innovative low carbon products and technologies following LED.

The outcome of those measures is emerging. The total GHG emission in Japan had been increasing since the time around the Great East Japan Earthquake, until 2014 when it was reduced by 3% from the previous year. We will proactively promote the global warming measures furthermore.

In recent years Japan has been hit by extreme ~~whether~~ events such as powerful typhoons the negative impacts of global warming become noticeable without distinction between developing countries and developed ones. Japan has recently developed its national adaptation plan based on detailed impact assessment, and will implement concrete measures according to the plan.

(我が国の貢献：国外)

During the Leaders Event, Prime Minister Abe announced the “Actions for Cool Earth 2.0 (ACE 2.0)”. In order to support developing countries which take actions to cope with climate change, Japan will provide, in 2020, approximately 1.3 trillion Japanese yen of public and private climate finance, 1.3 times up from the current level, to developing countries. Also by strengthening the development of innovative technologies, Japan will strongly uphold global climate action.

Japan has established the Joint Crediting Mechanism with 16 countries. 50 registered projects are implemented including the installation of energy conservation facility at a cement factory in Indonesia and the improvement of transmission efficiency in Vietnam.

We will continue with the steady and concrete international contributions through the inter-city cooperation and capacity building programs, by utilizing our leading low-carbon technologies, experiences and human resources on environmental management.

Taking advantage of our experiences on the Japan's adaptation planning, we will contribute to global transformation to climate resilient society by supporting for the development of adaptation plans and climate change impact assessments in developing countries. We are also making efforts to strengthen the knowledge sharing networks, such as the Global Adaptation Network (GAN) in order to share information and experiences across the region.

(おわりに)

This COP21 is a starting point for the world to collectively tackle with climate change. I swear to do my best to contribute to the success of COP21 in order to meet the strong will that leaders of states have shown.

Thank you.



**STATEMENT BY SOUTH AFRICA ON BEHALF OF THE GROUP
OF 77 AND CHINA**

OPENING OF THE HIGH-LEVEL SEGMENT OF COP21/CMP11

MONDAY, 7 DECEMBER 2015, PARIS

Mr President

Your Excellency, Mr Secretary-General

Madam Executive Secretary

Excellencies

Distinguished delegates

Ladies and gentlemen

1. I make this statement on behalf of my Minister, Ms Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, Minister of International Relations and Cooperation of South Africa, who sends her greetings and apologies for not being able to be here in person today. South Africa has the honour to speak on behalf of the Group of 77 and China.
2. At the outset, the Group wishes to express its full support to you Minister Fabius at this historic conference as you guide us

towards a fair and ambitious outcome of this conference and we thank you for the leadership role you have played throughout the year with the President of COP20 from Peru.

3. This is indeed an historic moment for the G77 and China that is more united than ever before. The G77 and China represent about 85% of the world's population and there can be no meaningful agreement if the Group's concerns are not taken into account.
4. As developing countries we share a common commitment to address the climate challenge in a manner that ensures that we achieve our goal of limiting temperature rise to safe levels, while at the same time allowing flexibility to developing countries to pursue their sustainable development priorities.
5. Our people suffer the effects of climate change first hand. In many cases climate change threatens the very existence and survival of countries, societies and the ecosystems of our Mother Earth. In light of this reality, developing countries have already taken ambitious steps to address climate change, mostly without adequate finance, technology and capacity-building support, despite the fact that our countries are home to the vast majority of the world's people living in poverty. This commitment is demonstrated by the unprecedented fact that nearly all developing countries have submitted intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs) that outline the ambitious action they intend to take in the post-2020 period. Many of these INDCs include a component on adaptation:

action which we have to take as a result mostly of the historical emissions by developed countries. This was done without any concrete reassurances from our partners that post-2020 support will be available.

President

6. The starting point for the G77 and China is that the mandate of our work is the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action. This mandate requires us to enhance the full, effective and sustained implementation of the Convention. We are not here in Paris to renegotiate, rewrite or reinterpret the Convention. Our objective is to strengthen the multilateral rules-based system under the Convention in accordance with its principles and provisions.
7. The Group of 77 and China reiterates that the agreement must be under the Convention, applicable to all Parties and based on its principles and provisions, in particular the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.
8. The core elements mandated by the Durban mandate, namely mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology development and transfer, capacity-building and transparency of action and support, as well as loss and damage and response measures must be addressed in a comprehensive and balanced manner, both in the agreement and in the COP decisions. Adaptation and mitigation must receive the same priority and must be

supported by finance, technology development and transfer and capacity-building by developed country Parties on a scale that matches the level of action required to achieve the objective of the Convention as set out in Article 2 of the Convention. We therefore call on developed country Parties to take the lead through undertaking ambitious emission reduction commitments and providing enhanced finance, technology development and transfer and capacity-building support to developing country Parties for their ambitious mitigation and adaptation actions.

9. The Group of 77 and China regards the work on pre-2020 ambition as an integral part of the ADP that has direct bearing on the successful adoption of the 2015 agreement. Enhanced pre-2020 ambition will provide a strong basis for post-2020 cooperation.
10. The urgent entry into force of the Doha Amendment would be an important signal to the world that Parties are committed to closing the pre-2020 ambition gap. Scaling up climate finance towards the goal of US\$100 billion by 2020 will also provide the resources required by developing countries to enhance pre-2020 mitigation and adaptation actions.

President

11. Finance, technology development and transfer and capacity building are crucial and key elements of the Paris outcome. The outcome regarding finance must provide clarity on the level

of financial support that will be provided by developed country Parties to developing country Parties to allow for enhanced implementation of the Convention in the post-2020 period, as well as existing commitment on pre-2020 finance. We require a substantial scaling up of finance from the 2020 base level of US\$100 billion and Annex I country Parties and other developed countries included in Annex II have the principal responsibility in providing support, which must be new, additional, predictable and sustainable with an equal allocation between adaptation and mitigation.

12. Very important work on implementation is also undertaken under the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol, which should not be overshadowed by our focus on future commitments that will only take effect from 2020. We cannot lose the five years between now and 2020 by shifting our focus away from the urgent work that needs to progress in the subsidiary bodies to implement existing commitments.

President

13. There can be no doubt that the Group of 77 and China are committed to play our part in addressing the global challenge of climate change. In order for the Group to turn this commitment into real actions, we have repeatedly called on developed countries to provide the necessary support to enable the members of the Group to take on their fair share of the global effort. This pre- and post-2020 support is essential to enable developing countries to unlock their full mitigation potential and


to allow them to adapt to climate change and its associated loss and damage.

President

14. Ministers of the G77 and China are here in Paris ready to engage constructively to find solutions to the outstanding political issues to enable us to deliver a strong outcome.

I thank you.

V. 제21차 기후변화협약
당사국총회(COP21) 채택 결정문





United Nations

Framework Convention on
Climate Change

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Conference of the Parties**Report of the Conference of the Parties on its twenty-first
session, held in Paris from 30 November to 13 December 2015****Addendum****Part two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its
twenty-first session****Contents****Decisions adopted by the Conference of the Parties**

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Decision 1/CP.21

Adoption of the Paris Agreement

The Conference of the Parties,

Recalling decision 1/CP.17 on the establishment of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action,

Also recalling Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Convention,

Further recalling relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties, including decisions 1/CP.16, 2/CP.18, 1/CP.19 and 1/CP.20,

Welcoming the adoption of United Nations General Assembly resolution A/RES/70/1, “Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”, in particular its goal 13, and the adoption of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the third International Conference on Financing for Development and the adoption of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction,

Recognizing that climate change represents an urgent and potentially irreversible threat to human societies and the planet and thus requires the widest possible cooperation by all countries, and their participation in an effective and appropriate international response, with a view to accelerating the reduction of global greenhouse gas emissions,

Also recognizing that deep reductions in global emissions will be required in order to achieve the ultimate objective of the Convention and *emphasizing* the need for urgency in addressing climate change,

Acknowledging that climate change is a common concern of humankind, Parties should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights, the right to health, the rights of indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations and the right to development, as well as gender equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity,

Also acknowledging the specific needs and concerns of developing country Parties arising from the impact of the implementation of response measures and, in this regard, decisions 5/CP.7, 1/CP.10, 1/CP.16 and 8/CP.17,

Emphasizing with serious concern the urgent need to address the significant gap between the aggregate effect of Parties’ mitigation pledges in terms of global annual emissions of greenhouse gases by 2020 and aggregate emission pathways consistent with holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels,

Also emphasizing that enhanced pre-2020 ambition can lay a solid foundation for enhanced post-2020 ambition,

Stressing the urgency of accelerating the implementation of the Convention and its Kyoto Protocol in order to enhance pre-2020 ambition,

Recognizing the urgent need to enhance the provision of finance, technology and capacity-building support by developed country Parties, in a predictable manner, to enable enhanced pre-2020 action by developing country Parties,

Emphasizing the enduring benefits of ambitious and early action, including major reductions in the cost of future mitigation and adaptation efforts,

Acknowledging the need to promote universal access to sustainable energy in developing countries, in particular in Africa, through the enhanced deployment of renewable energy,

Agreeing to uphold and promote regional and international cooperation in order to mobilize stronger and more ambitious climate action by all Parties and non-Party stakeholders, including civil society, the private sector, financial institutions, cities and other subnational authorities, local communities and indigenous peoples,

I. Adoption

1. *Decides* to adopt the Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (hereinafter referred to as “the Agreement”) as contained in the annex;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General of the United Nations to be the Depositary of the Agreement and to have it open for signature in New York, United States of America, from 22 April 2016 to 21 April 2017;
3. *Invites* the Secretary-General to convene a high-level signature ceremony for the Agreement on 22 April 2016;
4. *Also invites* all Parties to the Convention to sign the Agreement at the ceremony to be convened by the Secretary-General, or at their earliest opportunity, and to deposit their respective instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, where appropriate, as soon as possible;
5. *Recognizes* that Parties to the Convention may provisionally apply all of the provisions of the Agreement pending its entry into force, and *requests* Parties to provide notification of any such provisional application to the Depositary;
6. *Notes* that the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, in accordance with decision 1/CP.17, paragraph 4, has been completed;
7. *Decides* to establish the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement under the same arrangement, mutatis mutandis, as those concerning the election of officers to the Bureau of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action;¹
8. *Also decides* that the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement shall prepare for the entry into force of the Agreement and for the convening of the first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement;
9. *Further decides* to oversee the implementation of the work programme resulting from the relevant requests contained in this decision;
10. *Requests* the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement to report regularly to the Conference of the Parties on the progress of its work and to complete its work by the first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement;
11. *Decides* that the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement shall hold its sessions starting in 2016 in conjunction with the sessions of the Convention subsidiary bodies and shall prepare draft decisions to be recommended through the Conference of the Parties to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement for consideration and adoption at its first session;

¹ Endorsed by decision 2/CP.18, paragraph 2.

II. Intended nationally determined contributions

12. *Welcomes* the intended nationally determined contributions that have been communicated by Parties in accordance with decision 1/CP.19, paragraph 2(b);

13. *Reiterates* its invitation to all Parties that have not yet done so to communicate to the secretariat their intended nationally determined contributions towards achieving the objective of the Convention as set out in its Article 2 as soon as possible and well in advance of the twenty-second session of the Conference of the Parties (November 2016) and in a manner that facilitates the clarity, transparency and understanding of the intended nationally determined contributions;

14. *Requests* the secretariat to continue to publish the intended nationally determined contributions communicated by Parties on the UNFCCC website;

15. *Reiterates* its call to developed country Parties, the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism and any other organizations in a position to do so to provide support for the preparation and communication of the intended nationally determined contributions of Parties that may need such support;

16. *Takes note* of the synthesis report on the aggregate effect of intended nationally determined contributions communicated by Parties by 1 October 2015, contained in document FCCC/CP/2015/7;

17. *Notes with concern* that the estimated aggregate greenhouse gas emission levels in 2025 and 2030 resulting from the intended nationally determined contributions do not fall within least-cost 2 °C scenarios but rather lead to a projected level of 55 gigatonnes in 2030, and *also notes* that much greater emission reduction efforts will be required than those associated with the intended nationally determined contributions in order to hold the increase in the global average temperature to below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels by reducing emissions to 40 gigatonnes or to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels by reducing to a level to be identified in the special report referred to in paragraph 21 below;

18. *Further notes*, in this context, the adaptation needs expressed by many developing country Parties in their intended nationally determined contributions;

19. *Requests* the secretariat to update the synthesis report referred to in paragraph 16 above so as to cover all the information in the intended nationally determined contributions communicated by Parties pursuant to decision 1/CP.20 by 4 April 2016 and to make it available by 2 May 2016;

20. *Decides* to convene a facilitative dialogue among Parties in 2018 to take stock of the collective efforts of Parties in relation to progress towards the long-term goal referred to in Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Agreement and to inform the preparation of nationally determined contributions pursuant to Article 4, paragraph 8, of the Agreement;

21. *Invites* the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change to provide a special report in 2018 on the impacts of global warming of 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways;

III. Decisions to give effect to the Agreement

Mitigation

22. *Also invites* Parties to communicate their first nationally determined contribution no later than when the Party submits its respective instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession of the Paris Agreement; if a Party has communicated an intended

nationally determined contribution prior to joining the Agreement, that Party shall be considered to have satisfied this provision unless that Party decides otherwise;

23. *Requests* those Parties whose intended nationally determined contribution pursuant to decision 1/CP.20 contains a time frame up to 2025 to communicate by 2020 a new nationally determined contribution and to do so every five years thereafter pursuant to Article 4, paragraph 9, of the Agreement;

24. *Also requests* those Parties whose intended nationally determined contribution pursuant to decision 1/CP.20 contains a time frame up to 2030 to communicate or update by 2020 these contributions and to do so every five years thereafter pursuant to Article 4, paragraph 9, of the Agreement;

25. *Decides* that Parties shall submit to the secretariat their nationally determined contributions referred to in Article 4 of the Agreement at least 9 to 12 months in advance of the relevant session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement with a view to facilitating the clarity, transparency and understanding of these contributions, including through a synthesis report prepared by the secretariat;

26. *Requests* the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement to develop further guidance on features of the nationally determined contributions for consideration and adoption by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its first session;

27. *Agrees* that the information to be provided by Parties communicating their nationally determined contributions, in order to facilitate clarity, transparency and understanding, may include, as appropriate, inter alia, quantifiable information on the reference point (including, as appropriate, a base year), time frames and/or periods for implementation, scope and coverage, planning processes, assumptions and methodological approaches including those for estimating and accounting for anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions and, as appropriate, removals, and how the Party considers that its nationally determined contribution is fair and ambitious, in the light of its national circumstances, and how it contributes towards achieving the objective of the Convention as set out in its Article 2;

28. *Requests* the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement to develop further guidance for the information to be provided by Parties in order to facilitate clarity, transparency and understanding of nationally determined contributions for consideration and adoption by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its first session;

29. *Also requests* the Subsidiary Body for Implementation to develop modalities and procedures for the operation and use of the public registry referred to in Article 4, paragraph 12, of the Agreement, for consideration and adoption by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its first session;

30. *Further requests* the secretariat to make available an interim public registry in the first half of 2016 for the recording of nationally determined contributions submitted in accordance with Article 4 of the Agreement, pending the adoption by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement of the modalities and procedures referred to in paragraph 29 above;

31. *Requests* the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement to elaborate, drawing from approaches established under the Convention and its related legal instruments as appropriate, guidance for accounting for Parties' nationally determined contributions, as referred to in Article 4, paragraph 13, of the Agreement, for consideration and adoption by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its first session, which ensures that:

(a) Parties account for anthropogenic emissions and removals in accordance with methodologies and common metrics assessed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and adopted by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement;

(b) Parties ensure methodological consistency, including on baselines, between the communication and implementation of nationally determined contributions;

(c) Parties strive to include all categories of anthropogenic emissions or removals in their nationally determined contributions and, once a source, sink or activity is included, continue to include it;

(d) Parties shall provide an explanation of why any categories of anthropogenic emissions or removals are excluded;

32. *Decides* that Parties shall apply the guidance referred to in paragraph 31 above to the second and subsequent nationally determined contributions and that Parties may elect to apply such guidance to their first nationally determined contribution;

33. *Also decides* that the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures, under the subsidiary bodies, shall continue, and shall serve the Agreement;

34. *Further decides* that the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation shall recommend, for consideration and adoption by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its first session, the modalities, work programme and functions of the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures to address the effects of the implementation of response measures under the Agreement by enhancing cooperation amongst Parties on understanding the impacts of mitigation actions under the Agreement and the exchange of information, experiences, and best practices amongst Parties to raise their resilience to these impacts;

35. *Invites* Parties to communicate, by 2020, to the secretariat mid-century, long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies in accordance with Article 4, paragraph 19, of the Agreement, and *requests* the secretariat to publish on the UNFCCC website Parties' low greenhouse gas emission development strategies as communicated;

36. *Requests* the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice to develop and recommend the guidance referred to under Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Agreement for consideration and adoption by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its first session, including guidance to ensure that double counting is avoided on the basis of a corresponding adjustment by Parties for both anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks covered by their nationally determined contributions under the Agreement;

37. *Recommends* that the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement adopt rules, modalities and procedures for the mechanism established by Article 6, paragraph 4, of the Agreement on the basis of:

(a) Voluntary participation authorized by each Party involved;

(b) Real, measurable, and long-term benefits related to the mitigation of climate change;

(c) Specific scopes of activities;

(d) Reductions in emissions that are additional to any that would otherwise occur;

(e) Verification and certification of emission reductions resulting from mitigation activities by designated operational entities;

(f) Experience gained with and lessons learned from existing mechanisms and approaches adopted under the Convention and its related legal instruments;

38. *Requests* the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice to develop and recommend rules, modalities and procedures for the mechanism referred to in paragraph 37 above for consideration and adoption by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its first session;

39. *Also requests* the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice to undertake a work programme under the framework for non-market approaches to sustainable development referred to in Article 6, paragraph 8, of the Agreement, with the objective of considering how to enhance linkages and create synergy between, inter alia, mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology transfer and capacity-building, and how to facilitate the implementation and coordination of non-market approaches;

40. *Further requests* the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice to recommend a draft decision on the work programme referred to in paragraph 39 above, taking into account the views of Parties, for consideration and adoption by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its first session;

Adaptation

41. *Requests* the Adaptation Committee and the Least Developed Countries Expert Group to jointly develop modalities to recognize the adaptation efforts of developing country Parties, as referred to in Article 7, paragraph 3, of the Agreement, and make recommendations for consideration and adoption by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its first session;

42. *Also requests* the Adaptation Committee, taking into account its mandate and its second three-year workplan, and with a view to preparing recommendations for consideration and adoption by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its first session:

(a) To review, in 2017, the work of adaptation-related institutional arrangements under the Convention, with a view to identifying ways to enhance the coherence of their work, as appropriate, in order to respond adequately to the needs of Parties;

(b) To consider methodologies for assessing adaptation needs with a view to assisting developing country Parties, without placing an undue burden on them;

43. *Invites* all relevant United Nations agencies and international, regional and national financial institutions to provide information to Parties through the secretariat on how their development assistance and climate finance programmes incorporate climate-proofing and climate resilience measures;

44. *Requests* Parties to strengthen regional cooperation on adaptation where appropriate and, where necessary, establish regional centres and networks, in particular in developing countries, taking into account decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 30;

45. *Also requests* the Adaptation Committee and the Least Developed Countries Expert Group, in collaboration with the Standing Committee on Finance and other relevant institutions, to develop methodologies, and make recommendations for consideration and adoption by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its first session on:

(a) Taking the necessary steps to facilitate the mobilization of support for adaptation in developing countries in the context of the limit to global average temperature increase referred to in Article 2 of the Agreement;

(b) Reviewing the adequacy and effectiveness of adaptation and support referred to in Article 7, paragraph 14(c), of the Agreement;

46. *Further requests* the Green Climate Fund to expedite support for the least developed countries and other developing country Parties for the formulation of national adaptation plans, consistent with decisions 1/CP.16 and 5/CP.17, and for the subsequent implementation of policies, projects and programmes identified by them;

Loss and damage

47. *Decides* on the continuation of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts, following the review in 2016;

48. *Requests* the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism to establish a clearing house for risk transfer that serves as a repository for information on insurance and risk transfer, in order to facilitate the efforts of Parties to develop and implement comprehensive risk management strategies;

49. *Also requests* the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism to establish, according to its procedures and mandate, a task force to complement, draw upon the work of and involve, as appropriate, existing bodies and expert groups under the Convention including the Adaptation Committee and the Least Developed Countries Expert Group, as well as relevant organizations and expert bodies outside the Convention, to develop recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change;

50. *Further requests* the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism to initiate its work, at its next meeting, to operationalize the provisions referred to in paragraphs 48 and 49 above, and to report on progress thereon in its annual report;

51. *Agrees* that Article 8 of the Agreement does not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation;

Finance

52. *Decides* that, in the implementation of the Agreement, financial resources provided to developing country Parties should enhance the implementation of their policies, strategies, regulations and action plans and their climate change actions with respect to both mitigation and adaptation to contribute to the achievement of the purpose of the Agreement as defined in its Article 2;

53. *Also decides* that, in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 3, of the Agreement, developed countries intend to continue their existing collective mobilization goal through 2025 in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation; prior to 2025 the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement shall set a new collective quantified goal from a floor of USD 100 billion per year, taking into account the needs and priorities of developing countries;

54. *Recognizes* the importance of adequate and predictable financial resources, including for results-based payments, as appropriate, for the implementation of policy approaches and positive incentives for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks; as well as alternative policy approaches, such as joint mitigation and adaptation approaches for the integral and sustainable management of forests; while reaffirming the importance of non-carbon benefits associated with such

approaches; encouraging the coordination of support from, inter alia, public and private, bilateral and multilateral sources, such as the Green Climate Fund, and alternative sources in accordance with relevant decisions by the Conference of the Parties;

55. *Decides* to initiate, at its twenty-second session, a process to identify the information to be provided by Parties, in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 5, of the Agreement with a view to providing a recommendation for consideration and adoption by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its first session;

56. *Also decides* to ensure that the provision of information in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 7, of the Agreement shall be undertaken in accordance with the modalities, procedures and guidelines referred to in paragraph 91 below;

57. *Requests* the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice to develop modalities for the accounting of financial resources provided and mobilized through public interventions in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 7, of the Agreement for consideration by the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-fourth session (November 2018), with a view to making a recommendation for consideration and adoption by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its first session;

58. *Decides* that the Green Climate Fund and the Global Environment Facility, the entities entrusted with the operation of the Financial Mechanism of the Convention, as well as the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund, administered by the Global Environment Facility, shall serve the Agreement;

59. *Recognizes* that the Adaptation Fund may serve the Agreement, subject to relevant decisions by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol and the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement;

60. *Invites* the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol to consider the issue referred to in paragraph 59 above and make a recommendation to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its first session;

61. *Recommends* that the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement shall provide guidance to the entities entrusted with the operation of the Financial Mechanism of the Convention on the policies, programme priorities and eligibility criteria related to the Agreement for transmission by the Conference of the Parties;

62. *Decides* that the guidance to the entities entrusted with the operations of the Financial Mechanism of the Convention in relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties, including those agreed before adoption of the Agreement, shall apply *mutatis mutandis* to the Agreement;

63. *Also decides* that the Standing Committee on Finance shall serve the Agreement in line with its functions and responsibilities established under the Conference of the Parties;

64. *Urges* the institutions serving the Agreement to enhance the coordination and delivery of resources to support country-driven strategies through simplified and efficient application and approval procedures, and through continued readiness support to developing country Parties, including the least developed countries and small island developing States, as appropriate;

Technology development and transfer

65. *Takes note* of the interim report of the Technology Executive Committee on guidance on enhanced implementation of the results of technology needs assessments as contained in document FCCC/SB/2015/INF.3;

66. *Decides* to strengthen the Technology Mechanism and *requests* the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network, in supporting the implementation of the Agreement, to undertake further work relating to, inter alia:

(a) Technology research, development and demonstration;

(b) The development and enhancement of endogenous capacities and technologies;

67. *Requests* the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice to initiate, at its forty-fourth session (May 2016), the elaboration of the technology framework established under Article 10, paragraph 4, of the Agreement and to report on its findings to the Conference of the Parties, with a view to the Conference of the Parties making a recommendation on the framework to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement for consideration and adoption at its first session, taking into consideration that the framework should facilitate, inter alia:

(a) The undertaking and updating of technology needs assessments, as well as the enhanced implementation of their results, particularly technology action plans and project ideas, through the preparation of bankable projects;

(b) The provision of enhanced financial and technical support for the implementation of the results of the technology needs assessments;

(c) The assessment of technologies that are ready for transfer;

(d) The enhancement of enabling environments for and the addressing of barriers to the development and transfer of socially and environmentally sound technologies;

68. *Decides* that the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network shall report to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement, through the subsidiary bodies, on their activities to support the implementation of the Agreement;

69. *Also decides* to undertake a periodic assessment of the effectiveness and adequacy of the support provided to the Technology Mechanism in supporting the implementation of the Agreement on matters relating to technology development and transfer;

70. *Requests* the Subsidiary Body for Implementation to initiate, at its forty-fourth session, the elaboration of the scope of and modalities for the periodic assessment referred to in paragraph 69 above, taking into account the review of the Climate Technology Centre and Network as referred to in decision 2/CP.17, annex VII, paragraph 20, and the modalities for the global stocktake referred to in Article 14 of the Agreement, for consideration and adoption by the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-fifth session (November 2019);

Capacity-building

71. *Decides* to establish the Paris Committee on Capacity-building whose aim will be to address gaps and needs, both current and emerging, in implementing capacity-building in developing country Parties and further enhancing capacity-building efforts, including with regard to coherence and coordination in capacity-building activities under the Convention;

72. *Also decides* that the Paris Committee on Capacity-building will manage and oversee the workplan referred to in paragraph 73 below;

73. *Further decides* to launch a workplan for the period 2016–2020 with the following activities:

(a) Assessing how to increase synergies through cooperation and avoid duplication among existing bodies established under the Convention that implement capacity-building activities, including through collaborating with institutions under and outside the Convention;

(b) Identifying capacity gaps and needs and recommending ways to address them;

(c) Promoting the development and dissemination of tools and methodologies for the implementation of capacity-building;

(d) Fostering global, regional, national and subnational cooperation;

(e) Identifying and collecting good practices, challenges, experiences and lessons learned from work on capacity-building by bodies established under the Convention;

(f) Exploring how developing country Parties can take ownership of building and maintaining capacity over time and space;

(g) Identifying opportunities to strengthen capacity at the national, regional and subnational level;

(h) Fostering dialogue, coordination, collaboration and coherence among relevant processes and initiatives under the Convention, including through exchanging information on capacity-building activities and strategies of bodies established under the Convention;

(i) Providing guidance to the secretariat on the maintenance and further development of the web-based capacity-building portal;

74. *Decides* that the Paris Committee on Capacity-building will annually focus on an area or theme related to enhanced technical exchange on capacity-building, with the purpose of maintaining up-to-date knowledge on the successes and challenges in building capacity effectively in a particular area;

75. *Requests* the Subsidiary Body for Implementation to organize annual in-session meetings of the Paris Committee on Capacity-building;

76. *Also requests* the Subsidiary Body for Implementation to develop the terms of reference for the Paris Committee on Capacity-building, in the context of the third comprehensive review of the implementation of the capacity-building framework, also taking into account paragraphs 71–75 above and paragraphs 79 and 80 below, with a view to recommending a draft decision on this matter for consideration and adoption by the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-second session;

77. *Invites* Parties to submit their views on the membership of the Paris Committee on Capacity-building by 9 March 2016;²

78. *Requests* the secretariat to compile the submissions referred to in paragraph 77 above into a miscellaneous document for consideration by the Subsidiary Body for Implementation at its forty-fourth session;

79. *Decides* that the inputs to the Paris Committee on Capacity-building will include, inter alia, submissions, the outcome of the third comprehensive review of the implementation of the capacity-building framework, the secretariat's annual synthesis report on the implementation of the framework for capacity-building in developing

² Parties should submit their views via the submissions portal at <<http://www.unfccc.int/5900>>.

countries, the secretariat's compilation and synthesis report on capacity-building work of bodies established under the Convention and its Kyoto Protocol, and reports on the Durban Forum and the capacity-building portal;

80. *Requests* the Paris Committee on Capacity-building to prepare annual technical progress reports on its work, and to make these reports available at the sessions of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation coinciding with the sessions of the Conference of the Parties;

81. *Decides*, at its twenty-fifth session, to review the progress, need for extension, the effectiveness and enhancement of the Paris Committee on Capacity-building and to take any action it considers appropriate, with a view to making recommendations to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its first session on enhancing institutional arrangements for capacity-building consistent with Article 11, paragraph 5, of the Agreement;

82. *Calls upon* all Parties to ensure that education, training and public awareness, as reflected in Article 6 of the Convention and in Article 12 of the Agreement, are adequately considered in their contribution to capacity-building;

83. *Invites* the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement, at its first session, to explore ways of enhancing the implementation of training, public awareness, public participation and public access to information so as to enhance actions under the Agreement;

Transparency of action and support

84. *Decides* to establish a Capacity-building Initiative for Transparency in order to build institutional and technical capacity, both pre- and post-2020; this initiative will support developing country Parties, upon request, in meeting enhanced transparency requirements as defined in Article 13 of the Agreement in a timely manner;

85. *Also decides* that the Capacity-building Initiative for Transparency will aim:

(a) To strengthen national institutions for transparency-related activities in line with national priorities;

(b) To provide relevant tools, training and assistance for meeting the provisions stipulated in Article 13 of the Agreement;

(c) To assist in the improvement of transparency over time;

86. *Urges and requests* the Global Environment Facility to make arrangements to support the establishment and operation of the Capacity-building Initiative for Transparency as a priority reporting-related need, including through voluntary contributions to support developing country Parties in the sixth replenishment of the Global Environment Facility and future replenishment cycles, to complement existing support under the Global Environment Facility;

87. *Decides* to assess the implementation of the Capacity-building Initiative for Transparency in the context of the seventh review of the Financial Mechanism;

88. *Requests* that the Global Environment Facility, as an operating entity of the Financial Mechanism, include in its annual report to the Conference of the Parties the progress of work in the design, development and implementation of the Capacity-building Initiative for Transparency referred to in paragraph 84 above starting in 2016;

89. *Decides* that, in accordance with Article 13, paragraph 2, of the Agreement, developing country Parties shall be provided flexibility in the implementation of the provisions of that Article, including in the scope, frequency and level of detail of reporting,

and in the scope of review, and that the scope of review could provide for in-country reviews to be optional, while such flexibilities shall be reflected in the development of modalities, procedures and guidelines referred to in paragraph 91 below;

90. *Also decides* that all Parties, except for the least developed country Parties and small island developing States, shall submit the information referred to in Article 13, paragraphs 7, 8, 9 and 10, of the Agreement, as appropriate, no less frequently than on a biennial basis, and that the least developed country Parties and small island developing States may submit this information at their discretion;

91. *Requests* the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement to develop recommendations for modalities, procedures and guidelines in accordance with Article 13, paragraph 13, of the Agreement, and to define the year of their first and subsequent review and update, as appropriate, at regular intervals, for consideration by the Conference of the Parties, at its twenty-fourth session, with a view to forwarding them to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement for consideration and adoption at its first session;

92. *Also requests* the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement, in developing the recommendations for the modalities, procedures and guidelines referred to in paragraph 91 above, to take into account, inter alia:

(a) The importance of facilitating improved reporting and transparency over time;

(b) The need to provide flexibility to those developing country Parties that need it in the light of their capacities;

(c) The need to promote transparency, accuracy, completeness, consistency and comparability;

(d) The need to avoid duplication as well as undue burden on Parties and the secretariat;

(e) The need to ensure that Parties maintain at least the frequency and quality of reporting in accordance with their respective obligations under the Convention;

(f) The need to ensure that double counting is avoided;

(g) The need to ensure environmental integrity;

93. *Further requests* the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement, in developing the modalities, procedures and guidelines referred to in paragraph 91 above, to draw on the experiences from and take into account other ongoing relevant processes under the Convention;

94. *Requests* the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement, in developing the modalities, procedures and guidelines referred to in paragraph 91 above, to consider, inter alia:

(a) The types of flexibility available to those developing country Parties that need it on the basis of their capacities;

(b) The consistency between the methodology communicated in the nationally determined contribution and the methodology for reporting on progress made towards achieving individual Parties' respective nationally determined contribution;

(c) That Parties report information on adaptation action and planning including, if appropriate, their national adaptation plans, with a view to collectively exchanging information and sharing lessons learned;

(d) Support provided, enhancing delivery of support for both adaptation and mitigation through, inter alia, the common tabular formats for reporting support, and taking into account issues considered by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice on methodologies for reporting on financial information, and enhancing the reporting by developing country Parties on support received, including the use, impact and estimated results thereof;

(e) Information in the biennial assessments and other reports of the Standing Committee on Finance and other relevant bodies under the Convention;

(f) Information on the social and economic impact of response measures;

95. *Also requests* the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement, in developing recommendations for the modalities, procedures and guidelines referred to in paragraph 91 above, to enhance the transparency of support provided in accordance with Article 9 of the Agreement;

96. *Further requests* the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement to report on the progress of work on the modalities, procedures and guidelines referred to in paragraph 91 above to future sessions of the Conference of the Parties, and that this work be concluded no later than 2018;

97. *Decides* that the modalities, procedures and guidelines developed under paragraph 91 above shall be applied upon the entry into force of the Paris Agreement;

98. *Also decides* that the modalities, procedures and guidelines of this transparency framework shall build upon and eventually supersede the measurement, reporting and verification system established by decision 1/CP.16, paragraphs 40–47 and 60–64, and decision 2/CP.17, paragraphs 12–62, immediately following the submission of the final biennial reports and biennial update reports;

Global stocktake

99. *Requests* the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement to identify the sources of input for the global stocktake referred to in Article 14 of the Agreement and to report to the Conference of the Parties, with a view to the Conference of the Parties making a recommendation to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement for consideration and adoption at its first session, including, but not limited to:

(a) Information on:

(i) The overall effect of the nationally determined contributions communicated by Parties;

(ii) The state of adaptation efforts, support, experiences and priorities from the communications referred to in Article 7, paragraphs 10 and 11, of the Agreement, and reports referred to in Article 13, paragraph 8, of the Agreement;

(iii) The mobilization and provision of support;

(b) The latest reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change;

(c) Reports of the subsidiary bodies;

100. *Also requests* the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice to provide advice on how the assessments of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change can inform the global stocktake of the implementation of the Agreement pursuant to its Article 14 and to report on this matter to the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement at its second session;

101. *Further requests* the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement to develop modalities for the global stocktake referred to in Article 14 of the Agreement and to report to the Conference of the Parties, with a view to the Conference of the Parties making a recommendation to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement for consideration and adoption at its first session;

Facilitating implementation and compliance

102. *Decides* that the committee referred to in Article 15, paragraph 2, of the Agreement shall consist of 12 members with recognized competence in relevant scientific, technical, socioeconomic or legal fields, to be elected by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement on the basis of equitable geographical representation, with two members each from the five regional groups of the United Nations and one member each from the small island developing States and the least developed countries, while taking into account the goal of gender balance;

103. *Requests* the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement to develop the modalities and procedures for the effective operation of the committee referred to in Article 15, paragraph 2, of the Agreement, with a view to the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement completing its work on such modalities and procedures for consideration and adoption by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its first session;

Final clauses

104. *Also requests* the secretariat, solely for the purposes of Article 21 of the Agreement, to make available on its website on the date of adoption of the Agreement as well as in the report of the Conference of the Parties on its twenty-first session, information on the most up-to-date total and per cent of greenhouse gas emissions communicated by Parties to the Convention in their national communications, greenhouse gas inventory reports, biennial reports or biennial update reports;

IV. Enhanced action prior to 2020

105. *Resolves* to ensure the highest possible mitigation efforts in the pre-2020 period, including by:

- (a) Urging all Parties to the Kyoto Protocol that have not already done so to ratify and implement the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol;
- (b) Urging all Parties that have not already done so to make and implement a mitigation pledge under the Cancun Agreements;
- (c) Reiterating its resolve, as set out in decision 1/CP.19, paragraphs 3 and 4, to accelerate the full implementation of the decisions constituting the agreed outcome pursuant to decision 1/CP.13 and enhance ambition in the pre-2020 period in order to ensure the highest possible mitigation efforts under the Convention by all Parties;
- (d) Inviting developing country Parties that have not submitted their first biennial update reports to do so as soon as possible;
- (e) Urging all Parties to participate in the existing measurement, reporting and verification processes under the Cancun Agreements, in a timely manner, with a view to demonstrating progress made in the implementation of their mitigation pledges;

106. *Encourages* Parties to promote the voluntary cancellation by Party and non-Party stakeholders, without double counting, of units issued under the Kyoto Protocol, including certified emission reductions that are valid for the second commitment period;

107. *Urges* host and purchasing Parties to report transparently on internationally transferred mitigation outcomes, including outcomes used to meet international pledges, and emission units issued under the Kyoto Protocol with a view to promoting environmental integrity and avoiding double counting;

108. *Recognizes* the social, economic and environmental value of voluntary mitigation actions and their co-benefits for adaptation, health and sustainable development;

109. *Resolves* to strengthen, in the period 2016–2020, the existing technical examination process on mitigation as defined in decision 1/CP.19, paragraph 5(a), and decision 1/CP.20, paragraph 19, taking into account the latest scientific knowledge, including by:

(a) Encouraging Parties, Convention bodies and international organizations to engage in this process, including, as appropriate, in cooperation with relevant non-Party stakeholders, to share their experiences and suggestions, including from regional events, and to cooperate in facilitating the implementation of policies, practices and actions identified during this process in accordance with national sustainable development priorities;

(b) Striving to improve, in consultation with Parties, access to and participation in this process by developing country Party and non-Party experts;

(c) Requesting the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network in accordance with their respective mandates:

(i) To engage in the technical expert meetings and enhance their efforts to facilitate and support Parties in scaling up the implementation of policies, practices and actions identified during this process;

(ii) To provide regular updates during the technical expert meetings on the progress made in facilitating the implementation of policies, practices and actions previously identified during this process;

(iii) To include information on their activities under this process in their joint annual report to the Conference of the Parties;

(d) Encouraging Parties to make effective use of the Climate Technology Centre and Network to obtain assistance to develop economically, environmentally and socially viable project proposals in the high mitigation potential areas identified in this process;

110. *Encourages* the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism of the Convention to engage in the technical expert meetings and to inform participants of their contribution to facilitating progress in the implementation of policies, practices and actions identified during the technical examination process;

111. *Requests* the secretariat to organize the process referred to in paragraph 109 above and disseminate its results, including by:

(a) Organizing, in consultation with the Technology Executive Committee and relevant expert organizations, regular technical expert meetings focusing on specific policies, practices and actions representing best practices and with the potential to be scalable and replicable;

(b) Updating, on an annual basis, following the meetings referred to in paragraph 111(a) above and in time to serve as input to the summary for policymakers referred to in paragraph 111(c) below, a technical paper on the mitigation benefits and co-benefits of policies, practices and actions for enhancing mitigation ambition, as well as on options for supporting their implementation, information on which should be made available in a user-friendly online format;

(c) Preparing, in consultation with the champions referred to in paragraph 121 below, a summary for policymakers, with information on specific policies, practices and actions representing best practices and with the potential to be scalable and replicable, and on options to support their implementation, as well as on relevant collaborative initiatives, and publishing the summary at least two months in advance of each session of the Conference of the Parties as input for the high-level event referred to in paragraph 120 below;

112. *Decides* that the process referred to in paragraph 109 above should be organized jointly by the Subsidiary Body for Implementation and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and should take place on an ongoing basis until 2020;

113. *Also decides* to conduct in 2017 an assessment of the process referred to in paragraph 109 above so as to improve its effectiveness;

114. *Resolves* to enhance the provision of urgent and adequate finance, technology and capacity-building support by developed country Parties in order to enhance the level of ambition of pre-2020 action by Parties, and in this regard *strongly urges* developed country Parties to scale up their level of financial support, with a concrete road map to achieve the goal of jointly providing USD 100 billion annually by 2020 for mitigation and adaptation while significantly increasing adaptation finance from current levels and to further provide appropriate technology and capacity-building support;

115. *Decides* to conduct a facilitative dialogue in conjunction with the twenty-second session of the Conference of the Parties to assess the progress in implementing decision 1/CP.19, paragraphs 3 and 4, and identify relevant opportunities to enhance the provision of financial resources, including for technology development and transfer, and capacity-building support, with a view to identifying ways to enhance the ambition of mitigation efforts by all Parties, including identifying relevant opportunities to enhance the provision and mobilization of support and enabling environments;

116. *Acknowledges* with appreciation the results of the Lima-Paris Action Agenda, which build on the climate summit convened on 23 September 2014 by the Secretary-General of the United Nations;

117. *Welcomes* the efforts of non-Party stakeholders to scale up their climate actions, and *encourages* the registration of those actions in the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action platform;³

118. *Encourages* Parties to work closely with non-Party stakeholders to catalyse efforts to strengthen mitigation and adaptation action;

119. *Also encourages* non-Party stakeholders to increase their engagement in the processes referred to in paragraph 109 above and paragraph 124 below;

120. *Agrees* to convene, pursuant to decision 1/CP.20, paragraph 21, building on the Lima-Paris Action Agenda and in conjunction with each session of the Conference of the Parties during the period 2016–2020, a high-level event that:

(a) Further strengthens high-level engagement on the implementation of policy options and actions arising from the processes referred to in paragraph 109 above and paragraph 124 below, drawing on the summary for policymakers referred to in paragraph 111(c) above;

(b) Provides an opportunity for announcing new or strengthened voluntary efforts, initiatives and coalitions, including the implementation of policies, practices and actions arising from the processes referred to in paragraph 109 above and paragraph 124

³ <<http://climateaction.unfccc.int/>>.

below and presented in the summary for policymakers referred to in paragraph 111(c) above;

(c) Takes stock of related progress and recognizes new or strengthened voluntary efforts, initiatives and coalitions;

(d) Provides meaningful and regular opportunities for the effective high-level engagement of dignitaries of Parties, international organizations, international cooperative initiatives and non-Party stakeholders;

121. *Decides* that two high-level champions shall be appointed to act on behalf of the President of the Conference of the Parties to facilitate through strengthened high-level engagement in the period 2016–2020 the successful execution of existing efforts and the scaling-up and introduction of new or strengthened voluntary efforts, initiatives and coalitions, including by:

(a) Working with the Executive Secretary and the current and incoming Presidents of the Conference of the Parties to coordinate the annual high-level event referred to in paragraph 120 above;

(b) Engaging with interested Parties and non-Party stakeholders, including to further the voluntary initiatives of the Lima-Paris Action Agenda;

(c) Providing guidance to the secretariat on the organization of technical expert meetings referred to in paragraph 111(a) above and paragraph 129(a) below;

122. *Also decides* that the high-level champions referred to in paragraph 121 above should normally serve for a term of two years, with their terms overlapping for a full year to ensure continuity, such that:

(a) The President of the twenty-first session of the Conference of the Parties should appoint one champion, who should serve for one year from the date of the appointment until the last day of the twenty-second session of the Conference of the Parties;

(b) The President of the twenty-second session of the Conference of the Parties should appoint one champion who should serve for two years from the date of the appointment until the last day of the twenty-third session of the Conference of the Parties (November 2017);

(c) Thereafter, each subsequent President of the Conference of the Parties should appoint one champion who should serve for two years and succeed the previously appointed champion whose term has ended;

123. *Invites* all interested Parties and relevant organizations to provide support for the work of the champions referred to in paragraph 121 above;

124. *Decides* to launch, in the period 2016–2020, a technical examination process on adaptation;

125. *Also decides* that the process referred to in paragraph 124 above will endeavour to identify concrete opportunities for strengthening resilience, reducing vulnerabilities and increasing the understanding and implementation of adaptation actions;

126. *Further decides* that the process referred to in paragraph 124 above should be organized jointly by the Subsidiary Body for Implementation and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, and conducted by the Adaptation Committee;

127. *Decides* that the process referred to in paragraph 124 above will be pursued by:

(a) Facilitating the sharing of good practices, experiences and lessons learned;

(b) Identifying actions that could significantly enhance the implementation of adaptation actions, including actions that could enhance economic diversification and have mitigation co-benefits;

(c) Promoting cooperative action on adaptation;

(d) Identifying opportunities to strengthen enabling environments and enhance the provision of support for adaptation in the context of specific policies, practices and actions;

128. *Also decides* that the technical examination process on adaptation referred to in paragraph 124 above will take into account the process, modalities, outputs, outcomes and lessons learned from the technical examination process on mitigation referred to in paragraph 109 above;

129. *Requests* the secretariat to support the process referred to in paragraph 124 above by:

(a) Organizing regular technical expert meetings focusing on specific policies, strategies and actions;

(b) Preparing annually, on the basis of the meetings referred to in paragraph 129(a) above and in time to serve as an input to the summary for policymakers referred to in paragraph 111(c) above, a technical paper on opportunities to enhance adaptation action, as well as options to support their implementation, information on which should be made available in a user-friendly online format;

130. *Decides* that in conducting the process referred to in paragraph 124 above, the Adaptation Committee will engage with and explore ways to take into account, synergize with and build on the existing arrangements for adaptation-related work programmes, bodies and institutions under the Convention so as to ensure coherence and maximum value;

131. *Also decides* to conduct, in conjunction with the assessment referred to in paragraph 113 above, an assessment of the process referred to in paragraph 124 above, so as to improve its effectiveness;

132. *Invites* Parties and observer organizations to submit information on the opportunities referred to in paragraph 125 above by 3 February 2016;

V. Non-Party stakeholders

133. *Welcomes* the efforts of all non-Party stakeholders to address and respond to climate change, including those of civil society, the private sector, financial institutions, cities and other subnational authorities;

134. *Invites* the non-Party stakeholders referred to in paragraph 133 above to scale up their efforts and support actions to reduce emissions and/or to build resilience and decrease vulnerability to the adverse effects of climate change and demonstrate these efforts via the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action platform⁴ referred to in paragraph 117 above;

135. *Recognizes* the need to strengthen knowledge, technologies, practices and efforts of local communities and indigenous peoples related to addressing and responding to climate change, and *establishes* a platform for the exchange of experiences and sharing of best practices on mitigation and adaptation in a holistic and integrated manner;

⁴ <<http://climateaction.unfccc.int/>>.

136. *Also recognizes* the important role of providing incentives for emission reduction activities, including tools such as domestic policies and carbon pricing;

VI. Administrative and budgetary matters

137. *Takes note* of the estimated budgetary implications of the activities to be undertaken by the secretariat referred to in this decision and *requests* that the actions of the secretariat called for in this decision be undertaken subject to the availability of financial resources;

138. *Emphasizes* the urgency of making additional resources available for the implementation of the relevant actions, including actions referred to in this decision, and the implementation of the work programme referred to in paragraph 9 above;

139. *Urges* Parties to make voluntary contributions for the timely implementation of this decision.

Annex

Paris Agreement

The Parties to this Agreement,

Being Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, hereinafter referred to as “the Convention”,

Pursuant to the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action established by decision 1/CP.17 of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention at its seventeenth session,

In pursuit of the objective of the Convention, and being guided by its principles, including the principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances,

Recognizing the need for an effective and progressive response to the urgent threat of climate change on the basis of the best available scientific knowledge,

Also recognizing the specific needs and special circumstances of developing country Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, as provided for in the Convention,

Taking full account of the specific needs and special situations of the least developed countries with regard to funding and transfer of technology,

Recognizing that Parties may be affected not only by climate change, but also by the impacts of the measures taken in response to it,

Emphasizing the intrinsic relationship that climate change actions, responses and impacts have with equitable access to sustainable development and eradication of poverty,

Recognizing the fundamental priority of safeguarding food security and ending hunger, and the particular vulnerabilities of food production systems to the adverse impacts of climate change,

Taking into account the imperatives of a just transition of the workforce and the creation of decent work and quality jobs in accordance with nationally defined development priorities,

Acknowledging that climate change is a common concern of humankind, Parties should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights, the right to health, the rights of indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations and the right to development, as well as gender equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity,

Recognizing the importance of the conservation and enhancement, as appropriate, of sinks and reservoirs of the greenhouse gases referred to in the Convention,

Noting the importance of ensuring the integrity of all ecosystems, including oceans, and the protection of biodiversity, recognized by some cultures as Mother Earth, and noting the importance for some of the concept of “climate justice”, when taking action to address climate change,

Affirming the importance of education, training, public awareness, public participation, public access to information and cooperation at all levels on the matters addressed in this Agreement,

Recognizing the importance of the engagements of all levels of government and various actors, in accordance with respective national legislations of Parties, in addressing climate change,

Also recognizing that sustainable lifestyles and sustainable patterns of consumption and production, with developed country Parties taking the lead, play an important role in addressing climate change,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

For the purpose of this Agreement, the definitions contained in Article 1 of the Convention shall apply. In addition:

- (a) “Convention” means the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted in New York on 9 May 1992;
- (b) “Conference of the Parties” means the Conference of the Parties to the Convention;
- (c) “Party” means a Party to this Agreement.

Article 2

1. This Agreement, in enhancing the implementation of the Convention, including its objective, aims to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change, in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty, including by:

- (a) Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change;
- (b) Increasing the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and foster climate resilience and low greenhouse gas emissions development, in a manner that does not threaten food production; and
- (c) Making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development.

2. This Agreement will be implemented to reflect equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.

Article 3

As nationally determined contributions to the global response to climate change, all Parties are to undertake and communicate ambitious efforts as defined in Articles 4, 7, 9, 10, 11 and 13 with the view to achieving the purpose of this Agreement as set out in Article 2. The efforts of all Parties will represent a progression over time, while recognizing the need to support developing country Parties for the effective implementation of this Agreement.

Article 4

1. In order to achieve the long-term temperature goal set out in Article 2, Parties aim to reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible, recognizing that peaking will take longer for developing country Parties, and to undertake rapid reductions thereafter in accordance with best available science, so as to achieve a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century, on the basis of equity, and in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty.

2. Each Party shall prepare, communicate and maintain successive nationally determined contributions that it intends to achieve. Parties shall pursue domestic mitigation measures, with the aim of achieving the objectives of such contributions.
3. Each Party's successive nationally determined contribution will represent a progression beyond the Party's then current nationally determined contribution and reflect its highest possible ambition, reflecting its common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.
4. Developed country Parties should continue taking the lead by undertaking economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets. Developing country Parties should continue enhancing their mitigation efforts, and are encouraged to move over time towards economy-wide emission reduction or limitation targets in the light of different national circumstances.
5. Support shall be provided to developing country Parties for the implementation of this Article, in accordance with Articles 9, 10 and 11, recognizing that enhanced support for developing country Parties will allow for higher ambition in their actions.
6. The least developed countries and small island developing States may prepare and communicate strategies, plans and actions for low greenhouse gas emissions development reflecting their special circumstances.
7. Mitigation co-benefits resulting from Parties' adaptation actions and/or economic diversification plans can contribute to mitigation outcomes under this Article.
8. In communicating their nationally determined contributions, all Parties shall provide the information necessary for clarity, transparency and understanding in accordance with decision 1/CP.21 and any relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement.
9. Each Party shall communicate a nationally determined contribution every five years in accordance with decision 1/CP.21 and any relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement and be informed by the outcomes of the global stocktake referred to in Article 14.
10. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement shall consider common time frames for nationally determined contributions at its first session.
11. A Party may at any time adjust its existing nationally determined contribution with a view to enhancing its level of ambition, in accordance with guidance adopted by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement.
12. Nationally determined contributions communicated by Parties shall be recorded in a public registry maintained by the secretariat.
13. Parties shall account for their nationally determined contributions. In accounting for anthropogenic emissions and removals corresponding to their nationally determined contributions, Parties shall promote environmental integrity, transparency, accuracy, completeness, comparability and consistency, and ensure the avoidance of double counting, in accordance with guidance adopted by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement.
14. In the context of their nationally determined contributions, when recognizing and implementing mitigation actions with respect to anthropogenic emissions and removals, Parties should take into account, as appropriate, existing methods and guidance under the Convention, in the light of the provisions of paragraph 13 of this Article.

15. Parties shall take into consideration in the implementation of this Agreement the concerns of Parties with economies most affected by the impacts of response measures, particularly developing country Parties.

16. Parties, including regional economic integration organizations and their member States, that have reached an agreement to act jointly under paragraph 2 of this Article shall notify the secretariat of the terms of that agreement, including the emission level allocated to each Party within the relevant time period, when they communicate their nationally determined contributions. The secretariat shall in turn inform the Parties and signatories to the Convention of the terms of that agreement.

17. Each party to such an agreement shall be responsible for its emission level as set out in the agreement referred to in paragraph 16 of this Article in accordance with paragraphs 13 and 14 of this Article and Articles 13 and 15.

18. If Parties acting jointly do so in the framework of, and together with, a regional economic integration organization which is itself a Party to this Agreement, each member State of that regional economic integration organization individually, and together with the regional economic integration organization, shall be responsible for its emission level as set out in the agreement communicated under paragraph 16 of this Article in accordance with paragraphs 13 and 14 of this Article and Articles 13 and 15.

19. All Parties should strive to formulate and communicate long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies, mindful of Article 2 taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.

Article 5

1. Parties should take action to conserve and enhance, as appropriate, sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases as referred to in Article 4, paragraph 1(d), of the Convention, including forests.

2. Parties are encouraged to take action to implement and support, including through results-based payments, the existing framework as set out in related guidance and decisions already agreed under the Convention for: policy approaches and positive incentives for activities relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries; and alternative policy approaches, such as joint mitigation and adaptation approaches for the integral and sustainable management of forests, while reaffirming the importance of incentivizing, as appropriate, non-carbon benefits associated with such approaches.

Article 6

1. Parties recognize that some Parties choose to pursue voluntary cooperation in the implementation of their nationally determined contributions to allow for higher ambition in their mitigation and adaptation actions and to promote sustainable development and environmental integrity.

2. Parties shall, where engaging on a voluntary basis in cooperative approaches that involve the use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes towards nationally determined contributions, promote sustainable development and ensure environmental integrity and transparency, including in governance, and shall apply robust accounting to ensure, inter alia, the avoidance of double counting, consistent with guidance adopted by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement.

3. The use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes to achieve nationally determined contributions under this Agreement shall be voluntary and authorized by participating Parties.

4. A mechanism to contribute to the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and support sustainable development is hereby established under the authority and guidance of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement for use by Parties on a voluntary basis. It shall be supervised by a body designated by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement, and shall aim:

(a) To promote the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions while fostering sustainable development;

(b) To incentivize and facilitate participation in the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions by public and private entities authorized by a Party;

(c) To contribute to the reduction of emission levels in the host Party, which will benefit from mitigation activities resulting in emission reductions that can also be used by another Party to fulfil its nationally determined contribution; and

(d) To deliver an overall mitigation in global emissions.

5. Emission reductions resulting from the mechanism referred to in paragraph 4 of this Article shall not be used to demonstrate achievement of the host Party's nationally determined contribution if used by another Party to demonstrate achievement of its nationally determined contribution.

6. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement shall ensure that a share of the proceeds from activities under the mechanism referred to in paragraph 4 of this Article is used to cover administrative expenses as well as to assist developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change to meet the costs of adaptation.

7. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement shall adopt rules, modalities and procedures for the mechanism referred to in paragraph 4 of this Article at its first session.

8. Parties recognize the importance of integrated, holistic and balanced non-market approaches being available to Parties to assist in the implementation of their nationally determined contributions, in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication, in a coordinated and effective manner, including through, inter alia, mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology transfer and capacity-building, as appropriate. These approaches shall aim to:

(a) Promote mitigation and adaptation ambition;

(b) Enhance public and private sector participation in the implementation of nationally determined contributions; and

(c) Enable opportunities for coordination across instruments and relevant institutional arrangements.

9. A framework for non-market approaches to sustainable development is hereby defined to promote the non-market approaches referred to in paragraph 8 of this Article.

Article 7

1. Parties hereby establish the global goal on adaptation of enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change, with a view

to contributing to sustainable development and ensuring an adequate adaptation response in the context of the temperature goal referred to in Article 2.

2. Parties recognize that adaptation is a global challenge faced by all with local, subnational, national, regional and international dimensions, and that it is a key component of and makes a contribution to the long-term global response to climate change to protect people, livelihoods and ecosystems, taking into account the urgent and immediate needs of those developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.

3. The adaptation efforts of developing country Parties shall be recognized, in accordance with the modalities to be adopted by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement at its first session.

4. Parties recognize that the current need for adaptation is significant and that greater levels of mitigation can reduce the need for additional adaptation efforts, and that greater adaptation needs can involve greater adaptation costs.

5. Parties acknowledge that adaptation action should follow a country-driven, gender-responsive, participatory and fully transparent approach, taking into consideration vulnerable groups, communities and ecosystems, and should be based on and guided by the best available science and, as appropriate, traditional knowledge, knowledge of indigenous peoples and local knowledge systems, with a view to integrating adaptation into relevant socioeconomic and environmental policies and actions, where appropriate.

6. Parties recognize the importance of support for and international cooperation on adaptation efforts and the importance of taking into account the needs of developing country Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.

7. Parties should strengthen their cooperation on enhancing action on adaptation, taking into account the Cancun Adaptation Framework, including with regard to:

(a) Sharing information, good practices, experiences and lessons learned, including, as appropriate, as these relate to science, planning, policies and implementation in relation to adaptation actions;

(b) Strengthening institutional arrangements, including those under the Convention that serve this Agreement, to support the synthesis of relevant information and knowledge, and the provision of technical support and guidance to Parties;

(c) Strengthening scientific knowledge on climate, including research, systematic observation of the climate system and early warning systems, in a manner that informs climate services and supports decision-making;

(d) Assisting developing country Parties in identifying effective adaptation practices, adaptation needs, priorities, support provided and received for adaptation actions and efforts, and challenges and gaps, in a manner consistent with encouraging good practices; and

(e) Improving the effectiveness and durability of adaptation actions.

8. United Nations specialized organizations and agencies are encouraged to support the efforts of Parties to implement the actions referred to in paragraph 7 of this Article, taking into account the provisions of paragraph 5 of this Article.

9. Each Party shall, as appropriate, engage in adaptation planning processes and the implementation of actions, including the development or enhancement of relevant plans, policies and/or contributions, which may include:

- (a) The implementation of adaptation actions, undertakings and/or efforts;
 - (b) The process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans;
 - (c) The assessment of climate change impacts and vulnerability, with a view to formulating nationally determined prioritized actions, taking into account vulnerable people, places and ecosystems;
 - (d) Monitoring and evaluating and learning from adaptation plans, policies, programmes and actions; and
 - (e) Building the resilience of socioeconomic and ecological systems, including through economic diversification and sustainable management of natural resources.
10. Each Party should, as appropriate, submit and update periodically an adaptation communication, which may include its priorities, implementation and support needs, plans and actions, without creating any additional burden for developing country Parties.
11. The adaptation communication referred to in paragraph 10 of this Article shall be, as appropriate, submitted and updated periodically, as a component of or in conjunction with other communications or documents, including a national adaptation plan, a nationally determined contribution as referred to in Article 4, paragraph 2, and/or a national communication.
12. The adaptation communications referred to in paragraph 10 of this Article shall be recorded in a public registry maintained by the secretariat.
13. Continuous and enhanced international support shall be provided to developing country Parties for the implementation of paragraphs 7, 9, 10 and 11 of this Article, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 9, 10 and 11.
14. The global stocktake referred to in Article 14 shall, inter alia:
- (a) Recognize adaptation efforts of developing country Parties;
 - (b) Enhance the implementation of adaptation action taking into account the adaptation communication referred to in paragraph 10 of this Article;
 - (c) Review the adequacy and effectiveness of adaptation and support provided for adaptation; and
 - (d) Review the overall progress made in achieving the global goal on adaptation referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article.

Article 8

1. Parties recognize the importance of averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including extreme weather events and slow onset events, and the role of sustainable development in reducing the risk of loss and damage.
2. The Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts shall be subject to the authority and guidance of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement and may be enhanced and strengthened, as determined by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement.
3. Parties should enhance understanding, action and support, including through the Warsaw International Mechanism, as appropriate, on a cooperative and facilitative basis with respect to loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change.

4. Accordingly, areas of cooperation and facilitation to enhance understanding, action and support may include:

- (a) Early warning systems;
- (b) Emergency preparedness;
- (c) Slow onset events;
- (d) Events that may involve irreversible and permanent loss and damage;
- (e) Comprehensive risk assessment and management;
- (f) Risk insurance facilities, climate risk pooling and other insurance solutions;
- (g) Non-economic losses; and
- (h) Resilience of communities, livelihoods and ecosystems.

5. The Warsaw International Mechanism shall collaborate with existing bodies and expert groups under the Agreement, as well as relevant organizations and expert bodies outside the Agreement.

Article 9

1. Developed country Parties shall provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation in continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention.

2. Other Parties are encouraged to provide or continue to provide such support voluntarily.

3. As part of a global effort, developed country Parties should continue to take the lead in mobilizing climate finance from a wide variety of sources, instruments and channels, noting the significant role of public funds, through a variety of actions, including supporting country-driven strategies, and taking into account the needs and priorities of developing country Parties. Such mobilization of climate finance should represent a progression beyond previous efforts.

4. The provision of scaled-up financial resources should aim to achieve a balance between adaptation and mitigation, taking into account country-driven strategies, and the priorities and needs of developing country Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change and have significant capacity constraints, such as the least developed countries and small island developing States, considering the need for public and grant-based resources for adaptation.

5. Developed country Parties shall biennially communicate indicative quantitative and qualitative information related to paragraphs 1 and 3 of this Article, as applicable, including, as available, projected levels of public financial resources to be provided to developing country Parties. Other Parties providing resources are encouraged to communicate biennially such information on a voluntary basis.

6. The global stocktake referred to in Article 14 shall take into account the relevant information provided by developed country Parties and/or Agreement bodies on efforts related to climate finance.

7. Developed country Parties shall provide transparent and consistent information on support for developing country Parties provided and mobilized through public interventions biennially in accordance with the modalities, procedures and guidelines to be adopted by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement, at its

first session, as stipulated in Article 13, paragraph 13. Other Parties are encouraged to do so.

8. The Financial Mechanism of the Convention, including its operating entities, shall serve as the financial mechanism of this Agreement.

9. The institutions serving this Agreement, including the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism of the Convention, shall aim to ensure efficient access to financial resources through simplified approval procedures and enhanced readiness support for developing country Parties, in particular for the least developed countries and small island developing States, in the context of their national climate strategies and plans.

Article 10

1. Parties share a long-term vision on the importance of fully realizing technology development and transfer in order to improve resilience to climate change and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

2. Parties, noting the importance of technology for the implementation of mitigation and adaptation actions under this Agreement and recognizing existing technology deployment and dissemination efforts, shall strengthen cooperative action on technology development and transfer.

3. The Technology Mechanism established under the Convention shall serve this Agreement.

4. A technology framework is hereby established to provide overarching guidance to the work of the Technology Mechanism in promoting and facilitating enhanced action on technology development and transfer in order to support the implementation of this Agreement, in pursuit of the long-term vision referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article.

5. Accelerating, encouraging and enabling innovation is critical for an effective, long-term global response to climate change and promoting economic growth and sustainable development. Such effort shall be, as appropriate, supported, including by the Technology Mechanism and, through financial means, by the Financial Mechanism of the Convention, for collaborative approaches to research and development, and facilitating access to technology, in particular for early stages of the technology cycle, to developing country Parties.

6. Support, including financial support, shall be provided to developing country Parties for the implementation of this Article, including for strengthening cooperative action on technology development and transfer at different stages of the technology cycle, with a view to achieving a balance between support for mitigation and adaptation. The global stocktake referred to in Article 14 shall take into account available information on efforts related to support on technology development and transfer for developing country Parties.

Article 11

1. Capacity-building under this Agreement should enhance the capacity and ability of developing country Parties, in particular countries with the least capacity, such as the least developed countries, and those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, such as small island developing States, to take effective climate change action, including, inter alia, to implement adaptation and mitigation actions, and should facilitate technology development, dissemination and deployment, access to climate finance, relevant aspects of education, training and public awareness, and the transparent, timely and accurate communication of information.

2. Capacity-building should be country-driven, based on and responsive to national needs, and foster country ownership of Parties, in particular, for developing country Parties,

including at the national, subnational and local levels. Capacity-building should be guided by lessons learned, including those from capacity-building activities under the Convention, and should be an effective, iterative process that is participatory, cross-cutting and gender-responsive.

3. All Parties should cooperate to enhance the capacity of developing country Parties to implement this Agreement. Developed country Parties should enhance support for capacity-building actions in developing country Parties.

4. All Parties enhancing the capacity of developing country Parties to implement this Agreement, including through regional, bilateral and multilateral approaches, shall regularly communicate on these actions or measures on capacity-building. Developing country Parties should regularly communicate progress made on implementing capacity-building plans, policies, actions or measures to implement this Agreement.

5. Capacity-building activities shall be enhanced through appropriate institutional arrangements to support the implementation of this Agreement, including the appropriate institutional arrangements established under the Convention that serve this Agreement. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement shall, at its first session, consider and adopt a decision on the initial institutional arrangements for capacity-building.

Article 12

Parties shall cooperate in taking measures, as appropriate, to enhance climate change education, training, public awareness, public participation and public access to information, recognizing the importance of these steps with respect to enhancing actions under this Agreement.

Article 13

1. In order to build mutual trust and confidence and to promote effective implementation, an enhanced transparency framework for action and support, with built-in flexibility which takes into account Parties' different capacities and builds upon collective experience is hereby established.

2. The transparency framework shall provide flexibility in the implementation of the provisions of this Article to those developing country Parties that need it in the light of their capacities. The modalities, procedures and guidelines referred to in paragraph 13 of this Article shall reflect such flexibility.

3. The transparency framework shall build on and enhance the transparency arrangements under the Convention, recognizing the special circumstances of the least developed countries and small island developing States, and be implemented in a facilitative, non-intrusive, non-punitive manner, respectful of national sovereignty, and avoid placing undue burden on Parties.

4. The transparency arrangements under the Convention, including national communications, biennial reports and biennial update reports, international assessment and review and international consultation and analysis, shall form part of the experience drawn upon for the development of the modalities, procedures and guidelines under paragraph 13 of this Article.

5. The purpose of the framework for transparency of action is to provide a clear understanding of climate change action in the light of the objective of the Convention as set out in its Article 2, including clarity and tracking of progress towards achieving Parties' individual nationally determined contributions under Article 4, and Parties' adaptation

actions under Article 7, including good practices, priorities, needs and gaps, to inform the global stocktake under Article 14.

6. The purpose of the framework for transparency of support is to provide clarity on support provided and received by relevant individual Parties in the context of climate change actions under Articles 4, 7, 9, 10 and 11, and, to the extent possible, to provide a full overview of aggregate financial support provided, to inform the global stocktake under Article 14.

7. Each Party shall regularly provide the following information:

(a) A national inventory report of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases, prepared using good practice methodologies accepted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and agreed upon by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement; and

(b) Information necessary to track progress made in implementing and achieving its nationally determined contribution under Article 4.

8. Each Party should also provide information related to climate change impacts and adaptation under Article 7, as appropriate.

9. Developed country Parties shall, and other Parties that provide support should, provide information on financial, technology transfer and capacity-building support provided to developing country Parties under Articles 9, 10 and 11.

10. Developing country Parties should provide information on financial, technology transfer and capacity-building support needed and received under Articles 9, 10 and 11.

11. Information submitted by each Party under paragraphs 7 and 9 of this Article shall undergo a technical expert review, in accordance with decision 1/CP.21. For those developing country Parties that need it in the light of their capacities, the review process shall include assistance in identifying capacity-building needs. In addition, each Party shall participate in a facilitative, multilateral consideration of progress with respect to efforts under Article 9, and its respective implementation and achievement of its nationally determined contribution.

12. The technical expert review under this paragraph shall consist of a consideration of the Party's support provided, as relevant, and its implementation and achievement of its nationally determined contribution. The review shall also identify areas of improvement for the Party, and include a review of the consistency of the information with the modalities, procedures and guidelines referred to in paragraph 13 of this Article, taking into account the flexibility accorded to the Party under paragraph 2 of this Article. The review shall pay particular attention to the respective national capabilities and circumstances of developing country Parties.

13. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement shall, at its first session, building on experience from the arrangements related to transparency under the Convention, and elaborating on the provisions in this Article, adopt common modalities, procedures and guidelines, as appropriate, for the transparency of action and support.

14. Support shall be provided to developing countries for the implementation of this Article.

15. Support shall also be provided for the building of transparency-related capacity of developing country Parties on a continuous basis.

Article 14

1. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement shall periodically take stock of the implementation of this Agreement to assess the collective progress towards achieving the purpose of this Agreement and its long-term goals (referred to as the “global stocktake”). It shall do so in a comprehensive and facilitative manner, considering mitigation, adaptation and the means of implementation and support, and in the light of equity and the best available science.
2. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement shall undertake its first global stocktake in 2023 and every five years thereafter unless otherwise decided by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement.
3. The outcome of the global stocktake shall inform Parties in updating and enhancing, in a nationally determined manner, their actions and support in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Agreement, as well as in enhancing international cooperation for climate action.

Article 15

1. A mechanism to facilitate implementation of and promote compliance with the provisions of this Agreement is hereby established.
2. The mechanism referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall consist of a committee that shall be expert-based and facilitative in nature and function in a manner that is transparent, non-adversarial and non-punitive. The committee shall pay particular attention to the respective national capabilities and circumstances of Parties.
3. The committee shall operate under the modalities and procedures adopted by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement at its first session and report annually to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement.

Article 16

1. The Conference of the Parties, the supreme body of the Convention, shall serve as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement.
2. Parties to the Convention that are not Parties to this Agreement may participate as observers in the proceedings of any session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement. When the Conference of the Parties serves as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement, decisions under this Agreement shall be taken only by those that are Parties to this Agreement.
3. When the Conference of the Parties serves as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement, any member of the Bureau of the Conference of the Parties representing a Party to the Convention but, at that time, not a Party to this Agreement, shall be replaced by an additional member to be elected by and from amongst the Parties to this Agreement.
4. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement shall keep under regular review the implementation of this Agreement and shall make, within its mandate, the decisions necessary to promote its effective implementation. It shall perform the functions assigned to it by this Agreement and shall:
 - (a) Establish such subsidiary bodies as deemed necessary for the implementation of this Agreement; and
 - (b) Exercise such other functions as may be required for the implementation of this Agreement.

5. The rules of procedure of the Conference of the Parties and the financial procedures applied under the Convention shall be applied *mutatis mutandis* under this Agreement, except as may be otherwise decided by consensus by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement.

6. The first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement shall be convened by the secretariat in conjunction with the first session of the Conference of the Parties that is scheduled after the date of entry into force of this Agreement. Subsequent ordinary sessions of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement shall be held in conjunction with ordinary sessions of the Conference of the Parties, unless otherwise decided by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement.

7. Extraordinary sessions of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement shall be held at such other times as may be deemed necessary by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement or at the written request of any Party, provided that, within six months of the request being communicated to the Parties by the secretariat, it is supported by at least one third of the Parties.

8. The United Nations and its specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as any State member thereof or observers thereto not party to the Convention, may be represented at sessions of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement as observers. Any body or agency, whether national or international, governmental or non-governmental, which is qualified in matters covered by this Agreement and which has informed the secretariat of its wish to be represented at a session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement as an observer, may be so admitted unless at least one third of the Parties present object. The admission and participation of observers shall be subject to the rules of procedure referred to in paragraph 5 of this Article.

Article 17

1. The secretariat established by Article 8 of the Convention shall serve as the secretariat of this Agreement.

2. Article 8, paragraph 2, of the Convention on the functions of the secretariat, and Article 8, paragraph 3, of the Convention, on the arrangements made for the functioning of the secretariat, shall apply *mutatis mutandis* to this Agreement. The secretariat shall, in addition, exercise the functions assigned to it under this Agreement and by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement.

Article 18

1. The Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation established by Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention shall serve, respectively, as the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation of this Agreement. The provisions of the Convention relating to the functioning of these two bodies shall apply *mutatis mutandis* to this Agreement. Sessions of the meetings of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation of this Agreement shall be held in conjunction with the meetings of, respectively, the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation of the Convention.

2. Parties to the Convention that are not Parties to this Agreement may participate as observers in the proceedings of any session of the subsidiary bodies. When the subsidiary

bodies serve as the subsidiary bodies of this Agreement, decisions under this Agreement shall be taken only by those that are Parties to this Agreement.

3. When the subsidiary bodies established by Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention exercise their functions with regard to matters concerning this Agreement, any member of the bureaux of those subsidiary bodies representing a Party to the Convention but, at that time, not a Party to this Agreement, shall be replaced by an additional member to be elected by and from amongst the Parties to this Agreement.

Article 19

1. Subsidiary bodies or other institutional arrangements established by or under the Convention, other than those referred to in this Agreement, shall serve this Agreement upon a decision of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement shall specify the functions to be exercised by such subsidiary bodies or arrangements.

2. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement may provide further guidance to such subsidiary bodies and institutional arrangements.

Article 20

1. This Agreement shall be open for signature and subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by States and regional economic integration organizations that are Parties to the Convention. It shall be open for signature at the United Nations Headquarters in New York from 22 April 2016 to 21 April 2017. Thereafter, this Agreement shall be open for accession from the day following the date on which it is closed for signature. Instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary.

2. Any regional economic integration organization that becomes a Party to this Agreement without any of its member States being a Party shall be bound by all the obligations under this Agreement. In the case of regional economic integration organizations with one or more member States that are Parties to this Agreement, the organization and its member States shall decide on their respective responsibilities for the performance of their obligations under this Agreement. In such cases, the organization and the member States shall not be entitled to exercise rights under this Agreement concurrently.

3. In their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, regional economic integration organizations shall declare the extent of their competence with respect to the matters governed by this Agreement. These organizations shall also inform the Depositary, who shall in turn inform the Parties, of any substantial modification in the extent of their competence.

Article 21

1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the date on which at least 55 Parties to the Convention accounting in total for at least an estimated 55 per cent of the total global greenhouse gas emissions have deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

2. Solely for the limited purpose of paragraph 1 of this Article, "total global greenhouse gas emissions" means the most up-to-date amount communicated on or before the date of adoption of this Agreement by the Parties to the Convention.

3. For each State or regional economic integration organization that ratifies, accepts or approves this Agreement or accedes thereto after the conditions set out in paragraph 1 of this Article for entry into force have been fulfilled, this Agreement shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the date of deposit by such State or regional economic integration organization of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

4. For the purposes of paragraph 1 of this Article, any instrument deposited by a regional economic integration organization shall not be counted as additional to those deposited by its member States.

Article 22

The provisions of Article 15 of the Convention on the adoption of amendments to the Convention shall apply *mutatis mutandis* to this Agreement.

Article 23

1. The provisions of Article 16 of the Convention on the adoption and amendment of annexes to the Convention shall apply *mutatis mutandis* to this Agreement.

2. Annexes to this Agreement shall form an integral part thereof and, unless otherwise expressly provided for, a reference to this Agreement constitutes at the same time a reference to any annexes thereto. Such annexes shall be restricted to lists, forms and any other material of a descriptive nature that is of a scientific, technical, procedural or administrative character.

Article 24

The provisions of Article 14 of the Convention on settlement of disputes shall apply *mutatis mutandis* to this Agreement.

Article 25

1. Each Party shall have one vote, except as provided for in paragraph 2 of this Article.

2. Regional economic integration organizations, in matters within their competence, shall exercise their right to vote with a number of votes equal to the number of their member States that are Parties to this Agreement. Such an organization shall not exercise its right to vote if any of its member States exercises its right, and vice versa.

Article 26

The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be the Depositary of this Agreement.

Article 27

No reservations may be made to this Agreement.

Article 28

1. At any time after three years from the date on which this Agreement has entered into force for a Party, that Party may withdraw from this Agreement by giving written notification to the Depositary.

2. Any such withdrawal shall take effect upon expiry of one year from the date of receipt by the Depositary of the notification of withdrawal, or on such later date as may be specified in the notification of withdrawal.

3. Any Party that withdraws from the Convention shall be considered as also having withdrawn from this Agreement.

Article 29

The original of this Agreement, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

DONE at Paris this twelfth day of December two thousand and fifteen.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized to that effect, have signed this Agreement.

참 고 파리협정 (Paris Agreement) 번역본

파리 협정

이 협정의 당사자는,

「기후변화에 관한 국제연합 기본협약(이하 “협약”이라 한다)」의 당사자로서,

제17차 협약 당사자총회에서 결정(1/CP.17)으로 수립된 「행동 강화를 위한 더반 플랫폼」에 따라,

협약의 목적을 추구하고, 상이한 국내 여건에 비추어 형평의 원칙 및 공통적 이면서도 그 정도에 차이가 나는 책임과 각자의 능력의 원칙을 포함하는 협약의 원칙에 따라,

이용 가능한 최선의 과학적 지식에 기초하여 기후변화라는 급박한 위협에 대하여 효과적이고 점진적으로 대응할 필요성을 인식하며,

또한, 협약에서 규정된대로 개발도상국인 당사자, 특히 기후변화의 부정적 영향에 특별히 취약한 개발도상국 당사자의 특수한 필요와 특별한 사정을 인식하고,

자금 제공 및 기술 이전과 관련하여 최빈개도국의 특수한 필요와 특별한 상황을 충분히 고려하며,

당사자들이 기후변화뿐만 아니라 그에 대한 대응 조치에서 비롯된 여파에 의해서도 영향을 받을 수 있음을 인식하고,

기후변화 행동, 대응 및 영향이 지속가능한 발전 및 빈곤 퇴치에 대한 형평한 접근과 본질적으로 관계가 있음을 강조하며,

식량안보 수호 및 기아 종식이 근본적인 우선 과제이며, 기후변화의 부정적 영향에 식량생산체계가 특별히 취약하다는 점을 인식하고,

국내적으로 규정된 개발우선순위에 따라 노동력의 정당한 전환과 좋은 일자리 및 양질의 직업 창출이 매우 필요함을 고려하며,

기후변화가 인류의 공통 관심사임을 인정하고, 당사자는 기후변화에 대응하는 행동을 할 때 양성평등, 여성의 역량 강화 및 세대 간 형평뿐만 아니라, 인권, 보건에 대한 권리, 원주민·지역공동체·이주민·아동·장애인·취약계층의 권리 및 발전권에 관한 각자의 의무를 존중하고 촉진하며 고려하여야 함을 인정하며,

협약에 언급된 온실가스의 흡수원과 저장소의 적절한 보존 및 강화의 중요성을 인식하고,

기후변화에 대응하는 행동을 할 때, 해양을 포함한 모든 생태계의 건전성을 보장하는 것과 일부 문화에서 어머니 대지로 인식되는 생물다양성의 보존을 보장하는 것의 중요성에 주목하고, 일각에게 “기후 정의”라는 개념이 갖는 중요성에 주목하며,

이 협정에서 다루지는 문제에 대한 교육, 훈련, 공중의 인식, 공중의 참여, 공중의 정보 접근, 그리고 모든 차원에서의 협력이 중요함을 확인하고,

기후변화에 대응할 때 당사자 각자의 국내 법령에 따라 모든 차원의 정부조직과 다양한 행위자의 참여가 중요함을 인식하며,

또한, 선진국인 당사자가 주도하고 있는 지속가능한 생활양식과 지속가능한 소비 및 생산 방식이 기후변화에 대한 대응에 중요한 역할을 함을 인식하면서,

다음과 같이 합의하였다.

제1조

이 협정의 목적상, 협약 제1조에 포함된 정의가 적용된다. 추가로,

가. “협약”이란 1992년 5월 9일 뉴욕에서 채택된 「기후변화에 관한 국제연합 기본협약」을 말한다.

나. “당사자총회”란 협약의 당사자총회를 말한다.

다. “당사자”란 이 협정의 당사자를 말한다.

제2조

1. 이 협정은, 협약의 목적을 포함하여 협약의 이행을 강화하는 데 있어, 지속가능한

발전과 빈곤 퇴치를 위한 노력의 맥락에서, 다음의 방법을 포함하여 기후변화의 위협에 대한 전지구적 대응을 강화하는 것을 목표로 한다.

- 가. 기후변화의 위험 및 영향을 상당히 감소시킬 것이라는 인식 하에, 산업화 이전 수준 대비 지구 평균 기온 상승을 섭씨 2도보다 현저히 낮은 수준으로의 유지 및, 산업화 이전 수준 대비 지구 평균 기온 상승을 섭씨 1.5도로 제한하기 위한 노력의 추구
- 나. 식량 생산을 위협하지 아니하는 방식으로, 기후변화의 부정적 영향에 적응하는 능력과 기후 회복력 및 온실가스 저배출 발전을 증진하는 능력의 증대, 그리고
- 다. 온실가스 저배출 및 기후 회복적 발전이라는 방향에 부합하도록 재정 흐름의 조성

2. 이 협정은 상이한 국내 여건에 비추어 형평 그리고 공통적이면서도 그 정도에 차이가 나는 책임과 각자의 능력의 원칙을 반영하여 이행될 것이다.

제3조

기후변화에 전지구적으로 대응하기 위한 국가결정기여로서, 모든 당사자는 제2조에 규정된 이 협정의 목적을 달성하기 위하여 제4조, 제7조, 제9조, 제10조, 제11조 및 제13조에 규정된 바와 같이 의욕적인 노력을 수행하고 통보하여야 한다. 이 협정의 효과적인 이행을 위해서는 개발도상국 당사자에 대한 지원이 필요함을 인식하면서, 모든 당사자는 시간의 경과에 따라 진전되는 노력을 보여줄 것이다.

제4조

1. 형평에 기초하고 지속가능한 발전과 빈곤 퇴치를 위한 노력의 맥락에서, 제2조에 규정된 장기 기온 목표를 달성하기 위하여, 개발도상국 당사자에게는 온실가스 배출최대치 달성에 더욱 긴 시간이 소요될 것임을 인식하면서, 당사자는 전지구적 온실가스 배출최대치를 가능한 한 조속히 달성할 것을 목표로 하고, 그 이후에는 이용 가능한 최선의 과학에 따라 급속한 감축을 실시하는 것을 목표로 하여 금세기의 하반기에 온실가스의 배출원에 의한 인위적 배출과 흡수원에 의한 제거 간에 균형을 달성할 수 있도록 한다.

2. 각 당사자는 달성하고자 하는 차기 국가결정기여를 준비하고, 통보하고, 유지한다. 당사자는 그러한 국가결정기여의 목적을 달성하기 위하여 국내적 완화 조치를

추구한다.

3. 각 당사자의 차기 국가결정기여는 상이한 국내 여건에 비추어 공통적이면서도 그 정도에 차이가 나는 책임과 각자의 능력을 반영하고, 당사자의 현재 국가결정기여보다 진전되는 노력을 시현할 것이며 가능한 한 가장 높은 의욕 수준을 반영할 것이다.

4. 선진국 당사자는 경제 전반에 걸친 절대량 배출 감축목표를 약속함으로써 주도적 역할을 지속하여야 한다. 개발도상국 당사자는 완화 노력을 계속 강화하여야 하며, 상이한 국내 여건에 비추어 시간의 경과에 따라 경제 전반의 배출 감축 또는 제한 목표로 나아갈 것이 장려된다.

5. 개발도상국 당사자에 대한 지원 강화를 통해 그들이 보다 의욕적으로 행동할 수 있을 것임을 인식하면서, 개발도상국 당사자에게 이 조의 이행을 위하여 제9조, 제10조 및 제11조에 따라 지원이 제공된다.

6. 최빈개도국과 소도서 개발도상국은 그들의 특별한 사정을 반영하여 온실가스 저배출 발전을 위한 전략·계획·행동을 준비하고 통보할 수 있다.

7. 당사자의 적응 행동 그리고/또는 경제 다변화 계획으로부터 발생하는 완화의 공통이익은 이 조에 따른 완화 성과에 기여할 수 있다.

8. 국가결정기여를 통보할 때, 모든 당사자는 결정 1/CP.21과 이 협정의 당사자회의 역할을 하는 당사자총회의 모든 관련 결정에 따라 명확성, 투명성 및 이해를 위하여 필요한 정보를 제공한다.

9. 각 당사자는 결정 1/CP.21과 이 협정의 당사자회의 역할을 하는 당사자총회의 모든 관련 결정에 따라 매 5년마다 국가결정기여를 통보하며, 각 당사자는 제14조에 언급된 전지구적 이행점검의 결과를 통지받는다.

10. 이 협정의 당사자회의 역할을 하는 당사자총회는 제1차 회기에서 국가결정기여를 위한 공통의 시간 계획에 대해 고려한다.

11. 이 협정의 당사자회의 역할을 하는 당사자총회가 채택하는 지침에 따라, 당사자는 자신의 의욕 수준을 증진하기 위하여 기존의 국가결정기여를 언제든지 조정할 수 있다.

12. 당사자가 통보한 국가결정기여는 사무국이 유지하는 공공 등록부에 기록된다.

13. 당사자는 자신의 국가결정기여를 산정한다. 자신의 국가결정기여에 따른 인위적 배출과 제거를 산정할 때는, 당사자는 이 협정의 당사자회의 역할을 하는 당사자총회가 채택하는 지침에 따라, 환경적 건전성, 투명성, 정확성, 완전성, 비교가능성, 일관성을 촉진하며, 이중계산의 방지를 보장한다.

14. 국가결정기여의 맥락에서, 인위적 배출과 제거에 관한 완화 행동을 인식하고 이행할 때 당사자는, 이 조 제13항의 규정에 비추어, 협약상의 기존 방법론과 지침을 적절히 고려하여야 한다.

15. 당사자는 이 협정을 이행할 때, 대응조치의 영향으로 인하여 자국 경제가 가장 크게 영향을 받는 당사자, 특히 개발도상국 당사자의 우려사항을 고려한다.

16. 공동으로 이 조 제2항에 따라 행동할 것에 합의한 지역경제통합기구와 그 회원국을 포함하는 당사자는 자신의 국가결정기여를 통보할 때, 관련 기간 내에 각 당사자에 할당된 배출 수준을 포함하는 합의 내용을 사무국에 통고한다. 그 다음 순서로 사무국은 협약의 당사자 및 서명자에게 그 합의 내용을 통지한다.

17. 그러한 합의의 각 당사자는 이 조 제13항 및 제14항 그리고 제13조 및 제15조에 따라 이 조 제16항에서 언급된 합의에 규정된 배출 수준에 대하여 책임을 진다.

18. 공동으로 행동하는 당사자들이 이 협정의 당사자인 지역경제통합기구의 프레임 워크 안에서 그리고 지역경제통합기구와 함께 공동으로 행동하는 경우, 그 지역경제통합기구의 각 회원국은 개별적으로 그리고 지역경제통합기구와 함께, 이 조 제13항 및 제14항 그리고 제13조 및 제15조에 따라, 이 조 제16항에 따라 통보된 합의에서 명시된 배출 수준에 대하여 책임을 진다.

19. 모든 당사자는 상이한 국내 여건에 비추어, 공통적이면서도 그 정도에 차이가 나는 책임과 각자의 능력을 고려하는 제2조를 유념하며 장기적인 온실가스 저배출 발전 전략을 수립하고 통보하기 위하여 노력하여야 한다.

제5조

1. 당사자는 협약 제4조제1항라목에 언급된 바와 같이, 산림을 포함한 온실가스

흡수원 및 저장소를 적절히 보전하고 증진하는 조치를 하여야 한다.

2. 당사자는 협약에 따라 이미 합의된 관련 지침과 결정에서 규정하고 있는 기존의 프레임워크를 결과기반지불 등의 방식으로 이행하고 지원하는 조치를 하도록 장려된다. 그러한 프레임워크는, 개발도상국에서의 남벌과 산림 황폐화로 인한 배출의 감축 관련 활동을 위한 그리고 산림의 보존, 지속가능한 관리 및 산림의 탄소 축적 증진 역할을 위한 정책적 접근 및 긍정적 유인 프레임워크이며, 또한 산림의 통합적이고 지속가능한 관리를 위한 공동 완화 및 적응 접근과 같은 대안적 정책 접근 프레임워크이다. 당사자는 그러한 접근과 결부된 비탄소 이익에 적절하게 유인을 제공하는 것이 중요하다는 점을 재확인한다.

제6조

1. 당사자는 일부 당사자가 완화 및 적응 행동을 하는 데 있어 보다 높은 수준의 의욕을 가능하게 하고 지속가능한 발전과 환경적 건전성을 촉진하도록 하기 위하여, 국가결정기여 이행에 있어 자발적 협력 추구를 선택하는 것을 인정한다.

2. 국가결정기여를 위하여 당사자가 국제적으로 이전된 완화 성과의 사용을 수반하는 협력적 접근에 자발적으로 참여하는 경우, 당사자는 이 협정의 당사자회의 역할을 하는 당사자총회가 채택하는 지침에 따라, 지속가능한 발전을 촉진하고 거버넌스 등에서 환경적 건전성과 투명성을 보장하며, 이중계산의 방지 등을 보장하기 위한 엄격한 계산을 적용한다.

3. 이 협정에 따라 국가결정기여를 달성하기 위하여 국제적으로 이전된 완화 성과는 자발적으로 사용되며, 참여하는 당사자에 의하여 승인된다.

4. 당사자가 자발적으로 사용할 수 있도록 온실가스 배출 완화에 기여하고 지속가능한 발전을 지원하는 메커니즘을 이 협정의 당사자회의 역할을 하는 당사자총회의 권한과 지침에 따라 이에 설립한다. 이 메커니즘은 이 협정의 당사자회의 역할을 하는 당사자총회가 지정한 기구의 감독을 받으며, 다음을 목표로 한다.

가. 지속가능한 발전 증진 및 온실가스 배출의 완화 촉진

나. 당사자가 허가한 공공 및 민간 실체가 온실가스 배출 완화에 참여하도록 유인 제공 및 촉진

다. 유치당사자 국내에서의 배출 수준 하락에 기여. 유치당사자는 배출 감축으로 이어질 완화 활동으로부터 이익을 얻을 것이며 그러한 배출

감축은 다른 당사자가 자신의 국가결정기여를 이행하는 데에도 사용될 수 있다. 그리고

라. 전지구적 배출의 전반적 완화 달성

5. 이 조 제4항에 언급된 메커니즘으로부터 발생하는 배출 감축을 다른 당사자가 자신의 국가결정기여 달성을 증명하는데 사용하는 경우, 그러한 배출 감축은 유치당사자의 국가결정기여 달성을 증명하는 데 사용되지 아니한다.

6. 이 협정의 당사자회의 역할을 하는 당사자총회는 이 조 제4항에 언급된 메커니즘 하에서의 활동 수익 중 일부가 행정 경비로 지불되고, 기후변화의 부정적 영향에 특별히 취약한 개발도상국 당사자의 적응 비용의 충당을 지원하는 데 사용되도록 보장한다.

7. 이 협정의 당사자회의 역할을 하는 당사자총회는 제1차 회기에서 이 조 제4항에 언급된 메커니즘을 위한 규칙, 방식 및 절차를 채택한다.

8. 당사자는 지속가능한 발전과 빈곤퇴치의 맥락에서, 특히 완화, 적응, 금융, 기술 이전 및 역량배양 등을 통하여 적절히 조율되고 효과적인 방식으로 국가결정기여의 이행을 지원하기 위하여 당사자가 이용 가능한 통합적이고, 전체적이며, 균형적인 비시장 접근의 중요성을 인식한다. 이러한 접근은 다음을 목표로 한다.

가. 완화 및 적응 의욕 촉진

나. 국가결정기여 이행에 공공 및 민간 부문의 참여 강화, 그리고

다. 여러 기제 및 관련 제도적 장치 전반에서 조정의 기회를 마련

9. 지속가능한 발전에 대한 비시장 접근 프레임워크를 이 조 제8항에 언급된 비시장 접근을 촉진하기 위하여 이에 정의한다.

제7조

1. 당사자는 지속가능한 발전에 기여하고 제2조에서 언급된 기온 목표의 맥락에서 적절한 적응 대응을 보장하기 위하여, 적응 역량 강화, 회복력 강화 그리고 기후변화에 대한 취약성 경감이라는 전지구적 적응목표를 이에 수립한다.

2. 당사자는 기후변화의 부정적 영향에 특별히 취약한 개발도상국 당사자의 급박하고 즉각적인 요구를 고려하면서, 적응이 현지적, 지방적, 국가적, 지역적 및 국제적 차원에서 모두가 직면한 전지구적 과제라는 점과, 적응이 인간, 생계 및 생태계를

보호하기 위한 장기적이며 전지구적인 기후변화 대응의 핵심 요소이며 이에 기여한다는 점을 인식한다.

3. 개발도상국 당사자의 적응 노력은 이 협정의 당사자회의 역할을 하는 당사자 총회 제1차 회기에서 채택되는 방식에 따라 인정된다.

4. 당사자는 현재 적응에 대한 필요성이 상당하고, 더 높은 수준의 완화가 추가적인 적응 노력의 필요성을 줄일 수 있으며, 적응 필요성이 더 클수록 더 많은 적응 비용이 수반될 수 있다는 점을 인식한다.

5. 당사자는, 적절한 경우 적응을 관련 사회경제적 및 환경적 정책과 행동에 통합하기 위하여, 취약계층, 지역공동체 및 생태계를 고려하면서 적응 행동이 국가 주도적이고 성 인지적이며 참여적이고 전적으로 투명한 접근을 따라야 한다는 점과, 이용 가능한 최선의 과학, 그리고 적절히 전통 지식, 원주민 지식 및 지역 지식체계에 기반을 두고 따라야 한다는 점을 확인한다.

6. 당사자는 적응 노력에 대한 지원과 국제협력의 중요성을 인식하고, 개발도상국 당사자, 특히 기후변화의 부정적 영향에 특별히 취약한 국가의 요구를 고려하는 것의 중요성을 인식한다.

7. 당사자는 다음에 관한 것을 포함하여 「칸쿤 적응 프레임워크」를 고려하면서 적응 행동 강화를 위한 협력을 증진하여야 한다.

- 가. 적응 행동과 관련 있는 과학, 계획, 정책 및 이행에 관한 것을 적절히 포함하여, 정보, 모범관행, 경험 및 교훈의 공유
- 나. 관련 정보와 지식의 취합 및 당사자에 대한 기술적 지원 및 지침의 제공을 지원하기 위하여, 이 협정을 지원하는 협약상의 것을 포함한 제도적 장치의 강화
- 다. 기후 서비스에 정보를 제공하고 의사결정을 지원하는 방식으로, 연구, 기후체계에 관한 체계적 관측, 조기경보시스템 등을 포함하여 기후에 관한 과학적 지식의 강화
- 라. 개발도상국 당사자가 효과적인 적응 관행, 적응 요구, 우선순위, 적응 행동과 노력을 위하여 제공하고 제공받은 지원, 문제점과 격차를 파악할 수 있도록, 모범관행 장려에 부합하는 방식으로의 지원, 그리고
- 마. 적응 행동의 효과성 및 지속성 향상

8. 국제연합 전문기구 및 기관들은 이 조 제5항의 규정을 고려하면서 이 조

제7항에서 언급된 행동을 이행하기 위한 당사자의 노력을 지원하도록 장려된다.

9. 각 당사자는, 관련 계획, 정책 그리고/또는 기여의 개발 또는 강화를 포함하는 적응계획 과정과 행동의 이행에 적절히 참여하며, 이는 다음을 포함할 수 있다.

가. 적응 행동, 조치, 그리고/또는 노력의 이행

나. 국가별 적응계획을 수립하고 이행하는 절차

다. 취약인구, 지역 및 생태계를 고려하면서, 국가별로 결정된 우선 행동을 정하기 위하여 기후변화 영향과 취약성 평가

라. 적응 계획, 정책, 프로그램 및 행동에 대한 모니터링, 평가 및 그로부터의 학습, 그리고

마. 경제 다변화와 천연자원의 지속가능한 관리 등의 방식을 통하여 사회경제적 그리고 생태계의 회복력 구축

10. 각 당사자는 개발도상국 당사자에게 어떤 추가적 부담도 발생시키지 아니하면서 적절히 적응 보고서를 정기적으로 제출하고 갱신하여야 하며, 이 보고서는 당사자의 우선순위, 이행 및 지원 필요성, 계획 및 행동을 포함할 수 있다.

11. 이 조 제10항에 언급된 적응 보고서는 국가별 적응계획, 제4조제2항에 언급된 국가결정기여, 그리고/또는 국가별보고서를 포함하여 그 밖의 보고서나 문서의 일부로서 또는 이와 함께 정기적으로 적절히 제출되고 갱신된다.

12. 이 조 제10항에 언급된 적응 보고서는 사무국이 유지하는 공공 등록부에 기록된다.

13. 제9조, 제10조 및 제11조의 규정에 따라 이 조 제7항, 제9항, 제10항 및 제11항을 이행하기 위하여 지속적이고 강화된 국제적 지원이 개발도상국 당사자에게 제공된다.

14. 제14조에 언급된 전지구적 이행점검은 특히 다음의 역할을 한다.

가. 개발도상국 당사자의 적응 노력 인정

나. 이 조 제10항에 언급된 적응보고서를 고려하며 적응 행동의 이행 강화다. 적응과 적응을 위하여 제공되는 지원의 적절성과 효과성 검토, 그리고

라. 이 조 제1항에 언급된 전지구적 적응목표를 달성하면서 나타난 전반적인 진전 검토

제8조

1. 당사자는 기상이변과 서서히 발생하는 현상을 포함한 기후변화의 부정적 영향과 관련된 손실 및 피해를 방지하고, 최소화하며, 해결해 나가는 것의 중요성과, 그 손실과 피해의 위험을 줄이기 위한 지속가능한 발전의 역할을 인식한다.

2. 기후변화의 영향과 관련된 손실 및 피해에 관한 바르샤바 국제 메커니즘은 이 협정의 당사자회의 역할을 하는 당사자총회의 권한 및 지침을 따르며, 이 협정의 당사자회의 역할을 하는 당사자총회가 결정하는 바에 따라 증진되고 강화될 수 있다.

3. 당사자는 협력과 촉진을 기반으로, 적절한 경우 바르샤바 국제 메커니즘 등을 통하여 기후변화의 부정적 영향과 관련된 손실 및 피해에 관한 이해, 행동 및 지원을 강화하여야 한다.

4. 이에 따라, 이해, 행동 및 지원을 강화하기 위한 협력과 촉진 분야는 다음을 포함할 수 있다.

가. 조기경보시스템

나. 비상준비태세

다. 서서히 발생하는 현상

라. 돌이킬 수 없고 영구적인 손실과 피해를 수반할 수 있는 현상

마. 종합적 위험 평가 및 관리

바. 위험 보험 제도, 기후 위험 분산 그리고 기타 보험 해결책

사. 비경제적 손실, 그리고

아. 공동체, 생계 및 생태계의 회복력

5. 바르샤바 국제 메커니즘은 이 협정상의 기존 기구 및 전문가그룹, 그리고 이 협정 밖에 있는 관련 기구 및 전문가 단체와 협력한다.

제9조

1. 선진국 당사자는 협약상의 자신의 기존 의무의 연속선상에서 완화 및 적응 모두와 관련하여 개발도상국 당사자를 지원하기 위하여 재원을 제공한다.

2. 그 밖의 당사자는 자발적으로 그러한 지원을 제공하거나 제공을 지속하도록 장려된다.

3. 전지구적 노력의 일환으로, 선진국 당사자는 다양한 행동을 통하여 국가 주도적 전략 지원을 포함한 공적재원이 중요한 역할을 함에 주목하고 개발도상국 당사자의 요구와 우선순위를 고려하면서, 다양한 자원, 기제 및 경로를 통하여 기후 재원을 조성하는 데 있어 주도적 역할을 지속하여야 한다. 그러한 기후재원 조성은 이전보다 진전되는 노력을 보여주어야 한다.

4. 확대된 재원의 제공은 적응을 위한 공적 증여기반 재원의 필요성을 고려하고, 국가 주도적 전략과 개발도상국, 특히, 최빈개도국, 소도서 개발도상국과 같이 기후 변화의 부정적 영향에 특별히 취약하고 그 역량상 상당한 제약이 있는 개발도상국 당사자의 우선순위와 요구를 감안하면서 완화와 적응 간 균형 달성을 목표로 하여야 한다.

5. 선진국 당사자는 가능하다면 개발도상국 당사자에게 제공될 공적재원의 예상 수준을 포함하여, 이 조 제1항 및 제3항과 관련된 예시적인 성격의 정성적·정량적 정보를 적용 가능한 범위 내에서 2년마다 통보한다. 재원을 제공하는 그 밖의 당사자는 그러한 정보를 자발적으로 2년마다 통보하도록 장려된다.

6. 제14조에 언급된 전지구적 이행점검은 기후재원 관련 노력에 관하여 선진국 당사자 그리고/또는 협정상의 기구가 제공하는 관련 정보를 고려한다.

7. 선진국 당사자는, 제13조제13항에 명시된 바와 같이 이 협정의 당사자회의 역할을 하는 당사자총회 제1차 회기에서 채택되는 방식, 절차 및 지침에 따라, 공적 개입을 통하여 제공·조성된 개발도상국 당사자에 대한 지원에 관하여 투명하고 일관된 정보를 2년마다 제공한다. 그 밖의 당사자는 그와 같이 하도록 장려된다.

8. 운영 실체를 포함한 협약의 재정메커니즘은 이 협정의 재정메커니즘의 역할을 한다.

9. 협약의 재정메커니즘의 운영 실체를 포함하여 이 협정을 지원하는 기관은, 국가별 기후 전략과 계획의 맥락에서, 개발도상국 당사자, 특히 최빈개도국 및 소도서 개발도상국이 간소한 승인 절차 및 향상된 준비수준지원을 통하여 재원에 효율적으로 접근하도록 보장하는 것을 목표로 한다.

제10조

1. 당사자는 기후변화에 대한 회복력을 개선하고 온실가스 배출을 감축하기 위하여 기술 개발 및 이전을 완전히 실현하는 것의 중요성에 대한 장기적 전망을 공유한다.

2. 당사자는, 이 협정상의 완화 및 적응 행동의 이행을 위한 기술의 중요성에 주목하고 기존의 효율적 기술 사용 및 확산 노력을 인식하면서, 기술의 개발 및 이전을 위한 협력적 행동을 강화한다.

3. 협약에 따라 설립된 기술메커니즘은 이 협정을 지원한다.

4. 이 조 제1항에 언급된 장기적 전망을 추구하면서, 이 협정의 이행을 지원하기 위하여 기술 개발 및 이전 행동 강화를 촉진하고 증진함에 있어 기술메커니즘의 작업에 포괄적인 지침을 제공하도록 기술에 관한 프레임워크를 이에 설립한다.

5. 혁신을 가속화하고 장려하고 가능하게 하는 것은 기후변화에 대한 효과적이고 장기적인 전지구적 대응과 경제 성장 및 지속가능한 발전을 촉진하는 데 매우 중요하다. 그러한 노력은, 연구개발에 대한 협업적 접근을 위하여 그리고 특히 기술 주기의 초기 단계에 개발도상국 당사자가 기술에 쉽게 접근할 수 있도록 하기 위하여, 기술메커니즘 등에 의하여 그리고, 재정적 수단을 통하여, 협약의 재정메커니즘 등에 의하여 적절히 지원된다.

6. 이 조의 이행을 위하여 재정적 지원 등의 지원이 개발도상국 당사자에게 제공되며, 이에선 완화와 적응을 위한 지원 간의 균형을 이루기 위하여, 상이한 기술 주기 단계에서의 기술 개발 및 이전에 관한 협력 행동을 강화하기 위한 지원이 포함된다. 제14조에 언급된 전지구적 이행점검은 개발도상국 당사자를 위한 기술 개발 및 이전 지원 관련 노력에 대한 이용 가능한 정보를 고려한다.

제11조

1. 이 협정에 따른 역량배양은, 특히 적응 및 완화 행동의 이행을 포함한 효과적인 기후변화 행동을 위해 최빈개도국과 같은 역량이 가장 부족한 개발도상국 및 소도서 개발도상국과 같은 기후변화의 부정적 효과에 특별히 취약한 개발도상국 당사자의 역량과 능력을 강화하여야 하고, 기술의 개발·확산 및 효과적 사용, 기후재원에 대한 접근, 교육·훈련·공중의 인식과 관련된 측면, 그리고 투명하고 시의적절하며 정확한 정보의 소통을 원활하게 하여야 한다.

2. 역량배양은 국가별 필요를 기반으로 반응하는 국가 주도적인 것이어야 하고, 국가적, 지방적 그리고 현지적 차원을 포함하여 당사자, 특히 개발도상국 당사자의 국가 주인의식을 조성하여야 한다. 역량배양은 협약상의 역량배양 활동을 통한 교훈을 포함

하여 습득한 교훈을 따라야 하고, 참여적이고 종합적이며 성 인지적인 효과적·반복적 과정이 되어야 한다.

3. 모든 당사자는 이 협정을 이행하는 개발도상국 당사자의 역량을 강화하기 위하여 협력하여야 한다. 선진국 당사자는 개발도상국에서의 역량배양 행동에 대한 지원을 강화하여야 한다.

4. 지역적·양자적·다자적 접근 등의 수단을 통하여 이 협정의 이행을 위한 개발도상국 당사자의 역량을 강화하는 모든 당사자는, 역량배양을 위한 그러한 행동이나 조치에 대하여 정기적으로 통보한다. 개발도상국 당사자는 이 협정의 이행을 위한 역량배양 계획, 정책, 행동이나 조치를 이행하면서 얻은 진전을 정기적으로 통보하여야 한다.

5. 역량배양 활동은, 협약에 따라 설립되어 이 협정을 지원하는 적절한 제도적 장치 등 이 협정의 이행을 지원하기 위한 적절한 제도적 장치를 통하여 강화된다. 이 협정의 당사자회의 역할을 하는 당사자총회는 제1차 회기에서 역량배양을 위한 최초의 제도적 장치에 관한 결정을 고려하고 채택한다.

제12조

당사자는 이 협정상에서의 행동 강화와 관련하여 기후변화 교육, 훈련, 공중의 인식, 공중의 참여 그리고 정보에 대한 공중의 접근을 강화하기 위한 적절한 조치의 중요성을 인식하면서, 이러한 조치를 할 때 서로 협력한다.

제13조

1. 상호 신뢰와 확신을 구축하고 효과적 이행을 촉진하기 위하여, 당사자의 상이한 역량을 고려하고 공동의 경험에서 비롯된 유연성을 내재하고 있는, 행동 및 지원을 위하여 강화된 투명성 프레임워크를 이에 설립한다.

2. 투명성 프레임워크는 각자의 역량에 비추어 유연성이 필요한 개발도상국 당사자가 이 조 규정을 이행하는 데 있어 유연성을 제공한다. 이 조 제13항에 언급된 방식, 절차 및 지침은 그러한 유연성을 반영한다.

3. 투명성 프레임워크는 최빈개도국과 소도서 개발도상국의 특수한 여건을 인식

하면서 협약상의 투명성 장치를 기반으로 이를 강화하고, 국가주권을 존중하면서 촉진적·비침해적·비징벌적 방식으로 이행되며, 당사자에게 지나친 부담을 지우지 아니한다.

4. 국가별보고서, 격년보고서, 격년갱신보고서, 국제 평가 및 검토, 그리고 국제 협의 및 분석을 포함하는 협약상의 투명성 장치는 이 조 제13항상의 방식, 절차 및 지침을 개발하기 위하여 얻은 경험의 일부를 구성한다.

5. 행동의 투명성을 위한 프레임워크의 목적은, 제14조상의 전지구적 이행점검에 알려주기 위하여, 제4조상 당사자의 국가결정기여와 모범관행·우선순위·필요·격차 등 제7조상의 당사자들의 적응 행동을 완수하도록 명확성 및 그 진전을 추적하는 것을 포함하여, 협약 제2조에 설정된 목적에 비추어 기후변화 행동에 대한 명확한 이해를 제공하는 것이다.

6. 지원의 투명성을 위한 프레임워크의 목적은, 제14조상의 전지구적 이행점검에 알려주기 위하여, 제4조, 제7조, 제9조, 제10조 및 제11조상 기후변화 행동의 맥락에서 관련 개별 당사자가 제공하고 제공받은 지원과 관련하여 명확성을 제공하고, 제공된 총 재정지원의 전체적인 개관을 가능한 수준까지 제공하는 것이다.

7. 각 당사자는 다음의 정보를 정기적으로 제공한다.

- 가. 기후변화에 관한 정부 간 패널에서 수락되고 이 협정의 당사자회의의 역할을 하는 당사자총회에서 합의된 모범관행 방법론을 사용하여 작성된 온실가스의 배출원에 의한 인위적 배출과 흡수원에 의한 제거에 관한 국가별 통계 보고서, 그리고
- 나. 제4조상 국가결정기여를 이행하고 달성하는 데에서의 진전 추적에 필요한 정보

8. 각 당사자는 또한 제7조에 따라 기후변화의 영향과 적응에 관련된 정보를 적절히 제공하여야 한다.

9. 선진국 당사자는 제9조, 제10조 및 제11조에 따라 개발도상국 당사자에게 제공된 재정지원, 기술이전 지원 및 역량배양 지원에 관한 정보를 제공하고, 지원을 제공하는 그 밖의 당사자는 이러한 정보를 제공하여야 한다.

10. 개발도상국 당사자는 제9조, 제10조 및 제11조상 필요로 하고 제공받은 재정지원, 기술 이전 지원 및 역량배양 지원에 관한 정보를 제공하여야 한다.

11. 이 조 제7항과 제9항에 따라 각 당사자가 제출한 정보는 결정 1/CP.21에 따라 기술 전문가의 검토를 받는다. 개발도상국 당사자의 역량에 비추어 필요한 경우 역량 배양 필요를 파악하기 위한 지원을 검토 절차에 포함한다. 또한 각 당사자는 제9조에 따른 노력과 관련하여 그리고 국가결정기여에 대한 당사자 각자의 이행 및 달성과 관련하여 그 진전에 대한 촉진적·다자적 고려에 참여한다.

12. 이 항에 따른 기술 전문가의 검토는, 관련이 있을 경우 당사자가 제공한 지원에 대한 고려와, 국가결정기여의 이행 및 달성에 대한 고려로 구성된다. 또한 검토는 당사자를 위한 개선 분야를 파악하고, 이 조 제2항에 따라 당사자에 부여된 유연성을 고려하여 이 조 제13항에 언급된 방식·절차·지침과 제출된 정보 간 일관성에 대한 검토를 포함한다. 검토는 개발도상국 당사자 각자의 국가적 능력과 여건에 특별한 주의를 기울인다.

13. 이 협정의 당사자회의의 역할을 하는 당사자총회는 제1차 회기에서 협약상의 투명성과 관련된 장치로부터 얻은 경험을 기반으로 이 조의 규정을 구체화하여, 행동과 지원의 투명성을 위한 공동의 방식, 절차 및 지침을 적절히 채택한다.

14. 이 조의 이행을 위하여 개발도상국에 지원이 제공된다.

15. 또한 개발도상국 당사자의 투명성 관련 역량배양을 위하여 지속적인 지원이 제공된다.

제14조

1. 이 협정의 당사자회의의 역할을 하는 당사자총회는 이 협정의 목적과 그 장기적 목표의 달성을 위한 공동의 진전을 평가하기 위하여 이 협정의 이행을 정기적으로 점검 (“전지구적 이행점검”이라 한다)한다. 이는 완화, 적응, 이행 수단과 지원 수단을 고려하면서, 형평과 이용 가능한 최선의 과학에 비추어 포괄적이고 촉진적인 방식으로 행하여진다.

2. 이 협정의 당사자회의의 역할을 하는 당사자총회는 이 협정의 당사자회의의 역할을 하는 당사자총회에서 달리 결정하는 경우가 아니면 2023년에 첫 번째 전지구적 이행 점검을 실시하고 이후 5년마다 이를 실시한다.

3. 전지구적 이행점검의 결과는, 이 협정의 관련 규정에 따라 당사자가 국내적

으로 결정한 방식으로 행동과 지원을 갱신하고 강화하도록 또한 기후 행동을 위한 국제 협력을 강화하도록 당사자에게 알려준다.

제15조

1. 이 협정 규정의 이행을 원활하게 하고 그 준수를 촉진하기 위한 메커니즘을 이에 설립한다.

2. 이 조 제1항에 언급된 메커니즘은 전문가를 기반으로 한 촉진적 성격의 위원회로 구성되고, 이 위원회는 투명하고 비대립적이며 비정별적인 방식으로 기능한다. 위원회는 당사자 각자의 국가적 능력과 여건에 특별한 주의를 기울인다.

3. 위원회는 이 협정의 당사자회의 역할을 하는 당사자총회 제1차 회기에서 채택되는 방식 및 절차에 따라 운영되며, 매년 이 협정의 당사자회의 역할을 하는 당사자총회에 보고한다.

제16조

1. 협약의 최고기구인 당사자총회는 이 협정의 당사자회의 역할을 한다.

2. 이 협정의 당사자가 아닌 협약의 당사자는 이 협정의 당사자회의 역할을 하는 당사자총회의 모든 회기 절차에 옵서버로 참석할 수 있다. 당사자총회가 이 협정의 당사자회의 역할을 할 때, 이 협정에 따른 결정권은 이 협정의 당사자만이 갖는다.

3. 당사자총회가 이 협정의 당사자회의 역할을 할 때, 당사자총회 의장단의 구성원으로서 해당 시점에 이 협정의 당사자가 아닌 협약의 당사자를 대표하는 자는 이 협정의 당사자들이 그들 중에서 선출한 추가 구성원으로 대체된다.

4. 이 협정의 당사자회의 역할을 하는 당사자총회는 이 협정의 이행상황을 정기적으로 검토하고, 그 권한 범위 안에서 이 협정의 효과적 이행의 증진에 필요한 결정을 한다. 이 협정의 당사자회의 역할을 하는 당사자총회는 이 협정에 의하여 부여된 기능을 수행하며 다음을 행한다.

- 가. 이 협정의 이행에 필요하다고 간주되는 보조기구의 설립, 그리고
- 나. 이 협정의 이행을 위하여 요구될 수 있는 그 외 기능의 수행

5. 이 협정의 당사자회의 역할을 하는 당사자총회가 만장일치로 달리 결정하는 경우를 제외하고는, 당사자총회의 절차규칙 및 협약에 따라 적용되는 재정 절차는 이 협정에 준용된다.

6. 이 협정의 당사자회의 역할을 하는 당사자총회의 제1차 회기는 이 협정의 발효일 후에 예정되어 있는 당사자총회의 제1차 회기와 함께 사무국에 의하여 소집된다. 이 협정의 당사자회의 역할을 하는 당사자총회의 후속 정기회기는, 이 협정의 당사자회의 역할을 하는 당사자총회가 달리 결정하는 경우가 아니면, 당사자총회의 정기회기와 함께 개최된다.

7. 이 협정의 당사자회의 역할을 하는 당사자총회의 특별회기는 이 협정의 당사자회의 역할을 하는 당사자총회에서 필요하다고 간주되는 다른 때에 또는 어느 당사자의 서면요청이 있는 때에 개최된다. 다만, 그러한 서면 요청은 사무국에 의하여 당사자들에게 통보된 후 6개월 이내에 최소한 당사자 3분의 1의 지지를 받아야 한다.

8. 국제연합, 국제연합 전문기구, 국제원자력기구 및 이들 기구의 회원국이나 옵서버인 협약의 비당사자는 이 협정의 당사자회의 역할을 하는 당사자총회의 회기에 옵서버로 참석할 수 있다. 이 협정이 다루는 문제와 관련하여 자격을 갖추고 이 협정의 당사자회의 역할을 하는 당사자총회의 회기에 옵서버로 참석하고자 하는 의사를 사무국에 통지한 기구나 기관은, 국내적·국제적 또는 정부간·비정부간인지를 불문하고, 출석 당사자의 3분의 1이 반대하는 경우가 아니면 참석이 승인될 수 있다. 옵서버의 승인 및 참석은 이 조 제5항에 언급된 절차규칙에 따른다.

제17조

1. 협약 제8조에 의하여 설립되는 사무국은 이 협정의 사무국 역할을 한다.

2. 사무국의 기능에 관한 협약 제8조제2항 및 사무국의 기능수행에 필요한 장치에 관한 협약 제8조제3항은 이 협정에 준용된다. 또한 사무국은 이 협정에 따라 부여된 기능과 이 협정의 당사자회의 역할을 하는 당사자총회에 의하여 부여된 기능을 수행한다.

제18조

1. 협약 제9조 및 제10조에 의하여 설립된 과학기술자문 보조기구와 이행보조

기구는 각각 이 협정의 과학기술자문 보조기구와 이행보조기구의 역할을 한다. 이들 두 기구의 기능수행에 관한 협약 규정은 이 협정에 준용된다. 이 협정의 과학기술자문 보조기구와 이행보조기구 회의의 회기는 각각 협약의 과학기술 보조기구 및 이행보조기구의 회의와 함께 개최된다.

2. 이 협정의 당사자가 아닌 협약의 당사자는 그 보조기구의 모든 회기의 절차에 옵서버로 참석할 수 있다. 보조기구가 이 협정의 보조기구의 역할을 할 때, 이 협정에 따른 결정권은 이 협정의 당사자만 가진다.

3. 협약 제9조 및 제10조에 의하여 설립된 보조기구가 이 협정에 대한 문제와 관련하여 그 기능을 수행할 때, 보조기구 의장단의 구성원으로서 해당 시점에 이 협정의 당사자가 아닌 협약의 당사자를 대표하는 자는 이 협정의 당사자들이 그들 중에서 선출한 추가 구성원으로 대체된다.

제19조

1. 이 협정에서 언급되지 않은, 협약에 의하여 또는 협약에 따라 설립된 보조기구나 그 밖의 제도적 장치는 이 협정의 당사자회의 역할을 하는 당사자총회의 결정에 따라 이 협정을 지원한다. 이 협정의 당사자회의 역할을 하는 당사자총회는 그러한 보조기구나 장치가 수행할 기능을 명확히 한다.

2. 이 협정의 당사자회의 역할을 하는 당사자총회는 그러한 보조기구와 제도적 장치에 추가적인 지침을 제공할 수 있다.

제20조

1. 이 협정은 협약의 당사자인 국가와 지역경제통합기구의 서명을 위하여 개방되며, 이들에 의한 비준, 수락 및 승인을 조건으로 한다. 이 협정은 뉴욕의 국제연합 본부에서 2016년 4월 22일부터 2017년 4월 21일까지 서명을 위하여 개방된다. 이후 이 협정은 서명기간이 종료한 날의 다음 날부터 가입을 위하여 개방된다. 비준서, 수락서, 승인서 또는 가입서는 수탁자에게 기탁된다.

2. 그 회원국 중 어느 국가도 이 협정의 당사자가 아니면서 이 협정의 당사자가 되는 모든 지역경제통합기구는, 이 협정상의 모든 의무에 구속된다. 하나 또는 둘 이상의

회원국이 이 협정의 당사자인 지역경제통합기구의 경우, 그 기구와 그 회원국은 이 협정상의 의무를 이행하기 위한 각자의 책임에 관하여 결정한다. 그러한 경우, 그 기구와 그 회원국은 이 협정상의 권리를 동시에 행사하지 아니한다.

3. 지역경제통합기구는 그 비준서, 수탁서, 승인서 또는 가입서에서 이 협정이 규율하는 문제에 관한 기구의 권한범위를 선언한다. 또한, 이러한 기구는 그 권한범위의 실질적 변동을 수탁자에게 통지하며, 수탁자는 이를 당사자에게 통지한다.

제21조

1. 이 협정은 지구 온실가스 총 배출량 중 최소한 55퍼센트를 차지하는 것으로 추정되는 55개 이상의 협약 당사자가 비준서, 수탁서, 승인서 또는 가입서를 기탁한 날부터 30일 후에 발효한다.

2. 오직 이 조 제1항의 제한적 목적상, “지구 온실가스 총 배출량”이란 협약의 당사자가 이 협정의 채택일에 또는 그 이전에 통보한 가장 최신의 배출량을 말한다.

3. 발효에 관한 이 조 제1항의 조건이 충족된 후 이 협정을 비준, 수탁 또는 승인하거나 이에 가입하는 국가 또는 지역경제통합기구의 경우, 이 협정은 그러한 국가 또는 지역경제통합기구의 비준서, 수탁서, 승인서 또는 가입서가 기탁된 날부터 30일 후에 발효한다.

4. 이 조 제1항의 목적상, 지역경제통합기구가 기탁하는 모든 문서는 그 기구의 회원국이 기탁하는 문서에 추가하여 계산되지 아니한다.

제22조

협약의 개정안 채택에 관한 협약 제15조의 규정은 이 협정에 준용된다.

제23조

1. 협약의 부속서 채택 및 개정에 관한 협약 제16조의 규정은 이 협정에 준용된다.

2. 이 협정의 부속서는 이 협정의 불가분의 일부를 구성하며, 명시적으로 달리 규정되는 경우가 아니면, 이 협정을 언급하는 것은 이 협정의 모든 부속서도 언급하는 것으로 본다. 그러한 부속서는 목록, 양식 및 과학적·기술적·절차적·행정적 특성을 갖는 서술적 성격의 그 밖의 자료에 국한된다.

제24조

분쟁해결에 관한 협약 제14조의 규정은 이 협정에 준용된다.

제25조

1. 각 당사자는 이 조 제2항에 규정된 경우를 제외하고는 하나의 투표권을 가진다.

2. 지역경제통합기구는 자신의 권한범위 내의 문제에서 이 협정의 당사자인 그 기구 회원국의 수와 같은 수만큼의 투표권을 행사한다. 기구 회원국 중 어느 한 국가라도 투표권을 행사하는 경우, 그러한 기구는 투표권을 행사하지 아니하며, 그 반대의 경우에서도 또한 같다.

제26조

국제연합 사무총장은 이 협정의 수탁자가 된다.

제27조

이 협정에 대하여는 어떤 유보도 행할 수 없다.

제28조

1. 당사자는 이 협정이 자신에 대하여 발효한 날부터 3년 후에는 언제든지 수탁자에게 서면통고를 하여 이 협정에서 탈퇴할 수 있다.

2. 그러한 탈퇴는 수탁자가 탈퇴통고서를 접수한 날부터 1년이 경과한 날 또는 탈퇴통고서에 그보다 더 나중의 날짜가 명시된 경우에는 그 나중의 날에 효력이 발생한다.

3. 협약에서 탈퇴한 당사자는 이 협정에서도 탈퇴한 것으로 본다.

제29조

아랍어, 중국어, 영어, 프랑스어, 러시아어 및 스페인어본이 동등하게 정본인 이 협정의 원본은 국제연합 사무총장에게 기탁된다.

2015년 12월 12일에 파리에서 작성되었다.

이상의 증거로, 정당하게 권한을 위임받은 아래의 서명자들이 이 협정에 서명하였다.



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Conference of the Parties
Report of the Conference of the Parties on its twenty-first session, held in Paris from 30 November to 13 December 2015
Addendum
Part two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-first session
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Decision 2/CP.21

Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts

The Conference of the Parties,

1. *Welcomes with appreciation* the work by the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts (hereinafter referred to as the Executive Committee) as an important step in the operationalization of this mechanism;
2. *Welcomes* the report of the Executive Committee;¹
3. *Decides* that, as a consequence of the late nomination of members to the Executive Committee in 2015, the term of the members currently in office will end immediately before the first meeting of the Executive Committee in 2018 for members with a term of two years, and immediately before the first meeting of the Executive Committee in 2019 for members with a term of three years;
4. *Also decides* that, as a consequence of the adjustment to the terms of office of the members of the Executive Committee as referred to in paragraph 3 above, the terms of the Co-Chairs who are currently in office will end immediately before the first meeting of the Executive Committee in 2017;
5. *Notes with concern* the limited progress made in the implementation of the initial two-year workplan of the Executive Committee² owing to the late nomination of members as referred to in paragraph 3 above;
6. *Acknowledges with appreciation* that the Executive Committee plans to schedule at least three meetings³ during 2016;
7. *Urges* the Executive Committee to explore modalities of work in order to fulfil its mandate in accordance with decisions 2/CP.19 and 2/CP.20;
8. *Also urges* Parties to make available sufficient resources for the successful and timely implementation of the initial two-year workplan of the Executive Committee in view of the ambitious nature of that workplan.

*10th plenary meeting
10 December 2015*

¹ FCCC/SB/2015/3.

² As contained in document FCCC/SB/2014/4, annex II.

³ The 2nd meeting of the Executive Committee is scheduled to take place on 2–5 February 2016.

Decision 3/CP.21

Report of the Adaptation Committee

The Conference of the Parties,

1. *Welcomes* the report of the Adaptation Committee, including its recommendations;¹
2. *Also welcomes* the workplan of the Adaptation Committee for the period 2016–2018 contained in the report referred to in paragraph 1 above;
3. *Notes with appreciation* the progress made by the Adaptation Committee in the implementation of its first three-year workplan;²
4. *Invites* the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change to enhance outreach activities that would facilitate policymakers' understanding of the impact of different levels of warming on adaptation planning and actions;
5. *Requests* the Technology Executive Committee, in collaboration with the Climate Technology Centre and Network, the Adaptation Committee and the Least Developed Countries Expert Group, to consider how it can help Parties align their technology needs assessments with the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans;
6. *Invites* Parties to take into account climate risk screening of national development strategies and policies aimed at enhancing livelihoods and economic diversification to enhance climate resilience;
7. *Requests* the Adaptation Committee to further strengthen cooperation with the Standing Committee on Finance and other constituted bodies under the Convention, with a view to enhancing coherence and collaboration regarding adaptation finance as contained in the workplan of the Adaptation Committee referred to in paragraph 2 above;
8. *Recalls* decision 4/CP.20, which encourages Parties to nominate experts to the Adaptation Committee with a diversity of experience and knowledge relevant to adaptation to climate change, while also taking into account the need to achieve gender balance in accordance with decision 36/CP.7;
9. *Notes* the considerable time requirement that membership of the Adaptation Committee entails;
10. *Reiterates* its encouragement made to Parties in decision 11/CP.18, paragraph 6, to make available sufficient resources for the successful and timely implementation of the work of the Adaptation Committee;
11. *Takes note* of the estimated budgetary implications of the activities to be undertaken by the secretariat pursuant to the provisions contained in paragraph 2 above;
12. *Requests* that the actions of the secretariat called for in this decision be undertaken subject to the availability of financial resources.

*10th plenary meeting
10 December 2015*

¹ FCCC/SB/2015/2.

² As contained in document FCCC/SB/2012/3, annex II.

Decision 4/CP.21

National adaptation plans

The Conference of the Parties,

Recalling decisions 1/CP.16, 3/CP.17, 5/CP.17, 12/CP.18, 18/CP.19 and 3/CP.20,

Acknowledging that the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans is still in its early stages,

Noting with appreciation the pledges made by contributing Parties to the Green Climate Fund,¹

Noting with concern the lack of funding in the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund for the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans,

Noting with appreciation the contributions made by developed country Parties to the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund,

Emphasizing the need to align technical support provided to developing country Parties for the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans with the principles, terminology and guidelines for the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans contained in decision 5/CP.17 and subsequent related decisions,

Welcoming relevant publications of the Adaptation Committee and the Least Developed Countries Expert Group pertaining to the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans disseminated at this session,

Noting decision B.11/04 of the Board of the Green Climate Fund on the readiness programme implementation (progress report),² whereby it reaffirms that it may support a voluntary country-driven national adaptation planning process through its readiness and preparatory support programme, in coordination with other programmes and channels,

1. *Notes with appreciation* the progress made by developing country Parties in the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans;³
2. *Welcomes* the submission by Burkina Faso and Cameroon of their national adaptation plans through NAP Central,⁴ and *encourages* other Parties to forward relevant outputs and outcomes related to the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans to NAP Central as they are invited to do in decision 3/CP.20, paragraph 9;
3. *Notes* that gaps and needs remain in relation to the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans, including in terms of access to financial support, data and reporting;
4. *Acknowledges* that it is too early to assess how the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans has contributed towards reducing vulnerability to climate change and that the measures undertaken by countries to date constitute incremental

¹ See <<http://www.greenclimate.fund/contributions/pledge-tracker>>.

² Green Climate Fund Board document GCF/B.11/06. Available at <<http://www.greenclimate.fund/-/b-11>>.

³ See documents FCCC/SBI/2015/19 and Corr.1 and FCCC/SBI/2015/INF.11.

⁴ <<http://unfccc.int/nap>>.

steps towards achieving the objectives of the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans;

5. *Notes* the progress made by some Parties in integrating climate change adaptation into relevant new and existing policies, programmes and activities, in particular development planning processes and strategies within relevant sectors and at different levels of decision-making;

6. *Invites* the Green Climate Fund, as an operating entity of the Financial Mechanism, in accordance with paragraphs 36 and 40 of its governing instrument,⁵ to consider how to improve access to financial support for the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans;

7. *Also invites* developed country Parties to contribute to the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund;

8. *Encourages* United Nations organizations, specialized, bilateral and multilateral agencies and other relevant organizations to continue their efforts to coordinate support for the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans;

9. *Invites* United Nations organizations, specialized, bilateral and multilateral agencies and other relevant organizations to consider the gaps and needs, identified in the reports prepared on this matter,⁶ related to the provision of financial and technical support to developing country Parties for the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans;

10. *Requests* the Least Developed Countries Expert Group and the Adaptation Committee to consider how they can provide more information on accessing funding from the Green Climate Fund for the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans and to include such information, as appropriate, in their reports;

11. *Also requests* the Subsidiary Body for Implementation to assess progress made in the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans at its forty-eighth session (April–May 2018), with a view to making recommendations thereon to the Conference of the Parties, as appropriate;

12. *Decides* on the following actions and steps necessary for the Subsidiary Body for Implementation to initiate the assessment referred to in paragraph 11 above:

(a) To invite Parties and relevant organizations to submit to the secretariat, by 1 February 2018, information on their progress made towards the achievement of the objectives of the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans, experiences, best practices, lessons learned, gaps and needs, and support provided and received in the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans;

(b) To invite Parties to provide information, guided by a questionnaire,⁷ on an ongoing basis through NAP Central;

(c) To request the secretariat to prepare a synthesis report on the progress made towards the achievement of the objectives of the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans, experiences, best practices, lessons learned, gaps and needs, and support provided and received in the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans, taking into account information contained in national reports under the Convention, the information referred to in paragraphs 12(a) and (b) above, information

⁵ Decision 3/CP.17, annex.

⁶ FCCC/SBI/2015/INF.6, FCCC/SBI/2015/INF.11 and FCCC/SBI/2015/INF.14.

⁷ Based on the questions contained in document FCCC/SBI/2015/10, annex II.

from relevant events, including the NAP Expos, and information from other relevant sources;

(d) To request the Least Developed Countries Expert Group, in collaboration with the Adaptation Committee, to organize a meeting of Party experts, at which the report referred to in paragraph 12(c) above would be considered, with a view to providing a summary of progress made in the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans;

(e) To request the Least Developed Countries Expert Group, in collaboration with the Adaptation Committee and with the support of the secretariat, to prepare a report on the meeting referred to in paragraph 12(d) above, for consideration by the Subsidiary Body for Implementation at its forty-eighth session in its assessment of progress made in the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans;

13. *Also decides* that the assessment referred to in paragraph 11 above should take into account all the guiding principles of the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans contained in decision 5/CP.17, paragraph 3;

14. *Takes note* of the estimated budgetary implications of the activities to be undertaken by the secretariat pursuant to the provisions contained in paragraph 12 above;

15. *Requests* that the actions of the secretariat called for in this decision be undertaken subject to the availability of financial resources.

*10th plenary meeting
10 December 2015*

Decision 5/CP.21

Long-term climate finance

The Conference of the Parties,

Recalling Articles 4 and 11 of the Convention,

Also recalling decision 1/CP.16, paragraphs 2, 4 and 97–101, as well as decisions 1/CP.17, 2/CP.17, paragraphs 126–132, 4/CP.18, 3/CP.19 and 5/CP.20,

1. *Welcomes with appreciation* the pledges and announcements and progress made towards reaching the goal of jointly mobilizing USD 100 billion annually by 2020 by developed country Parties, in accordance with decision 1/CP.16, including financial contributions made to the Green Climate Fund, the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Adaptation Fund, providing further clarity to and predictability of public climate finance flows from 2015 to 2020;¹
2. *Urges* developed country Parties to continue efforts to channel a substantial share of public climate funds to adaptation activities and to strive to achieve a greater balance between finance for mitigation and adaptation, recognizing the importance of adaptation finance;
3. *Takes note with appreciation* of the summary report on the in-session workshop on long-term climate finance held in 2015;²
4. *Decides* that the second biennial high-level ministerial dialogue on climate finance, to be convened in accordance with decision 3/CP.19, will focus on the issues of adaptation finance, needs for support to developing country Parties, and cooperation on enhanced enabling environments and support for readiness activities, and that it will be informed by the report of the in-session workshop on long-term climate finance in 2016 and the second biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows;
5. *Requests* the Presidency of the Conference of the Parties, with the support of the secretariat, to prepare a summary of the second biennial high-level ministerial dialogue on climate finance for consideration by the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-third session (November 2017).

*10th plenary meeting
10 December 2015*

¹ See <http://unfccc.int/cooperation_support/financial_mechanism/long-term_finance/items/9359.php?prirref=600008649>.

² FCCC/CP/2015/2.

Decision 6/CP.21

Report of the Standing Committee on Finance

The Conference of the Parties,

Recalling Articles 4 and 11 of the Convention,

Also recalling decisions 1/CP.16, paragraph 112, and 2/CP.17, paragraphs 120 and 121, as well as decisions 5/CP.18, 7/CP.19 and 6/CP.20,

1. *Welcomes with appreciation* the report of the Standing Committee on Finance to the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-first session, taking note of the recommendations contained therein;¹
2. *Requests* the Standing Committee on Finance to continue to strengthen its engagement with all relevant stakeholders and bodies under the Convention;
3. *Endorses* the workplan of the Standing Committee on Finance for 2016–2017;²
4. *Requests* the Standing Committee on Finance, in implementing its workplan on the measurement, reporting and verification of support beyond the biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows, to continue to engage with relevant bodies under the Convention, multilateral and bilateral agencies, and international institutions;
5. *Welcomes* the third forum of the Standing Committee on Finance, on enhancing the coherence and coordination of forest financing, held on 8 and 9 September 2015 in Durban, South Africa;
6. *Notes* the recommendations of the Standing Committee on Finance from its third forum;³
7. *Expresses* its gratitude to the Government of South Africa and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations for their support in ensuring the success of the third forum of the Standing Committee on Finance;
8. *Requests* the Standing Committee on Finance to report to the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-second session (November 2016) on the progress made in the implementation of its workplan;
9. *Decides* to initiate the review of the functions of the Standing Committee on Finance referred to in decision 6/CP.20, paragraph 23, at the twenty-second session of the Conference of the Parties;
10. *Requests* the Subsidiary Body for Implementation, at its forty-fifth session (November 2016), to prepare draft terms of reference for the review referred to in paragraph 9 above, on the basis of the submissions referred to in paragraph 11 below, for consideration by the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-second session;
11. *Also requests* the members of the Standing Committee on Finance and *invites* Parties and observer organizations to submit their views on the terms of reference for the review of

¹ FCCC/CP/2015/8.

² As contained in document FCCC/CP/2015/8, annex X.

³ As contained in document FCCC/CP/2015/8, annex II.

the functions of the Standing Committee on Finance by 21 September 2016,⁴ for compilation by the secretariat into a miscellaneous document;

12. *Further requests* the Standing Committee on Finance to consider the guidance provided to it in other relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties.

*10th plenary meeting
10 December 2015*

⁴ Parties should submit their views via the submissions portal at <<http://www.unfccc.int/5900>>. Observer organizations should e-mail their submissions to <secretariat@unfccc.int>.

Decision 7/CP.21

Report of the Green Climate Fund to the Conference of the Parties and guidance to the Green Climate Fund

The Conference of the Parties,

Recalling decision 7/CP.20,

Noting the recommendations of the Standing Committee on Finance contained in its report to the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-first session with regard to the provision of draft guidance to the Green Climate Fund,¹

1. *Welcomes* the report of the Green Climate Fund to the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-first session² and the information contained therein on the progress made by the Green Climate Fund towards its full operationalization;
2. *Notes with appreciation* the attainment of the effectiveness of the Green Climate Fund by achieving the 50 per cent threshold required for the Green Climate Fund to allocate its resources to projects and programmes;
3. *Also notes with appreciation* that the Board of the Green Climate Fund reached its aim of taking its first funding decisions by its third meeting of 2015, committing USD 168 million to eight public and private projects that will promote, in the context of sustainable development, the paradigm shift towards low-emission and climate-resilient development pathways, thereby making the Green Climate Fund fully operational;
4. *Welcomes with appreciation* pledges made to the Green Climate Fund since the twentieth session of the Conference of Parties;³
5. *Welcomes* the aspirations of the Board of the Green Climate Fund to approve proposals in 2016 to a value of USD 2.5 billion;
6. *Also welcomes* the establishment of a project preparation facility that will be targeted to small-scale activities and direct access entities, and requests the Board of the Green Climate Fund to consider lessons learned from other relevant facilities;
7. *Further welcomes* the allocation of up to USD 900 million for three pilot programmes on: enhancing direct access for recipient countries to the Green Climate Fund; supporting micro, small and medium-sized enterprises; and mobilizing resources at scale in order to address adaptation and mitigation;⁴
8. *Urges* Parties that made pledges under the initial resource mobilization process of the Green Climate Fund but have not yet confirmed them to the Green Climate Fund through fully executed contribution arrangements or agreements to do so as a matter of high priority;
9. *Reiterates* the invitation for financial inputs from a variety of sources, public and private, including alternative sources, throughout the initial resource mobilization process;

¹ FCCC/CP/2015/8, annex IV.

² FCCC/CP/2015/3.

³ Pledges have been made by Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Norway, Portugal, Viet Nam, Brussels-Capital Region, Flemish Region, Walloon Region and the city of Paris.

⁴ FCCC/CP/2015/3.

10. *Requests* the Board of the Green Climate Fund to agree on the arrangements for the first formal replenishment process of the Green Climate Fund as soon as feasible;
11. *Welcomes* the decision of the Board of the Green Climate Fund to develop a strategic plan for the Green Climate Fund and to adopt it as soon as possible;
12. *Also welcomes* the decision of the Board of the Green Climate Fund to simplify the funding proposal template and concept note template in an expeditious manner;
13. *Requests* the Board of the Green Climate Fund to ensure that the revised funding proposal template and concept note template are designed to facilitate the application process;
14. *Also requests* the Board of the Green Climate Fund to adopt a simplified process for approval of proposals for certain activities, in particular for small-scale activities, as soon as possible in 2016, to reduce complexities and costs involved in project proposal development;
15. *Welcomes* the decisions of the Board of the Green Climate Fund to approve the accreditation of 20 national, regional, international and private entities to the Green Climate Fund;⁵
16. *Urges* the Board of the Green Climate Fund to streamline the accreditation modalities and to seek a balance of diversity in accredited entities;
17. *Takes note* of the progress achieved to date in the implementation of the readiness and preparatory support programme of the Green Climate Fund and stresses the importance of improving the approval process and timely disbursement of readiness resources to facilitate readiness programme implementation pursuant to Green Climate Fund Board decision B.11/04;
18. *Requests* the Board of the Green Climate Fund to prioritize the development of its initial risk management framework;
19. *Also requests* the Board of the Green Climate Fund to enhance transparency and stakeholder engagement;
20. *Urges* the Board of the Green Climate Fund to operationalize the Independent Evaluation Unit, Independent Redress Mechanism and Independent Integrity Unit as a matter of urgency and to make public the procedures Parties and affected individuals should follow when seeking redress until the Independent Redress Mechanism is operationalized;
21. *Invites* the Board of the Green Climate Fund to take into account in its programmatic priorities the Cancun Adaptation Framework, in particular the principles referred to in decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 12, and the activities referred to in decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 14;
22. *Also invites* the Board of the Green Climate Fund, in line with paragraph 38 of the governing instrument of the Green Climate Fund,⁶ to consider ways to provide support, pursuant to the modalities of the Green Climate Fund, for facilitating access to environmentally sound technologies in developing country Parties, and for undertaking collaborative research and development for enabling developing country Parties to enhance their mitigation and adaptation action;
23. *Urges* the Board of the Green Climate Fund to operationalize results-based payments for activities referred to in decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 70, consistent with decision 9/CP.19, and in accordance with Green Climate Fund Board decision B.08/08;

⁵ Five national, three regional, nine international and three private entities.

⁶ Decision 3/CP.17, annex.

24. *Encourages* the Board of the Green Climate Fund to consider the mobilization of private sector finance to progress the Green Climate Fund's forestry-related result areas;
25. *Requests* the Board of the Green Climate Fund to take into account decision 16/CP.21, in particular paragraph 6, referring to support for alternative policy approaches, such as joint mitigation and adaptation approaches for the integral and sustainable management of forests, as appropriate, in its funding decisions;
26. *Encourages* the Board of the Green Climate Fund to improve complementarity and coherence with other institutions, per paragraphs 33 and 34 of the governing instrument of the Green Climate Fund,⁷ including by engaging with relevant bodies of the Convention, such as the Standing Committee on Finance;
27. *Urges* the Board of the Green Climate Fund to develop appropriate mechanisms to support the fund through appropriate expert and technical advice, including from thematic bodies, as appropriate;
28. *Requests* the Board of the Green Climate Fund to report to the Conference of Parties on the steps it has taken to implement the guidance provided in this decision and other relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties;
29. *Invites* Parties to submit to the secretariat annually, in writing and no later than 10 weeks prior to each session of the Conference of the Parties, their views and recommendations on the elements to be taken into account in developing guidance to the Green Climate Fund.

*11th plenary meeting
13 December 2015*

⁷ Decision 3/CP.17, annex.

Decision 8/CP.21

Report of the Global Environment Facility to the Conference of the Parties and guidance to the Global Environment Facility

The Conference of the Parties,

Recalling decisions 12/CP.2, 3/CP.16, 5/CP.16, 7/CP.16, 11/CP.17, 9/CP.18, 6/CP.19 and 8/CP.20,

Welcoming the report of the Global Environment Facility to the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-first session and the information contained therein on the implementation of the sixth replenishment of the Global Environment Facility,¹

Also welcoming the pledges and contributions made to the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund,

Noting the recommendations of the Standing Committee on Finance contained in its report to the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-first session with regard to the provision of draft guidance to the Global Environment Facility,²

1. *Notes* that the Global Environment Facility has supported implementation of the remaining elements of the least developed countries work programme, including the update and implementation of national adaptation programmes of action, by providing funding to projects aimed at building capacity for the least developed countries to participate effectively in climate change processes, promoting public awareness on climate change issues, promoting the transfer of adaptation technology, and strengthening meteorological and hydrological services;
2. *Welcomes* the investments by the Global Environment Facility in sustainable forest management and activities referred to in decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 70, harnessing multiple benefits from forests and tackling deforestation and forest degradation in line with the programming directions of the sixth replenishment of the Global Environment Facility Trust Fund;³
3. *Invites* the Global Environment Facility to continue to provide finance to the activities referred to in paragraph 2 above, also taking into account decision 9/CP.19, paragraph 8, and decision 16/CP.21, as appropriate;
4. *Encourages* additional voluntary financial contributions to provide support for the national adaptation plan process through contributions to the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund;
5. *Welcomes* the addition of eight project agencies to the network of the Global Environment Facility;
6. *Notes* that the Independent Evaluation Office of the Global Environment Facility is carrying out a review of the Least Developed Countries Fund;

¹ FCCC/CP/2015/4 and Add.1.

² FCCC/CP/2015/8, annex V.

³ See Global Environment Facility document GEF/A.5/07/Rev.01. Available at <http://www.thegef.org/gef/gef_Documents_Publications>.

7. *Encourages* the Global Environment Facility to include the conclusions of the review referred to in paragraph 6 above in its report to the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-second session (November 2016);
8. *Requests* the Global Environment Facility to carry out a technical review of the programme priorities of the Least Developed Countries Fund, taking into account the independent review referred to in paragraph 6 above, and to focus the technical review on, inter alia:
 - (a) Undertaking pilot concrete climate change activities that are particularly relevant for the least developed countries;
 - (b) Enhancing longer-term institutional capacity to design and execute the activities referred to in paragraph 8(a) above;
9. *Urges* the Global Environment Facility to work with all its agencies and recipient countries to ensure that these countries can take full advantage of the expanded network of agencies;
10. *Welcomes* the exploration of innovative non-grant instruments by the Global Environment Facility, and *encourages* the Global Environment Facility to work with its agencies, recipient countries and the private sector to submit proposals;
11. *Also welcomes* the approval of projects by the Global Environment Facility to support 46 developing country Parties in preparing their intended nationally determined contributions,⁴ and *encourages* the Global Environment Facility to continue providing such support;
12. *Requests* the Global Environment Facility to consider how to support developing country Parties in formulating policies, strategies, programmes and projects to implement activities that advance priorities identified in their respective intended nationally determined contributions in a manner consistent with the operational policies and guidelines of the Global Environment Facility, starting in 2016;
13. *Notes* the actions of the Global Environment Facility to establish a more coherent, system-based approach for managing and sharing information and knowledge gained from projects and programmes of the Global Environment Facility in order to improve the effectiveness of the Global Environment Facility and its agencies and enhance the capacity of recipient countries;
14. *Welcomes* the efforts to date of the Global Environment Facility to engage with the Green Climate Fund and *encourages* both entities to further articulate and build on the complementarity of their policies and programmes within the Financial Mechanism of the Convention;
15. *Invites* Parties to submit to the secretariat annually, in writing and no later than 10 weeks prior to each session of the Conference of the Parties, their views and recommendations on the elements to be taken into account in developing guidance to the Global Environment Facility;
16. *Requests* the Global Environment Facility to include, in its annual report to the Conference of the Parties, information on the steps it has taken to implement the guidance provided in this decision and other relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties.

*10th plenary meeting
10 December 2015*

⁴ As at 16 September 2015.

Decision 9/CP.21

Methodologies for the reporting of financial information by Parties included in Annex I to the Convention

The Conference of the Parties,

Recalling Articles 4, 5, 7, 10 and 12 of the Convention,

Also recalling decisions 9/CP.2, 11/CP.4, 4/CP.5 and 1/CP.16, paragraph 40,

Further recalling decisions 2/CP.17, paragraph 19, and 11/CP.20,

1. *Recognizes* the need to enhance common understanding on key terminology for reporting financial information under the Convention to facilitate transparency and comparability of information and data on support over time and across Parties;
2. *Welcomes* the submissions from Parties and observer organizations on methodologies for the reporting of financial information, and the technical paper¹ summarizing existing international methodologies, drawing on relevant information contained in, inter alia, submissions from Parties and observer organizations;
3. *Also welcomes* the joint in-session technical workshop on the methodologies for the reporting of financial information by Parties included in Annex I to the Convention organized under the auspices of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, the Subsidiary Body for Implementation and the Standing Committee on Finance, taking note of the summary of the workshop;²
4. *Further welcomes* the update of the Standing Committee on Finance on this matter, as a part of its work on the measurement, reporting and verification of support beyond the biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows provided during the forty-third session of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice;
5. *Welcomes* the recommendations of the Standing Committee on Finance on the methodologies for the reporting of financial information, as referred to in decision 2/CP.17, paragraph 19, contained in its report to the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-first session;³
6. *Decides* to enhance consistency and transparency through adjustments in the reporting parameters in tables 7, 7(a) and 7(b) of the common tabular format for the “UNFCCC biennial reporting guidelines for developed country Parties” by:
 - (a) Creating reporting fields for the provision of information on definitions or methodologies used for reporting information in the following reporting parameters: “climate-specific” or “core/general”, “status”, “funding source”, “activity”, “financial instrument”, “type of support” and “sector”;
 - (b) Improving the software for tables 7, 7(a) and 7(b) of the common tabular format by extending the number of input rows in the Microsoft Excel file;

¹ FCCC/TP/2015/2.

² Available at

<http://unfccc.int/files/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/standing_committee/application/pdf/summary_of_the_in-session_workshop_on_reporting_methodologies_final_web.pdf>.

³ FCCC/CP/2015/8, annex VI.

(c) Aligning the categorization in the reporting parameter “status” of support (“pledged”, “committed” and “provided”) in tables 7, 7(a) and 7(b) of the common tabular format with the categorization used in other existing international methodologies (“committed” and “disbursed”);

7. *Requests* the secretariat to revise the electronic reporting application for a common tabular format, in accordance with the provisions contained in the annex, in time for the preparation and submission of the biennial reports of Parties due in 2018;

8. *Decides* that developed country Parties shall use the revised electronic reporting application, taking into account their national circumstances, when preparing and submitting their biennial reports in 2018 in accordance with decision 2/CP.17;

9. *Requests* Parties included in Annex II to the Convention to continue to provide information on the underlying assumptions and the methodologies used in their biennial reports;

10. *Also requests* the secretariat to improve the software of the biennial report data interface to allow for search functions on the UNFCCC website to collect information per key category in tables 7, 7(a) and 7(b) of the common tabular format (i.e. category “recipient country/region, financial instrument”);

11. *Further requests* the secretariat to explore ways of creating links to other reporting software and platforms to facilitate the importation and exportation of activity-level data, and to inform the Standing Committee on Finance to take this into consideration in its workplan;

12. *Requests* the secretariat to update the UNFCCC national focal points when the information referred to in paragraph 6 above on climate finance directed to recipient countries as reported under the Convention is made available;

13. *Also requests* the Standing Committee on Finance to take into account the enhanced information provided by Parties included in Annex II to the Convention referred to in paragraph 6 above in its biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows;

14. *Further requests* the Standing Committee on Finance to take into account the work on the methodologies for the reporting of financial information by Parties included in Annex I to the Convention in the context of its workplan on the measurement, reporting and verification of support;

15. *Invites* the Subsidiary Body for Implementation to take into consideration the adjustments referred to in paragraph 6 above in its revision of the “Guidelines for the preparation of national communications by Parties included in Annex I to the Convention, Part II: UNFCCC reporting guidelines on national communications”, to be completed at the twenty-second session of the Conference of the Parties (November 2016);

16. *Takes note* of the estimated budgetary implications of the activities to be undertaken by the secretariat pursuant to the provisions contained in paragraphs 7, 10 and 11 above;

17. *Requests* that the actions of the secretariat called for in this decision be undertaken subject to the availability of financial resources.

Annex

Revised common tabular format for the “UNFCCC biennial reporting guidelines for developed country Parties”

The following tables shall replace tables 7, 7(a) and 7(b) of the common tabular format for the “UNFCCC biennial reporting guidelines for developed country Parties”.

Table 7
Provision of public financial support: summary information in 20XX-3^a

Allocation channels							Domestic currency		USD ^b			Year
Core/ general ^{c, 1}	Climate-specific ^{d, 2}			Core/ general ^f	Climate-specific ^{d, 2}			Core/ general ^f	Climate-specific ^{d, 2}			
	Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting ^e		Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting ^e		Other ^f	Other ^f		
Total contributions through multilateral channels:												
Multilateral climate change funds ^g												
Other multilateral climate change funds ^h												
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks												
Specialized United Nations bodies												
Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels												
Total												

Note: Explanation of numerical footnotes is provided in the documentation box after tables 7, 7(a) and 7(b).

Abbreviation: USD = United States dollars.

^a Parties should fill in a separate table for each year, namely 20XX-3 and 20XX-2, where 20XX is the reporting year.

^b Parties should provide an explanation of the methodology used for currency exchange for the information provided in tables 7, 7(a) and 7(b) in the documentation box.

^c This refers to support to multilateral institutions that Parties cannot specify as being climate-specific.

^d Parties should explain in their biennial reports how they define funds as being climate-specific.

^e This refers to funding for activities that are cross-cutting across mitigation and adaptation.

^f Please specify.

^g Multilateral climate change funds listed in paragraph 17(a) of the “UNFCCC biennial reporting guidelines for developed country Parties” in decision 2/CP.17.

^h Other multilateral climate change funds as referred to in paragraph 17(b) of the “UNFCCC biennial reporting guidelines for developed country Parties” in decision 2/CP.17.

Table 7(a)
Provision of public financial support: contribution through multilateral channels in 20XX-3^a

	Total amount		Status ^{b, 3}	Funding source ⁴	Financial instrument ⁵	Type of support ⁶	Sector ^{c, 7}
	Climate-specific ^{e, 2}						
	Core/general ^{d, 1}						
Donor funding	Domestic currency	Domestic currency	Committed	ODA	Grant	Mitigation	Energy
	USD	USD		OOF	Concessional loan	Adaptation	Transport
			Disbursed	Other ^f	Non-concessional loan	Cross-cutting ^g	Industry
					Equity	Other ^f	Agriculture
					Other ^f		Forestry
							Water and sanitation
							Cross-cutting
							Other ^f
							Not applicable
Multilateral climate change funds							
1. Global Environment Facility							
2. Least Developed Countries Fund							
3. Special Climate Change Fund							
4. Adaptation Fund							
5. Green Climate Fund							
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities							
7. Other multilateral climate change funds							
Subtotal							
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks							
1. World Bank							
2. International Finance Corporation							
3. African Development Bank							
4. Asian Development Bank							
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development							
6. Inter-American Development Bank							
7. Other							
Subtotal							
Specialized United Nations bodies							
1. United Nations Development Programme (specific programmes)							
2. United Nations Environment Programme							

	Total amount		Status ^{b, 3}	Funding source ^a	Financial instrument ⁵	Type of support ⁶	Sector ^{c, 7}
	Climate-specific ^{e, 2}						
	Core/general ^{d, 1}						
Donor funding	Domestic currency	Domestic USD	Committed	ODA	Grant	Mitigation	Energy
							Transport
				OOF	Concessional loan	Adaptation	Industry
			Disbursed	Other ^f	Non-concessional loan	Cross-cutting ^g	Agriculture
					Equity	Other ^f	Forestry
							Water and sanitation
						Cross-cutting	
						Other ^f	
							Not applicable
(specific programmes)							
3. Other							
Subtotal							
Total							

Note: Explanation of numerical footnotes is provided in the documentation box after tables 7, 7(a) and 7(b).

Abbreviations: ODA = official development assistance, OOF = other official flows, USD = United States dollars.

^a Parties should fill in a separate table for each year, namely 20XX-3 and 20XX-2, where 20XX is the reporting year.

^b Parties should explain, in their biennial reports, the methodologies used to specify the funds as disbursed and committed. Parties will provide the information for as many status categories as appropriate in the following order of priority: disbursed and committed.

^c Parties may select several applicable sectors. Parties may report sectoral distribution, as applicable, under "Other".

^d This refers to support to multilateral institutions that Parties cannot specify as being climate-specific.

^e Parties should explain in their biennial reports how they define funds as being climate-specific.

^f Please specify.

^g This refers to funding for activities that are cross-cutting across mitigation and adaptation.

Table 7(b)
Provision of public financial support: contribution through bilateral, regional and other channels in 20XX-3^a

Recipient country/ region/project/programme/activity ^b	Total amount	Status ^{c, 3}	Funding source ⁴	Financial instrument ⁵	Type of support ⁶	Sector ^{d, 7}	Additional Information ^e
			Climate-specific ^{f, 2}				
		Committed	ODA	Grant	Mitigation	Energy	
			OOF	Concessional loan	Adaptation	Transport	
			Other ^g	Non-concessional loan	Cross-cutting ^h	Industry	
		Disbursed			Other ^g	Agriculture	
				Equity		Forestry	
				Other ^g		Water and sanitation	
						Cross-cutting	
						Other ^g	
	Domestic currency						
	USD						

Note: Explanation of numerical footnotes is provided in the documentation box after tables 7, 7(a) and 7(b).

Abbreviations: ODA = official development assistance, OOF = other official flows, USD = United States dollars.

^a Parties should fill in a separate table for each year, namely 20XX-3 and 20XX-2, where 20XX is the reporting year.

^b Parties should report, to the extent possible, on details contained in this table.

^c Parties should explain, in their biennial reports, the methodologies used to specify the funds as disbursed and committed. Parties will provide the information

for as many status categories as appropriate in the following order of priority: disbursed and committed.

^d Parties may select several applicable sectors. Parties may report sectoral distribution, as applicable, under "Other":

^e Parties should report, as appropriate, on project details and the implementing agency.

Parties should explain in their biennial reports how they define funds as being climate-specific.

^g Please specify.

^h This refers to funding for activities that are cross-cutting across mitigation and adaptation.

Documentation box

1: Core/general
2: Climate-specific
3: Status
4: Funding source
5: Financial instrument
6: Type of support
7: Sector
Each Party shall provide an indication of what new and additional financial resources it has provided and clarify how it has determined that such resources are new and additional. Please provide this information in relation to tables 7(a) and (b).

*10th plenary meeting
10 December 2015*

Decision 10/CP.21

The 2013–2015 review

The Conference of the Parties,

Recalling Article 2 of the Convention,

Also recalling decisions 1/CP.16, paragraphs 138 and 139, 1/CP.17, paragraph 6, 2/CP.17, paragraphs 157–167, and 1/CP.18, paragraphs 79–91,

1. *Takes note* of the work of the structured expert dialogue, which contributed to completing the phases of the 2013–2015 review reflected in decision 2/CP.17, paragraph 164, and of the report on the structured expert dialogue,¹ including the 10 messages highlighted therein;
2. *Expresses* its appreciation and gratitude to all those involved in the structured expert dialogue;
3. *Notes* that the structured expert dialogue completed its work, as described in decision 1/CP.18, paragraphs 86–89;
4. *Decides*, in relation to the adequacy of the long-term global goal, and in the light of the ultimate objective of the Convention, that the goal is to hold the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change;
5. *Also decides* that, in the light of the overall progress made towards achieving the long-term global goal, including consideration of the implementation of the commitments under the Convention, Parties should act urgently and ambitiously under the Convention while recognizing the technological, economic and institutional challenges;
6. *Notes* that, although some progress has already been made by UNFCCC bodies in scaling up financial, technological and capacity-building support, significant gaps still exist in terms of both the scale and the speed of such progress;
7. *Also notes* that there continue to be information gaps in relation to the areas covered within the scope of the 2013–2015 review as set out in decision 1/CP.18, paragraph 79;
8. *Encourages* the scientific community to address information and research gaps identified during the structured expert dialogue, including scenarios that limit warming to below 1.5 °C relative to pre-industrial levels by 2100 and the range of impacts at the regional and local scales associated with those scenarios;
9. *Recalls* that the next periodic review should be conducted in accordance with decision 2/CP.17, paragraph 167, and *agrees* that the next periodic review should be conducted in an effective and efficient manner, avoid duplication of work, and take into account the results of relevant work conducted under the Convention and its Kyoto Protocol and the subsidiary bodies;
10. *Requests* the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation to consider the scope of the next periodic review, referred to in paragraph 9 above, with a view to forwarding a recommendation for consideration by the Conference of the Parties by no later than 2018, as appropriate;

¹ FCCC/SB/2015/INF.1.

11. *Agrees* to reconvene the structured expert dialogue in conjunction with the next periodic review;
12. *Notes* that the first periodic review fulfilled its mandate, as contained in decisions 1/CP.16, paragraphs 138 and 139, 1/CP.17, paragraph 6, 2/CP.17, paragraphs 157–167, and 1/CP.18, paragraphs 79–91.

*11th plenary meeting
13 December 2015*

Decision 11/CP.21

Forum and work programme on the impact of the implementation of response measures

The Conference of the Parties,

Recalling the objective of the Convention as set out in its Article 2,

Reaffirming the relevant principles and provisions of the Convention related to the economic and social consequences of response measures, in particular its Articles 2, 3 and 4,

Recalling decisions 5/CP.7, 1/CP.10, 1/CP.13, 1/CP.16, 2/CP.17, 8/CP.17, 1/CP.18 and 31/CMP.1, and Article 4, paragraphs 8, 9 and 10, of the Convention, as well as Article 2, paragraph 3, and Article 3, paragraph 14, of the Kyoto Protocol,

Acknowledging Parties' repeated calls for a continued and structured exchange of information on both the positive and the negative consequences of response measures and on ways to maximize the positive and minimize the negative consequences for Parties, in line with the work programme on this matter developed by the subsidiary bodies,

Noting that the review of the work of the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures, pursuant to decision 8/CP.17, paragraph 5, has been concluded,

Affirming that a more focused consideration of issues is needed for improving the effectiveness of the process,

1. *Decides* to continue and improve the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures, which shall provide a platform allowing Parties to share, in an interactive manner, information, experiences, case studies, best practices and views, and to facilitate assessment and analysis of the impact of the implementation of response measures, with a view to recommending specific actions;
2. *Also decides* to focus work under the improved forum on, inter alia, the provision of concrete examples, case studies and practices in order to enhance the capacity of Parties, in particular developing country Parties, to deal with the impact of the implementation of response measures;
3. *Requests* the Chairs of the subsidiary bodies to convene the improved forum in order to implement the work programme on the impact of the implementation of response measures referred to in paragraph 5 below, which will continue to be convened under a joint agenda item of the subsidiary bodies and operate in accordance with the procedures applicable to contact groups. The improved forum shall meet twice a year in conjunction with the sessions of the subsidiary bodies, with its first meeting taking place at the forty-fourth sessions (May 2016) of the subsidiary bodies;
4. *Also requests* the subsidiary bodies, in order to advance the work of the improved forum, to constitute ad hoc technical expert groups, as appropriate, to elaborate on the technical work under the improved forum. The ad hoc technical expert groups shall consist of balanced regional representation of Parties;
5. *Adopts* the work programme comprising the following areas:
 - (a) Economic diversification and transformation;

(b) Just transition of the workforce, and the creation of decent work and quality jobs;

6. *Decides* that the implementation of the work programme shall address the needs of all Parties, in particular developing country Parties, and shall be informed, inter alia, by the assessment and analysis of impacts, including the use and development of economic modelling, taking into account all relevant policy issues of concern;

7. *Requests* the subsidiary bodies to review every three years, beginning at their forty-ninth sessions (November 2018), the work programme of the improved forum, including the modalities for its operation;

8. *Decides* that the improved forum shall provide recommendations to the subsidiary bodies on the actions referred to in paragraph 1 above for their consideration, with a view to recommending those actions, as appropriate, to the Conference of the Parties, beginning at its twenty-third session (November 2017);

9. *Requests* the secretariat to prepare, subject to the availability of financial resources, a guidance document to assist developing country Parties to assess the impact of the implementation of response measures, including guidance on modelling tools, as well as technical materials to assist developing country Parties in their economic diversification initiatives, for consideration at the forty-fourth sessions of the subsidiary bodies;

10. *Takes note* of the estimated budgetary implications of the activities to be undertaken by the secretariat pursuant to the provisions contained in paragraph 9 above;

11. *Requests* that the actions of the secretariat called for in this decision be undertaken subject to the availability of financial resources.

*11th plenary meeting
13 December 2015*

Decision 12/CP.21

Enhancing climate technology development and transfer through the Technology Mechanism

The Conference of the Parties,

Recalling decisions 1/CP.16, 2/CP.17, 4/CP.17, 1/CP.18, 13/CP.18, 14/CP.18, 25/CP.19, 16/CP.20 and 17/CP.20, in particular paragraph 3,

1. *Welcomes with appreciation* the joint annual report of the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network for 2015,¹ which contains information on their respective activities and on the performance of their respective functions;
2. *Invites* the Technology Executive Committee and the Advisory Board of the Climate Technology Centre and Network to update the procedures² for preparing the joint chapter of their joint annual report;
3. *Also invites* Parties and all relevant entities working on technology development and transfer to consider the key messages contained in the report referred to in paragraph 1 above;
4. *Welcomes* the interim report by the Technology Executive Committee on guidance on enhanced implementation of the results of technology needs assessments,³ noting that the report should be considered final;
5. *Notes* that the Technology Executive Committee is to elaborate the outline for guidance on the preparation of technology action plans, contained in the annex to the report referred to in paragraph 4 above, and make it available in early 2016 to developing country Parties for use in informing the technology needs assessment process;
6. *Invites* the Climate Technology Centre and Network to use the guidance referred to in paragraph 5 above when responding to requests from developing country Parties regarding the provision of assistance to enable the implementation of the results of their technology needs assessments.

*10th plenary meeting
10 December 2015*

¹ FCCC/SB/2015/1.

² See document FCCC/SB/2013/1, paragraph 3.

³ FCCC/SB/2015/INF.3.

Decision 13/CP.21

Linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism of the Convention

The Conference of the Parties,

Recalling decisions 1/CP.18, paragraph 62, and 3/CP.17, paragraph 17,

1. *Welcomes with appreciation* the recommendations of the Technology Executive Committee on linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism, as contained in the report of the Technology Executive Committee on this matter;¹
2. *Welcomes* the ongoing and positive dialogue between the Green Climate Fund, the Global Environment Facility, the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network;
3. *Also welcomes* the contribution of the Global Environment Facility to the activities of the Climate Technology Centre and Network and looks forward to ongoing cooperation between these two entities;
4. *Invites* the Board of the Green Climate Fund to provide its recommendations, in accordance with decision 1/CP.18, paragraph 62, for consideration by the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-second session (November 2016);
5. *Recognizes* the importance of and the need for defined, mutually beneficial and functional linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism through its operating entities, the Global Environment Facility and the Green Climate Fund;
6. *Also recognizes* that the definition and elaboration of linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism has the aim of ensuring financial resources for, and scaling up action on, technology development and transfer;
7. *Underlines* the need for the Technology Executive Committee, the Climate Technology Centre and Network and the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism to enhance cooperation and collaboration with a view to enhancing the fulfilment and implementation of their respective mandates effectively, in accordance with Article 12, paragraph 4, of the Convention;
8. *Requests* the Technology Executive Committee, the Climate Technology Centre and Network and the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism to continue to consult on and further elaborate, including through an in-session workshop at the forty-fourth sessions of the subsidiary bodies (May 2016), the linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism;
9. *Also requests* the Technology Executive Committee to include, in its annual report, the findings arising from the activities referred to in paragraph 8 above for consideration by the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-second session, taking into consideration the recommendations referred to in paragraph 4 above;
10. *Invites* the Board of the Green Climate Fund, in line with paragraph 38 of the governing instrument of the Green Climate Fund,² to consider ways to provide support,

¹ FCCC/CP/2014/6.

² Decision 3/CP.17, annex.

pursuant to the modalities of the Green Climate Fund, for facilitating access to environmentally sound technologies in developing country Parties, and for undertaking collaborative research and development for enabling developing country Parties to enhance their mitigation and adaptation action.

*11th plenary meeting
13 December 2015*



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Decision 14/CP.21

Capacity-building under the Convention

The Conference of the Parties,

Recalling decisions 2/CP.7, 4/CP.12, 1/CP.16, 2/CP.17 and 1/CP.18,

1. *Adopts* the terms of reference for the third comprehensive review of the implementation of the framework for capacity-building in developing countries established under decision 2/CP.7 (hereinafter referred to as the capacity-building framework) as contained in the annex;
2. *Requests* the Subsidiary Body for Implementation to conduct the comprehensive review of the implementation of the capacity-building framework at its forty-fourth session (May 2016) on the basis of the terms of reference referred to in paragraph 1 above, with a view to recommending a draft decision on this matter for consideration and adoption by the Conference of Parties at its twenty-second session (November 2016);
3. *Also requests* the secretariat to prepare a technical paper based on the terms of reference referred to in paragraph 1 above as input to the comprehensive review;
4. *Invites* Parties and observer organizations to submit their views on the comprehensive review by 9 March 2016¹ for compilation by the secretariat into a miscellaneous document;
5. *Encourages* Parties to continue to provide information through the appropriate channels, including annual submissions on the implementation of the capacity-building framework, national communications, biennial reports and biennial update reports, on the progress made in enhancing capacity to address climate change;
6. *Urges* relevant bodies established under the Convention to continue to undertake capacity-building activities in their work, as appropriate;
7. *Stresses* that the Durban Forum for in-depth discussion on capacity-building (hereinafter referred to as the Durban Forum) is a platform to share experiences and exchange ideas, best practices and lessons learned regarding the implementation of capacity-building activities with the participation of Parties, representatives of the relevant bodies established under the Convention, and relevant experts and practitioners;
8. *Invites* representatives of the relevant bodies established under the Convention, operating entities of the Financial Mechanism of the Convention, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, and relevant experts and practitioners to integrate into their work programmes and activities the lessons learned at, and the main outcomes of, the meetings of the Durban Forum;
9. *Decides* that the 5th meeting of the Durban Forum, to be held during the forty-fourth session of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation, will explore potential ways for enhancing capacity-building by sharing information and varied experiences;

¹ Parties should submit their views via the submissions portal at <<http://www.unfccc.int/5900>>. Observer organizations should e-mail their submissions to <secretariat@unfccc.int>.

10. *Invites* United Nations agencies and multilateral organizations to provide information to the secretariat for the capacity-building portal;²

11. *Also invites* Parties to submit via the submissions portal³ by 9 March 2016, as part of their annual submissions pursuant to decision 4/CP.12, suggestions on additional potential topics for the 5th meeting of the Durban Forum and their views on possible ways to enhance the information included in the capacity-building portal.

² <<http://unfccc.int/capacitybuilding/core/activities.html>>.

³ <<http://www.unfccc.int/5900>>.

Annex

Terms of reference for the third comprehensive review of the implementation of the framework for capacity-building in developing countries

[English only]

I. Mandate

1. The Conference of the Parties (COP) decided to initiate the third comprehensive review of the implementation of the framework for capacity-building in developing countries established under decision 2/CP.7 (hereinafter referred to as the capacity-building framework) at the forty-second session of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) with a view to completing the review at COP 22.¹

2. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP) decided to initiate the third comprehensive review of the implementation of the capacity-building framework at SBI 42 with a view to completing the review at CMP 12.²

II. Objectives

3. The third comprehensive review of the implementation of the capacity-building framework has the following objectives:

(a) To explore ways to enhance the implementation of capacity-building activities by reviewing the current institutional arrangements related to capacity-building, including the thematic bodies under the Convention, with a view to making recommendations for the enhancement of these arrangements, as appropriate;

(b) To take stock of progress in and assess the effectiveness of the implementation of the capacity-building framework;

(c) To examine possible gaps between the provisions of decisions of the COP and the CMP and the implementation of capacity-building activities;

(d) To identify lessons learned and best practices with a view to developing options for the enhanced implementation of the capacity-building framework, taking into account additional needs and priorities for capacity-building;

(e) To effectively review gaps and challenges in addressing the implementation of priority areas as contained in the capacity-building framework and in meeting capacity-building needs to enhance action on mitigation, adaptation and technology transfer;

(f) To effectively review capacity gaps and challenges in accessing climate finance;

¹ Decision 13/CP.17, paragraph 7.

² Decision 15/CMP.7, paragraph 8.

(g) To provide recommendations to the SBI on ways to effectively address the capacity-building gaps at the individual, institutional and systemic levels, including those identified by the first³ and second⁴ comprehensive reviews of the implementation of the capacity-building framework;

(h) To explore potential ways to further enhance the implementation of capacity-building activities at the national level;

(i) To identify major actors supporting the implementation of the capacity-building framework within and outside the arrangements established under the Convention and its Kyoto Protocol;

(j) To review the operation of the Durban Forum for in-depth discussion on capacity-building (hereinafter referred to as the Durban Forum) and identify potential ways to enhance it.

III. General principles of the comprehensive review process

4. The third comprehensive review of the implementation of the capacity-building framework should be conducted on the basis of the guiding principles and approaches outlined in decision 2/CP.7, annex, chapter B, and should take into account relevant provisions in related COP⁵ and CMP⁶ decisions on capacity-building.

IV. Information sources

5. Information to be used in the third comprehensive review of the implementation of the capacity-building framework should be drawn from, inter alia:

(a) Submissions from Parties;

(b) Findings of the first⁷ and second⁸ comprehensive reviews of the implementation of the capacity-building framework;

(c) Annual synthesis reports on the implementation of the capacity-building framework prepared in accordance with the steps for the regular monitoring and evaluation of capacity-building work as contained in decisions 4/CP.12 and 6/CMP.2;

(d) Relevant national reports (such as national communications, biennial reports, biennial update reports, national adaptation programmes of action and their updates, outcomes of the national adaptation plan process, and national capacity self-assessments);

(e) Reports and submissions from the Global Environment Facility and its implementing agencies, United Nations entities and other relevant organizations;

(f) Information contained in the capacity-building portal;⁹

(g) Summary reports on the meetings of the Durban Forum;

³ Decision 2/CP.10.

⁴ Decisions 13/CP.17 and 15/CMP.7.

⁵ Decisions 4/CP.9, 9/CP.9, 2/CP.10, 4/CP.12, 6/CP.14, 10/CP.16, 1/CP.16, 2/CP.17, 13/CP.17 and 1/CP.18.

⁶ Decisions 7/CMP.1, 29/CMP.1, 6/CMP.2, 6/CMP.4, 11/CMP.6, 15/CMP.7 and 10/CMP.8.

⁷ Decision 2/CP.10.

⁸ Decisions 13/CP.17 and 15/CMP.7.

⁹ <<http://unfccc.int/capacitybuilding/core/activities.html>>.

- (h) Reports of relevant bodies established under the Convention and its Kyoto Protocol;
- (i) Interviews, surveys and focused discussions with national focal points for Article 6 of the Convention and other relevant national focal points;
- (j) Other relevant existing documents prepared by the secretariat.

V. Modalities of work

6. Drawing upon the information sources listed in chapter IV above and taking into account the objectives listed in chapter II above, the secretariat will prepare, for consideration at SBI 44, a report on the implementation of the capacity-building framework, including:

- (a) Descriptions of capacity-building programmes and activities;
- (b) Identification of needs and gaps and an assessment of factors that influence the effectiveness of capacity-building activities in developing countries;
- (c) Key results and impacts;
- (d) Information on the extent and variety of stakeholders within developing countries (governmental and non-governmental organizations, the private sector, community organizations, etc.) involved in, and benefiting from, capacity-building activities;
- (e) The availability of and access to resources and the effectiveness of their deployment;
- (f) Recommendations for the further implementation of the capacity-building framework;
- (g) Assessment of the different baselines and performance indicators for capacity-building.

*10th plenary meeting
10 December 2015*

Decision 15/CP.21

Terms of reference for the intermediate review of the Doha work programme on Article 6 of the Convention

The Conference of the Parties,

Recalling decision 15/CP.18,

Recognizing the progress made by Parties, international organizations and civil society in planning, coordinating and implementing activities relating to all the elements of Article 6 of the Convention – education, training, public awareness, public participation, public access to information, and international cooperation on these matters,

Also recognizing that ensuring the availability of sufficient financial and technical resources continues to be a challenge for the implementation of Article 6 of the Convention for Parties, in particular African countries, the least developed countries and small island developing States,

Reaffirming the importance of taking into account gender aspects and the need to promote the effective engagement of children, youth, the elderly, women, persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples, local communities and non-governmental organizations in activities related to Article 6 of the Convention,

Re-emphasizing the importance of building and strengthening the skills and capacities of national focal points for Article 6 of the Convention, including by continuing to facilitate a regular exchange of views, good practices and lessons learned through the organization of workshops, videoconferences and activities at the international, regional and national levels,

Recalling the invitation to multilateral and bilateral institutions and organizations, including operating entities of the Financial Mechanism of the Convention, as appropriate, to provide financial support for the activities relating to the implementation of Article 6 of the Convention,

Also recalling the Lima Ministerial Declaration on Education and Awareness-raising,¹ which stresses that education, training, public awareness, public participation, public access to information, knowledge and international cooperation play a fundamental role in meeting the ultimate objective of the Convention and in promoting climate-resilient sustainable development,

1. *Requests* the Subsidiary Body for Implementation to launch the intermediate review of the implementation of the Doha work programme on Article 6 of the Convention at its forty-fourth session (May 2016) on the basis of the terms of reference contained in the annex, with a view to the review being completed by November 2016;
2. *Encourages* United Nations organizations, in particular the members of the United Nations Alliance on Climate Change Education, Training and Public Awareness, to submit information on the results of their activities, including reports from relevant regional and subregional workshops, as appropriate, in order to support the implementation of the Doha work programme;

¹ Decision 19/CP.20.

3. *Requests* the Global Environment Facility to report on the progress made in providing financial support and implementing activities to contribute to the implementation of the Doha work programme;
4. *Invites* multilateral and bilateral institutions and organizations, the private sector and donors to report on financial resources provided to support the activities relating to the implementation of Article 6 of the Convention;
5. *Requests* the secretariat:
 - (a) To prepare a report on the progress made, as well as emerging gaps, needs and recommendations by Parties, admitted observer organizations and other stakeholders in implementing the Doha work programme as input to the intermediate review, as specified in paragraph 5 of the terms of reference contained in the annex, for consideration by the Subsidiary Body for Implementation at its forty-fourth session;
 - (b) To continue facilitating a regular exchange of views, good practices and lessons learned among national focal points for Article 6 of the Convention;
 - (c) To continue collaborating with admitted observer organizations and other stakeholders and the members of the United Nations Alliance on Climate Change Education, Training and Public Awareness so as to catalyse action on Article 6 of the Convention;
6. *Also requests* that the actions of the secretariat called for in this decision be undertaken subject to the availability of financial resources.

Annex

Terms of reference for the intermediate review of the Doha work programme on Article 6 of the Convention

I. Mandate

1. At its eighteenth session, the Conference of the Parties (COP) adopted the eight-year Doha work programme on Article 6 of the Convention and decided that it would be reviewed in 2020, with an intermediate review of progress in 2016, to evaluate its effectiveness, identify any emerging gaps and needs, and inform any decisions on improving the effectiveness of the work programme, as appropriate.¹

2. By the same decision, the COP requested the secretariat to prepare reports on the progress made by Parties in implementing Article 6 of the Convention based on information contained in national communications, reports on the annual in-session Dialogue on Article 6 and other sources of information, including a report on good practices of stakeholder participation in implementing Article 6 activities.² These reports will be issued regularly and in particular for the intermediate progress review in 2016 and the review in 2020.

II. Objectives

3. With a view to encouraging improvement based on experience, the objectives of the intermediate review of the progress made in the implementation of the Doha work programme are:

- (a) To take stock of the progress made in the implementation of the Doha work programme to date, noting that this work is still ongoing;
- (b) To take stock of progress in the integration of Article 6 activities into existing climate change adaptation and mitigation programmes, strategies and activities;
- (c) To identify essential needs for, potential gaps in and barriers to the implementation of the Doha work programme;
- (d) To identify good practices and lessons learned with a view to their dissemination, promotion and replication, as appropriate;
- (e) To identify recommendations on further steps for improving the effective implementation of the Doha work programme.

III. Information sources

4. Information for the intermediate review of the implementation of the Doha work programme should be drawn from, inter alia:

- (a) Reports on the annual in-session Dialogue on Article 6 of the Convention;

¹ Decision 15/CP.18, paragraphs 1 and 2.

² Decision 15/CP.18, annex, paragraph 35(a).

(b) A report on good practices of stakeholder participation in implementing Article 6 of the Convention;³

(c) Submissions from Parties, admitted observer organizations and other stakeholders made in response to an invitation by the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) at its forty-second session, containing information on steps taken to implement the Doha work programme, such as efforts to consider the linkages between Article 6 activities, implementation of policies and measures to mitigate and adapt to climate change, and on emerging gaps and needs, as well as recommendations on further steps for improving the effective implementation of the Doha work programme;

(d) Relevant conclusions adopted at SBI 40,⁴ including the annex to document FCCC/SBI/2014/L.20;

(e) National communications and other relevant national reports;

(f) Relevant information and resource materials from United Nations organizations, in particular the members of the United Nations Alliance on Climate Change Education, Training and Public Awareness;

(g) Reports and submissions from the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism of the Convention and its implementing agencies on financial support provided and activities implemented to contribute to the implementation of the Doha work programme;

(h) Reports and submissions from multilateral and bilateral institutions and organizations, the private sector and donors on financial resources provided to support the implementation of Article 6 of the Convention.

IV. Modalities of review and expected outcomes

5. Drawing upon the information sources listed in paragraph 4 above, the secretariat will prepare for consideration at SBI 44 (May 2016):

(a) A synthesis report on the progress made by Parties, admitted observer organizations and other stakeholders in implementing the Doha work programme;

(b) A report on the functionality and accessibility of the information network clearing house CC:iNet.

6. SBI 44 will consider the documents referred to in paragraph 5 above and any other information relevant to the completion of the intermediate review, including the information referred to in paragraph 4 above, with a view to recommending a draft decision on this matter for consideration and adoption at COP 22 (November 2016).

*10th plenary meeting
10 December 2015*

³ FCCC/SBI/2014/3.

⁴ FCCC/SBI/2014/8, paragraphs 169–173.

Decision 16/CP.21

Alternative policy approaches, such as joint mitigation and adaptation approaches for the integral and sustainable management of forests

The Conference of the Parties,

Recalling decisions 2/CP.17, paragraph 67, and 1/CP.18, paragraph 39,

1. *Notes* that methodological aspects related to non-market-based approaches as referred to in decision 1/CP.18, paragraph 39, have been addressed by decisions 9/CP.19 to 15/CP.19;
2. *Also notes* the references to alternative policy approaches, such as joint mitigation and adaptation approaches for the integral and sustainable management of forests, as referred to in decision 9/CP.19, and the need to provide clarity on such approaches as per this decision;
3. *Acknowledges* that alternative policy approaches, such as joint mitigation and adaptation approaches for the integral and sustainable management of forests, are subject to the methodological guidance contained in decision 4/CP.15, paragraph 1, as well as the guidance on safeguards and on systems for providing information on how the safeguards are being addressed and respected when addressing issues related to the reduction of emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks;
4. *Recognizes* that alternative policy approaches, such as joint mitigation and adaptation approaches for the integral and sustainable management of forests, are one of the alternatives to results-based payments, as referred to in decision 9/CP.19, that may contribute to the long-term sustainability of the implementation of the activities referred to in decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 70;
5. *Decides* that developing country Parties seeking to receive support for the design and implementation of alternative policy approaches, such as joint mitigation and adaptation approaches for the integral and sustainable management of forests, may consider the following elements:
 - (a) Development of national strategies or action plans for the implementation of the activities referred to in decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 70, in order to support the integral and sustainable management of forests;
 - (b) Identification of support needs, including financial resources and technical and technological support;
 - (c) Development of proposals demonstrating how alternative policy approaches, such as joint mitigation and adaptation approaches for the integral and sustainable management of forests, are contributing to the activities referred to in decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 70;
 - (d) Consideration of outcomes and areas of improvement in accordance with national circumstances by using adaptive management and learning, as appropriate;
6. *Notes* that the financing entities referred to in decision 9/CP.19, paragraph 5, are encouraged to continue to provide financial resources, including through the wide variety of sources referred to in decision 2/CP.17, paragraph 65, for alternative policy approaches,

such as joint mitigation and adaptation approaches for the integral and sustainable management of forests;

7. *Invites* Parties that want to implement alternative policy approaches, such as joint mitigation and adaptation approaches for the integral and sustainable management of forests, to support the implementation of the activities referred to in decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 70, to share information via the web platform on the UNFCCC website;¹

8. *Decides* to conclude its consideration of alternative policy approaches, such as joint mitigation and adaptation approaches for the integral and sustainable management of forests, in the context of decision 1/CP.18, paragraph 39.

*10th plenary meeting
10 December 2015*

¹ <<http://unfccc.int/4531>>.

Decision 17/CP.21

Further guidance on ensuring transparency, consistency, comprehensiveness and effectiveness when informing on how all the safeguards referred to in decision 1/CP.16, appendix I, are being addressed and respected

The Conference of the Parties,

Recalling decisions 1/CP.16, 12/CP.17, 9/CP.19, 11/CP.19 and 12/CP.19,

Noting that the implementation of the safeguards referred to in decision 1/CP.16, appendix I, and the information provided on how these safeguards are being addressed and respected should take into account national circumstances and respective capabilities and recognize national sovereignty and legislation and relevant international obligations and agreements,

Recalling the importance and necessity of adequate and predictable financial and technical support for developing all of the elements referred to in decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 71,

Also recalling that the monitoring and reporting of emissions displacement at the national level is agreed separately in decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 71(c),

1. *Reiterates* that, in accordance with decision 12/CP.17, paragraphs 1 and 3, developing country Parties undertaking the activities referred to in decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 70, should provide a summary of information on how all the safeguards referred to in decision 1/CP.16, appendix I, are being addressed and respected throughout the implementation of those activities;
2. *Also reiterates* that the summary of information referred to in paragraph 1 above should be provided periodically, in accordance with decisions 12/CP.17 and 12/CP.19;
3. *Notes* that information on how all the safeguards are being addressed and respected should be provided in a way that ensures transparency, consistency, comprehensiveness and effectiveness;
4. *Decides* that developing country Parties should provide information on which activity or activities referred to in decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 70, are included in the summary of information referred to in paragraph 1 above, taking into account decision 12/CP.17, paragraphs 1 and 3, and decision 9/CP.19, paragraph 4;
5. *Strongly encourages* developing country Parties, when providing the summary of information referred to in paragraph 1 above, to include the following elements, where appropriate:
 - (a) Information on national circumstances relevant to addressing and respecting the safeguards;
 - (b) A description of each safeguard in accordance with national circumstances;
 - (c) A description of existing systems and processes relevant to addressing and respecting safeguards, including the information systems referred to in decision 12/CP.17, in accordance with national circumstances;

(d) Information on how each of the safeguards has been addressed and respected, in accordance with national circumstances;

6. *Encourages* developing country Parties to provide any other relevant information on the safeguards in the summary of information referred to in paragraph 1 above;

7. *Also encourages* developing country Parties to improve the information provided in the summary of information referred to in paragraph 1 above, taking into account the stepwise approach;

8. *Decides* that there is no need for further guidance pursuant to decision 12/CP.17, paragraph 6, to ensure transparency, consistency, comprehensiveness and effectiveness when informing on how all the safeguards are being addressed and respected.

*10th plenary meeting
10 December 2015*

Decision 18/CP.21

Methodological issues related to non-carbon benefits resulting from the implementation of the activities referred to in decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 70

The Conference of the Parties,

Recalling decisions 1/CP.16, 1/CP.18 and 9/CP.19, paragraph 22,

Reaffirming the importance of incentivizing non-carbon benefits for the long-term sustainability of the implementation of the activities referred to in decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 70, recognized in decision 9/CP.19, paragraph 22,

Recognizing that multiple non-carbon benefits associated with the activities referred to in decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 70, can contribute to adaptation,

1. *Recognizes* that non-carbon benefits associated with the activities referred to in decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 70, are unique to countries' national circumstances, in accordance with national sovereignty, legislation, policies and priorities;
2. *Also recognizes* that, in line with their national circumstances and capabilities, developing country Parties seeking support for the integration of non-carbon benefits into activities referred to in decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 70, with a view to contributing to the long-term sustainability of those activities, may provide information addressing, inter alia, the nature, scale and importance of the non-carbon benefits;
3. *Encourages* developing country Parties to share the information referred to in paragraph 2 above via the web platform on the UNFCCC website;¹
4. *Invites* interested developing country Parties to communicate the information referred to in paragraph 2 above for consideration by interested Parties and relevant financing entities, as appropriate;
5. *Decides* that methodological issues related to non-carbon benefits resulting from the implementation of the activities referred to in decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 70, do not constitute a requirement for developing country Parties seeking to receive support for the implementation of the actions and activities referred to in decision 1/CP.16 or results-based payments pursuant to decision 9/CP.19;
6. *Agrees* to conclude at this session the work on methodological issues related to non-carbon benefits from the implementation of the activities referred to in decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 70.

*10th plenary meeting
10 December 2015*

¹ <<http://unfccc.int/4531>>.

Decision 19/CP.21

Extension of the mandate of the Least Developed Countries Expert Group

The Conference of the Parties,

Recalling decisions 5/CP.7, 7/CP.7, 27/CP.7, 28/CP.7, 29/CP.7, 7/CP.9, 4/CP.10, 4/CP.11, 8/CP.13, 6/CP.16, 3/CP.17, 5/CP.17, 12/CP.18 and 3/CP.20,

Recognizing the specific needs and special situation of the least developed countries under Article 4, paragraph 9, of the Convention,

Having considered the reports on the meetings of the Least Developed Countries Expert Group, the views of Parties on the work of the Least Developed Countries Expert Group, the report on the stocktaking meeting on the work of the Least Developed Countries Expert Group and the synthesis report on the progress, need for continuation and terms of reference of the Least Developed Countries Expert Group,¹

Noting the importance of the Least Developed Countries Expert Group as a body that provides high-quality and relevant information on adaptation for the least developed countries,

Also noting that the least developed country Parties continue to require support for, inter alia, the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans, engagement with the Green Climate Fund, regional approaches to adaptation, and the implementation of the least developed countries work programme,

1. *Decides* to extend the mandate of the Least Developed Countries Expert Group under its current terms of reference;²
2. *Also decides* that the Least Developed Countries Expert Group should be mandated to provide technical guidance and advice on:
 - (a) The integration of climate change adaptation into national planning and the development of programmes that address both objectives of the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans;
 - (b) Regional approaches to adaptation planning;³
 - (c) Accessing funding from the Green Climate Fund for the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans in collaboration with the Green Climate Fund secretariat;
 - (d) Needs related to adaptation that may arise from the Paris Agreement and the decisions adopted by the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-first session, as determined by Parties;
3. *Invites* the Least Developed Countries Expert Group to consider the need to update the least developed countries work programme and to make recommendations for consideration by the Subsidiary Body for Implementation at its forty-eighth session (April–

¹ Documents FCCC/SBI/2015/7, FCCC/SBI/2015/MISC.2, FCCC/SBI/2015/8 and FCCC/SBI/2015/6, respectively.

² Decisions 29/CP.7, 7/CP.9, 4/CP.11, 8/CP.13, 6/CP.16, 5/CP.17, 12/CP.18 and 3/CP.20.

³ See document FCCC/SBI/2015/8.

May 2018), with a view to those recommendations being forwarded to the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-fourth session (November 2018), as appropriate;

4. *Requests* the Least Developed Countries Expert Group, in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 above, when developing its two-year rolling work programme to take into account the compilation of elements contained in annex I to document FCCC/SBI/2015/8 and the compilation of gaps and needs in the least developed countries, considered at this session;⁴

5. *Also requests* the Least Developed Countries Expert Group to invite the Green Climate Fund secretariat to its meetings, as appropriate;

6. *Further requests* the Least Developed Countries Expert Group, recognizing its good collaboration with the Global Environment Facility, to continue to invite the Global Environment Facility and its agencies to its meetings, as appropriate;

7. *Requests* the Least Developed Countries Expert Group to collaborate with other constituted bodies under the Convention, including by inviting members of these bodies to participate, as appropriate, in its meetings;

8. *Decides* that the membership of the Least Developed Countries Expert Group should remain at 13 members;

9. *Encourages* the Least Developed Countries Expert Group to invite representatives of regional centres or networks to its meetings as observers, as appropriate;

10. *Also encourages* the Least Developed Countries Expert Group to invite relevant regional centres to nominate one focal point each for the Least Developed Countries Expert Group with a view to enhancing collaboration with those centres;

11. *Invites* the Least Developed Countries Expert Group to invite representatives of global programmes, projects and/or networks that support the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans to its meetings, as appropriate, as a way to promote the exchange of experiences and lessons learned;

12. *Decides* that, in accordance with decision 7/CP.9, paragraph 2, new experts may be nominated to the Least Developed Countries Expert Group or existing members of the group may continue in office, as determined by the respective regions or groups, taking into account the goal of gender balance in established bodies, in accordance with decision 23/CP.18, paragraph 2;

13. *Also decides* to review, at its twenty-sixth session, the progress, need for continuation and terms of reference of the Least Developed Countries Expert Group, with a view to adopting a decision thereon, taking into account, as appropriate, new processes and needs that may arise prior to that session;

14. *Further decides* on the following actions and steps necessary for the Subsidiary Body for Implementation to initiate the review referred to in paragraph 13 above at its fifty-second session:

(a) To request the Least Developed Countries Expert Group to convene before June 2020, with the assistance of the secretariat, a meeting with representatives of Parties and relevant organizations, to take stock of its work;

⁴ See documents FCCC/SBI/2015/6, FCCC/SBI/2015/7, FCCC/SBI/2015/8, FCCC/SBI/2015/INF.6 and FCCC/SBI/2015/INF.14.

(b) To invite Parties to submit their views on the work of the Least Developed Countries Expert Group via the submissions portal⁵ by 1 February 2020, for consideration by the Subsidiary Body for Implementation at its fifty-second session;

(c) To request the secretariat to prepare a report on the stocktaking meeting referred to in paragraph 14(a) above for consideration by the Subsidiary Body for Implementation at its fifty-second session, as input to the review;

(d) To request the secretariat to prepare a synthesis report on the progress, need for continuation and terms of reference of the Least Developed Countries Expert Group based on submissions from Parties, reports of the Least Developed Countries Expert Group, the report of the stocktaking meeting referred to in paragraph 14(c) above and other relevant information for consideration by the Subsidiary Body for Implementation at its fifty-second session, as input to the review;

15. *Requests* the secretariat to continue to facilitate the work of the Least Developed Countries Expert Group.

*10th plenary meeting
10 December 2015*

⁵ <<http://www.unfccc.int/5900>>.

Decision 20/CP.21

Technical review in 2016 of greenhouse gas inventories from Parties included in Annex I to the Convention

The Conference of the Parties,

Recalling decisions 12/CP.9, 24/CP.19 and 13/CP.20,

Emphasizing the importance of ensuring that the Conference of the Parties has adequate and reliable information on annual greenhouse gas inventories from Parties included in Annex I to the Convention (Annex I Parties),

Recognizing that owing to a delay in the availability of a functioning CRF Reporter, not all Annex I Parties were able to submit their 2015 greenhouse gas inventories in time to start the review process of those inventories in 2015,

1. *Requests* the secretariat to organize, for Parties included in Annex I to the Convention (Annex I Parties) that did not undergo a review of their annual greenhouse gas inventory in 2015, the review of their 2015 greenhouse gas inventory submission under the Convention in conjunction with the review of their 2016 greenhouse gas inventory submission, ensuring that the reviews are organized in accordance with decision 13/CP.20;
2. *Decides* that the expert review teams shall review identical information only once, and that the expert review teams shall produce a separate, complete review report for each Party for each year, but may replicate the same review text in both review reports concerning identical information in both years' inventories;
3. *Also decides* that the exceptional measures taken under paragraph 1 above to review the greenhouse gas inventories for Annex I Parties for the years 2015 and 2016 shall not be precedent-setting for future work;
4. *Requests* the secretariat to make every effort to facilitate future reviews in accordance with decision 13/CP.20 and any subsequent relevant decisions, without exception;
5. *Also requests* the secretariat to continue to make improvements to the CRF Reporter functionality, prioritizing the resolution of outstanding issues related to transparency and accuracy, noting that the CRF Reporter is not yet fully functioning.

*10th plenary meeting
10 December 2015*

Decision 21/CP.21

Administrative, financial and institutional matters

The Conference of the Parties,

Recalling decision 27/CP.19, in which the programme budget for the biennium 2014–2015 was approved,

Also recalling paragraph 11 of the financial procedures for the Conference of the Parties, its subsidiary bodies and the secretariat¹

Having considered the information contained in the documents prepared by the secretariat on administrative, financial and institutional matters,²

I. Budget performance for the biennium 2014–2015

1. *Takes note* of the information contained in the report on budget performance for the period 1 January 2014 to 30 June 2015³ and the status of contributions to the trust funds administered by the secretariat as at 15 November 2015;⁴
2. *Welcomes* the Executive Secretary's efforts to address budgetary limits by enhancing effectiveness and efficiency, including reducing staffing costs through post management;
3. *Expresses appreciation* to Parties that made contributions to the core budget in a timely manner;
4. *Urges* Parties that have not made contributions to the core budget in full for the current and/or previous bienniums to do so without delay;
5. *Calls upon* Parties to make their contributions to the core budget for the biennium 2016–2017 in a timely manner, bearing in mind that contributions are due on 1 January of each year, in accordance with the financial procedures of the Conference of the Parties;
6. *Expresses appreciation* for the contributions received from Parties to the Trust Fund for Participation in the UNFCCC Process and to the Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities;
7. *Urges* Parties to contribute further to the Trust Fund for Participation in the UNFCCC Process in order to ensure the widest possible participation in the negotiations in 2016, and to the Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities;
8. *Reiterates its appreciation* to the Government of Germany for its annual voluntary contribution to the core budget of EUR 766,938 and its special contribution as Host Government of the secretariat of EUR 1,789,522;

¹ Decision 15/CP.1, annex I, as revised by decision 23/CP.20.

² FCCC/SBI/2015/13, FCCC/SBI/2015/INF.10 and FCCC/SBI/2015/INF.17.

³ FCCC/SBI/2015/13.

⁴ FCCC/SBI/2015/INF.17.

II. Audit report and financial statements for 2014

9. *Takes note* of the audit report of the United Nations Board of Auditors,⁵ which includes recommendations and the financial statements for 2014, and the comments of the secretariat thereon;

10. *Expresses its appreciation* to the United Nations for arranging the audits of the accounts of the Convention and for the valuable observations and recommendations of the auditors;

11. *Urges* the Executive Secretary to implement the recommendations of the auditors, as appropriate.

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10 December 2015*

⁵ FCCC/SBI/2015/INF.10.

Decision 22/CP.21

Programme budget for the biennium 2016–2017

The Conference of the Parties,

Recalling paragraph 4 of the financial procedures for the Conference of the Parties, its subsidiary bodies and the secretariat,¹

Having considered the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2016–2017 submitted by the Executive Secretary,²

1. *Approves* the programme budget for the biennium 2016–2017, amounting to EUR 54,648,484, for the purposes specified in table 1;³
2. *Notes with appreciation* the annual contribution of EUR 766,938 of the Host Government of the secretariat, which offsets planned expenditures;
3. *Approves* the staffing table (table 2) for the programme budget;
4. *Notes* that the programme budget contains elements relating to the Convention as well as to its Kyoto Protocol;
5. *Adopts* the indicative scale of contributions for 2016 and 2017 contained in the annex, covering 71.2 per cent of the indicative contributions specified in table 1;
6. *Invites* the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, at its eleventh session, to endorse the elements of the recommended budget as it applies to the Kyoto Protocol;
7. *Also invites* the United Nations General Assembly to decide at its seventieth session on the issue of meeting the conference services expenses from the United Nations regular budget;
8. *Approves* a contingency budget for conference services, amounting to EUR 10,378,900, to be added to the programme budget for the biennium 2016–2017 in the event that the United Nations General Assembly decides not to provide resources for these activities in the United Nations regular budget (see table 3);
9. *Requests* the Executive Secretary to report to the Subsidiary Body for Implementation on the implementation of paragraphs 7 and 8 above, as necessary;
10. *Authorizes* the Executive Secretary to make transfers between each of the main appropriation lines set out in table 1, up to an aggregate limit of 15 per cent of total estimated expenditure for those appropriation lines, provided that a further limitation of up to minus 25 per cent of each such appropriation line shall apply;

¹ Decision 15/CP.1, annex I, as revised by decision 23/CP.20.

² FCCC/SBI/2015/3 and Add.1–3.

³ Recognizes that, in accordance with decision 13/CP.20, three operational approaches may be used for implementing the technical review of the greenhouse gas inventories of Parties included in Annex I to the Convention, namely desk reviews, centralized reviews and in-country reviews, assuming available resources, and recognizes that the secretariat may implement such reviews according to decision 13/CP.20 in 2016–2017, taking into account the programme budget and supplementary resources provided for under this decision.

11. *Decides* to maintain the level of the working capital reserve at 8.3 per cent of the estimated expenditure;
12. *Takes note* of the surplus accumulated under the Trust Fund for the Core Budget of the UNFCCC as at 31 December 2014, amounting to USD 6.337 million;
13. *Decides*, on an exceptional basis, not to apply the last sentence of regulation 5.3 of the Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations,⁴ which would require the surrender of the accumulated surplus referred to in paragraph 12 above;
14. *Invites* all Parties to the Convention to note that contributions to the core budget are due on 1 January of each year, in accordance with paragraph 8(b) of the financial procedures, and to pay promptly and in full, for each of the years 2016 and 2017, the contributions required to finance expenditures approved under paragraph 1 above and any contributions required to finance the expenditures arising from the decision referred to in paragraph 8 above;
15. *Authorizes* the Executive Secretary to implement decisions taken by the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-first session for which provisions are not made under the approved budget, using voluntary contributions and to the extent possible, resources available under the core budget;
16. *Urges* Parties to make voluntary contributions as necessary for the timely implementation of the decisions referred to in paragraph 15 above;
17. *Takes note* of the funding estimates for the Trust Fund for Participation in the UNFCCC Process specified by the Executive Secretary (table 4);
18. *Invites* Parties to make contributions to the Trust Fund for Participation in the UNFCCC Process;
19. *Takes note* of the funding estimates for the Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities specified by the Executive Secretary (EUR 51,647,777 for the biennium 2016–2017) (table 5);
20. *Invites* Parties to make contributions to the Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities;
21. *Requests* the Executive Secretary to report to the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-second session (November 2016) on income and budget performance, and to propose any adjustments that might be needed in the programme budget for the biennium 2016–2017;
22. *Also requests* the Executive Secretary to facilitate the consideration of future programme budget proposals by including in the official budget documents budget scenarios, including zero nominal growth, together with information on the related implications of the implementation of the secretariat's work programme and the estimated impacts on the level of indicative contributions by Parties, and by submitting at least 15 days in advance of the relevant session of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation the latest unaudited financial statements and an update on the implementation of the approved core budget.

⁴ United Nations Secretariat document ST/SGB/2013/4.

Table 1

Proposed core budget for 2016–2017 by programme

	2016 (EUR)	2017 (EUR)	Total 2016–2017 (EUR)
A. Programme appropriations			
Executive Direction and Management	2 250 862	2 210 862	4 461 724
Mitigation, Data and Analysis	7 611 688	7 611 688	15 223 376
Finance, Technology and Capacity-Building	2 732 260	2 732 627	5 464 887
Adaptation	2 335 712	2 336 252	4 671 964
Sustainable Development Mechanisms	406 250	369 990	776 240
Legal Affairs	1 304 455	1 304 455	2 608 910
Conference Affairs Services	1 691 137	1 633 142	3 324 279
Communications and Outreach	1 591 177	1 478 722	3 069 899
Information Technology Services	2 874 780	2 690 771	5 565 551
Administrative Services ^a			
B. Secretariat-wide operating costs ^b	1 402 358	1 829 358	3 231 716
Programme expenditures (A + B)	24 200 679	24 197 867	48 398 546
C. Programme support costs (overheads) ^c	3 146 088	3 145 723	6 291 811
D. Adjustment to working capital reserve ^d	(41 609)	(264)	(41 873)
Total (A + B + C + D)	27 305 158	27 343 326	54 648 484
Income			
Contribution from the Host Government	766 938	766 938	1 533 876
Indicative contributions	26 538 220	26 576 388	53 114 608
Total income	27 305 158	27 343 326	54 648 484

^a Administrative Services is funded from programme support costs (overheads).

^b Secretariat-wide operating costs are managed by Administrative Services.

^c Standard 13 per cent applied for administrative support.

^d In accordance with the financial procedures (decision 15/CP.1), the core budget is required to maintain a working capital reserve of 8.3 per cent (one month of operating requirements) amounting to EUR 2,269,782 in 2016 and EUR 2,269,518 in 2017.

Table 2

Secretariat-wide staffing from the core budget

	2015	2016	2017
Professional category and above ^a			
ASG	1	1	1
D-2	3	3	3
D-1	7	7	7
P-5	15	15	15
P-4	35	35	35
P-3	43	43	43
P-2	16	16	16
Subtotal Professional category and above	120	120	120
Subtotal General Service category	53.5	53.5	53.5
Total	173.5	173.5	173.5

^a Assistant Secretary-General (ASG), Director (D) and Professional (P).

Table 3
Resource requirements for the conference services contingency

	2016 (EUR)	2017 (EUR)	Total 2016–2017 (EUR)
<i>Object of expenditure</i>			
Interpretation ^a	1 258 100	1 295 900	2 554 000
Documentation ^b			
Translation	2 104 500	2 167 700	4 272 200
Reproduction and distribution	719 900	741 500	1 461 400
Meetings services support ^c	259 200	266 900	526 100
Subtotal	4 341 700	4 472 000	8 813 700
Programme support costs	564 400	581 400	1 145 800
Working capital reserve	407 200	12 200	419 400
Total	5 313 300	5 065 600	10 378 900

Note: Assumptions used for calculating the conference services contingency budget include the following:

- The expected number of meetings with interpretation does not exceed 40 per session;
- The expected documentation volume is based on the calculations provided by the United Nations Office at Geneva;
- Meetings services support includes staff normally provided by the United Nations Office at Geneva conference services for the in-session coordination and support of interpretation, translation and reproduction services;
- Overall, the figures used are conservative and have been applied on the assumption that there will be no major increase in requirements during the biennium.

^a Includes salaries, travel and daily subsistence allowance for interpreters.

^b Includes all costs related to the processing of pre-, in- and post-session documentation; translation costs include revision and typing of documents.

^c Includes salaries, travel and daily subsistence allowance for meetings services support staff and costs of shipment and telecommunications.

Table 4
Resource requirements for the Trust Fund for Participation in the UNFCCC Process in the biennium 2016–2017

<i>Number of delegates</i>	<i>Estimated cost (EUR)</i>
Support for one delegate from each eligible Party to participate in a one-week session organized in Bonn, Germany ^a	615 000
Support for one delegate from each eligible Party to participate in a two-week session organized in Bonn ^a	960 000
Support for one delegate from each eligible Party plus a second delegate from each least developed country and each small island developing State to participate in a two-week session organized in Bonn ^a	1 485 000
Support for two delegates from each eligible Party to participate in a two-week session organized in Paris, France ^a	2 350 000
Support for two delegates from each eligible Party plus a third delegate from each least developed country and each small island developing State to participate in a two-week session organized in Paris ^a	3 000 000

^a Locations provided as examples.

Table 5

Resource requirements for the Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities in the biennium 2016–2017^a

<i>Table no.^b</i>	<i>Activities to be undertaken by the secretariat</i>	<i>EUR</i>
<i>Convention</i>		
2	Coordinating the implementation of the Paris outcome, institutional arrangements under the Convention and efforts to mobilize and catalyse climate action	2 108 444
3	Support to gender mainstreaming in climate change policy and action	398 800
4	Supporting the work of the Consultative Group of Experts on National Communications from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention on implementing the measurement, reporting and verification framework for developing country Parties	1 843 304
8	Supporting the implementation of national greenhouse gas (GHG) inventories and related activities by non-Annex I Parties, including national forest monitoring systems	529 643
9	Supporting the implementation of enhanced action on mitigation by developing country Parties	2 323 497
11	Supporting the work programme for the development of modalities and guidelines for enhanced reporting by developed country Parties and the international assessment and review process	1 621 731
13	Further improvements and development of the nationally appropriate mitigation action registry	585 340
15	Support to technical dialogue on nationally determined contributions	2 074 725
16	Supporting the operationalization of the international consultation and analysis process for developing country Parties	2 302 760
17	Supporting the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice consideration of issues relating to agriculture	275 720
18	Supporting the work of the Standing Committee on Finance	1 159 380
19	Support to climate finance	333 802
20	Supporting the implementation of the Technology Mechanism and the work of the Technology Executive Committee, including the implementation of the framework for meaningful and effective actions to enhance the implementation of Article 4, paragraph 5, of the Convention	1 193 981
22	Supporting the implementation of the Nairobi work programme on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change	1 301 172
23	Supporting the implementation of the Cancun Adaptation Framework	5 340 425
24	Supporting the least developed countries and the Least Developed Countries Expert Group	3 389 096
25	Supporting activities relating to climate change science, research and systematic observation	534 230
26	Supporting the periodic review of the adequacy of the long-term global goal referred to in decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 4	493 189
27	Supporting the implementation of adaptation mandates of a cross-cutting nature, including those relating to the Durban Platform, stakeholder engagement, communications and outreach	1 022 952
29	Support to stakeholder engagement in the UNFCCC process	746 193
31	Developing internal communication tools and channels within the secretariat, in order to enhance communication between management and staff and among staff	243 402
32	Managing and preserving sound recordings of all the sessions of the Conference of the Parties, the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol and the subsidiary bodies	1 010 646
36	Managing and preserving video recordings of the sessions of the Conference of the Parties, the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol and the subsidiary bodies	492 646
37	The development and maintenance of the secretariat's vocabulary for information retrieval in all secretariat systems	319 944

<i>Table no.^b</i>	<i>Activities to be undertaken by the secretariat</i>	<i>EUR</i>
Subtotal		31 645 022
<i>Kyoto Protocol</i>		
5	Enhancement and maintenance of the compilation and accounting database under the Kyoto Protocol	577 204
28	Support to the Compliance Committee	505 901
Subtotal		1 083 105
<i>Convention and its Kyoto Protocol</i>		
6	Activities relating to land use, land-use change and forestry: reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, enhancement of forest carbon sinks, and the role of sinks in future mitigation actions	2 242 598
7	Providing training for expert review teams and organizing meetings of the lead reviewers	1 524 485
10	Supporting activities relating to the impact of the implementation of response measures	1 086 608
12	Supporting the upgraded software (CRF Reporter) for the reporting of GHG emissions/removals by Annex I Parties	1 523 466
14	Maintenance and enhancement of the UNFCCC data warehouse and related information technology tools and data-processing systems, including tools for the review of GHG inventories and the operation of the GHG data interface on the UNFCCC website	660 711
21	Supporting the implementation of the framework for capacity-building in developing countries established under decision 2/CP.7 and the framework for capacity-building in countries with economies in transition established under decision 3/CP.7	266 002
30	Further development of the Electronic Official Documentation System	52 048
33	Managing the secretariat's business records	1 135 853
34	Providing archive services for the historical records of the UNFCCC	1 394 578
35	Enhancing information governance	276 398
38	Website project – digital enhancements post-2015 (web/social media)	1 179 042
39	UNFCCC web portal in the six United Nations languages (Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish)	2 185 782
40	Visualization of UNFCCC process information and data	808 402
41	Developing country media training workshops	395 500
42	Web and outreach for greater climate action	1 411 912
43	Momentum for Change	2 308 346
44	Activities to support the implementation of Article 6 of the Convention	467 919
Subtotal		18 919 650
Grand total		51 647 777

^a The table includes projects for which funding is sought from Parties. Projects funded from other sources are not listed.

^b Table numbers refer to the tables contained in document FCCC/SBI/2015/3/Add.2.

Annex

Indicative scale of contributions from Parties to the Convention for the biennium 2016–2017

[English only]

<i>Party</i>	<i>United Nations scale of assessments for 2015</i>	<i>UNFCCC adjusted scale of assessments for 2016</i>	<i>UNFCCC adjusted scale of assessments for 2017</i>
Afghanistan	0.005	0.005	0.005
Albania	0.010	0.010	0.010
Algeria	0.137	0.134	0.134
Andorra	0.008	0.008	0.008
Angola	0.010	0.010	0.010
Antigua and Barbuda	0.002	0.002	0.002
Argentina	0.432	0.421	0.421
Armenia	0.007	0.007	0.007
Australia	2.074	2.022	2.022
Austria	0.798	0.778	0.778
Azerbaijan	0.040	0.039	0.039
Bahamas	0.017	0.017	0.017
Bahrain	0.039	0.038	0.038
Bangladesh	0.010	0.010	0.010
Barbados	0.008	0.008	0.008
Belarus	0.056	0.055	0.055
Belgium	0.998	0.973	0.973
Belize	0.001	0.001	0.001
Benin	0.003	0.003	0.003
Bhutan	0.001	0.001	0.001
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	0.009	0.009	0.009
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.017	0.017	0.017
Botswana	0.017	0.017	0.017
Brazil	2.934	2.861	2.861
Brunei Darussalam	0.026	0.025	0.025
Bulgaria	0.047	0.046	0.046
Burkina Faso	0.003	0.003	0.003
Burundi	0.001	0.001	0.001
Cabo Verde	0.001	0.001	0.001
Cambodia	0.004	0.004	0.004
Cameroon	0.012	0.012	0.012
Canada	2.984	2.909	2.909
Central African Republic	0.001	0.001	0.001
Chad	0.002	0.002	0.002
Chile	0.334	0.326	0.326
China	5.148	5.019	5.019
Colombia	0.259	0.253	0.253
Comoros	0.001	0.001	0.001
Congo	0.005	0.005	0.005
Cook Islands	0.001	0.001	0.001
Costa Rica	0.038	0.037	0.037

<i>Party</i>	<i>United Nations scale of assessments for 2015</i>	<i>UNFCCC adjusted scale of assessments for 2016</i>	<i>UNFCCC adjusted scale of assessments for 2017</i>
Côte d'Ivoire	0.011	0.011	0.011
Croatia	0.126	0.123	0.123
Cuba	0.069	0.067	0.067
Cyprus	0.047	0.046	0.046
Czech Republic	0.386	0.376	0.376
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	0.006	0.006	0.006
Democratic Republic of the Congo	0.003	0.003	0.003
Denmark	0.675	0.658	0.658
Djibouti	0.001	0.001	0.001
Dominica	0.001	0.001	0.001
Dominican Republic	0.045	0.044	0.044
Ecuador	0.044	0.043	0.043
Egypt	0.134	0.131	0.131
El Salvador	0.016	0.016	0.016
Equatorial Guinea	0.010	0.010	0.010
Eritrea	0.001	0.001	0.001
Estonia	0.040	0.039	0.039
Ethiopia	0.010	0.010	0.010
European Union	2.500	2.500	2.500
Fiji	0.003	0.003	0.003
Finland	0.519	0.506	0.506
France	5.593	5.453	5.453
Gabon	0.020	0.019	0.019
Gambia	0.001	0.001	0.001
Georgia	0.007	0.007	0.007
Germany	7.141	6.962	6.962
Ghana	0.014	0.014	0.014
Greece	0.638	0.622	0.622
Grenada	0.001	0.001	0.001
Guatemala	0.027	0.026	0.026
Guinea	0.001	0.001	0.001
Guinea-Bissau	0.001	0.001	0.001
Guyana	0.001	0.001	0.001
Haiti	0.003	0.003	0.003
Honduras	0.008	0.008	0.008
Hungary	0.266	0.259	0.259
Iceland	0.027	0.026	0.026
India	0.666	0.649	0.649
Indonesia	0.346	0.337	0.337
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	0.356	0.347	0.347
Iraq	0.068	0.066	0.066
Ireland	0.418	0.408	0.408
Israel	0.396	0.386	0.386
Italy	4.448	4.337	4.337
Jamaica	0.011	0.011	0.011
Japan	10.833	10.562	10.562
Jordan	0.022	0.021	0.021
Kazakhstan	0.121	0.118	0.118
Kenya	0.013	0.013	0.013

<i>Party</i>	<i>United Nations scale of assessments for 2015</i>	<i>UNFCCC adjusted scale of assessments for 2016</i>	<i>UNFCCC adjusted scale of assessments for 2017</i>
Kiribati	0.001	0.001	0.001
Kuwait	0.273	0.266	0.266
Kyrgyzstan	0.002	0.002	0.002
Lao People's Democratic Republic	0.002	0.002	0.002
Latvia	0.047	0.046	0.046
Lebanon	0.042	0.041	0.041
Lesotho	0.001	0.001	0.001
Liberia	0.001	0.001	0.001
Libya	0.142	0.138	0.138
Liechtenstein	0.009	0.009	0.009
Lithuania	0.073	0.071	0.071
Luxembourg	0.081	0.079	0.079
Madagascar	0.003	0.003	0.003
Malawi	0.002	0.002	0.002
Malaysia	0.281	0.274	0.274
Maldives	0.001	0.001	0.001
Mali	0.004	0.004	0.004
Malta	0.016	0.016	0.016
Marshall Islands	0.001	0.001	0.001
Mauritania	0.002	0.002	0.002
Mauritius	0.013	0.013	0.013
Mexico	1.842	1.796	1.796
Micronesia (Federated States of)	0.001	0.001	0.001
Monaco	0.012	0.012	0.012
Mongolia	0.003	0.003	0.003
Montenegro	0.005	0.005	0.005
Morocco	0.062	0.060	0.060
Mozambique	0.003	0.003	0.003
Myanmar	0.010	0.010	0.010
Namibia	0.010	0.010	0.010
Nauru	0.001	0.001	0.001
Nepal	0.006	0.006	0.006
Netherlands	1.654	1.613	1.613
New Zealand	0.253	0.247	0.247
Nicaragua	0.003	0.003	0.003
Niger	0.002	0.002	0.002
Nigeria	0.090	0.088	0.088
Niue	0.001	0.001	0.001
Norway	0.851	0.830	0.830
Oman	0.102	0.099	0.099
Pakistan	0.085	0.083	0.083
Palau	0.001	0.001	0.001
Panama	0.026	0.025	0.025
Papua New Guinea	0.004	0.004	0.004
Paraguay	0.010	0.010	0.010
Peru	0.117	0.114	0.114
Philippines	0.154	0.150	0.150
Poland	0.921	0.898	0.898
Portugal	0.474	0.462	0.462

<i>Party</i>	<i>United Nations scale of assessments for 2015</i>	<i>UNFCCC adjusted scale of assessments for 2016</i>	<i>UNFCCC adjusted scale of assessments for 2017</i>
Qatar	0.209	0.204	0.204
Republic of Korea	1.994	1.944	1.944
Republic of Moldova	0.003	0.003	0.003
Romania	0.226	0.220	0.220
Russian Federation	2.438	2.377	2.377
Rwanda	0.002	0.002	0.002
Saint Kitts and Nevis	0.001	0.001	0.001
Saint Lucia	0.001	0.001	0.001
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	0.001	0.001	0.001
Samoa	0.001	0.001	0.001
San Marino	0.003	0.003	0.003
Sao Tome and Principe	0.001	0.001	0.001
Saudi Arabia	0.864	0.842	0.842
Senegal	0.006	0.006	0.006
Serbia	0.040	0.039	0.039
Seychelles	0.001	0.001	0.001
Sierra Leone	0.001	0.001	0.001
Singapore	0.384	0.374	0.374
Slovakia	0.171	0.167	0.167
Slovenia	0.100	0.097	0.097
Solomon Islands	0.001	0.001	0.001
Somalia	0.001	0.001	0.001
South Africa	0.372	0.363	0.363
South Sudan	0.004	0.004	0.004
Spain	2.973	2.899	2.899
Sri Lanka	0.025	0.024	0.024
Sudan	0.010	0.010	0.010
Suriname	0.004	0.004	0.004
Swaziland	0.003	0.003	0.003
Sweden	0.960	0.936	0.936
Switzerland	1.047	1.021	1.021
Syrian Arab Republic	0.036	0.035	0.035
Tajikistan	0.003	0.003	0.003
Thailand	0.239	0.233	0.233
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	0.008	0.008	0.008
Timor-Leste	0.002	0.002	0.002
Togo	0.001	0.001	0.001
Tonga	0.001	0.001	0.001
Trinidad and Tobago	0.044	0.043	0.043
Tunisia	0.036	0.035	0.035
Turkey	1.328	1.295	1.295
Turkmenistan	0.019	0.019	0.019
Tuvalu	0.001	0.001	0.001
Uganda	0.006	0.006	0.006
Ukraine	0.099	0.097	0.097
United Arab Emirates	0.595	0.580	0.580
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	5.179	5.049	5.049
United Republic of Tanzania	0.009	0.009	0.009
United States of America	22.000	21.449	21.449

<i>Party</i>	<i>United Nations scale of assessments for 2015</i>	<i>UNFCCC adjusted scale of assessments for 2016</i>	<i>UNFCCC adjusted scale of assessments for 2017</i>
Uruguay	0.052	0.051	0.051
Uzbekistan	0.015	0.015	0.015
Vanuatu	0.001	0.001	0.001
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	0.627	0.611	0.611
Viet Nam	0.042	0.041	0.041
Yemen	0.010	0.010	0.010
Zambia	0.006	0.006	0.006
Zimbabwe	0.002	0.002	0.002
Total	102.502	100.000	100.000

*10th plenary meeting
10 December 2015*

Decision 23/CP.21

Dates and venues of future sessions

The Conference of the Parties,

Recalling Article 7, paragraph 4, of the Convention,

Also recalling United Nations General Assembly resolution 40/243 of 18 December 1985 on the pattern of conferences,

Further recalling rule 22, paragraph 1, of the draft rules of procedure being applied regarding the rotation of the office of President among the five regional groups,

I. Dates and venues of future sessions

A. Twenty-second session of the Conference of the Parties and twelfth session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol

1. *Decides* to accept with appreciation the offer by the Kingdom of Morocco to host the twenty-second session of the Conference of the Parties and the twelfth session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol in Marrakesh, Morocco, from Monday, 7 November, to Friday, 18 November 2016, in conformity with United Nations General Assembly resolution 40/243, and subject to the successful conclusion of a Host Country Agreement;

2. *Requests* the Executive Secretary to continue consultations with the Kingdom of Morocco and to negotiate and finalize a Host Country Agreement for convening the sessions that complies with the provisions of the United Nations administrative instruction ST/AI/342, with a view to concluding and signing the Host Country Agreement not later than the forty-fourth sessions of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation;

B. Twenty-third session of the Conference of the Parties and thirteenth session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol

3. *Notes* that, in keeping with the principle of rotation among regional groups, the President of the twenty-third session of the Conference of the Parties and the thirteenth session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol would come from the Asia-Pacific States;

4. *Invites* Parties to undertake further consultations on the hosting of those sessions, which will be held from Monday, 6 November, to Friday, 17 November 2017;

5. *Requests* the Subsidiary Body for Implementation, at its forty-fourth session, to consider the issue of the host of the twenty-third session of the Conference of the Parties and the thirteenth session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol and to recommend a draft decision on this matter for consideration and adoption by the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-second session;

C. Twenty-fourth session of the Conference of the Parties and fourteenth session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol

6. *Notes* that, in keeping with the principle of rotation among regional groups, the President of the twenty-fourth session of the Conference of the Parties and the fourteenth session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol would come from the Eastern European States;

7. *Invites* Parties to undertake further consultations on the hosting of those sessions, which will be held from Monday, 5 November, to Friday, 16 November 2018;

8. *Requests* the Subsidiary Body for Implementation, at its forty-fourth session, to consider the issue of the host of the twenty-fourth session of the Conference of the Parties and the fourteenth session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol and to recommend a draft decision on this matter for consideration and adoption by the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-second session;

II. Calendar of meetings of the Convention and Kyoto Protocol bodies

9. *Takes note* that, as recommended by the Subsidiary Body for Implementation at its fortieth session,¹ future May/June sessions of the subsidiary bodies should commence on a Monday, and that, in order to enhance efficiency and time management, work should be completed one day earlier than previously, so as to finish the sessions on the Thursday of the second week, and that all meetings at those sessions taking place on the Saturday should be completed by midday in order to enhance the efficiency, timeliness and transparency of the work;

10. *Decides* to adopt the following dates for the sessional periods in 2020:

- (a) First sessional period: Monday, 1 June, to Thursday, 11 June;
- (b) Second sessional period: Monday, 9 November, to Friday, 20 November.

*10th plenary meeting
10 December 2015*

¹ FCCC/SBI/2014/8, paragraphs 212 and 213.

Resolution 1/CP.21

Expression of gratitude to the Government of the French Republic and the people of the city of Paris

Draft resolution submitted by Morocco

The Conference of the Parties and the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol,

Having met in Paris from 30 November to 11 December 2015 at the invitation of the Government of the French Republic,

1. *Express their profound gratitude* to the Government of the French Republic for having made it possible for the twenty-first session of the Conference of the Parties and the eleventh session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol to be held in Paris;
2. *Request* the Government of the French Republic to convey to the city and people of Paris the gratitude of the Conference of the Parties and the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol for the hospitality and warmth extended to the participants.

*11th plenary meeting
13 December 2015*



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**Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting
of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol**

**Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the
meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its eleventh
session, held in Paris from 30 November to 13 December 2015**

Addendum

**Part two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties
serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol at
its eleventh session**

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Decision 1/CMP.11

Report of the Adaptation Fund Board

The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol,

Recalling decision 2/CMP.10, paragraph 4,

Welcoming the annual report of the Adaptation Fund Board,¹

Noting the limited resources in the Adaptation Fund given the current prices of certified emission reductions, which affect its ability to fulfil its mandate,

1. *Welcomes* the financial pledges and contributions made to the Adaptation Fund by the Governments of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Sweden and the Walloon Region of Belgium, amounting to USD 77 million;

2. *Also welcomes* the adoption by the Executive Directors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank) of the amendments to the terms and conditions of services to be provided by the World Bank as trustee for the Adaptation Fund on an interim basis;²

3. *Notes* that, as at 30 June 2015, a total of USD 1.8 million in pledged contributions to the Adaptation Fund was outstanding;

4. *Also notes* the following information, actions and decisions relating to the Adaptation Fund contained in the report of the Adaptation Fund Board³ and the oral report made by the Chair of the Adaptation Fund Board in December 2015:

(a) The approval of the second phase of the readiness programme for direct access to climate finance, launched on 1 July 2015, and the approval of South–South cooperation grants for Burundi, Cabo Verde, Chad and Niger, totalling USD 244,447;

(b) The approval of a pilot programme for regional projects/programmes;

(c) Cumulative project and programme approvals reaching USD 318.6 million as at 30 June 2015;

(d) Funds available for new funding approvals amounting to USD 129.9 million as at 30 June 2015;

(e) The approval of 14 project/programme proposals, totalling USD 92.4 million, submitted by implementing entities, including 9 proposals submitted by national implementing entities totalling USD 54.1 million;

(f) The cumulative receipts of USD 483.3 million into the Adaptation Fund Trust Fund;

(g) The approval of a streamlined accreditation process for small-sized entities with limited experience in managing projects worth more than USD 1 million;

(h) Ongoing discussion on linkages between the Adaptation Fund and the Green Climate Fund;

¹ FCCC/KP/CMP/2015/2.

² Decision 1/CMP.10, annex.

³ As footnote 1 above.

(i) The accreditation of 20 national implementing entities that can access resources from the Adaptation Fund directly, including 3 entities accredited during the reporting period, and the accreditation of 5 regional implementing entities, including 1 accredited during the reporting period;

5. *Requests* the Adaptation Fund Board to continue its efforts to simplify accreditation procedures for national implementing entities and to report back on its progress to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol at its twelfth session (November 2016);

6. *Urges* the developed country Parties that responded to the fundraising target of the Adaptation Fund Board but have not yet made financial contributions to do so at their earliest opportunity;

7. *Encourages* the provision of voluntary support that is additional to the share of proceeds from clean development mechanism project activities in order to support the resource mobilization efforts of the Adaptation Fund Board, with a view to strengthening the Adaptation Fund;

8. *Recommends* that the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement, at its first session, consider that the Adaptation Fund may serve the Paris Agreement, in accordance with paragraphs 60 and 61 of decision 1/CP.21;

9. *Invites* the Conference of the Parties, at its twenty-second session (November 2016), to request the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement to undertake the necessary preparatory work concerning the issue referred to in paragraph 8 above and to forward a recommendation to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol for its consideration and adoption no later than at its fifteenth session (November 2019);

10. *Notes with appreciation* the efforts of the Adaptation Fund Board secretariat to organize workshops for national implementing entities;

11. *Requests* the Adaptation Fund Board to provide in its reports to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol further information on the status of the portfolio of the Adaptation Fund, including projects at different stages of development.

*9th plenary meeting
13 December 2015*

Decision 2/CMP.11

Clarification of the text in section G (Article 3, paragraph 7 ter) of the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol

The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol,

Recalling Article 3, paragraph 7 ter, of the Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol contained in annex I to decision 1/CMP.8 (the Doha Amendment),

Taking note of the request from Kazakhstan to clarify the provision of Article 3, paragraph 7 ter, of the Doha Amendment,

1. *Clarifies* that Article 3, paragraph 7 ter, of the Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol contained in annex I to decision 1/CMP.8 (the Doha Amendment) is applicable, for the second commitment period, to Parties that did not have a quantified emission limitation or reduction commitment during the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol;

2. *Also clarifies* that, for the purpose of implementing Article 3, paragraph 7 ter, of the Doha Amendment, the reference in Article 3, paragraph 7 ter, of the Doha Amendment to “average annual emissions for the first three years of the preceding commitment period” refers to the average of the annual emissions of a Party for the years 2008, 2009 and 2010, and that Parties with a quantified emission limitation or reduction commitment inscribed in the third column of Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol contained in annex I to decision 1/CMP.8 shall clarify, in their reports to facilitate the calculation of the assigned amount submitted pursuant to decision 2/CMP.8, whether they have used, in the calculation of the average annual emissions for the first three years of the preceding commitment period:

(a) The gases and sources listed in Annex A to the Kyoto Protocol; or

(b) The same greenhouse gases, sectors and source categories as those used to calculate the assigned amount for the second commitment period;

3. *Decides* that, for a Party included in Annex I undergoing the process of transition to a market economy and without a quantified emission limitation or reduction commitment in the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, the positive difference between the total emissions during the second commitment period and the assigned amount adjusted in accordance with Article 3, paragraph 7 ter, of the Doha Amendment shall be added to the quantity of assigned amount units to be taken into account for the purpose of the assessment referred to in decision 13/CMP.1, annex, paragraph 14, and that the added quantity shall be limited to the quantity of assigned amount units cancelled by that Party for the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, in accordance with Article 3, paragraph 7 ter, of the Doha Amendment.

*8th plenary meeting
10 December 2015*

Decision 3/CMP.11

Implications of the implementation of decisions 2/CMP.7 to 4/CMP.7 and 1/CMP.8 on the previous decisions on methodological issues related to the Kyoto Protocol, including those relating to Articles 5, 7 and 8 of the Kyoto Protocol, part I: implications related to accounting and reporting and other related issues

The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol,

Recalling Articles 5, 7 and 8 of the Kyoto Protocol,

Also recalling decisions 2/CMP.6, 2/CMP.7, 3/CMP.7, 4/CMP.7, 1/CMP.8 and 2/CMP.8,

Being aware of decisions 11/CMP.1, 13/CMP.1, 15/CMP.1, 16/CMP.1, 18/CMP.1, 19/CMP.1 and 27/CMP.1,

1. *Decides* that, for the purpose of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol and pending the entry into force of the Doha Amendment, contained in annex I to decision 1/CMP.8, any references in this decision and decision 2/CMP.8 to Annex A, Annex B, Article 3, paragraphs 1 bis, 1 ter, 1 quater, 7 bis, 7 ter, 8, 8 bis, 12 bis and 12 ter, and Article 4, paragraphs 2 and 3, unless otherwise specified, shall be understood as referring to those Articles and annexes as contained in the Doha Amendment, and that, upon the entry into force of the Doha Amendment, such references shall be read as references to the relevant Articles of the Kyoto Protocol as amended;

2. *Also decides* that, for the purpose of the second commitment period, decisions 13/CMP.1, 15/CMP.1, 18/CMP.1 and 19/CMP.1 shall apply *mutatis mutandis*, except where otherwise specified in decisions 1/CMP.8 and 2/CMP.8 and in this decision;

3. *Clarifies* that, for the purpose of the second commitment period, unless otherwise specified in this decision, any references in decision 13/CMP.1 and in annexes I and II to Parties included in Annex I or to Parties shall be understood as referring to Parties included in Annex I with commitments inscribed in the third column of Annex B;

4. *Also clarifies* that, for the purpose of the second commitment period, unless otherwise specified in this decision, any references in decision 13/CMP.1 and in annexes I and II to Parties included in Annex I or to Parties are not applicable to the Parties included in Annex I without quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments for the second commitment period;

5. *Decides* that, for the purpose of the second commitment period, the following changes shall apply to decisions 13/CMP.1 and 15/CMP.1:

(a) All references to Article 3, paragraph 1, shall be read as references to Article 3, paragraph 1 bis, except those in paragraphs 12(e) and 47(h) of the annex to decision 13/CMP.1;

(b) All references to Article 3, paragraphs 7 and 8, shall be read as references to Article 3, paragraphs 7 bis, 8 and 8 bis, except that in paragraph 4 of decision 13/CMP.1;

(c) All references to the first commitment period shall be read as references to the second commitment period, except that in paragraph 3(e) of decision 15/CMP.1;

(d) All references to activities under Article 3, paragraph 3, and elected activities under Article 3, paragraph 4, shall be read as references to activities under Article 3, paragraph 3, forest management under Article 3, paragraph 4, and any elected activities under Article 3, paragraph 4;

(e) All references to the *Revised 1996 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories* or to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change *Good Practice Guidance and Uncertainty Management in National Greenhouse Gas Inventories* in decision 15/CMP.1 shall be read as references to the *2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories* (hereinafter referred to as the 2006 IPCC Guidelines), as implemented through the “Guidelines for the preparation of national communications by Parties included in Annex I to the Convention, Part I: UNFCCC reporting guidelines on annual greenhouse gas inventories” and the *2013 Revised Supplementary Methods and Good Practice Guidance Arising from the Kyoto Protocol*. References to chapter 7 of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change *Good Practice Guidance and Uncertainty Management in National Greenhouse Gas Inventories* shall be read as references to chapter 4 of volume 1 of the 2006 IPCC Guidelines;

(f) All references to decision 16/CMP.1 shall be read as references to decision 2/CMP.7 and 6/CMP.9;

6. *Also decides* that, for the purpose of the second commitment period, paragraph 3(b) of decision 15/CMP.1 shall be replaced by the following paragraph:

3(b) The Party concerned has failed to include an estimate for an Annex A source category (as defined in chapter 4 of volume I of the 2006 IPCC Guidelines) that individually accounted for 7 per cent or more of the Party’s aggregate emissions, defined as the aggregate submitted emissions of the gases and from the sources listed in Annex A to the Kyoto Protocol, in the most recent of the Party’s reviewed inventories in which the source was estimated;

7. *Further decides* that decisions 14/CMP.1, 17/CMP.1 and 6/CMP.3 shall not apply for the purpose of the second commitment period;

8. *Decides* that Parties included in Annex I without quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments for the second commitment period shall provide information on which voluntary activities under Article 3, paragraph 4, of the Kyoto Protocol they will include in their reporting, at the latest in their 2016 annual inventory submission;

9. *Adopts* the revisions to the modalities for the accounting of assigned amounts under Article 7, paragraph 4, of the Kyoto Protocol¹ as set out in annex I;

10. *Recalls* that, pursuant to Article 4 of the Kyoto Protocol, each Party to an agreement to fulfil their commitments under Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol shall jointly, in the event that the aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions of the greenhouse gases listed in Annex A of the Parties to that agreement exceed their assigned amounts, be responsible for its own level of emissions as set out in that agreement;

11. *Decides* that each of the Parties included in Annex I that have reached an agreement to fulfil their commitments under Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol jointly, in accordance with Article 4 of the Kyoto Protocol, shall clarify in their reports, so as to facilitate the calculation of the assigned amount submitted pursuant to decision 2/CMP.8, how the information listed in annex I to that decision, the application of Article 3, paragraph 7 ter,

¹ Decision 13/CMP.1, annex.

including its technical implementation, and chapter VI of decision 1/CMP.8 are determined. Such clarification shall describe, in detail, methodologies and, if applicable, any relevant assumptions applied by those Parties for their joint fulfilment in relation to:

- (a) The application of paragraphs 23–26 of decision 1/CMP.8;
- (b) The calculation of base year emissions in accordance with Article 3, paragraphs 5, 7 bis, 8 and 8 bis;
- (c) The calculation of those Parties' assigned amounts in accordance with Article 3, paragraphs 7 bis, 8 and 8 bis, and the respective emission level allocated to each of the Parties as set out in the agreement pursuant to Article 4, paragraph 1;
- (d) The calculation of those Parties' commitment period reserves in accordance with decision 11/CMP.1, decision 1/CMP.8, paragraph 18, and this decision;
- (e) The application and calculation pursuant to paragraph 13 in the annex of decision 2/CMP.7;

12. *Adopts* the standard electronic format for reporting Kyoto Protocol units and the reporting instructions for the second commitment period contained in annex II for reporting in accordance with paragraph 11 of the annex to decision 15/CMP.1;

13. *Decides* that each Party included in Annex I with a quantified emission limitation or reduction commitment inscribed in the third column of Annex B shall annually report tables in a standard electronic format to the secretariat electronically; that any related information of a non-quantitative nature shall be submitted separately; and that, unless otherwise indicated, Parties shall submit information for the previous calendar year (based on Universal Coordinated Time), which is referred to as the "reported year" (e.g. in the 2017 standard electronic format submission, the "reported year" will be the 2016 calendar year);

14. *Also decides* that a Party included in Annex I without a quantified emission limitation or reduction commitment inscribed in the third column of Annex B shall continue to provide relevant information on its national registry, or changes thereto, including information on the units in its registry, by submitting the standard electronic format tables in conjunction with its annual inventory submission for the second commitment period, in accordance with decisions 13/CMP.1 and 15/CMP.1 and annex I to this decision, if its registry is connected to the international transaction log at any time during the relevant calendar year;

15. *Further decides* that, for the second commitment period, each Party included in Annex I with a quantified emission limitation or reduction commitment inscribed in the third column of Annex B shall submit its first standard electronic format for reporting Kyoto Protocol units for the second commitment period in conjunction with its first annual inventory submission for that commitment period, in accordance with paragraph 5 of decision 2/CMP.8;

16. *Decides* that the contribution of assigned amount units as a share of proceeds shall be executed in the most transparent manner, taking into account environmental integrity at the international level;

17. *Also decides* that, where a Party included in Annex I undertakes a corrective transaction to reflect a correction to the compilation and accounting database applied by the Compliance Committee, pursuant to chapter V, paragraph 5(b), of the annex to decision 27/CMP.1, the information in the compilation and accounting database shall be appropriately amended to avoid double counting, following the review of the corrective transaction in accordance with Article 8 of the Kyoto Protocol and the resolution of any questions of implementation;

18. *Further decides* to extend the code of practice for the treatment of confidential information for the review of inventories under Article 8 of the Kyoto Protocol to the review of information on assigned amounts under Article 8 of the Kyoto Protocol;
19. *Requests* the administrator of the international transaction log to develop an application to facilitate the submission of the standard electronic format referred to in paragraph 12 above and to report on progress made in the development and testing of that application in its next annual report;
20. *Adopts* the revisions to the “Guidelines for the preparation of the information required under Article 7 of the Kyoto Protocol”² for the second commitment period contained in annex III.

² Decision 15/CMP.1, annex.

Annex I

Modalities for the accounting of assigned amounts under Article 7, paragraph 4, of the Kyoto Protocol

General provisions

1. For the purpose of the second commitment period, paragraph 2 of decision 13/CMP.1 shall be replaced by the following paragraph:

2. For the purpose of the second commitment period, after completion of the initial review under Article 8 of the report to facilitate the calculation of the assigned amount pursuant to Article 3, paragraphs 7 bis, 8 and 8 bis, in accordance with paragraphs 2–4 of decision 2/CMP.8, and in resolution of any question of implementation relating to adjustments under Article 5, paragraph 2, or the assigned amount pursuant to Article 3, paragraphs 7 bis, 8 and 8 bis, the assigned amount pursuant to Article 3, paragraphs 7 bis, 8 and 8 bis, of each Party shall be recorded in the database for the compilation and accounting of emissions and assigned amounts referred to in paragraph 50 of the annex to decision 13/CMP.1, and shall remain fixed for the second commitment period.

I. Modalities

B. Calculation of the assigned amounts pursuant to Article 3, paragraphs 7 bis, 8 and 8 bis¹

2. For the purpose of the second commitment period, paragraph 5 of the annex to decision 13/CMP.1 shall be replaced with the following paragraph:

5. The assigned amount pursuant to Article 3, paragraphs 7 bis, 8 and 8 bis, for the second commitment period, from 2013 to 2020, for each Party included in Annex I with a commitment inscribed in the third column of Annex B, shall be equal to the percentage inscribed for it in the third column of Annex B of its aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions of greenhouse gases from the sources listed in Annex A to the Kyoto Protocol in the base year or period multiplied by eight, taking into account the following:

(a) The base year shall be 1990 except for those Parties undergoing the process of transition to a market economy that have selected a historical base year or period other than 1990, in accordance with Article 3, paragraph 5, for those Parties that have selected 1995 as the base year for total emissions of hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride, in accordance with Article 3, paragraph 8, and 1995 or 2000 as the base year for total emissions of nitrogen trifluoride, in accordance with Article 3, paragraph 8 bis;

(b) Those Parties for which land-use change and forestry (all emissions by sources and removals by sinks under category 4 of the *Guidelines for the preparation of national communications by Parties included in Annex I to the Convention, Part I: UNFCCC reporting guidelines on annual greenhouse gas*

¹ Unless otherwise specified in this annex, hereinafter the section headings in the annex follow the numbering of the corresponding section headings in the annex to decision 13/CMP.1.

inventories (hereinafter referred to as the UNFCCC Annex I inventory reporting guidelines)² as contained in the common reporting format tables) constituted a net source of greenhouse gas emissions in the base year or period shall include in their emissions during that year or period the aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions by sources minus removals by sinks in that year or period from land-use change (all emissions by sources minus removals by sinks reported in relation to the conversion of forests (deforestation));

(c) Those Parties that have reached an agreement in accordance with Article 4 to fulfil their commitments under Article 3 jointly shall use the respective emission level allocated to each of the Parties in that agreement instead of the percentage inscribed for it in the third column of Annex B.

3. Paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of the annex to decision 13/CMP.1 shall not apply for the purpose of the second commitment period.

4. The following paragraphs and chapter heading shall be inserted after paragraph 8 of the annex to decision 13/CMP.1:

8 bis. The report to facilitate the calculation of the assigned amount pursuant to Article 3, paragraphs 7 bis, 8 and 8 bis, referred to in paragraph 2 of decision 2/CMP.8, shall contain the following additional information, in accordance with the following subparagraph, inserted after subparagraph (m) in annex I to decision 2/CMP.8:

(n) The calculation of the difference between the assigned amount for the second commitment period and average annual emissions for the first three years of the preceding commitment period multiplied by eight, pursuant to Article 3, paragraph 7 ter, and in accordance with paragraphs 8 ter and 8 quater below.

B bis. Cancellation pursuant to Article 3, paragraph 7 ter

8 ter. The reference to the assigned amount for the second commitment period referred to in Article 3, paragraph 7 ter, shall be understood as referring to the assigned amount for the second commitment period calculated pursuant to Article 3, paragraphs 7 bis, 8 and 8 bis.

8 quater. For the purpose of Article 3, paragraph 7 ter, the units cancelled shall be assigned amount units (AAUs) issued by the Party for the second commitment period.

8 quinquies. Where a Party applies the cancellation pursuant to Article 3, paragraph 7 ter, the commitment period reserve for the second commitment period under paragraph 6 of the annex to decision 11/CMP.1 for that Party shall not drop below 90 per cent of eight times its average annual emissions for the first three years of the first commitment period, or 100 per cent of eight times its most recently reviewed inventory, whichever is lower.

8 sexies. The reference to assigned amount in decision 1/CMP.8, paragraph 25, for a Party that is undergoing the process of transition to a market economy and is not fulfilling its commitments under Article 3 jointly, in accordance with Article 4 of the Kyoto Protocol, shall be understood as referring to the assigned amount for the second commitment period, calculated pursuant to Article 3, paragraphs 7 bis, 8 and

² Decision 24/CP.19, annex I.

8 bis, adjusted by the number of assigned amount units cancelled in accordance with paragraph 23 ter of decision 13/CMP.1 as revised by this decision.

8 septies. Any Party that is undergoing the process of transition to a market economy and is not fulfilling its commitments under Article 3 jointly, in accordance with Article 4 of the Kyoto Protocol, and for which the reference to assigned amount in decision 1/CMP.8 is understood as referring to the assigned amount for the second commitment period, calculated pursuant to Article 3, paragraphs 7 bis, 8 and 8 bis, and adjusted by the number of assigned amount units cancelled in accordance with paragraph 23 ter of decision 13/CMP.1, as revised by this decision in accordance with paragraph 8 sexies above, shall not transfer units from its previous period surplus reserve account to other previous period surplus reserve accounts and may use assigned amount units from its previous period surplus reserve account for retirement in accordance with paragraph 25 of decision 1/CMP.8 and paragraph 8 sexies above.

C. Recording of the assigned amounts pursuant to Article 3, paragraphs 7 bis, 8 and 8 bis

5. For the purpose of the second commitment period, the following paragraphs shall be inserted after paragraphs 9 and 10 of the annex to decision 13/CMP.1, respectively:

9 bis. After initial review under Article 8 and resolution of any questions of implementation relating to adjustments or the calculation of its assigned amount pursuant to Article 3, paragraphs 7 bis, 8 and 8 bis, any positive difference between the assigned amount for the second commitment period for a Party included in Annex I and its average annual emissions for the first three years of the preceding commitment period multiplied by eight of each Party shall be recorded in the database for the compilation and accounting of emissions and assigned amounts referred to in paragraph 50 of the annex to decision 13/CMP.1.

10 bis. Once recorded in the compilation and accounting database referred to in paragraph 50 of the annex to decision 13/CMP.1, the quantity to be cancelled under Article 3, paragraph 7 ter, for each Party shall remain fixed for the second commitment period.

D. Additions to, and subtractions from, the assigned amounts pursuant to Article 3, paragraphs 7 bis, 8 and 8 bis, for the accounting of the compliance assessment

6. For the purpose of the second commitment period, the following shall be inserted after paragraph 11(d) of the annex to decision 13/CMP.1:

11(d) bis. Any acquisition by a Party of AAUs from previous period surplus reserve accounts of other Parties shall be in accordance with decision 1/CMP.8.

7. For the purpose of the second commitment period, paragraph 11(f) of the annex to decision 13/CMP.1 shall be replaced with the following:

11(f) Carry-over by the Party of emission reduction units (ERUs), certified emission reductions (CERs) and/or AAUs from the previous commitment period, in accordance with paragraphs 23–26 of decision 1/CMP.8.

8. For the purpose of the second commitment period, the following subparagraphs shall be added after the appropriate subparagraphs of paragraph 12 of the annex to decision 13/CMP.1:

12(e) bis. For the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, cancellation by the Party of AAUs under Article 3, paragraphs 1 ter and 1 quater;

12(e) ter. For the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, cancellation by the Party of AAUs under Article 3, paragraph 7 ter;

12(g) Transfers by the Party of AAUs from its previous period surplus reserve account to the previous period surplus reserve accounts of other Parties in accordance with paragraph 26 of decision 1/CMP.8;

12(h) Transfer by the Party of AAUs from the previous period surplus reserve account to the retirement account in accordance with paragraphs 23–26 of decision 1/CMP.8;

12(i) Voluntary cancellation by the Party of any units under paragraph 21(e) of the annex to decision 13/CMP.1;

12(j) Cancellation of units that remain after the expiration of the additional period for fulfilment commitments and carry-overs under paragraph 36 of the annex to decision 13/CMP.1;

12(k) Cancellation of temporary certified emission reductions (tCERs) by the Party after their expiry under paragraph 53 of the annex to decision 5/CMP.1;

12(l) Cancellation of long-term certified emission reductions (lCERs) by the Party after their expiry under paragraph 53 of the annex to decision 5/CMP.1;

12(m) Cancellation by the Party of lCERs held in holding accounts where there has been a reversal of removals by sinks for the project activity concerned under paragraph 49 of the annex to decision 5/CMP.1 and paragraph 3 of appendix D to decision 5/CMP.1;

12(n) Cancellation by the Party of lCERs by the Party held in holding accounts where a certification report for the project activity concerned has not been provided under paragraph 50 of the annex to decision 5/CMP.1 and paragraph 3 of appendix D to decision 5/CMP.1;

12(o) Cancellation of AAUs, CERs, ERUs, removal units (RMUs) and/or tCERs for the purpose of replacing tCERs prior to expiry under paragraphs 41–43 of the annex to decision 5/CMP.1;

12(p) Cancellation of AAUs, CERs, ERUs and/or RMUs for the purpose of replacing lCERs prior to expiry under paragraph 47(a) of the annex to decision 5/CMP.1;

12(q) Cancellation of AAUs, CERs, ERUs, RMUs and/or lCERs from the same project activity for the purpose of replacing lCERs where there has been a reversal of removals by sinks under paragraph 47(b) of the annex to decision 5/CMP.1;

12(r) Cancellation of AAUs, CERs, ERUs, RMUs and/or lCERs from the same project activity for the purpose of replacing lCERs where a certification report has not been provided under paragraph 47(c) of the annex to decision 5/CMP.1.

E. Basis for the compliance assessment

9. For the purpose of the second commitment period, the assessment referred to in paragraph 14 of the annex to decision 13/CMP.1 shall be carried out taking into account also paragraph 25 of decision 1/CMP.8.

F. Carry-over

10. For the purpose of the second commitment period, the following chapter heading and paragraphs shall be inserted after paragraph 16 of the annex to decision 13/CMP.1:

G. Share of proceeds

16 bis. The share of proceeds pursuant to paragraphs 20 and 21 of decision 1/CMP.8 shall be calculated in accordance with the following:

- (a) The quantity of units levied as a share of the proceeds on the issuance of CERs from project activities, on the first international transfers of AAUs and on the issuance of ERUs, shall be calculated as 2 per cent of the amount of units issued or transferred in each transaction, rounded up to the next higher integer value;
- (b) The quantity of units levied as a share of the proceeds on the first international transfer of AAUs shall be included in the quantity of AAUs transferred. The quantity of units levied as a share of the proceeds on the issuance of ERUs for Article 6 projects shall be included in the quantities of ERUs issued for the project concerned;
- (c) The transfers to the Adaptation Fund account pursuant to paragraphs 20–22 of decision 1/CMP.8 shall not be subject to the share of proceeds;
- (d) The first international transfers of units between previous period surplus reserve accounts shall not be subject to the share of proceeds;
- (e) The term “first international transfer” refers to the first external transfer of each individual AAU from the originating registry to the registry of another Party, tracked by its serial number.

II. Registry requirements

A. National registries

11. For the purpose of the second commitment period, the following shall be inserted after paragraph 21(d) of the annex to decision 13/CMP.1:

21(d) bis. One cancellation account for each commitment period for the purpose of cancelling AAUs under Article 3, paragraphs 1 ter and 1 quater;

21(d) ter. One cancellation account for the second commitment period for the purpose of cancelling AAUs pursuant to Article 3, paragraph 7 ter;

21(d) quater. One previous period surplus reserve account for holdings of AAUs, in accordance with paragraphs 23–26 of decision 1/CMP.8;

12. For the purpose of the second commitment period, the following shall be inserted after paragraph 21(f) of the annex to decision 13/CMP.1:

- 21(g) One cancellation account for voluntary cancellation by the Party of any units under paragraph 21(e) of the annex to decision 13/CMP.1;
- 21(h) One cancellation account for the purpose of cancelling units that remain after the expiration of the additional period for fulfilment commitments and carry-overs under paragraph 36 of the annex to decision 13/CMP.1;
- 21(i) One cancellation account for the purpose of cancellation of tCERs by the Party after their expiry under paragraph 53 of the annex to decision 5/CMP.1;
- 21(j) One cancellation account for the purpose of cancellation of ICERs by the Party after their expiry under paragraph 53 of the annex to decision 5/CMP.1;
- 21(k) One cancellation account for the purpose of cancellation of ICERs by the Party held in holding accounts where there has been a reversal of removals by sinks for the project activity concerned under paragraph 49 of the annex to decision 5/CMP.1 and paragraph 3 of appendix D to decision 5/CMP.1;
- 21(l) One cancellation account for the purpose of cancellation of ICERs by the Party held in holding accounts where a certification report for the project activity concerned has not been provided under paragraph 50 of the annex to decision 5/CMP.1 and paragraph 3 of appendix D to decision 5/CMP.1;
- 21(m) One replacement account for the purpose of cancelling AAUs, CERs, ERUs, RMUs and/or tCERs for the purpose of replacing tCERs prior to expiry under paragraph 43 of the annex to decision 5/CMP.1;
- 21(n) One replacement account for the purpose of cancelling AAUs, CERs, ERUs and/or RMUs for the purpose of replacing ICERs prior to expiry under paragraph 47(a) of the annex to decision 5/CMP.1;
- 21(o) One replacement account for the purpose of cancelling AAUs, CERs, ERUs, RMUs and/or ICERs from the same project activity for the purpose of replacing ICERs where there has been a reversal of removals by sinks under paragraph 47(b) of the annex to decision 5/CMP.1;
- 21(p) One replacement account for the purpose of cancelling AAUs, CERs, ERUs, RMUs and/or ICERs from the same project activity for the purpose of replacing ICERs where a certification report has not been provided under paragraph 47(c) of the annex to decision 5/CMP.1.

B. Issuance of emission reduction units, assigned amount units and removal units

13. Paragraph 23 of the annex to decision 13/CMP.1 shall not apply for the second commitment period and the following paragraphs shall be inserted after paragraph 23 of the annex to decision 13/CMP.1:

23 bis. For the purpose of the second commitment period, each Party included in Annex I shall issue in its national registry a quantity of AAUs equivalent to the assigned amount of that Party pursuant to Article 3, paragraphs 7 bis, 8 and 8 bis, calculated and reported in accordance with paragraph 5 bis above, and paragraph 3 of decision 2/CMP.8.

23 ter. For the purpose of the second commitment period, the transfer of units for cancellation in accordance with Article 3, paragraph 7 ter shall occur immediately upon issuance of the assigned amount units referred to in the previous paragraph.

C. Transfer, acquisition, cancellation, retirement and carry-over

14. For the purpose of the second commitment period, paragraphs 30, 34 and 36 of the annex to decision 13/CMP.1 shall be replaced by paragraphs 30, 34 and 36 below and paragraphs 33 bis and 33 ter shall be inserted after paragraph 33 as follows:

30. For the purpose of the second commitment period, ERUs, CERs, AAUs and RMUs may be transferred between registries in accordance with decisions 3/CMP.1, 9/CMP.1, 11/CMP.1 and 1/CMP.8, and may be transferred within registries.

33 bis. Each Party included in Annex I may cancel AAUs under Article 3, paragraphs 1 ter and 1 quater, so they cannot be used in fulfilment of commitments under Article 3, paragraph 1 bis, in accordance with paragraph 12(e) bis above, by transferring them to the appropriate cancellation account in its national registry. Legal entities, where authorized by the Party, may also transfer AAUs into the cancellation account.

33 ter. Each Party included in Annex I shall cancel AAUs pursuant to Article 3, paragraph 7 ter, in accordance with paragraph 12(e) ter above, by transferring them to the appropriate cancellation account in its national registry.

34. For the purpose of the second commitment period, prior to the end of the additional period for fulfilling commitments, each Party included in Annex I shall retire ERUs, CERs, AAUs and/or RMUs valid for that commitment period for use towards meeting its commitments under Article 3, paragraph 1 bis, in accordance with paragraph 13 of the annex to decision 13/CMP.1 and paragraph 25 of decision 1/CMP.8 by transferring ERUs, CERs, AAUs and/or RMUs to the retirement account for that commitment period in its national registry.

36. For the purpose of the second commitment period, each Party included in Annex I may carry over to the subsequent commitment period, in accordance with paragraph 15 of the annex to decision 13/CMP.1 and paragraphs 23–26 of decision 1/CMP.8, ERUs, CERs and/or AAUs held in its registry that have not been cancelled or retired for a commitment period or that are not held in its previous period surplus reserve account. Each ERU, CER and/or AAU carried over in this manner shall maintain its original serial number and shall be valid in the subsequent commitment period. ERUs, CERs, AAUs and RMUs held in the national registry of a Party that have not been carried over in this manner or retired for the commitment period shall be cancelled in accordance with paragraph 12(f) of the annex to decision 13/CMP.1, once the additional period for fulfilling commitments has ended.

D. Transaction procedures

15. For the purpose of the second commitment period, the following paragraph shall replace paragraph 42 of the annex to decision 13/CMP.1:

42. Upon receipt of the record, for the second commitment period the transaction log shall conduct an automated check to verify that there is no discrepancy:

(a) All transactions: units previously retired or cancelled; units existing in more than one registry; units for which a previously identified discrepancy has not been resolved; units improperly carried over or improperly transferred to previous period surplus reserve accounts; units improperly issued, including those that infringe the limits contained in decision 2/CMP.7; and the authorization of legal entities involved to participate in the transaction;

- (b) In the case of transfers between registries: the eligibility of Parties involved in the transaction to participate in joint implementation, the clean development mechanism and international emissions trading under Articles 6, 12 and 17 of the Kyoto Protocol; infringement of the commitment period reserve of the transferring Party; and infringements of the limits to transfer units between previous period surplus reserve accounts of different Parties as set out in paragraph 26 of decision 1/CMP.8;
- (c) In the case of acquisitions of tCERs and lCERs from land use, land-use change and forestry projects under Article 12: infringement of the limits contained in decision 2/CMP.7;
- (d) In the case of a retirement of CERs: the eligibility of the Party in accordance with paragraph 14 of decision 1/CMP.8 to use CERs to contribute to its compliance under Article 3, paragraph 1 bis.

E. Publicly accessible information

- 16. For the purpose of the second commitment period, paragraph 45(e) of the annex to decision 13/CMP.1 shall not apply.
- 17. For the purpose of the second commitment period, the following shall be added after the respective subparagraphs of paragraph 47 of the annex to decision 13/CMP.1:
 - 47(a) bis. The total quantity of AAUs in the previous period surplus reserve account at the beginning of the year;
 - 47(h) bis. The total quantity of AAUs cancelled under Article 3, paragraphs 1 ter and 1 quater;
 - 47(h) ter. The total quantity of AAUs cancelled under Article 3, paragraph 7 ter.

III. Compilation and accounting of emission inventories and assigned amounts

Compilation and accounting database

- 18. For the purpose of the second commitment period, the following shall be added after paragraph 52(b) of the annex to decision 13/CMP.1:
 - 52(c) For the purpose of the second commitment period, any positive difference between the assigned amount for the second commitment period for a Party included in Annex I and average annual emissions for the first three years of the preceding commitment period multiplied by eight, pursuant to Article 3, paragraph 7 ter;
 - 52(d) For the purpose of the second commitment period, the forest management reference level inscribed in the appendix to the annex to decision 2/CMP.7;
 - 52(e) For the purpose of the second commitment period, any cancellations of Kyoto Protocol units pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of section XV of the annex to decision 27/CMP.1 arising from non-compliance in the first commitment period.
- 19. For the purpose of the second commitment period, the following shall be added after paragraph 55(e) of the annex to decision 13/CMP.1:
 - 55(f) Technical corrections in accordance with paragraph 15 of decision 2/CMP.7;

55(g) For those activities for which the Party has elected to account annually, the net anthropogenic emissions and removals of greenhouse gases in accordance with decision 2/CMP.7 and the related accounting quantity for the calendar year;

55(h) For those activities for which the Party has elected to account for the entire commitment period, the net anthropogenic emissions and removals of greenhouse gases in accordance with decision 2/CMP.7 and the related accounting quantity at the end of the commitment period;

55(i) In the second commitment period, any changes to the total allowable issuance of RMUs resulting from forest management activities under Article 3, paragraph 4, due to technical corrections to forest management reference levels reported by a Party in accordance with paragraphs 14 and 15 of decision 2/CMP.7 and reviewed under Article 8 in accordance with decision 2/CMP.7.

20. For the purpose of the second commitment period, the following shall be added after paragraph 58(h) of the annex to decision 13/CMP.1:

58(h) bis. For the purpose of the second commitment period, total cancellations of AAUs cancelled under Article 3, paragraphs 1 ter and 1 quater;

58(h) ter. For the purpose of the second commitment period, total cancellations of AAUs cancelled under Article 3, paragraph 7 ter.

Annex II

Standard electronic format for reporting information on Kyoto Protocol units¹

I. General reporting instructions

1. Each Party included in Annex I with a quantified emissions limitation or reduction commitment inscribed in the third column of Annex B shall annually report tables in a standard electronic format (SEF) to the secretariat electronically. Any related information of a non-quantitative nature shall be submitted separately. Unless otherwise indicated, Parties shall submit information for the previous calendar year (based on Universal Coordinated Time). This is referred to as the “reported year” (e.g. in the 2017 SEF submission, the “reported year” will be the 2016 calendar year).
2. For the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, each Party included in Annex I shall submit its first SEF for reporting Kyoto Protocol units for the second commitment period in conjunction with its first annual inventory submission for that commitment period.²
3. Each Party included in Annex I shall submit the SEF annually until the expiration of the additional period for the fulfilment of commitments for the relevant commitment period.
4. If a Party included in Annex I is undertaking transactions for two or more commitment periods simultaneously, then the Party shall provide a separate, complete report for each commitment period. Each report shall contain information on only those Kyoto Protocol units valid for that commitment period.³
5. All values recorded in the SEF tables shall be positive, whole units. Negative values shall not be entered.
6. Not all unit types are relevant to each account, transaction or event type. Where a cell is shaded in a table, the information or transaction does not apply to that particular unit type.
7. All tables shall be filled in completely. If no units of a particular type occurred for a transaction in the previous year, the Party shall enter “NO” in the cell for “not occurring”.
8. In the interest of readability, descriptive titles are used in the SEF to refer to specific account and transaction types. Explanations of those descriptive titles and references to the pertinent provisions under the Kyoto Protocol are provided in the instructions on individual tables contained in chapter II below.

¹ Assigned amount units (AAUs), emission reduction units (ERUs), removal units (RMUs), and certified emission reductions (CERs), including temporary certified emission reductions (tCERs) and long-term certified emission reductions (lCERs).

² In accordance with decision 2/CMP.8, paragraph 5.

³ AAUs, ERUs, RMUs and CERs, including tCERs and lCERs.

II. Instructions on individual tables

A. Table 1. Total quantities of Kyoto Protocol units by account type at beginning of reported year

9. In table 1, each Party included in Annex I shall provide information on the total quantity of Kyoto Protocol units contained in its national registry, by account type and by unit type, as at 1 January of the reported year.

10. Each Party included in Annex I shall report on the total quantities of Kyoto Protocol units, by unit type, held in each of the following account types:

(a) “Party holding accounts” (paragraph 21(a) of the annex to decision 13/CMP.1);

(b) “Entity holding accounts” (paragraph 21(b) of the annex to decision 13/CMP.1);

(c) “Retirement account” (paragraph 21(f) of the annex to decision 13/CMP.1);

(d) “Previous period surplus reserve account” (paragraph 23 of decision 1/CMP.8);

(e) “Article 3.3/3.4 net source cancellation accounts”, for the cancellation of Kyoto Protocol units as a result of emissions from activities under Article 3, paragraphs 3 and 4, of the Kyoto Protocol (paragraph 21(c) of the annex to decision 13/CMP.1 and decision 2/CMP.7);

(f) “Non-compliance cancellation account”, for the cancellation of Kyoto Protocol units following a determination by the Compliance Committee that the Party included in Annex I is not in compliance with its commitment under Article 3, paragraph 1 (paragraphs 12(e) and 21(d) of the annex to decision 13/CMP.1);

(g) “Voluntary cancellation account”, for voluntary cancellations (paragraph 21(e) of the annex to decision 13/CMP.1);

(h) “Cancellation account for remaining units after carry-over”, to cancel units that remain after the expiration of the additional period for fulfilling commitments and the carry-overs, if any, have been undertaken (paragraph 36 of the annex to decision 13/CMP.1);

(i) “Article 3.1 ter and quater ambition increase cancellation account”, for cancellations pursuant to paragraph 8 of decision 1/CMP.8;

(j) “Article 3.7 ter cancellation account”, for cancellations pursuant to Article 3, paragraph 7 ter;

(k) “tCER cancellation account for expiry”, to cancel temporary certified emission reduction (tCERs) after their expiry (paragraph 53 of the annex to decision 5/CMP.1);

(l) “lCER cancellation account for expiry”, to cancel long-term certified emission reduction (lCERs) after their expiry (paragraph 53 of the annex to decision 5/CMP.1);

(m) “lCER cancellation account for reversal of removals”, to cancel lCERs held in holding accounts where there has been a reversal of removals by sinks for the project activity concerned (paragraph 49 of the annex to decision 5/CMP.1 and paragraph 3 of appendix D to decision 5/CMP.1);

(n) “ICER cancellation account for non-submission of certification report”, to cancel ICERs held in holding accounts where a certification report for the project activity concerned has not been provided (paragraph 50 of the annex to decision 5/CMP.1 and paragraph 3 of appendix D to decision 5/CMP.1).

11. In addition, each Party included in Annex I shall report on the total quantities of Kyoto Protocol units, by unit type, held in each of the replacement account types specified in the following paragraphs of the annex to decision 5/CMP.1:

(a) “tCER replacement account for expiry”, to cancel assigned amount units (AAUs), certified emission reduction (CERs), emission reduction units (ERUs), removal units (RMUs) and/or tCERs for the purpose of replacing tCERs prior to expiry (para. 43);

(b) “ICER replacement account for expiry”, to cancel AAUs, CERs, ERUs and/or RMUs for the purpose of replacing ICERs prior to expiry (para. 47(a));

(c) “ICER replacement account for reversal of removals”, to cancel AAUs, CERs, ERUs, RMUs and/or ICERs from the same project activity for the purpose of replacing ICERs where there has been a reversal of removals by sinks (para. 47(b));

(d) “ICER replacement account for non-submission of certification report”, to cancel AAUs, CERs, ERUs, RMUs and/or ICERs from the same project activity for the purpose of replacing ICERs when a certification report has not been provided (para. 47(c)).

B. Table 2(a). Annual internal transactions

12. In table 2(a), Annex I Parties shall report information on the total quantity of Kyoto Protocol units involved in internal transactions (those that did not involve another registry) that occurred between 1 January and 31 December of the reported year, as described below, including any corrective transactions.

13. Under the “Article 6 issuance and conversion” section, Annex I Parties shall report information relating to joint implementation projects under the Kyoto Protocol in accordance with the following paragraphs of the annex to decision 9/CMP.1:

(a) For “Party-verified projects” (also referred to as “track one” projects) Annex I Parties shall report information pertaining to projects for which emission reductions or the enhancement of removals have been verified by the host Party in accordance with paragraph 23 of the annex to decision 9/CMP.1:

(i) Each Party included in Annex I shall report under “Additions” the total quantity of ERUs issued pursuant to paragraph 29 of the annex to decision 13/CMP.1;

(ii) The Party shall report under “Subtractions” the corresponding quantity of AAUs converted, or, in the case of land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) projects, the corresponding quantity of RMUs converted, pursuant to paragraph 29 of the annex to decision 13/CMP.1;

(b) For “Independently verified projects” (also referred to as “track two” projects), Annex I Parties shall report information pertaining to projects for which emission reductions or the enhancement of removals have been verified through the procedure under the Article 6 Supervisory Committee in accordance with paragraphs 30–45 of the annex to decision 9/CMP.1:

(i) Each Party included in Annex I shall report under “Additions” the total quantity of ERUs issued pursuant to paragraph 29 of the annex to decision 13/CMP.1;

- (ii) The Party shall report under “Subtractions” the corresponding quantity of AAUs converted, or, in the case of LULUCF projects, the corresponding quantity of RMUs converted, pursuant to paragraph 29 of the annex to decision 13/CMP.1.

14. Under the section “Article 3.3 and 3.4 issuance or cancellation”, each Party included in Annex I shall report the quantity of RMUs issued or the units cancelled for its LULUCF activities under Article 3, paragraphs 3 and 4, of the Kyoto Protocol, by individual activity, in accordance with the annex to decision 16/CMP.1 and decision 2/CMP.7, and with its election of activities pursuant to paragraph 8(c) and (d) of the annex to decision 13/CMP.1 and paragraphs 7 and 8 of the annex to decision 2/CMP.7:

- (a) For any activity resulting in a net removal, each Party included in Annex I shall report under “Additions” the total quantity of RMUs issued pursuant to paragraph 25 of the annex to decision 13/CMP.1 and decision 2/CMP.7;

- (b) For any activity resulting in net emissions, each Party shall report under “Subtractions” the total quantities of AAUs, ERUs, RMUs and/or CERs cancelled pursuant to paragraph 32 of the annex to decision 13/CMP.1 and decision 2/CMP.7.

15. Under the section “Article 12 afforestation and reforestation”, each Party included in Annex I shall report information relating to afforestation and reforestation project activities under the clean development mechanism (CDM), as specified in the relevant paragraphs of the annex to decision 5/CMP.1:⁴

- (a) “Replacement of expired tCERs”, the total quantities of AAUs, CERs, ERUs, RMUs and/or tCERs that were transferred to the tCER replacement account (para. 44);

- (b) “Replacement of expired ICERs”, the total quantities of AAUs, CERs, ERUs and/or RMUs that were transferred to the ICER replacement account for replacement of expiring ICERs (para. 47(a));

- (c) “Replacement of ICERs for reversal of removals”, the total quantities of AAUs, CERs, ERUs, RMUs and/or ICERs that were transferred to the ICER replacement account for reversal of removals (para. 47(b));

- (d) “Cancellation of ICERs for reversal of removals”, the total quantities of ICERs that were cancelled following a reversal of removals (para. 49 and appendix D, para. 3);

- (e) “Replacement of ICERs for non-submission of certification report”, the total quantities of AAUs, CERs, ERUs, RMUs and/or ICERs that were transferred to the ICER replacement account for non-submission of certification report (para. 50 and appendix D, para. 3);

- (f) “Cancellation of ICERs for non-submission of certification report”, the total quantities of ICERs that were cancelled following a non-submission of certification report (para. 50 and appendix D, para. 3).

16. Under “Other cancellation”, each Party included in Annex I shall report the total quantities of Kyoto Protocol units, by type, that were cancelled for the following reasons:⁵

- (a) “Voluntary cancellation”, for voluntary cancellations (para. 21(e) of the annex to decision 13/CMP.1);

⁴ Additional information relating to afforestation and reforestation project activities is reported in table 3.

⁵ Cancellations following determination of non-compliance are reported in table 5(a).

(b) “Article 3.1 ter and quater ambition increase cancellation”, for cancellations pursuant to paragraph 8 of decision 1/CMP.8.⁶

17. Each Party included in Annex I shall sum the quantities of Kyoto Protocol units in each column and report these under “Sub-total”.

18. In the box “Retirement”, each Party included in Annex I shall report the following information:

(a) Under the line “Retirement”, the total quantities of Kyoto Protocol units, by type, that were transferred from its national holding account to its retirement account. These values shall not be included in the main body of table 2(a);

(b) Under the line “Retirement from PPSR”, the total quantities of AAUs that were transferred from its previous period surplus reserve (PPSR) account to its retirement account. These values shall not be included in the main body of table 2(a);

(c) Under the line “Total”, the total quantities of units that were transferred to its retirement account.

C. Table 2(b). Total annual external transactions

19. In table 2(b), Annex I Parties shall report information on the total quantities of Kyoto Protocol units involved in external transactions (those that involved another registry) that occurred between 1 January and 31 December of the reported year, including any corrective transactions.

20. Under “Total transfers and acquisitions”, each Party included in Annex I shall include a separate row for each registry (Party or CDM registry) to which it transferred, from which it acquired or from which it was forwarded Kyoto Protocol units during the previous year:

(a) Each Party shall report the quantities of all Kyoto Protocol units acquired from a registry, including any units transferred from the Adaptation Fund account or forwarded from the CDM registry, by type, under “Additions”;

(b) Each Party shall report the total quantities of Kyoto Protocol units transferred to that registry, including transfers to the share of proceeds pursuant to paragraph 21 of decision 1/CMP.8, cancellations for excess issuance of a CDM project activity⁷ and cancellations of units following a reversal of storage⁸ or non-submission of certification report⁹ for a carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) project activity, under “Subtractions” on the same line.

21. Each Party included in Annex I shall sum the quantities of Kyoto Protocol units in each column and report these under “Sub-total”.

⁶ Cancellations to increase ambition in accordance with paragraph 8 of decision 1/CMP.8 are also reported in table 5(a).

⁷ Paragraph 52 of the annex to decision 5/CMP.1.

⁸ Paragraph 24(b) of the annex to decision 10/CMP.7.

⁹ Paragraph 27 of the annex to decision 10/CMP.7.

D. Table 2(c). Annual transactions between previous period surplus reserve accounts

22. Under “Transfers and acquisitions between PPSR accounts”, each Party included in Annex I shall include a separate row for each registry to which it transferred AAUs from its PPSR account or from which it acquired AAUs located in a PPSR account during the previous year:

(a) The quantity of AAUs acquired shall be reported under “Additions”. This quantity shall also be reported under the “Total transfers and acquisitions” section of table 2(b);

(b) The quantity of AAUs transferred shall be reported under “Subtractions”. This quantity shall also be reported under the “Total transfers and acquisitions” section of table 2(b).

23. Each Party included in Annex I shall sum the quantities of Kyoto Protocol units in each column and report these under “Sub-total”.

E. Table 2(d). Share of proceeds transactions under decision 1/CMP.8, paragraph 21 - Adaptation Fund

24. The term “first international transfer” refers to the first external transfer of each individual AAU from the originating registry to the registry of another Party, tracked by its serial number.

25. Each Party included in Annex I shall report the quantity of units transferred and of units issued for which a share of the proceeds levy applies and the related quantity of units contributed to the Adaptation Fund in accordance with paragraph 21 of decision 1/CMP.8 as follows:

(a) Under “First international transfers of AAUs”, “Amount transferred or converted”, each Party shall report the total quantity of AAUs transferred for the first time from its registry to another registry tracked by serial number. Under “First international transfers of AAUs”, “Amount contributed as Share of Proceeds (SoP) to the Adaptation Fund”, each Party shall report the total quantity of AAUs contributed to the Adaptation Fund. These transfers shall also be included in the “Transfers and acquisitions” section of table 2(b);

(b) Under “Issuance of ERUs from Party-verified projects”, “Amount transferred or converted”, each Party shall report the total quantity of ERUs relating to projects where emission reductions or enhancements of removals have been verified by the host Party in accordance with paragraph 23 of the annex to decision 9/CMP.1. Under “Issuance of ERUs from Party-verified projects”, “Amount contributed as SoP to the Adaptation Fund”, each Party shall report the total quantity of ERUs issued relating to projects where emission reductions or enhancements of removals have been verified by the host Party in accordance with paragraph 23 of the annex to decision 9/CMP.1 and contributed to the Adaptation Fund. These transfers shall also be included under the “Transfers and acquisitions” section of table 2(b);

(c) Under “Issuance of independently verified ERUs”, “Amount transferred or converted”, each Party shall report the total quantity of ERUs that had been independently verified by the Article 6 Supervisory Committee. Under “Issuance of independently verified ERUs”, “Amount contributed as SoP to the Adaptation Fund”, each Party shall report the total quantity of ERUs issued that were independently verified by the Article 6

Supervisory Committee and contributed to the Adaptation Fund. These transfers shall also be included under the “Transfers and acquisitions” section of table 2(b).

F. Table 2(e). Total annual transactions

26. Each Party included in Annex I shall add the subtotals of tables 2(a) and 2(b) and report the corresponding quantities under “Total” in table 2(e).

G. Table 3. Annual expiry, cancellation and replacement

27. In table 3, Annex I Parties shall report information on the expiry, cancellation and replacement of tCERs, ICERs and CERs from CCS project activities in accordance with the modalities and procedures for afforestation and reforestation project activities under the CDM (decision 5/CMP.1) and the modalities and procedures for CCS in geological formations as CDM project activities (decision 10/CMP.7). Annex I Parties shall include all transactions that occurred between 1 January and 31 December of the reported year, including any corrective transactions.

28. Each Party included in Annex I shall report the following information under the section “Temporary CERs”:

(a) “Expired in retirement and replacement accounts”: the quantity of tCERs that expired in the reported year in the retirement account and the tCER replacement accounts for the previous commitment period and the quantity of units that were used to replace them. These tCERs will have been valid for the previous commitment period and will expire in the final year of the commitment period;

(b) “Expired in holding accounts”: the quantity of tCERs that expired in the reported year in all Party and entity holding accounts for the previous commitment period and the quantity of units that were cancelled as a result.

29. Each Party included in Annex I shall report the following information under the section “Long-term CERs”:

(a) “Expired in retirement and replacement accounts”, the quantity of ICERs that expired in the reported year in the retirement account and the ICER replacement accounts for previous commitment periods and the quantity of units that were used to replace them. These ICERs will have been valid for the previous commitment period;

(b) “Expired in holding accounts”, the quantity of ICERs that expired in all Party and entity holding accounts and the quantity of units that were cancelled as a result. These ICERs will have been valid for the previous commitment period;

(c) “Subject to reversal of removals”, in the event that the Party has received notification(s) of a reversal of removals under a project activity from the Executive Board of the clean development mechanism (CDM Executive Board), the quantity of ICERs that the Party is required to replace pursuant to the notification(s) and the quantity of units that the Party used for replacement or cancellation as a result of these notifications;

(d) “Subject to non-submission of certification report”, in the event that the Party included in Annex I has received notification(s) of non-submission of certification report under a project activity from the CDM Executive Board, the quantity of ICERs that the Party is required to replace pursuant to the notification(s) and the quantity of units that the Party used for replacement or cancellation as a result of the notification(s).

30. Each Party included in Annex I shall report the following information under the section “Carbon Capture and Storage CERs”:

(a) “Subject to net reversal of storage”, in the event that the Party has received notification(s) of a net reversal of storage of a CCS project activity from the CDM Executive Board, the quantity of units that the Party included in Annex I is required to cancel pursuant to that notification and the quantity of units that the Party included in Annex I used for cancellation as a result of these notifications. The units used to meet this requirement are transferred to the CDM registry and are therefore not reported in table 2(a). These units used to meet this requirement shall also be reported in table 2(b);

(b) “Subject to non-submission of certification report”, in the event that the Party included in Annex I has received notification(s) of non-submission of certification report for a CCS project activity from the CDM Executive Board, the quantity of units that the Party included in Annex I is required to replace pursuant to the notification(s) and the quantity of units that the Party included in Annex I used for cancellation as a result of the notification(s). The units used to meet this requirement are transferred to the CDM registry and are therefore not reported in table 2(a). These units used to meet this requirement shall also be reported in table 2(b).

31. Annex I Parties shall sum the quantities of Kyoto Protocol units in each column and report these under “Total”.

H. Table 4. Total quantities of Kyoto Protocol units by account type at end of reported year

32. In table 4, Annex I Parties shall include information on the total quantities of Kyoto Protocol units in each account type, by unit type, in the national registry at 31 December of the reported year.

33. The structure of table 4 follows the structure of table 1.

I. Table 5(a). Summary information on additions and subtractions

34. In table 5(a), Annex I Parties shall report cumulative information for the reported year and previously reported years to facilitate the recording of information for the commitment period in the compilation and accounting database in accordance with the annex to decision 13/CMP.1 and this decision.

35. Each Party included in Annex I shall report the following information:

(a) “Assigned amount units issued”, “Additions”, the total quantity of AAUs issued on the basis of its assigned amount under Article 3, paragraphs 7 bis, 8 and 8 bis;

(b) “Article 3, paragraph 7 ter, cancellations”, “Subtractions”, the total quantity of AAUs cancelled in accordance with Article 3, paragraph 7 ter;

(c) “Cancellation following increase in ambition”, the total quantity of AAUs cancelled in accordance with paragraph 8 of decision 1/CMP.8;

(d) “Cancellation of remaining units after carry-over”, the total quantity of units, per unit type, cancelled after expiration of the additional period for fulfilling commitments and carry-overs, if any, have been undertaken (decision 13/CMP.1, annex, para. 36);

(e) “Non-compliance cancellation”, if applicable, the quantities of Kyoto Protocol units, by type, that the Party cancelled pursuant to a determination by the Compliance Committee that the Party is not in compliance with its commitment under

Article 3, paragraph 1, for the previous commitment period pursuant to paragraph 37 of the annex to decision 13/CMP.1;¹⁰

(f) “Carry-over”, under “Additions” and if applicable, the total quantities of ERUs and/or CERs that were carried over from the previous commitment period; under “Subtractions” the total quantities of ERUs and/or CERs that were carried over to the subsequent commitment period;

(g) “Carry-over to PPSR”, under “Additions” and if applicable, the total quantities of AAUs that were carried over from the previous commitment period to the PPSR account; under “Subtractions” the total quantities of AAUs that were carried over to the subsequent commitment period from the PPSR account.

J. Table 5(b). Summary information on annual transactions

36. In table 5(b), each Party included in Annex I shall provide summary information on annual transactions for the reported year and previously reported years for the commitment period:

(a) For the reported year, each Party shall report the total quantities of Kyoto Protocol units, by type, from table 2(e);

(b) For all years prior to the reported year, the Party shall report the total quantities of Kyoto Protocol units, as reported in table 5(b) in the previous SEF tables;

(c) Under “Total”, each Party shall report the sum to date of all transactions.

K. Table 5(c). Summary information on annual transactions between previous period surplus reserve accounts

37. In table 5(c), each Party included in Annex I shall provide summary information on annual transactions between PPSR accounts for the reported year and for all previously reported years for the commitment period:

(a) For the reported year, each Party shall report the total quantities of AAUs, from table 2(c);

(b) For all years prior to the reported year, the Party shall report the total quantities of AAUs, as reported in table 5(c) in the previous SEF tables;

(c) Under “Total”, each Party shall report the sum to date of all transactions.

L. Table 5(d). Summary information on expiry, cancellation and replacement

38. In table 5(d), Annex I Parties shall provide summary information relating to the replacement and cancellations of tCERs, ICERs and CERs from CCS project activities for each reported year for the commitment period.

39. For the reported year, each Party included in Annex I shall report:

¹⁰ This information will not be available until completion of the compliance assessment for the previous commitment period, following the expiration of the additional period for the fulfilment of commitments.

(a) Under “Requirement to replace or cancel”, the total quantities of tCERs, ICERs or CERs from CCS project activities that expired, were subject to a reversal of removals or a reversal of storage or a non-submission of certification report in that year;

(b) Under “Replacement”, the total quantities of Kyoto Protocol units, by type, cancelled to replace tCERs or ICERs. These quantities should match those reported under “Total” in table 3;

(c) Under “Cancellation”, the total quantities of Kyoto Protocol units, by type, cancelled to replace tCERs, ICERs or to respond to a reversal of storage or non-submission of certification report for CCS project activities. These quantities should match those reported under “Total” in table 3.

40. For all years prior to the reported year, the Party included in Annex I shall repeat the information under “Requirement to replace or cancel” and under “Replacement” and “Cancellation” as reported in the previous SEF.

41. Under “Total”, each Party included in Annex I shall report the sum of each column. At the end of the commitment period, the total quantities of tCERs, ICERs and CERs from CCS project activities should match the total quantities of Kyoto Protocol units under “Replacement” and “Cancellation”.

M. Table 5(e). Summary information on retirement

42. In table 5(e), Annex I Parties shall provide summary information on retirement to facilitate the compliance assessment at the end of the additional period for fulfilling commitments.

43. For the reported year, each Party included in Annex I shall report under “Retirement”, the total quantities of Kyoto Protocol units, by type, retired in that year for the purpose of demonstrating its compliance with its commitment under Article 3, paragraph 1, of the Kyoto Protocol. These quantities should match those reported under “Retirement”, “Total”, in table 2(a).

44. For all years prior to the reported year, the Party included in Annex I shall repeat the information as reported in the previous SEF.

45. Under “Total”, each Party included in Annex I shall report the sum of each column.

N. Table 6. Memo item: Corrective transactions undertaken in the reported year

46. In tables 6(a) to 6(c), Annex I Parties shall report any corrective transactions undertaken in the reported year relating to previously reported years, including transactions to address a correction to the compilation and accounting database applied by the Compliance Committee, pursuant to paragraph 5(b) in chapter V of the annex to decision 27/CMP.1. It should be noted that quantities of Kyoto Protocol units reported here are included in the annual transactions reported in tables 2 and 3 and are reported in tables 6(a) to 6(c) as a memo item for the purpose of transparency. Parties shall provide explanations for these transactions in accompanying text, as required by paragraph 8 of section E of the guidelines for reporting under Article 7 of the Kyoto Protocol.

III. Standard electronic format tables

47. The SEF tables are not included in this document but can be downloaded from the UNFCCC website.¹¹

¹¹ <http://unfccc.int/national_reports/accounting_reporting_and_review_under_the_kyoto_protocol/items/7969.php>.

Annex III

Guidelines for the preparation of the information required under Article 7 of the Kyoto Protocol

1. For the purpose of the second commitment period, paragraph 11 of the annex to decision 15/CMP.1 shall not apply and Parties shall report Kyoto Protocol units in accordance with the standard electronic format and reporting instructions as contained in annex II.

2. For the purpose of the second commitment period, paragraph 18 of the annex to decision 15/CMP.1 shall be replaced with the following paragraph:

18. For the purpose of the second commitment period, each Party included in Annex I shall report the calculation of its commitment period reserve in accordance with the annex to decision 18/CP.7, decision 11/CMP.1 and paragraph 18 of decision 1/CMP.8.

3. For the purpose of the second commitment period, paragraph 19 of the annex to decision 15/CMP.1 shall be replaced with the following paragraph:

19. For the purpose of the second commitment period, each Party included in Annex I shall provide access, upon the request of expert review teams, to information held in the national registry relating to the holding accounts referred to in paragraph 21(b) of the annex to decision 13/CMP.1, and other types of accounts and transactions for the previous calendar year, that substantiates the supplementary information reported under paragraph 1 above and paragraph 12 of the annex to decision 15/CMP.1.

4. For the purpose of the second commitment period, the following paragraph shall be inserted after paragraph 24 of the annex to decision 15/CMP.1:

24 bis. Parties included in Annex I without quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments for the second commitment period shall continue to provide information relating to how they are striving, under Article 3, paragraph 14, of the Kyoto Protocol, to implement their commitments mentioned in Article 3, paragraph 1, of the Kyoto Protocol in such a way as to minimize adverse social, environmental and economic impacts on developing country Parties, particularly those identified in Article 4, paragraphs 8 and 9, of the Convention, in accordance with this decision.

*8th plenary meeting
10 December 2015*

Decision 4/CMP.11

Implications of the implementation of decisions 2/CMP.7 to 4/CMP.7 and 1/CMP.8 on the previous decisions on methodological issues related to the Kyoto Protocol, including those relating to Articles 5, 7 and 8 of the Kyoto Protocol, part II: implications related to review and adjustments and other related issues

The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol,

Recalling Articles 5, 7 and 8 of the Kyoto Protocol,

Also recalling decisions 2/CMP.6, 2/CMP.7, 3/CMP.7, 4/CMP.7, 1/CMP.8, 2/CMP.8 and 6/CMP.9,

Being aware of decisions 11/CMP.1, 13/CMP.1, 15/CMP.1, 16/CMP.1, 18/CMP.1, 19/CMP.1, 20/CMP.1, 21/CMP.1, 22/CMP.1, 23/CMP.1, 24/CMP.1, 25/CMP.1, 27/CMP.1 and 8/CMP.5,

1. *Decides* that, for the purpose of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol and pending the entry into force of the Doha Amendment, contained in annex I to decision 1/CMP.8, any references in this decision to Annex A, Annex B, Article 3, paragraphs 1 bis, 1 ter, 1 quater, 7 bis, 7 ter, 8, 8 bis, 12 bis and 12 ter, and Article 4, paragraphs 2 and 3, unless otherwise specified, shall be understood as referring to those Articles and annexes as contained in the Doha Amendment, and that upon the entry into force of the Doha Amendment such references shall be read as references to the relevant Articles of the Kyoto Protocol as amended;

2. *Also decides* that, for the purpose of the second commitment period, decisions 20/CMP.1 and 22/CMP.1 shall apply *mutatis mutandis*, except where otherwise specified in decisions 1/CMP.8 and 2/CMP.8 and in this decision;

3. *Further decides* that, for the purpose of the second commitment period, the following changes shall apply to decisions 18/CMP.1, 19/CMP.1, 20/CMP.1 and 22/CMP.1:

(a) All references to Article 3, paragraphs 7 and 8, shall be read as references to Article 3, paragraphs 7 bis, 8 and 8 bis;

(b) All references to the *Revised 1996 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories* (hereinafter referred to as the Revised 1996 IPCC Guidelines) as elaborated by the *Good Practice Guidance and Uncertainty Management in National Greenhouse Gas Inventories* (hereinafter referred to as the IPCC good practice guidance), the IPCC Guidelines as elaborated by the IPCC good practice guidance, the IPCC Guidelines and any good practice guidance or the IPCC good practice guidance, shall be read as references to the *2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories* (hereinafter referred to as the 2006 IPCC Guidelines) as implemented through the “Guidelines for the preparation of national communications by Parties included in Annex I to the Convention, Part I: UNFCCC reporting guidelines on annual greenhouse gas inventories” and the *2013 Revised Supplementary Methods and Good Practice Guidance Arising from the Kyoto Protocol and the 2013 Supplement to the 2006 IPCC Guidelines for*

National Greenhouse Gas Inventories: Wetlands, as implemented in accordance with decisions 24/CP.19 and 6/CMP.9, except references in paragraph 1 of decision 20/CMP.1;

(c) All references to chapter 7 of the IPCC good practice guidance shall be read as references to chapter 4 of volume 1 of the 2006 IPCC Guidelines;

(d) All references to “source categories” shall be read as references to “categories”;

(e) All references to “initial review” shall be read as references to “review of the report to facilitate the calculation of the assigned amount”; except that in paragraph 125 of the annex to decision 22/CMP.1;

(f) All references to “industrial processes, solvent and other product use” shall be read as references to “industrial processes and product use”;

(g) All references to decision 13/CMP.1 shall be read as references to decision 13/CMP.1 in conjunction with decision 3/CMP.11, except those in paragraphs 2 and 5 of decision 22/CMP.1 and paragraphs 85(a) and (c), 86(a) and (c), 87(a), 89(a) and 92 of the annex to decision 22/CMP.1;

(h) All references to paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of the annex to decision 13/CMP.1 shall be read as references to paragraph 2 of and annex I to decision 2/CMP.8, except those in paragraphs 2 and 5 of decision 22/CMP.1;

(i) All references to activities under Article 3, paragraph 3, and elected activities under Article 3, paragraph 4, shall be read as references to activities under Article 3, paragraph 3, forest management under Article 3, paragraph 4, and any elected activities under Article 3, paragraph 4;

(j) All references to decision 16/CMP.1 shall be read as references to decision 2/CMP.7 and decision 6/CMP.9;

(k) Reference to “section I of the guidelines for the preparation of the information required under Article 7” in paragraphs 50(a) and 69 of the annex to decision 22/CMP.1 shall be read as reference to “the guidance included in annex II to decision 2/CMP.8 and in decision 6/CMP.9”;

(l) Reference to “section I.D, greenhouse gas inventory information, of the guidelines for the preparation of the information required under Article 7” in paragraph 51 of the annex to decision 22/CMP.1 shall be read as reference to “guidance included in annex II to decision 2/CMP.8 and in decision 6/CMP.9”;

(m) Reference to “section I.E of the annex to decision 15/CMP.1” in paragraphs 88(a) and 93 of the annex to decision 22/CMP.1 shall be read as a reference to “guidance included in section I.E of the annex to decision 15/CMP.1 and in annex III to decision 3/CMP.11”;

(n) References to “section 7.3.2.2 of the Good Practice Guidance and Uncertainty Management in National Greenhouse Gas Inventories and section 5.6 of the Good Practice Guidance for Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry” shall be read as references to “section 5.3 of Chapter 5 of volume 1 of the 2006 IPCC Guidelines”;

(o) References to “paragraph 21 of the annex to decision 16/CMP.1” shall be read as references to “paragraph 26 of the annex to decision 2/CMP.7”;

(p) Reference to “IPCC good practice guidance (chapter 7, section 7.2)” in paragraph 14(a) of the annex to decision 19/CMP.1 shall be read as reference to “chapter 4.3, volume 1, of the 2006 IPCC Guidelines”;

(q) For the purpose of the second commitment period, all references to decision 15/CMP.1 in part III of the annex to decision 22/CMP.1 shall be read as references to decision 15/CMP.1 in conjunction with annex III to decision 3/CMP.11;

(r) References to “as reported in accordance with paragraph 6 of the annex to decision 13/CMP.1” in paragraph 85(a) of the annex to decision 22/CMP.1 shall be read as references to “as submitted through the report to facilitate the calculation of the assigned amount of each Party included in Annex I with a commitment inscribed in the third column of Annex B to the Doha Amendment in accordance with paragraph 2 of decision 2/CMP.8”;

(s) The definition of key source category in paragraph 3(d) of decision 19/CMP.1 shall be read as “Key category is one that is prioritized within the national inventory because its estimate has a significant influence on a country’s total inventory of greenhouse gases in terms of the absolute level of emissions, the trend in emissions and removals, or uncertainty in emissions or removals. Whenever the term key category is used, it includes both source and sink categories”;

4. *Adopts* the revisions to the “Guidelines for review under Article 8 of the Kyoto Protocol” for the second commitment period contained in annex I;

5. *Also adopts* the revisions to the “Good practice guidance and adjustments under Article 5, paragraph 2, of the Kyoto Protocol” for the second commitment period set out in annex II;

6. *Clarifies* that for the purpose of the second commitment period, the adjustments referred to in paragraph 5 above are not applicable to the Parties included in Annex I without quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments for the second commitment period;

7. *Requests* the secretariat, in view of the revision of the “Guidelines for review under Article 8 of the Kyoto Protocol”, to modify the relevant information technology tools, as needed, so as to support the implementation of the review process;

8. *Recognizes* that the deadline of June 2014, set out in decision 6/CMP.9, paragraph 4, for providing the upgraded CRF Reporter to Parties in order to enable them to submit their inventories, was not met;

9. *Notes* that the December 2014 software version of the CRF Reporter was not functioning¹ in such a manner as to enable Annex I Parties to prepare their inventory submissions;

10. *Reiterates* that in 2015, Annex I Parties may submit their common reporting format tables after 15 April, but no later than the corresponding delay in CRF Reporter availability;

11. *Notes* that a delay in the submission of the common reporting format tables by a Party also delays the submission of the report to facilitate the calculation of its assigned amount referred to in decision 2/CMP.8, paragraph 2;

12. *Acknowledges* that Annex I Parties may submit the report to facilitate the calculation of the assigned amount referred to in paragraph 11 above and make the annual inventory submission after 15 April, but no later than the corresponding delay in CRF Reporter availability;

¹ Functioning software means that the data on greenhouse gas emissions/removals are reported accurately both in terms of CRF tables and Extensible Markup Language format.

13. *Urges* Annex I Parties to submit the report to facilitate the calculation of the assigned amount referred to in decision 2/CMP.8, paragraph 2, as soon as practically possible.

Annex I

Revisions to the guidelines for review under Article 8 of the Kyoto Protocol

I. General approach to review

1. For the purpose of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, footnote 1 to the title of the annex to decision 22/CMP.1 shall be replaced by the following footnote: “Article” in these guidelines refers to an Article of the Kyoto Protocol or an Article in the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol (annex I to decision 1/CMP.8), unless otherwise specified.
2. For the purpose of the second commitment period, footnotes 5 and 6 of the annex to decision 22/CMP.1 shall not apply.

II. Review of report to facilitate the calculation of the assigned amount pursuant to Article 3, paragraphs 7 bis, 8 and 8 bis

3. For the purpose of the second commitment period, paragraphs 11 and 12 of the annex to decision 22/CMP.1 shall be replaced by the following:
 11. Each Party included in Annex I with a commitment inscribed in the third column of the table contained in Annex B to the Doha Amendment shall be subject to a review of the report to facilitate the calculation of its assigned amount pursuant to paragraph 2 of decision 2/CMP.8 for the second commitment period together with the inventory submission for the first year of the second commitment period.
 12. The expert review team shall review the following information contained or referenced in the report to facilitate the calculation of the assigned amount referred to in paragraph 2 of decision 2/CMP.8:
 - (a) The calculation of the assigned amount pursuant to Article 3, paragraphs 7 bis, 8 and 8 bis, in accordance with paragraph 2 of annex I to decision 3/CMP.11, and the calculation of the commitment period reserve, for conformity with the modalities for the accounting of assigned amounts under Article 7, paragraph 4 of the Kyoto Protocol, in accordance with the procedures contained in part III of these guidelines;¹
 - (b) The information provided in accordance with paragraphs 1(f) to 1(k) in annex I to decision 2/CMP.8 related to the accounting of activities under Article 3, paragraphs 3 and 4, of the Kyoto Protocol;
 - (c) With regard to Parties included in Annex I with a commitment inscribed in the third column of the table contained in Annex B to the Doha Amendment which did not have a quantified emission limitation and reduction target in the first commitment period:
 - (i) The national system pursuant to Article 5, paragraph 1, in accordance with the procedures contained in part IV of these guidelines;

¹ References to “these guidelines” hereinafter shall be understood as referring to the guidelines contained in the annex to decision 22/CMP.1, as amended by the current decision.

- (ii) The national registry pursuant to Article 7, paragraph 4, in accordance with the procedures contained in part V of these guidelines;
- (d) This review shall replace the review of the same elements in the annual inventory review conducted in conjunction with this review. For Parties that have reached an agreement to fulfil their commitments under Article 3 jointly, in accordance with Article 4, the completeness of information referred to in paragraph 11 of decision 3/CMP.11.
- 4. Paragraph 14 of the annex to decision 22/CMP.1 shall be replaced by the following:

14. For Parties included in Annex I with a commitment inscribed in the third column of the table contained in Annex B to the Doha Amendment which did not have a quantified emission limitation and reduction target in the first commitment period, the review of the report to facilitate the calculation of the assigned amount for the second commitment period shall be conducted as an in-country visit. For other Parties included in Annex I the review shall be conducted either as a centralized review or as an in-country visit, giving priority to in-country visits for those Parties that have not been reviewed in such a way in recent years.

III. Annual review of national systems and national registries

- 5. For the purpose of the second commitment period, paragraph 15(b)(iii) and (iv) of the annex to decision 22/CMP.1 shall be replaced by the following:
 - 15(b)(iii) Information provided on national systems or changes thereof in accordance with the procedures contained in part IV of these guidelines;
 - 15(b)(iv) Information provided on national registries or changes thereto in accordance with the procedures contained in part V of these guidelines.
- 6. For the purpose of the second commitment period, the following paragraph shall be inserted after paragraph 15(b)(iv) of the annex to decision 22/CMP.1:

15(b)(iv) bis. When a Party included in Annex I without a quantified emission limitation and reduction commitment for the second commitment period reports information on its national registry in accordance with decision 15/CMP.1, that information shall be reviewed.
- 7. Paragraph 17 of the annex to decision 22/CMP.1 shall not apply for the purpose of the second commitment period.
- 8. For the purpose of the second commitment period, paragraph 97 of the annex to decision 22/CMP.1 shall be replaced by the following:

97. The review of the national system shall be conducted in conjunction with the annual inventory review.

IV. Annual review of standard independent assessment reports

- 9. For the purpose of the second commitment period, paragraph 86(b)(ii) and (iii) of the annex to decision 22/CMP.1 shall be replaced by the following:

86(b)(ii) Standard independent assessment reports (SIARs) prepared by the secretariat, including information of any discrepancies or non-replacements indicated by these reports;

86(b)(iii) Information contained in the national registry that substantiates or clarifies the issues raised in the SIAR, if the SIAR prepared by the secretariat indicates any issues related to accounting, transactions, and reporting of units under the Kyoto Protocol. In such cases Parties included in Annex I shall provide the expert review team with effective access to their national registry during the review. The relevant parts of paragraphs 9 and 10 of part I of these guidelines shall also apply to this information.

10. For the purpose of the second commitment period, the reference in paragraph 87(c) of the annex to decision 22/CMP.1 shall be updated as follows:

87(c) The calculation of the required level of the commitment period reserve is in accordance with decision 3/CMP.11.

11. For the purpose of the second commitment period, paragraph 88(b) of the annex to decision 22/CMP.1 shall be replaced by the following:

88(b) The information contained in the SIAR identifies any issues related to accounting, transactions and reporting of units under the Kyoto Protocol, whether these issues still exist and whether recommendations from previous reviews have been implemented by the Party.

12. Paragraph 88(c–g) and (i) of the annex to decision 22/CMP.1 shall not apply for the purpose of the second commitment period.

13. For the purpose of the second commitment period, paragraph 88(h) of the annex to decision 22/CMP.1 shall be replaced by the following:

88(h) The required level of the commitment period reserve as reported, is calculated in accordance with decision 3/CMP.11.

14. For the purpose of the second commitment period, paragraph 88(j)(v) of the annex to decision 22/CMP.1 shall be replaced by the following:

88(j)(v) Assess whether any discrepancy has been identified in the SIAR by the transaction log relating to transactions initiated by the Party, and if so the expert review team shall:

- (i) Examine the cause of the discrepancy and whether the Party or Parties has or have corrected the problem that caused the discrepancy;
- (ii) Assess whether the problem that caused the discrepancy relates to the capacity of the national registry to ensure the accurate accounting, issuance, holding, transfer, acquisition, cancellation and retirement of ERUs, CERs, tCERs, ICERs, AAUs and RMUs, the replacement of tCERs and ICERs, and the carry-over of ERUs, CERs and AAUs, and if so, initiate a thorough review of the registry system in accordance with part V of these guidelines.

15. For the purpose of the second commitment period, paragraph 88(k) of the annex to decision 22/CMP.1 shall be replaced by the following:

88(k) Any non-replacement of units has been identified in the SIAR, and if so the expert review team shall:

- (i) Examine the cause of the non-replacement and whether the Party has corrected the problem that caused the non-replacement;
- (ii) Assess whether the problem that caused the non-replacement relates to the capacity of the national registry to ensure the accurate accounting, holding, transfer, acquisition, cancellation, and retirement of ERUs, CERs, tCERs, ICERs, AAUs and RMUs, and the replacement of tCERs and ICERs,

and if so, initiate a thorough review of the registry system in accordance with part V of these guidelines.

V. Consistency with the revised review guidelines under the Convention

16. For the purpose of the second commitment period, paragraphs 55–57 of the annex to decision 22/CMP.1 shall not apply and paragraph 52 shall be replaced by the following paragraph:

52. Related to the organization of the inventory review in different phases and the scheduling of desk, centralized and in-country reviews, the same provisions as agreed in the “UNFCCC guidelines for the technical review of greenhouse gas inventories from Parties included in Annex I to the Convention” contained in the annex to decision 13/CP.20 shall apply.

17. For the purpose of the second commitment period, paragraph 59 shall not apply and the following paragraph shall replace paragraph 60 of the annex to decision 22/CMP.1:

60. The initial check shall be conducted consistent with the initial assessment included in part III of the “UNFCCC guidelines for the technical review of greenhouse gas inventories from Parties included in Annex I to the Convention” contained in the annex to decision 13/CP.20. The initial check shall in addition cover whether:

(a) A Party included in Annex I to the Convention has failed to include an estimate for a source category (as defined in chapter 4 of volume 1 of the 2006 IPCC Guidelines) that individually accounted for 7 per cent or more of the Party’s aggregate emissions, defined as the aggregated submitted emissions of the gases from the sources listed in Annex A to the Kyoto Protocol as contained in the Doha Amendment, in the most recent of the Party’s reviewed inventories in which the source was estimated;

(b) An Annex I Party has failed to provide supplementary information in accordance with Annex II to decision 2/CMP.8 and decision 6/CMP.9.

18. For the purpose of the second commitment period, paragraphs 61–63 of the annex to decision 22/CMP.1 shall be replaced by the following:

61. For the scope of the individual review, the same provisions as included in the “UNFCCC guidelines for the technical review of greenhouse gas inventories from Parties included in Annex I to the Convention”, contained in the annex to decision 13/CP.20, shall apply.

19. For the purpose of the second commitment period, paragraphs 65–67 of the annex to decision 22/CMP.1 shall be replaced by the following:

65. For the scope of the individual review, the same provisions as those included in the “UNFCCC Guidelines for the technical review of greenhouse gas inventories from Parties included in Annex I to the Convention” included in the annex to decision 13/CP.20 shall apply. In addition, the inventory review shall:

(a) Examine the application of the requirement of the 2006 *IPCC Guidelines, the 2013 Revised Supplementary Methods and Good Practice Guidance Arising from the Kyoto Protocol and the Wetlands Supplement* as adopted by the COP/MOP and the “UNFCCC Guidelines for the technical review of greenhouse gas inventories from Parties included in Annex I to the Convention” contained in the annex to

decision 13/CP.20 and relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties on those requirements, and identify any divergence from these requirements;

(b) Assess whether the functions of the national system have been established to facilitate the continuous improvement of the greenhouse gas inventory and whether Quality Assurance/Quality Control procedures in accordance with guidelines for national systems in accordance with decision 19/CMP.1 have been implemented;

(c) Assess the completeness and transparency of supplementary information in accordance with reporting under Article 7 of the Kyoto Protocol;

(d) Assess whether the supplementary information reported for activities under Article 3, paragraph 3, forest management under Article 3, paragraph 4, and any elected activities under Article 3, paragraph 4, of the Kyoto Protocol has been estimated, reported and accounted in line with 2013 Revised Supplementary Methods and Good Practice Guidance Arising from the Kyoto Protocol, decision 2/CMP.7, annex II to decision 2/CMP.8 and decision 6/CMP.9.

20. For the purpose of the second commitment period, paragraph 69(d)(i) of the annex to decision 22/CMP.1 shall be read as “Gaps in the inventory estimates for source categories or gases for which methods are provided in the IPCC guidelines and the Wetlands Supplement, for Parties that have elected to account for wetland drainage and rewetting”.

Annex II

Revisions to the good practice guidance and adjustments under Article 5, paragraph 2, of the Kyoto Protocol

1. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of decision 20/CMP.1 shall not apply for the purpose of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol.

2. For the purpose of the second commitment period, paragraph 11 of decision 20/CMP.1 shall be replaced by the following:

11. *Decides* that an Annex I Party may submit a revised estimate for a part of its inventory of a year of the commitment period to which an adjustment was previously applied, provided that the revised estimate is submitted, at the latest, in conjunction with the inventory for the final year of the commitment period. Subject to a review under Article 8 and the acceptance of the revised estimate by the expert review team, the revised estimate shall replace the adjusted estimate. In the event of a disagreement between the Annex I Party and the expert review team regarding the revised estimate, the issue will be forwarded to the Compliance Committee, which will resolve the disagreement in accordance with the procedures and mechanisms on compliance. The option for an Annex I Party to submit a revised estimate for a part of its inventory to which an adjustment was previously applied should not prevent Annex I Parties from making their best efforts to correct the problem at the time it was initially identified and in accordance with the time frame set forth in the guidelines for review under Article 8.

3. For the purpose of the second commitment period, the following paragraph shall be inserted after paragraph 11 of decision 20/CMP.1:

12. *Decides* that Parties included in Annex I without quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments for the second commitment period may submit a revised estimate for a part of their inventory or a single year during the review process, noting that the application of the adjustments is not applicable to such Parties. Subject to a review under Article 8 of the Kyoto Protocol and the acceptance of the revised estimate by the expert review team, the revised estimate shall replace the previous estimate. The option for a Party to submit a revised estimate for a part of its inventory should not prevent such a Party from making its best efforts to correct the problem at the time it was initially identified and in accordance with the time frame set forth in the guidelines for review under Article 8 of the Kyoto Protocol.

I. Technical guidance on methodologies for adjustments under Article 5, paragraph 2, of the Kyoto Protocol

4. Footnote 3 in paragraph 4 of the annex to decision 20/CMP.1 shall not apply for the purpose of the second commitment period.

5. For the purpose of the second commitment period, paragraph 13(c) of the annex to decision 20/CMP.1 shall be replaced by the following:

13(c) For cropland management, grazing land management, revegetation and wetland drainage and rewetting under Article 3, paragraph 4, any adjustment to the emissions or removals in the base year resulting from these activities should be considered and applied according to the choice made by a Party regarding the

periodicity of accounting of these activities (e.g. annually or at the end of the commitment period). In the case that the Party has chosen to account annually for these activities and submits recalculated estimates, adjustments may be applied retroactively for the base year, provided these recalculated estimates have not yet been subject to review and the provisions of paragraph 4 above apply to these recalculated estimates.

6. For the purpose of the second commitment period, the following paragraph shall be inserted after paragraph 13 of the annex to decision 20/CMP.1:

13 bis. Adjustments shall be applied to technical corrections to forest management reference levels when the reported data on forest management or forest land remaining forest land used to establish the reference level are recalculated, and the recalculations have not resulted in a technical correction to the reference level which ensures methodological consistency between the corrected forest management reference level and the reported estimates for forest management. The methods and conservativeness factors shall be applied to adjustments to technical corrections for forest management using the guidance in the attachment. When an adjustment to a forest management emission/removals estimate also results in an adjustment to the technical correction, conservativeness factors should not be applied to the technical correction.

7. For the purpose of the second commitment period, paragraph 17 of the annex to decision 20/CMP.1 shall be replaced by the following:

17. If the expert review team finds that an estimate submitted by a Party leads to an underestimation of emissions or overestimation of removals in the base year or in the forest management reference level after any technical correction, or an overestimation of emissions or underestimation of removals in a year of the commitment period or forest management reference level after any technical correction, an adjustment calculated in accordance with paragraph 54 below should not be applied.

8. For the purpose of the second commitment period, paragraph 18 of the annex to decision 20/CMP.1 shall be replaced by the following:

18. Similarly, if the expert review team finds that an estimate submitted by a Party leads to an underestimation of removals resulting from any activity under Article 3, paragraph 3, or any elected activity under Article 3, paragraph 4, in a year of the commitment period, or an overestimation of removals in the base year for any elected activity under Article 3, paragraph 4 (cropland management, grazing land management, revegetation and wetland drainage and rewetting), the adjustment calculated in accordance with paragraph 54 below should not be applied if such a calculation would result in an adjusted estimate that is less conservative than the original estimate submitted by the Party.

9. Reference to “paragraph 21 of the annex to decision 16/CMP.1” in paragraph 21 of the annex to decision 20/CMP.1 shall be read as a reference to “paragraph 26 of the annex to decision 2/CMP.7”.

10. For the purpose of the second commitment period, paragraph 28 of the annex to decision 20/CMP.1 shall be replaced by the following:

28. In the case where none of the basic adjustment methods listed in table 1 is suitable for a given adjustment case, expert review teams may use other adjustment methods. If adjustment methods other than those included in this technical guidance are applied, expert review teams should report the reason for not using any of the

basic adjustment methods of this technical guidance and should justify why they consider the method chosen as appropriate.

11. For the purpose of the second commitment period, paragraph 34(a) of the annex to decision 20/CMP.1 shall be replaced by the following, including the additional footnote:

34(a) IPCC default values from the 2006 *IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories* (hereinafter referred to as the 2006 IPCC Guidelines), the 2013 *Revised Supplementary Methods and Good Practice Guidance Arising from the Kyoto Protocol* and the 2013 *Supplement to the 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories: Wetlands* (hereinafter referred to as the Wetlands Supplement),¹ or other recommended international data sources included in the inventory review resources listed in appendix I to that document, and consistent with the IPCC good practice guidance. If emission factors or other inventory parameters from other international data sources are used, the expert review team should, in the review report, justify and document the reasons for their use.

12. For the purpose of the second commitment period, paragraph 38 of the annex to decision 20/CMP.1 shall be replaced by the following:

38. When using an average inventory parameter from a cluster of countries, assumptions made in choosing the cluster should be documented, as should how the given inventory average parameter compares with the default parameter or range provided in the 2006 *IPCC Guidelines*, the 2013 *Revised Supplementary Methods and Good Practice Guidance Arising from the Kyoto Protocol* and the *Wetlands Supplement*, as applicable, where available. Similarly, when clustering is related to the use of a driver (application of an average driver-based emission or removal rate) from a cluster of countries, assumptions made for the composition of the cluster and the established relationship with the driver should be documented.

13. For the purpose of the second commitment period, paragraph 42 of the annex to decision 20/CMP.1 shall be replaced by the following:

42. This basic adjustment method refers to tier 1 methods in the 2006 *IPCC Guidelines*, the 2013 *Revised Supplementary Methods and Good Practice Guidance Arising from the Kyoto Protocol* and the *Wetlands Supplement*. The Wetlands Supplement should be consulted only in cases where the Party has elected the activity wetland drainage and rewetting and in cases where the Party applies methods from the Wetlands Supplement on a voluntary basis. This adjustment method will be applicable only if activity data are available from national sources in accordance with paragraph 29 above or from international data sources as described in paragraph 31 above, or are obtained as described in paragraph 33 above. An emission factor or other inventory parameter as required by the method and obtained as described in paragraph 34 above should be used.

14. Paragraphs 61, 64, 68, and 74 of the annex to decision 20/CMP.1 shall not apply for the purpose of the second commitment period.

15. For the purpose of the second commitment period, paragraph 63 of the annex to decision 20/CMP.1 shall be replaced by the following paragraph:

63. If adjusting hydrofluorocarbon (HFC), perfluorocarbon (PFC), nitrogen trifluoride (NF₃) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF₆) estimates from the consumption of halocarbons, NF₃ and SF₆, consideration should be given to the uncertainty of sales

¹ When wetland drainage and rewetting has been elected, the Wetlands Supplement should have the highest order of preference for applicable categories.

figures (e.g. for sales of these chemicals to the foam blowing industry) and other parameters (such as the composition of the mix in coolants) as given in the 2006 IPCC Guidelines.

16. For the purpose of the second commitment period, paragraph 69 of the annex to decision 20/CMP.1 shall be replaced by the following:

69. Estimates of emissions and removals in the LULUCF sector and from LULUCF activities may be based not on annual data but on extrapolations and may be recalculated at a later stage. For this reason, the application of an adjustment to the base year of cropland management, grazing land management, revegetation and wetland drainage and rewetting through an extrapolation should be done with care, given that data may not be reported for the years between the base year and the commitment period. If an extrapolation is needed for the base year of these activities, the expert review team could use as a driver the time series for the LULUCF sector included in the annual inventory submission under the Convention.

17. For the purpose of the second commitment period, paragraph 1(a) of appendix III to the annex to decision 20/CMP.1 shall be replaced by the following:

1(a) For Annex A sources, one for use in the calculation of adjustments for an base year emission estimate and a commitment period recovery estimate (e.g. landfill gas recovery) and one for the calculation of adjustments of emissions for a year of the commitment period and base year's recovery estimates.

18. For the purpose of the second commitment period, paragraph 3 of appendix III to the annex to decision 20/CMP.1 shall be replaced by the following:

3. When a given category is not covered in the table, the provision of paragraph 55 of the technical guidance applies, such as for categories "other" under energy, industrial processes and other product use, agriculture, LULUCF and waste.

II. Procedures for adjustments under Article 5, paragraph 2, of the Kyoto Protocol

19. For the purpose of the second commitment period, paragraph 80(b) of the annex to decision 22/CMP.1 shall be replaced by the following:

80(b) The adjustment procedure should only commence after the Party has had an opportunity to correct a problem and if the expert review team finds that the Party has not adequately corrected the problem through the provision of an acceptable revised estimate, within the time frames set out in paragraphs 74 and 76 above and if the expert review team assumes that the change resulting from the adjustment will be above the threshold given in paragraph 37 of the annex to decision 24/CP.19.

III. Tables of conservativeness factors

20. For the purpose of the second commitment period, tables 1 to 4b in appendix III to the annex to decision 20/CMP.1 shall be replaced by the tables in the appendix.

Appendix

Tables of conservativeness factors

Table 1

Conservativeness factors for adjustments to emission estimates in the base year or recovery estimates in the commitment period (for sources in Annex A to the Kyoto Protocol)

	Emission factors							Activity data	Emission estimates						
	CO ₂	CH ₄	N ₂ O	HFCs	PFCs	SF ₆	NF ₃		CO ₂	CH ₄	N ₂ O	HFCs	PFCs	SF ₆	NF ₃
1. Energy															
A. Fuel combustion (sectoral approach)															
1. Energy industries	0.98	0.82	0.73					0.98	0.94	0.82	0.73				
2. Manufacturing industries and construction	0.98	0.82	0.73					0.94	0.94	0.73	0.73				
3.a Domestic aviation and navigation	0.98	0.89	0.82					0.82	0.82	0.73	0.73				
3.b-c Road transport and railways	0.98	0.89	0.82					0.94	0.94	0.89	0.73				
4. Other sectors	0.98	0.82	0.73					0.94	0.94	0.73	0.73				
5. Other	0.98	0.82	0.73					0.82	0.94	0.73	0.73				
Biomass (all fuel combustion sources)		0.82	0.82					0.82		0.73	0.73				
Off-road vehicles	0.98	0.73	0.73					0.89	0.82	0.73	0.73				
Fuel combustion (reference approach)	0.98							0.98	0.98						
B. Fugitive emissions from fuels															
1. Solid fuels	0.73	0.73						0.98	0.73	0.73					
2. Oil and natural gas	0.73	0.73	0.73					0.98	0.73	0.73	0.73				
C. CO ₂ Transport and storage	0.82							0.98	0.73						
2. Industrial processes and product use															
A. Mineral industry	0.94							0.94	0.94						
B. Chemical industry	0.98	0.73	0.89	0.89	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.94	0.94	0.73	0.89	0.89	0.73	0.73	0.73
C. Metal industry	0.98	0.82		0.98	0.82	0.82		0.98	0.94	0.73		0.94	0.82	0.82	
D. Non-energy products from fuels and solvent use	0.89							0.94	0.82						
E. Electronics industry					0.73	0.73	0.73	0.94					0.73	0.73	0.73
F. Product uses as substitutes for ozone depleting substances				0.82	0.82			0.82				0.82	0.82		
G. Other product manufacture and use			0.98		0.89	0.89		0.89			0.94		0.82	0.82	
H. Other															
3. Agriculture															
A. Enteric fermentation		0.89						0.98		0.89					
B. Manure management		0.89	0.82					0.98		0.89	0.82				
C. Rice cultivation		0.89						0.94		0.89					
D. Agricultural soils			0.73					0.82			0.73				
E. Prescribed burning of savannas		0.94	0.94					0.82		0.82	0.82				
F. Field burning of agricultural residues		0.94	0.94					0.82		0.82	0.82				
G. Liming	0.98							0.94	0.94						
H. Urea application	0.89							0.94	0.82						
I. Other															
5. Waste															
A. Solid waste disposal	0.89	0.89						0.82		0.73					
B. Biological treatment of solid waste		0.73	0.73					0.94		0.73	0.73				
C. Incineration and open burning of waste	0.89	0.82	0.89					0.82	0.73	0.73	0.73				
D. Wastewater treatment and discharge		0.89	0.89					0.98		0.82	0.82				
E. Other															

Table 2

Conservativeness factors for adjustments to emission estimates in the commitment year or recovery estimates in the base year (for sources in Annex A to the Kyoto Protocol)

	Emission factors							Activity data	Emission estimates						
	CO2	CH4	N2O	HFCs	PFCs	SF6	NF3		CO2	CH4	N2O	HFCs	PFCs	SF6	NF3
1. Energy															
A. Fuel combustion (sectoral approach)															
1. Energy industries	1.02	1.21	1.37					1.02	1.06	1.21	1.37				
2. Manufacturing industries and construction	1.02	1.21	1.37					1.06	1.06	1.37	1.37				
3.a Domestic aviation and navigation	1.02	1.12	1.21					1.21	1.21	1.37	1.37				
3.b-c Road transport and railways	1.02	1.12	1.21					1.06	1.06	1.12	1.37				
4. Other sectors	1.02	1.21	1.37					1.06	1.06	1.37	1.37				
5. Other	1.02	1.21	1.37					1.21	1.06	1.37	1.37				
Biomass (all fuel combustion sources)		1.21	1.21					1.21		1.37	1.37				
Off-road vehicles	1.02	1.37	1.37					1.12	1.21	1.37	1.37				
Fuel combustion (reference approach)	1.02							1.02	1.02						
B. Fugitive emissions from fuels															
1. Solid fuels	1.37	1.37						1.02	1.37	1.37					
2. Oil and natural gas	1.37	1.37	1.37					1.02	1.37	1.37	1.37				
C. CO ₂ Transport and storage	1.21							1.02	1.37						
2. Industrial processes and product use															
A. Mineral industry	1.06							1.06	1.06						
B. Chemical industry	1.02	1.37	1.12	1.12	1.21	1.21	1.21	1.06	1.06	1.37	1.12	1.12	1.37	1.37	1.37
C. Metal industry	1.02	1.21		1.02	1.21	1.21		1.02	1.06	1.37		1.06	1.21	1.21	
D. Non-energy products from fuels and solvent use	1.12							1.06	1.21						
E. Electronics industry					1.37	1.37	1.37	1.06					1.37	1.37	1.37
F. Product uses as substitutes for Ozone Depleting Substances				1.21	1.21			1.21				1.21	1.21		
G. Other product manufacture and use			1.02		1.12	1.12		1.12			1.06		1.21	1.21	
H. Other															
3. Agriculture															
A. Enteric fermentation		1.12						1.02		1.12					
B. Manure management		1.12	1.21					1.02		1.12	1.21				
C. Rice cultivation		1.12						1.06		1.12					
D. Agricultural soils			1.37					1.21			1.37				
E. Prescribed burning of savannas		1.06	1.06					1.21		1.21	1.21				
F. Field burning of agricultural residues		1.06	1.06					1.21		1.21	1.21				
G. Liming	1.02							1.06	1.06						
H. Urea application	1.12							1.06	1.21						
I. Other															
5. Waste															
A. Solid waste disposal	1.12	1.12						1.21		1.37					
B. Biological treatment of solid waste		1.37	1.37					1.06		1.37	1.37				
C. Incineration and open burning of waste	1.12	1.21	1.12					1.21	1.37	1.37	1.37				
D. Wastewater treatment and discharge		1.12	1.12					1.02		1.21	1.21				
E. Other															

Table 3

Conservativeness factors for net emissions for adjustments to the land use, land-use change and forestry sector during the initial review for the purpose of establishing a Party's assigned amount under Article 3, paragraphs 7 and 8, of the Kyoto Protocol^a

	Emission factors							Activity data	Emission estimates						
	CO ₂	CH ₄	N ₂ O	HFCs	PFCs	SF ₆	NF ₃		CO ₂	CH ₄	N ₂ O	HFCs	PFCs	SF ₆	NF ₃
4. Land use, land-use change and forestry															
A.1. Forest land remaining forest land															
Carbon stock change in living biomass	0.89							0.98	0.89						
Carbon stock change in dead wood	0.73							0.98	0.73						
Carbon stock change in litter	0.82							0.98	0.82						
Net carbon stock change in soils: mineral soils	0.82							0.98	0.82						
Net carbon stock change in soils: organic soils ^b	0.73							0.94	0.73						
A.2. Land converted to forest land															
Carbon stock change in living biomass	0.89							0.94	0.89						
Carbon stock change in dead wood	0.73							0.94	0.73						
Carbon stock change in litter	0.82							0.94	0.82						
Net carbon stock change in soils: mineral soils	0.82							0.94	0.82						
Net carbon stock change in soils: organic soils	0.73							0.94	0.73						
B.1. Cropland land remaining cropland															
Carbon stock change in living biomass	0.82							0.98	0.82						
Carbon stock change in dead organic matter	0.73							0.98	0.73						
Carbon stock change in litter	0.82							0.98	0.82						
Net carbon stock change in soils: mineral soils	0.82							0.98	0.82						
Net carbon stock change in soils: organic soils ^b	0.82							0.94	0.82						
B.2. Land converted to crop land															
Carbon stock change in living biomass	0.82							0.94	0.82						
Carbon stock change in dead wood	0.73							0.94	0.73						
Carbon stock change in litter	0.82							0.94	0.82						
Net carbon stock change in soils: mineral soils	0.82							0.94	0.82						
Net carbon stock change in soils: organic soils ^b	0.82							0.94	0.82						
C.1. Grassland remaining grass land															
Carbon stock change in living biomass															
(Root-to-shoot ratio)	0.73							0.98	0.73						
(All other parameters)	0.82							0.98	0.82						
Carbon stock change in dead organic matter	0.73							0.98	0.73						
Carbon stock change in litter	0.82							0.98	0.82						
Net carbon stock change in soils: mineral soils	0.82							0.98	0.82						
Net carbon stock change in soils: organic soils ^b	0.82							0.94	0.82						
C.2. Land converted to grassland															
Carbon stock change in living biomass															
(Root-to-shoot ratio)	0.73							0.94	0.73						
(All other parameters)	0.82							0.94	0.82						
Carbon stock change in dead organic matter	0.73							0.94	0.73						
Carbon stock change in litter	0.82							0.94	0.82						
Net carbon stock change in soils: mineral soils	0.82							0.94	0.82						
Net carbon stock change in soils: organic soils ^b	0.82							0.94	0.82						

	Emission factors							Activity data	Emission estimates						
	CO ₂	CH ₄	N ₂ O	HFCs	PFCs	SF ₆	NF ₃		CO ₂	CH ₄	N ₂ O	HFCs	PFCs	SF ₆	NF ₃
D.1. Wetlands remaining wetlands															
D.1.1 Peat extraction remaining peat extraction															
Carbon stock change in dead organic matter	0.73							0.82	0.73						
Carbon stock change in litter	0.73							0.82	0.73						
Net carbon stock change in soils: mineral soils	0.73		0.89					0.82	0.73		0.73				
Net carbon stock change in soils: organic soils	0.73		0.89					0.82	0.73		0.73				
D.1.2 Flooded land remaining flooded land ^d															
D.2. Land converted to wetlands															
Carbon stock change in living biomass	0.73							0.94	0.73						
Carbon stock change in dead organic matter	0.73							0.94	0.73						
Carbon stock change in litter	0.73							0.94	0.73						
Net carbon stock change in soils: mineral soils	0.73							0.94	0.73						
Net carbon stock change in soils: organic soils	0.73							0.94	0.73						
D.2.1 Lands converted to peat extraction															
Carbon stock change in living biomass	0.73							0.82	0.73						
Carbon stock change in dead organic matter	0.73							0.82	0.73						
Carbon stock change in litter	0.73							0.82	0.73						
Net carbon stock change in soils: mineral soils	0.73		0.89					0.82	0.73		0.73				
Net carbon stock change in soils: organic soils	0.73		0.89					0.82	0.73		0.73				
D.2.2 Land converted to flooded land															
Carbon stock change in living biomass	0.82							0.89	0.82						
Carbon stock change in dead organic matter	NA							0.89							
Carbon stock change in litter	NA							0.89							
Net carbon stock change in soils: mineral soils	NA							0.89							
Net carbon stock change in soils: organic soils	NA							0.89							
E.1. Settlements remaining settlements															
Carbon stock change in living biomass ^d	0.89							0.89	0.82						
Carbon stock change in dead organic matter	0.73							0.98	0.73						
Carbon stock change in litter	0.73							0.98	0.73						
Net carbon stock change in soils: mineral soils	0.82							0.98	0.82						
Net carbon stock change in soils: organic soils ^b	0.82							0.98	0.82						
E.2. Land converted to settlements															
Carbon stock change in living biomass ^d	0.89							0.89	0.82						
Carbon stock change in dead organic matter	0.73							0.98	0.73						
Carbon stock change in litter	0.73							0.98	0.73						
Net carbon stock change in soils: mineral soils	0.82							0.98	0.82						
Net carbon stock change in soils: organic soils ^b	0.82							0.94	0.82						
F.1. Other land remaining other land ^d															
F.2. Land converted to other land															
Carbon stock change in living biomass	0.89							0.89	0.82						
Carbon stock change in dead organic matter	0.73							0.94	0.73						
Carbon stock change in litter	0.73							0.94	0.73						
Net carbon stock change in soils: mineral soils	0.82							0.94	0.82						
Net carbon stock change in soils: organic soils ^b	0.82							0.94	0.82						
Cross-cutting categories															
Direct N ₂ O emissions from N inputs to managed soils			0.73					0.94			0.73				
Emissions and removals from drainage and rewetting and other management of organic and mineral soils															
Drained organic soils ^a	0.73	0.73	0.73					0.94	0.73	0.73	0.73				
Rewetted organic soils	0.73	0.73	NA					0.94	0.73	0.73					
Direct N ₂ O emissions from N mineralization/immobilization associated with loss/gain of soil organic matter			0.73					0.94			0.73				
Indirect N ₂ O emissions from managed soils			0.73					0.94			0.73				
Biomass burning	0.82	0.82	0.82					0.89	0.73	0.73	0.73				
Harvested wood products	0.89							0.89	0.82						

Note: Entries are marked "NA" because Parties are either not required to report this category in the greenhouse gas inventories or are not required to include it in their national totals.

Abbreviation: NA = Not applicable.

^a Net emissions include net decreases in carbon stocks in individual carbon pools.

^b In accordance with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) *2013 Supplement to the 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories: Wetlands* (chapter 2), the uncertainty for drained organic soils is 20 per cent, and conservativeness factors are 0.94. The uncertainty for carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions is higher than 150 per cent for drained and rewetted inland organic soils (conservativeness factors of 0.73) as presented in this table under “emissions and removals from drainage and rewetting”.

^c No methodologies are available in the 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories (hereinafter the 2006 IPCC Guidelines).

^d In accordance with the 2006 IPCC Guidelines, the activity data for this subcategory (living biomass) is not land area but crown area or number of trees depending on the methodology.

^e Information on CO₂ is also included here, although emissions/removals may be reported in the land use remaining in the same category and land converted to a new land use category.

Table 4

Conservativeness factors for net removals for adjustments to the land use, land-use change and forestry sector during the initial review for the purpose of establishing a Party's assigned amount under Article 3, paragraphs 7 and 8, of the Kyoto Protocol^a

	Emission factors							Activity data	Emission estimates						
	CO ₂	CH ₄	N ₂ O	HFCs	PFCs	SF ₆	NF ₃		CO ₂	CH ₄	N ₂ O	HFCs	PFCs	SF ₆	NF ₃
4. Land use, land-use change and forestry															
A.1. Forest land remaining forest land															
Carbon stock change in living biomass	1.12							1.02	1.12						
Carbon stock change in dead wood	1.37							1.02	1.37						
Carbon stock change in litter	1.21							1.02	1.21						
Net carbon stock change in soils: mineral soils	1.21							1.02	1.21						
Net carbon stock change in soils: organic soils ^b	1.37							1.06	1.37						
A.2. Land converted to forest land															
Carbon stock change in living biomass	1.12							1.06	1.12						
Carbon stock change in dead wood	1.37							1.06	1.37						
Carbon stock change in litter	1.21							1.06	1.21						
Net carbon stock change in soils: mineral soils	1.21							1.06	1.21						
Net carbon stock change in soils: organic soils	1.37							1.06	1.37						
B.1. Cropland land remaining cropland															
Carbon stock change in living biomass	1.21							1.02	1.21						
Carbon stock change in dead organic matter	1.37							1.02	1.37						
Carbon stock change in litter	1.21							1.02	1.21						
Net carbon stock change in soils: mineral soils	1.21							1.02	1.21						
Net carbon stock change in soils: organic soils ^b	1.21							1.06	1.21						
B.2. Land converted to crop land															
Carbon stock change in living biomass	1.21							1.06	1.21						
Carbon stock change in dead organic matter	1.37							1.06	1.37						
Carbon stock change in litter	1.21							1.06	1.21						
Net carbon stock change in soils: mineral soils	1.21							1.06	1.21						
Net carbon stock change in soils: organic soils ^b	1.21							1.06	1.21						
C.1. Grassland remaining grass land															
Carbon stock change in living biomass															
(Root-to-shoot ratio)	1.37							1.02	1.37						
(All other parameters)	1.21							1.02	1.21						
Carbon stock change in dead organic matter	1.37							1.02	1.37						
Carbon stock change in litter	1.21							1.02	1.21						
Net carbon stock change in soils: mineral soils	1.21							1.02	1.21						
Net carbon stock change in soils: organic soils ^b	1.21							1.06	1.21						
C.2. Land converted to grassland															
Carbon stock change in living biomass															
(Root-to-shoot ratio)	1.37							1.06	1.37						
(All other parameters)	1.21							1.06	1.21						
Carbon stock change in dead organic matter	1.37							1.06	1.37						
Carbon stock change in litter	1.21							1.06	1.21						
Net carbon stock change in soils: mineral soils	1.21							1.06	1.21						
Net carbon stock change in soils: organic soils ^b	1.21							1.06	1.21						

	Emission factors							Activity data	Emission estimates						
	CO ₂	CH ₄	N ₂ O	HFCs	PFCs	SF ₆	NF ₃		CO ₂	CH ₄	N ₂ O	HFCs	PFCs	SF ₆	NF ₃
D.1. Wetlands remaining wetlands															
D.1.1 Peat extraction remaining peat extraction															
Carbon stock change (carbon stock change) in dead organic matter	1.37							1.21	1.37						
Carbon stock change in litter	1.37							1.21	1.37						
Net carbon stock change in soils: mineral soils	1.37		1.12					1.21	1.37		1.37				
Net carbon stock change in soils: organic soils	1.37		1.12					1.21	1.37		1.37				
D.1.2 Flooded land remaining flooded land ^d															
D.2. Land converted to wetlands															
Carbon stock change in living biomass	1.37							1.06	1.37						
Carbon stock change in dead organic matter	1.37							1.06	1.37						
Carbon stock change in litter	1.37							1.06	1.37						
Net carbon stock change in soils: mineral soils	1.37							1.06	1.37						
Net carbon stock change in soils: organic soils	1.37							1.06	1.37						
D.2.1 Lands converted to peat extraction															
Carbon stock change in living biomass	1.37							1.21	1.37						
Carbon stock change in dead organic matter	1.37							1.21	1.37						
Carbon stock change in litter	1.37							1.21	1.37						
Net carbon stock change in soils: mineral soils	1.37		1.12					1.21	1.37		1.37				
Net carbon stock change in soils: organic soils	1.37		1.12					1.21	1.37		1.37				
D.2.2 Land converted to flooded land															
Carbon stock change in living biomass	1.21							1.12	1.21						
Carbon stock change in dead organic matter	NA							1.12							
Carbon stock change in litter	NA							1.12							
Net carbon stock change in soils: mineral soils	NA							1.12							
Net carbon stock change in soils: organic soils	NA							1.12							
E.1. Settlements remaining settlements															
Carbon stock change in living biomass ^d	1.12							1.12	1.21						
Carbon stock change in dead organic matter	1.37							1.02	1.37						
Carbon stock change in litter	1.37							1.02	1.37						
Net carbon stock change in soils: mineral soils	1.21							1.02	1.21						
Net carbon stock change in soils: organic soils ^b	1.21							1.02	1.21						
E.2. Land converted to settlements															
Carbon stock change in living biomass ^d	1.12							1.12	1.21						
Carbon stock change in dead organic matter	1.37							1.02	1.37						
Carbon stock change in litter	1.37							1.02	1.37						
Net carbon stock change in soils: mineral soils	1.21							1.02	1.21						
Net carbon stock change in soils: organic soils ^b	1.21							1.06	1.21						
F.1. Other land remaining other land ^d															
F.2. Land converted to other land															
Carbon stock change in living biomass	1.12							1.12	1.21						
Carbon stock change in dead organic matter	1.37							1.06	1.37						
Carbon stock change in litter	1.37							1.06	1.37						
Net carbon stock change in soils: mineral soils	1.21							1.06	1.21						
Net carbon stock change in soils: organic soils ^b	1.21							1.06	1.21						
Cross-cutting categories															
Direct N ₂ O emissions from N inputs to managed soils			1.37					1.06			1.37				
Emissions and removals from drainage and rewetting and other management of organic and mineral soils															
Drained organic soils ^a	1.37	1.37	1.37					1.06	1.37	1.37	1.37				
Rewetted organic soils	1.37	1.37	NA					1.06	1.37	1.37					
Direct N ₂ O emissions from N mineralization/immobilization associated with loss/gain of soil organic matter			1.37					1.06			1.37				
Indirect N ₂ O emissions from managed soils			1.37					1.06			1.37				
Biomass burning	1.21	1.21	1.21					1.12	1.37	1.37	1.37				
Harvested wood products	1.12							1.12	1.21						

Note: Entries are marked “NA” because Parties are either not required to report this category in the greenhouse gas inventories or are not required to include it in their national totals.

Abbreviations: NA = Not applicable.

^a Net removals include net decreases in carbon stocks in individual carbon pools.

^b In accordance with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) *2013 Supplement to the 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories: Wetlands* (chapter 2), the uncertainty for drained organic soils is 20 per cent, and conservativeness factors are 1.06. The uncertainty for carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions is higher than 150 per cent for drained and rewetted inland organic soils (conservativeness factors of 1.37) as presented in this table under “emissions and removals from drainage and rewetting”.

^c No methodologies are available in the *2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories* (hereinafter the 2006 IPCC Guidelines).

^d In accordance with the 2006 IPCC Guidelines, the activity data for this subcategory (living biomass) is not land area, but crown area or number of trees depending on the methodology.

^e Information on CO₂ is also included here, although emissions/removals may be reported in the land use remaining in the same category and land converted to a new land use category.

Table 5

Conservativeness factors for adjustments to land use, land-use change and forestry activities under Article 3, paragraphs 3 and 4, of the Kyoto Protocol: Conservativeness factors for removals^a in a year of the commitment period/emissions^a in the base year^b

	Emission factors							Activity data	Emission estimates						
	CO ₂	CH ₄	N ₂ O	HFCs	PFCs	SF ₆	NF ₃		CO ₂	CH ₄	N ₂ O	HFCs	PFCs	SF ₆	NF ₃
Afforestation and reforestation (total)															
Carbon stock change in above-ground biomass	0.89							0.94	0.89						
Carbon stock change in below-ground biomass	0.89							0.94	0.89						
Carbon stock change in litter	0.82							0.94	0.82						
Carbon stock change in dead wood	0.73							0.94	0.73						
Net carbon stock change in soils: mineral soils	0.82							0.94	0.82						
Net carbon stock change in soils: organic soils ^c	0.73							0.94	0.73						
Harvest wood products	0.89							0.82	0.73						
(Land subject to natural disturbances) ^d															
Carbon stock change in above-ground biomass	0.89							0.94	0.89						
Carbon stock change in below-ground biomass	0.89							0.94	0.89						
Carbon stock change in litter	0.82							0.94	0.82						
Carbon stock change in dead wood	0.73							0.94	0.73						
Net Carbon stock change in soils: mineral soils	0.82							0.94	0.82						
Net Carbon stock change in soils: organic soils ^c	0.73							0.94	0.73						
Harvest wood products	0.89							0.82	0.73						
Deforestation (total)^e															
Carbon stock change in above-ground biomass ^f	0.73							0.94	0.73						
Carbon stock change in below-ground biomass	0.82							0.94	0.82						
Carbon stock change in litter	0.73							0.94	0.73						
Carbon stock change in dead wood	0.73							0.94	0.73						
Net Carbon stock change in soils: mineral soils	0.82							0.94	0.82						
Net Carbon stock change in soils: organic soils ^c	0.82							0.94	0.82						
Harvest wood products	0.89							0.82	0.73						
Forest management (total)^g															
Carbon stock change in above-ground biomass	0.89							0.98	0.89						
Carbon stock change in below-ground biomass	0.89							0.98	0.89						
Carbon stock change in litter	0.82							0.98	0.82						
Carbon stock change in dead wood	0.73							0.98	0.73						
Net Carbon stock change in soils: mineral soils	0.82							0.98	0.82						
Net Carbon stock change in soils: organic soils ^c	0.73							0.94	0.73						
Harvest wood products	0.89							0.82	0.73						
(Newly established forest (CEF-ne))^h															
Carbon stock change in above-ground biomass	0.89							0.94	0.89						
Carbon stock change in below-ground biomass	0.89							0.94	0.89						
Carbon stock change in litter	0.82							0.94	0.82						
Carbon stock change in dead wood	0.73							0.94	0.73						
Net Carbon stock change in soils: mineral soils	0.82							0.94	0.82						
Net Carbon stock change in soils: organic soils ^c	0.73							0.94	0.73						
Carbon stock at harvesting ^h															
Harvest wood products	0.89							0.82	0.73						
(Harvested and converted forest plantations (CEF-hc))ⁱ															
Carbon stock change in above-ground biomass	0.73							0.94	0.73						
Carbon stock change in below-ground biomass	0.82							0.94	0.82						
Carbon stock change in litter	0.73							0.94	0.82						
Carbon stock change in dead wood	0.73							0.94	0.73						
Net Carbon stock change in soils: mineral soils	0.82							0.94	0.82						
Net Carbon stock change in soils: organic soils ^c	0.82							0.94	0.82						
Harvest wood products	0.89							0.82	0.73						

	Emission factors							Activity data	Emission estimates						
	CO ₂	CH ₄	N ₂ O	HFCs	PFCs	SF ₆	NF ₃		CO ₂	CH ₄	N ₂ O	HFCs	PFCs	SF ₆	NF ₃
Forest management (Land subject to natural disturbances) ^{6/}	0.73														
Carbon stock change in above-ground biomass	0.82							0.94	0.82						
Carbon stock change in below-ground biomass	0.73							0.94	0.73						
Carbon stock change in litter	0.73							0.94	0.73						
Carbon stock change in dead wood	0.82							0.94	0.82						
Net Carbon stock change in soils: mineral soils	0.82							0.94	0.82						
Net Carbon stock change in soils: organic soils ⁵	0.89							0.94	0.82						
Harvest wood products	0.89							0.82	0.73						
Technical correction ¹															
Cropland management ⁸															
Carbon stock change in above-ground biomass	0.82							0.98	0.82						
Carbon stock change in below-ground biomass	0.82							0.98	0.82						
Carbon stock change in litter	0.82							0.98	0.82						
Carbon stock change in dead wood	0.73							0.98	0.73						
Net Carbon stock change in soils: mineral soils	0.82							0.98	0.82						
Net Carbon stock change in soils: organic soils ⁵	0.82							0.94	0.82						
Grazingland management ⁸															
Carbon stock change in above-ground biomass	0.82							0.98	0.82						
Carbon stock change in below-ground biomass	0.73							0.98	0.73						
Carbon stock change in litter	0.82							0.98	0.82						
Carbon stock change in dead wood	0.73							0.98	0.73						
Net Carbon stock change in soils: mineral soils	0.82							0.98	0.82						
Net Carbon stock change in soils: organic soils ⁵	0.82							0.94	0.82						
Revegetation ⁸															
Carbon stock change in above-ground biomass	0.82							0.98	0.82						
Carbon stock change in below-ground biomass	0.73							0.98	0.73						
Carbon stock change in litter	0.73							0.98	0.73						
Carbon stock change in dead wood	0.73							0.98	0.73						
Net Carbon stock change in soils: mineral soils	0.82							0.98	0.82						
Net Carbon stock change in soils: organic soils ⁵	0.82							0.94	0.82						
Wetland drainage and rewetting ⁸															
Carbon stock change in above-ground biomass	0.73							0.94	0.73						
Carbon stock change in below-ground biomass	0.73							0.94	0.73						
Carbon stock change in litter	0.73							0.94	0.73						
Carbon stock change in dead wood	0.73							0.94	0.73						
Net Carbon stock change in soils: mineral soils	0.73	0.73	0.73					0.94	0.73	0.73	0.73				
Net Carbon stock change in soils: organic soils ⁵	0.73	0.73	NA					0.94	0.73	0.73					
Harvest wood products															
From afforestation/reforestation	0.89							0.82	0.73						
From deforestation	0.89							0.82	0.73						
From forest management	0.89							0.82	0.73						
Cross-cutting categories															
Direct and indirect N ₂ O emissions from N fertilization			0.73					0.94			0.73				
CH ₄ and N ₂ O emissions from drained and rewetted organic soils ¹															
Drained organic soils ¹	0.73	0.73	0.73					0.94	0.73	0.73	0.73				
Rewetted organic soils ¹	0.73	0.73	NA					0.94	0.73	0.73					
N ₂ O emissions from N mineralization/immobilization due to carbon loss/gain associated with land-use conversions and management change in mineral soils			0.73					0.94			0.73				
Greenhouse gas emissions from biomass burning (CO ₂ , CH ₄ , N ₂ O)	0.82	0.82	0.82					0.89	0.73	0.73	0.73				

Note: Entries are marked "NA" because Parties are either not required to report this category in the greenhouse gas inventories or are not required to include it in their national totals.

Abbreviations: NA = Not applicable.

^a Net emissions and removals include net increases and net decreases in carbon stocks in individual carbon pools (in a year during the commitment period and in the base year, respectively).

^b For the base year, conservativeness factors given in this table apply to cropland management, grazing land management, wetland drainage and rewetting and revegetation under Article 3, paragraph 4, of the Kyoto Protocol.

^c In accordance with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) *2013 Supplement to the 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories: Wetlands (chapter 2)*, the uncertainty for drained organic soils is 20 per cent, and conservativeness factors are 0.94/1.06. The uncertainty for carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions is higher than 150 per cent for drained and rewetted inland organic soils (conservativeness factors of 0.73/1.37) as presented in this table under “emissions and removals from drainage and rewetting”.

^d In cases where adjustments are calculated for other variables related to this category in common reporting format (CRF) table 4(KP-I)A.1.1, the conservativeness factor for the specific pool should be applied. This applies, in particular, to the areas subject to natural disturbances in the year that it was first reported: background levels, margins, the emissions in the inventory that can be excluded and subsequent removals in the inventory year. For salvage logging, the conservativeness factors for harvest wood products should apply.

^e In cases where adjustments are calculated for other variables related to this category in CRF table 4(KP-I)A.2, the conservativeness factor for the specific pool should be applied. This applies, in particular, to the areas subject to natural disturbances in the year that it was first reported: background levels, margins, the emissions in the inventory that can be excluded, and subsequent removals in inventory year. For salvage logging, the conservativeness factors for harvest wood products should apply.

^f The same conservativeness factors apply for deforested land previously reported under afforestation/reforestation and forest management and subject to natural disturbances.

^g In cases where adjustments are calculated for other variables related to this category in CRF tables 4(KP-I)B.1, 4(KP-I)B.1.1 and 4(KP-I)B.1.2, the conservativeness factor for the specific pool should be applied.

^h For all these cases, assume the uncertainties for the specific pool that are being adjusted.

ⁱ The conservativeness factors for deforestation were assumed for this activity.

^j In cases where adjustments are calculated for the technical correction, the conservativeness factor for the specific pool should be applied.

^k The uncertainty for activity data for the base year is 50 per cent, and the conservativeness factors are 0.89/1.12.

^l Information on CO₂ is also included here, although emissions/removals may be reported in the land use remaining in the same category and land converted to a new land-use category.

Table 6

Conservativeness factors for adjustments to land use, land-use change and forestry activities under Article 3, paragraphs 3 and 4, of the Kyoto Protocol: Conservativeness factors for emissions^a in a year during the commitment period/removals^a in the base year^b

	Emission factors							Activity data	Emission estimates						
	CO ₂	CH ₄	N ₂ O	HFCs	PFCs	SF ₆	NF ₃		CO ₂	CH ₄	N ₂ O	HFCs	PFCs	SF ₆	NF ₃
Afforestation and reforestation (total)															
Carbon stock change in above-ground biomass	1.12							1.06	1.12						
Carbon stock change in below-ground biomass	1.12							1.06	1.12						
Carbon stock change in litter	1.21							1.06	1.21						
Carbon stock change in dead wood	1.37							1.06	1.37						
Net carbon stock change in soils: mineral soils	1.21							1.06	1.21						
Net carbon stock change in soils: organic soils ^c	1.37							1.06	1.37						
Harvest wood products	1.12							1.21	1.37						
(Land subject to natural disturbances) ^d															
Carbon stock change in above-ground biomass	1.12							1.06	1.12						
Carbon stock change in below-ground biomass	1.12							1.06	1.12						
Carbon stock change in litter	1.21							1.06	1.21						
Carbon stock change in dead wood	1.37							1.06	1.37						
Net Carbon stock change in soils: mineral soils	1.21							1.06	1.21						
Net Carbon stock change in soils: organic soils ^c	1.37							1.06	1.37						
Harvest wood products	1.12							1.21	1.37						
Deforestation (total) ^e															
Carbon stock change in above-ground biomass ^f	1.37							1.06	1.37						
Carbon stock change in below-ground biomass	1.21							1.06	1.21						
Carbon stock change in litter	1.37							1.06	1.37						
Carbon stock change in dead wood	1.37							1.06	1.37						
Net Carbon stock change in soils: mineral soils	1.21							1.06	1.21						
Net Carbon stock change in soils: organic soils ^c	1.21							1.06	1.21						
Harvest wood products	1.12							1.21	1.37						
Forest management (total) ^g															
Carbon stock change in above-ground biomass	1.12							1.02	1.12						
Carbon stock change in below-ground biomass	1.12							1.02	1.12						
Carbon stock change in litter	1.21							1.02	1.21						
Carbon stock change in dead wood	1.37							1.02	1.37						
Net Carbon stock change in soils: mineral soils	1.21							1.02	1.21						
Net Carbon stock change in soils: organic soils ^c	1.37							1.06	1.37						
Harvest wood products	1.12							1.21	1.37						
(Newly established forest (CEF-ne)) ^g															
Carbon stock change in above-ground biomass	1.12							1.06	1.12						
Carbon stock change in below-ground biomass	1.12							1.06	1.12						
Carbon stock change in litter	1.21							1.06	1.21						
Carbon stock change in dead wood	1.37							1.06	1.37						
Net Carbon stock change in soils: mineral soils	1.21							1.06	1.21						
Net Carbon stock change in soils: organic soils ^c	1.37							1.06	1.37						
Carbon stock at harvesting ^h															
Harvest wood products	1.12							1.21	1.37						
(Harvested and converted forest plantations (CEF-hc)) ⁱ															
Carbon stock change in above-ground biomass	1.37							1.06	1.37						
Carbon stock change in below-ground biomass	1.21							1.06	1.21						
Carbon stock change in litter	1.37							1.06	1.21						
Carbon stock change in dead wood	1.37							1.06	1.37						
Net Carbon stock change in soils: mineral soils	1.21							1.06	1.21						
Net Carbon stock change in soils: organic soils ^c	1.21							1.06	1.21						
Harvest wood products	1.12							1.21	1.37						

	Emission factors							Activity data	Emission estimates						
	CO ₂	CH ₄	N ₂ O	HFCs	PFCs	SF ₆	NF ₃		CO ₂	CH ₄	N ₂ O	HFCs	PFCs	SF ₆	NF ₃
Forest management (Land subject to natural disturbances) ^{6j}	1.37														
Carbon stock change in above-ground biomass	1.21							1.06	1.21						
Carbon stock change in below-ground biomass	1.37							1.06	1.37						
Carbon stock change in litter	1.37							1.06	1.37						
Carbon stock change in dead wood	1.21							1.06	1.21						
Net Carbon stock change in soils: mineral soils	1.21							1.06	1.21						
Net Carbon stock change in soils: organic soils ⁵	1.12							1.06	1.21						
Harvest wood products	1.12							1.21	1.37						
Technical correction ^l															
Cropland management ^k															
Carbon stock change in above-ground biomass	1.21							1.02	1.21						
Carbon stock change in below-ground biomass	1.21							1.02	1.21						
Carbon stock change in litter	1.21							1.02	1.21						
Carbon stock change in dead wood	1.37							1.02	1.37						
Net Carbon stock change in soils: mineral soils	1.21							1.02	1.21						
Net Carbon stock change in soils: organic soils ⁵	1.21							1.06	1.21						
Grazingland management ^k															
Carbon stock change in above-ground biomass	1.21							1.02	1.21						
Carbon stock change in below-ground biomass	1.37							1.02	1.37						
Carbon stock change in litter	1.21							1.02	1.21						
Carbon stock change in dead wood	1.37							1.02	1.37						
Net Carbon stock change in soils: mineral soils	1.21							1.02	1.21						
Net Carbon stock change in soils: organic soils ⁵	1.21							1.06	1.21						
Revegetation ^k															
Carbon stock change in above-ground biomass	1.21							1.02	1.21						
Carbon stock change in below-ground biomass	1.37							1.02	1.37						
Carbon stock change in litter	1.37							1.02	1.37						
Carbon stock change in dead wood	1.37							1.02	1.37						
Net Carbon stock change in soils: mineral soils	1.21							1.02	1.21						
Net Carbon stock change in soils: organic soils ⁵	1.21							1.06	1.21						
Wetland drainage and rewetting ^k															
Carbon stock change in above-ground biomass	1.37							1.06	1.37						
Carbon stock change in below-ground biomass	1.37							1.06	1.37						
Carbon stock change in litter	1.37							1.06	1.37						
Carbon stock change in dead wood	1.37							1.06	1.37						
Net Carbon stock change in soils: mineral soils	1.37	1.37	1.37					1.06	1.37	1.37	1.37				
Net Carbon stock change in soils: organic soils ⁵	1.37	1.37	NA					1.06	1.37	1.37					
Harvest wood products															
From afforestation/reforestation	1.12							1.21	1.37						
From deforestation	1.12							1.21	1.37						
From forest management	1.12							1.21	1.37						
Cross-cutting categories															
Direct and indirect N ₂ O emissions from N fertilization			1.37					1.06			1.37				
CH ₄ and N ₂ O emissions from drained and rewetted organic soils ^l															
Drained organic soils ^l	1.37	1.37	1.37					1.06	1.37	1.37	1.37				
Rewetted organic soils ^l	1.37	1.37	NA					1.06	1.37	1.37					
N ₂ O emissions from N mineralization/immobilization due to carbon loss/gain associated with land-use conversions and management change in mineral soils			1.37					1.06			1.37				
Greenhouse gas emissions from biomass burning (CO ₂ , CH ₄ , N ₂ O)	1.21	1.21	1.21					1.12	1.37	1.37	1.37				

Note: Entries are marked “NA” because Parties are either not required to report this category in the greenhouse gas inventories or are not required to include it in their national totals.

Abbreviations: NA = Not applicable.

^a Net emissions and removals include net increases and net decreases in carbon stocks in individual carbon pools (in a year during the commitment period and in the base year, respectively).

^b For the base year, conservativeness factors given in this table apply to cropland management, grazing land management, wetland drainage and rewetting, and revegetation under Article 3, paragraph 4, of the Kyoto Protocol.

^c In cases where adjustments are calculated for other variables related to this category in common reporting format (CRF) table 4(KP-I)A.1.1, the conservativeness factor for the specific pool should be applied. This applies, in particular, to the areas subject to natural disturbances in the year that it was first reported: background levels, margins, the emissions in the inventory that can be excluded and subsequent removals in the inventory year. For salvage logging the conservativeness factors for harvest wood products should apply.

^d The same conservativeness factors apply for deforested land previously reported under afforestation/reforestation and forest management and subject to natural disturbances.

^e In cases where adjustments are calculated for other variables related to this category in CRF table 4(KP-I)A.2, the conservativeness factor for the specific pool should be applied. This applies, in particular, to the areas subject to natural disturbances in the year that it was first reported: background levels, margins, the emissions in the inventory that can be excluded, and subsequent removals in the inventory year. For salvage logging the conservativeness factors for harvest wood products should apply.

^f In accordance with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) *2013 Supplement to the 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories: Wetlands (chapter 2)*, the uncertainty for drained organic soils is 20 per cent, and conservativeness factors are 0.94/1.06. The uncertainty for carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions is higher than 150 per cent for drained and rewetted inland organic soils (conservativeness factors of 0.73/1.37) as presented in this table under “emissions and removals from drainage and rewetting”.

^g In cases where adjustments are calculated for other variables related to this category in CRF table 4(KP-I)B.1, the conservativeness factor for the specific pool should be applied.

^h For all these cases, assume the uncertainties for the specific pool that are being adjusted.

ⁱ The conservativeness factors for deforestation were assumed for this activity. In cases where adjustments are calculated for other variables related to this category in CRF table 4(KP-I)B.1, the conservativeness factor for the specific pool should be applied.

^j In case that adjustments are calculated for the technical correction, the conservativeness factor for the specific pool should be applied.

^k The uncertainty for activity data for the base year is 50 per cent, and the conservativeness factors are 0.89/1.12.

^l Information on CO₂ is also included here, although emissions/removals may be reported in the land use remaining in the same category and land converted to a new land-use category.

8th plenary meeting
10 December 2015

Decision 5/CMP.11

Training programme for members of expert review teams participating in annual reviews under Article 8 of the Kyoto Protocol

The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol,

Having considered decisions 22/CMP.1, 24/CMP.1, 8/CMP.5, 3/CMP.11 and 4/CMP.11,

Recognizing the importance of the training programme for members of expert review teams participating in annual reviews under Article 8 of the Kyoto Protocol, which builds on the training programme for greenhouse gas inventory review experts under the Convention,

1. *Requests* the secretariat to update and implement the courses on national systems, application of adjustments, modalities for the accounting of assigned amounts under Article 7, paragraph 4, of the Kyoto Protocol, review of national registries and information on assigned amounts, and review of activities under Article 3, paragraphs 3 and 4, of the Kyoto Protocol included in the training programme for members of expert review teams participating in annual reviews under Article 8 of the Kyoto Protocol, as outlined in the annex, to reflect any changes arising from the implementation of decisions 2/CMP.7 to 4/CMP.7 and 1/CMP.8 and any other relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, including the consideration of requirements for Parties included in Annex I without a quantified emission limitation and reduction commitment for the second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol, and to implement the updated training programme as soon as possible, subject to the availability of financial resources, ensuring that the courses incorporate the rules and modalities applicable to the second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol;
2. *Also requests* the secretariat to develop and implement the courses referred to in paragraph 1 above, if possible in time for the first inventory review of the second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol, emphasizing the priority for the development of the course related to review of activities under Article 3, paragraphs 3 and 4, of the Kyoto Protocol;
3. *Further requests* the secretariat to continue the current practice of including, in its annual report on the technical review of greenhouse gas inventories reported by Parties included in Annex I that are also Parties to the Kyoto Protocol to the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, information on the updated training programme, in particular information on examination procedures and the selection of trainees and instructors, in order for Parties to assess the effectiveness of the programme;
4. *Encourages* Parties included in Annex I to the Convention that are also Parties to the Kyoto Protocol that are in a position to do so to provide financial support for the implementation of the training programme referred to in paragraph 1 above;
5. *Takes note* of the estimated budgetary implications of the activities to be undertaken by the secretariat referred to in paragraph 1 above;
6. *Requests* that the actions of the secretariat called for in this decision be undertaken subject to the availability of financial resources.

Annex

Training programme for members of expert review teams participating in annual reviews under Article 8 of the Kyoto Protocol

I. Details of the training programme

1. The courses of the training programme are intended to train members of expert review teams (ERTs) for the review of information submitted under Article 7 of the Kyoto Protocol. All training courses will be available online. For trainees without easy access to the Internet, courses will be distributed through electronic means; for courses that are facilitated by an instructor, trainees will communicate with the instructor by electronic means. At the request of a Party, the courses will also be made available for others interested in the review process, provided that this does not require additional resources. All courses will be available upon request to trainees year-round without facilitation by instructors.
2. All training courses will include an examination. Examination procedures will be standardized, objective and transparent. Examinations will take place online.
3. New greenhouse gas (GHG) inventory review experts who successfully complete the relevant requirements of the training programme will be invited to participate in a centralized or in-country review, working alongside experienced GHG inventory review experts.
4. Experts who do not pass an examination for a course at the first attempt may retake the examination one additional time, provided that the expert has fulfilled all of the tasks assigned during the course in a timely manner and that the retake does not incur additional costs for the secretariat.
5. Experts with relevant expertise will be invited to act as instructors for courses of the training programme, ensuring that their skills cover the subjects addressed in each course. They will provide advice and support by e-mail or other electronic means. The secretariat will seek to achieve a geographical balance among the instructors participating in the training programme.

II. Courses of the training programme

A. National systems

Description: This course covers guidelines for the review of national systems under Article 5, paragraph 1, of the Kyoto Protocol and related parts of guidelines under Articles 7 and 8 of the Kyoto Protocol.

Preparation: 2016.

Implementation: 2016–2022.

Target audience: Lead reviewers, generalists and GHG inventory review experts who have successfully completed the basic course for the technical review of GHG inventories of Parties included in Annex I to the Convention (Annex I Parties).

Type of course: E-learning, without instructor.

Examination requirements and format: New GHG inventory review experts and new lead reviewers must pass the examination before participating in ERTs. Online examination.

B. Application of adjustments

Description: This course covers decisions of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol and technical guidance on methodologies for adjustments under Article 5, paragraph 2, of the Kyoto Protocol and related parts of guidelines under Articles 7 and 8 of the Kyoto Protocol.

Preparation: 2016.

Implementation: 2016–2022.

Target audience: Lead reviewers, experienced GHG inventory review experts and GHG inventory review experts who have successfully completed the basic course for the technical review of GHG inventories of Annex I Parties.

Type of course: E-learning, facilitated by an instructor.

Examination requirements and format: New GHG inventory review experts and new lead reviewers must pass the examination before participating in ERTs. Online examination.

C. Modalities for the accounting of assigned amounts under Article 7, paragraph 4

Description: This course provides guidance for members of ERTs reviewing information provided in the initial report for the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, the calculation of the assigned amount pursuant to Article 3, paragraphs 7 bis, 7 ter, 8 and 8 bis of the Kyoto Protocol, the commitment period reserve, and the national registries for conformity with the modalities for the accounting of assigned amounts under Article 7, paragraph 4.

Preparation: 2016.

Implementation: 2016–2022.

Target audience: Members of ERTs reviewing national registries and assigned amount information, generalists and lead reviewers.

Type of course: E-learning, without instructor.

Examination requirements and format: Examination required for new members of ERTs. Online examination.

D. Review of national registries and information on assigned amounts

Description: This course provides guidance for members of ERTs reviewing annual information on assigned amounts pursuant to Article 3, paragraphs 7 bis, 7 ter, 8 and 8 bis, of the Kyoto Protocol, information on Kyoto Protocol units and the standard electronic format, for conformity with Article 7, paragraph 4, of the Kyoto Protocol. In addition, the course provides guidance on the review of national registries, including of changes in national registries reported by Parties in accordance with decisions 15/CMP.1, 1/CMP.8 and 4/CMP.11 and of conformity with the technical standards for data exchange between registry systems.

Preparation: 2016.

Implementation: 2016–2022.

Target audience: Members of ERTs reviewing national registries and assigned amount information, generalists and lead reviewers.

Type of course: E-learning, facilitated by an instructor, subject to the availability of resources.

Examination requirements and format: New generalists, new lead reviewers and any new members of ERTs who will review national registries and annual information on

assigned amounts must pass the examination before participating in ERTs. Online examination.

E. Review of activities under Article 3, paragraphs 3 and 4, of the Kyoto Protocol

Description: This course provides guidance for members of ERTs reviewing information provided during the commitment period for land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) activities under Article 3, paragraphs 3 and 4, of the Kyoto Protocol for conformity with the requirements of decisions 2/CMP.7, 2/CMP.8 and 6/CMP.9, including procedures for adjustments under Article 5, paragraph 2, of the Kyoto Protocol.

Preparation: 2016.

Implementation: 2016–2022.

Target audience: LULUCF inventory review experts and lead reviewers.

Type of course: E-learning, facilitated by an instructor, subject to the availability of resources.

Examination requirements and format: All LULUCF inventory review experts and new lead reviewers must pass the examination before participating in ERTs. Online examination.

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**Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting
of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol**

**Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the
meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its eleventh
session, held in Paris from 30 November to 13 December 2015**

Addendum

**Part two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties
serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol at
its eleventh session**

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the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol**

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Decision 6/CMP.11

Guidance relating to the clean development mechanism

The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol,

Recalling the provisions of Articles 3 and 12 of the Kyoto Protocol and decision 1/CMP.6,

Cognizant of decision 3/CMP.1 and subsequent guidance provided by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol relating to the clean development mechanism,

I. General

1. *Welcomes* the report for 2014–2015 of the Executive Board of the clean development mechanism (hereinafter referred to as the Executive Board);¹
2. *Commends* the Executive Board for the substantial work undertaken over the past year;
3. *Expresses satisfaction* with the progress of the clean development mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol, which to date has been responsible for:²
 - (a) Over 7,600 project activities being registered in over 95 countries;
 - (b) Over 1,900 component project activities being included in over 280 programmes of activities registered in over 75 countries;
 - (c) Over 1.6 billion certified emission reductions being issued and over USD 300 billion being invested;
 - (d) Over 5.7 million certified emission reductions voluntarily cancelled;
 - (e) Over 32 million certified emission reductions being transferred through the share of proceeds to the Adaptation Fund;
 - (f) Over USD 190 million of revenue for the Adaptation Fund from the sale of certified emission reductions;
 - (g) Seventy-three loans under the clean development mechanism loan scheme being approved and over USD 6 million of total commitment;
 - (h) Twenty-nine sustainable development co-benefit description reports being published using the voluntary sustainable development tool;
4. *Welcomes* the launch of the online platform for voluntary cancellation of certified emission reductions;³
5. *Requests* the Executive Board and the secretariat to facilitate access to the section concerning sustainable development in the project and programme design documents of the project activities and programmes of activities on the online platform for voluntary cancellation of certified emission reductions referred to in paragraph 4 above;

¹ FCCC/KP/CMP/2015/5.

² See document FCCC/KP/CMP/2015/5 and the UNFCCC CDM website at <<http://cdm.unfccc.int/>>.

³ <<https://offset.climateneutralnow.org/>>.

6. *Encourages* the Executive Board to continue the simplification process of the clean development mechanism with the aim of further simplifying and streamlining the project cycle, the registration and verification process, the development and approval of standardized baselines, the methodological standards and procedures, and the accreditation procedure;
7. *Also encourages* the Executive Board to continue exploring options for using the clean development mechanism as a tool for other uses and report back to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol at its twelfth session (November 2016);
8. *Further encourages* the Executive Board to explore the opportunities for the financing of the clean development mechanism through international climate financing institutions, such as the Green Climate Fund, and report back to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol at its twelfth session;
9. *Invites* the Executive Board, as part of the implementation of paragraph 8 above, to consider hosting an in-session workshop at the forty-fourth sessions of the subsidiary bodies (May 2016), taking into account paragraph 28 below;

II. Accreditation

10. *Designates* as operational entities those entities that have been accredited, and provisionally designated, as operational entities by the Executive Board to carry out the sector-specific validation functions and/or sector-specific verification functions described in the annex;
11. *Requests* the Executive Board to analyse the need for measures to ensure the continued participation of designated operational entities in the clean development mechanism, in particular in the regions underrepresented in the clean development mechanism, taking into account paragraph 28 below;

III. Baseline and monitoring methodologies

12. *Decides* to allow the submission of a request for the revision of a baseline and monitoring methodology without a draft project or programme design document in cases where the Executive Board considers that the assessment of such a request can be conducted without the project-specific information;
13. *Requests* the Executive Board to implement paragraph 12 above by revising the relevant regulations;
14. *Encourages* the Executive Board to continue the development of digitized project and programme design document forms for clean development mechanism project activities and programmes of activities;
15. *Requests* the Executive Board to develop more cost-effective and context-appropriate approaches for monitoring, reporting and verification with a focus on project activities involving households and communities, addressing, inter alia:
 - (a) Procedures to manage data gaps;
 - (b) Regionally appropriate calibration requirements;
 - (c) The use of sectoral and nationally collected data where appropriate;

16. *Encourages* the Executive Board to continue its work related to the “Application of E-policy in investment analysis for additionality demonstration and selection of baseline scenario”,⁴ and to report back to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol at its twelfth session;

17. *Also encourages* the Executive Board to continue assessing methodologies in order to ensure environmental integrity and additionality;

IV. Registration of project activities and programmes and issuance of certified emission reductions

18. *Requests* the Executive Board to develop stand-alone programme of activities guidance, consisting, inter alia, of a “clean development mechanism programme of activities standard”, a “clean development mechanism programme of activities validation and verification standard” and a “clean development mechanism programme of activities cycle procedure”;

19. *Reiterates* its request to the Executive Board, as contained in decision 4/CMP.10, to consider allowing, as an option, a simplified inclusion process for activities that satisfy microscale thresholds and are considered automatically additional; this option shall allow for inclusion on the basis of a pre-approved standardized inclusion template of component project activities carried out directly by the coordinating/managing entity without prior validation through a designated operational entity;

20. *Requests* the Executive Board to consider developing a standardized registration template using objective criteria for activities that qualify as automatically additional;

21. *Encourages* the Executive Board to continue its efforts in communicating the sustainable development co-benefits of clean development mechanism project activities and programmes of activities to the public;

22. *Also encourages* the Executive Board to improve the user-friendliness of the existing sustainable development co-benefits tool;

23. *Requests* designated operational entities to confirm that requests for issuance of emission reductions are submitted only to the Executive Board;

24. *Also requests* the Executive Board to examine how the information specified in paragraph 12 of appendix D to decision 3/CMP.1 can be best made publicly available, and the implications thereof, and report back on this matter to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol at its twelfth session;

V. Regional and subregional distribution

25. *Welcomes* the progress made in establishing and operating the regional collaboration centres to promote the clean development mechanism in regions underrepresented in the mechanism and to support stakeholders at the regional and national levels;

26. *Requests* the Executive Board to expand, taking into account paragraph 28 below, the scope and scale of regional collaboration centres’ assistance activities in developing countries by exploring the emerging technical and methodological areas in the context of the clean development mechanism where specific assistance is identified as needed by the countries underrepresented in the mechanism;

⁴ See annex 13 to the annotated agenda of the 79th meeting of the Executive Board. Available at <<http://cdm.unfccc.int/EB/index.html>>.

VI. Resources for work on the clean development mechanism

27. *Expresses* its appreciation to the secretariat for having ensured the prudent management of its resources and deep gratitude to the staff that have left the secretariat for their enormous contribution to the clean development mechanism;

28. *Requests* the Executive Board to ensure the transparent and prudent management of the resources of the clean development mechanism, including the spending for those serving on the Executive Board.

Annex

[English only]

Designation of operational entities by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol at its eleventh session

<i>Name of entity^a</i>	<i>Designated sectoral scopes (validation and verification)</i>
Carbon Check (India) Private Ltd. (Carbon Check) (formerly Carbon Check (Pty) Ltd.) ^b	1–5, 8–10, 13 and 14
China Building Material Test and Certification Group Co. Ltd. (CTC) ^c	1–4, 6, 9, 10 and 13
China Certification Center Inc. (CCCI) ^c	1–15
China Classification Society Certification Company (CCSC) ^d	1–10 and 13
GHD Limited (GHD) (formerly Conestoga Rovers & Associates Limited) ^b	1, 4, 5, 8–10, 12 and 13
Hong Kong Quality Assurance Agency (HKQAA) ^d	1
KBS Certification Services Pvt. Ltd. (KBS) ^d	1, 3–5, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13 and 15

^a This table does not include entities for which accreditation has been withdrawn for some or all sectoral scopes.

^b Transfer of accreditation from another legal entity.

^c Initial accreditation granted for five years.

^d Reaccreditation granted for five years.

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Decision 7/CMP.11

Guidance on the implementation of Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol

The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol,

Recalling the provisions of Articles 3 and 6 of the Kyoto Protocol and decision 1/CMP.6,

Cognizant of decision 9/CMP.1 and subsequent guidance provided by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol relating to joint implementation,

1. *Takes note* of the achievements of joint implementation in the period 2006–2015, accounting for 548 Track 1 projects,¹ 52 Track 2 projects² and over 871 million emission reduction units issued for emission reductions;

2. *Takes note with appreciation* of the report of the Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee for 2014–2015³ and the status of work undertaken during its current term, in particular:

(a) The elaboration of further recommendations on the review of the joint implementation guidelines submitted to the Subsidiary Body for Implementation at its forty-second session;⁴

(b) The decision of the Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee to allow designated operational entities accredited under the accreditation rules of the clean development mechanism to act voluntarily as accredited independent entities under joint implementation while taking measures to safeguard environmental integrity;⁵

3. *Reiterates* its concern regarding the difficult market situation currently faced by participants in joint implementation, with projects declining to a point where the mechanism is practically non-existent;

4. *Requests* the Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee to submit recommendations for consideration by the Subsidiary Body for Implementation at its forty-fourth session (May 2016) on actions that would be necessary to implement the draft joint implementation modalities and procedures,⁶ including changes to:

(a) The rules of procedure of the Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee as adopted by decision 3/CMP.5;

(b) Provisions under other decisions of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol relating to joint implementation;

¹ Decision 9/CMP.1, annex, paragraph 23.

² The verification procedure under the Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee, defined in decision 9/CMP.1, annex, paragraphs 30–45.

³ FCCC/KP/CMP/2015/4.

⁴ FCCC/SBI/2015/5.

⁵ Report on the 37th meeting of the Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee, paragraph 15. Available at <http://ji.unfccc.int/Sup_Committee/Meetings/index.html>.

⁶ FCCC/SBI/2015/L.30.

5. *Also requests* the Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee to submit recommendations for consideration by the Subsidiary Body for Implementation at its forty-fourth session in the context of the review of the joint implementation guidelines, inter alia, on options to address:

- (a) Concerns raised by stakeholders;
- (b) Validation by an accredited independent entity of post-registration changes;

6. *Invites* Parties and admitted observer organizations to submit, by 31 March 2016, their views on experiences and lessons learned from joint implementation for the possible design of mitigation mechanisms and on links and interactions with other tools;⁷

7. *Requests* the Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee to reflect on synergies between joint implementation and other mitigation mechanisms to ensure the cost-efficient use of resources, the coherence of mitigation instruments and the avoidance of double counting, in particular regarding infrastructure and technical arrangements, tools, governance structures and processes;

8. *Also requests* the Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee to prepare an analysis of the experiences and lessons learned referred to in paragraph 6 above, taking into account the submissions referred to in the same paragraph and any other relevant materials, and to forward recommendations and the reflections of the Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee mentioned in paragraph 7 above for consideration by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol at its twelfth session (November 2016);

9. *Commends* the Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee and the secretariat for their prudent management of resources;

10. *Reiterates* its request to the Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee to ensure sufficient infrastructure and capacity for the mechanism's use by Parties for as long as needed, and to keep the joint implementation management plan under review, making necessary adjustments to ensure the efficient, cost-effective and transparent functioning of joint implementation.

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⁷ Parties should submit their views via the submissions portal at <<http://www.unfccc.int/5900>>. Admitted observer organizations should e-mail their submissions to <secretariat@unfccc.int>.

Decision 8/CMP.11

Methodology for the collection of international transaction log fees in the biennium 2016–2017

The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol,

Recalling Article 13, paragraph 5, of the Kyoto Protocol,

Also recalling decisions 11/CMP.3, 10/CMP.5, 9/CMP.6 and 8/CMP.8,

Recognizing the importance of sufficient and stable funding for the international transaction log,

1. *Adopts* the scale of fees for the international transaction log for the biennium 2016–2017 contained in the annex;
2. *Decides* that fees for the international transaction log paid by a Party for the biennium 2016–2017 shall be calculated by multiplying the scale of fees for that Party, as contained in the annex, by the budget for the international transaction log for the biennium 2016–2017, with the fees for the first year of the biennium being equal to the fees for the second year of the biennium;
3. *Requests* the Executive Secretary to notify Parties connected to the international transaction log in the biennium 2016–2017 of the annual fees, calculated in accordance with paragraph 2 above, as early as possible and at least four months in advance of the relevant calendar year, where possible;
4. *Decides* that, if a Party connects to the international transaction log for the first time or reconnects to it following disconnection during the biennium 2016–2017, the scale of fees for that Party shall be that contained in the annex, or, for Parties not listed in the table contained in the annex, shall be made equal to 130 per cent of their Kyoto Protocol adjusted scale for the relevant biennium;
5. *Also decides* that fees paid by a Party that connects to the international transaction log for the first time shall be deducted from the resource requirement for activities relating to the international transaction log in the next biennium;
6. *Further decides* that fees paid by a Party that connects to the international transaction log for the first time or, following disconnection, reconnects to it during the biennium 2016–2017, shall be proportioned for the period between the date of connection or reconnection of its registry and the end of the biennium, except for the period for which the fees were already paid;
7. *Decides* that, where a Party disconnects during the biennium 2016–2017, the Party shall cover the fees for the full year in which the disconnection took place, and that, if the disconnection takes place in the first year of the biennium and the Party does not reconnect in the second year of the biennium, fees for the second year of the biennium shall not apply;
8. *Authorizes* the international transaction log administrator to disconnect the registry of a Party from the international transaction log in the event of the non-payment of its fees by that Party, provided that such disconnection shall not be effected earlier than four months after the beginning of the relevant calendar year, at least two reminders have already been given to the Party and consultations have taken place with the Party concerned prior to the final reminder;

9. *Also authorizes* the Executive Secretary to draw up funds from unspent balances (carry-over) of the Trust Fund for the International Transaction Log from previous financial periods to cover the potential shortfall in fees due to the disconnection of Parties during the biennium 2016–2017;
10. *Requests* the international transaction log administrator to provide, in its annual reports for 2016 and 2017, information on transactions of Kyoto Protocol units;
11. *Also requests* the international transaction log administrator to publish, in its annual reports, a table listing the scale and the level of fees and the status of payments for all Parties connected to the international transaction log.

Annex

[English only]

**Scale of fees for the international transaction log for the biennium
2016–2017**

<i>Party</i>	<i>Scale of fees (per cent)</i>
Australia	2.841
Austria	1.588
Belarus ^a	0.073
Belgium	1.973
Bulgaria	0.036
Croatia	0.079
Cyprus ^a	0.061
Czech Republic	0.503
Denmark	1.323
Estonia	0.028
European Union	2.685
Finland	1.009
France	10.667
Germany	15.350
Greece	1.065
Hungary	0.437
Iceland	0.737
Ireland	0.797
Italy	9.090
Japan	14.939
Kazakhstan ^a	0.157
Latvia	0.032
Liechtenstein	0.188
Lithuania	0.055
Luxembourg	0.153
Malta ^a	0.021
Monaco	0.181
Netherlands	3.352
New Zealand	0.961
Norway	2.319
Poland	0.896
Portugal	0.943
Romania	0.125
Russian Federation	2.743
Slovakia	0.113
Slovenia	0.171
Spain	5.311
Sweden	1.917
Switzerland	2.760
Ukraine	0.745

<i>Party</i>	<i>Scale of fees (per cent)</i>
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	11,888
Subtotal for Parties connected to the international transaction log	100,000
Subtotal for Parties not connected to the international transaction log	0.312
Total	100,312

^a Parties currently not connected to the international transaction log.

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Decision 9/CMP.11

Capacity-building under the Kyoto Protocol

The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol,

Recalling decisions 29/CMP.1, 6/CMP.2, 6/CMP.4, 15/CMP.7, 10/CMP.8, 2/CP.7 and 2/CP.17,

1. *Requests* the Subsidiary Body for Implementation to conduct the third comprehensive review of the implementation of the framework for capacity-building in developing countries, established under decision 2/CP.7 and reaffirmed under decision 29/CMP.1, at its forty-fourth session (May 2016), on the basis of the terms of reference contained in the annex to decision 14/CP.21, with a view to recommending a draft decision for consideration and adoption by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol at its twelfth session (November 2016);
2. *Decides* that the 5th meeting of the Durban Forum, to be held during the forty-fourth session of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation, will explore potential ways for enhancing capacity-building by sharing information and varied experiences related to the Kyoto Protocol;
3. *Invites* Parties to submit via the submissions portal,¹ by 9 March 2016, as part of their annual submissions pursuant to decision 6/CMP.2, suggestions for additional potential topics related to the Kyoto Protocol for the 5th meeting of the Durban Forum.

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¹ <<http://www.unfccc.int/5900>>.

Decision 10/CMP.11

Technical review in 2016 of greenhouse gas inventories and initial reports for the second commitment period from Parties included in Annex I to the Convention that are also Parties to the Kyoto Protocol

The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol,

Recalling decisions 13/CMP.1, 22/CMP.1, 2/CMP.8 and 6/CMP.9,

Emphasizing the importance of ensuring that the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol has adequate and reliable information on annual greenhouse gas inventories from Parties included in Annex I to the Convention that are also Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (Parties included in Annex I),

Noting that owing to a delay in the availability of a functioning CRF Reporter and pending the finalization of the full set of accounting, reporting and review modalities under Articles 5, 7 and 8 of the Kyoto Protocol, Parties included in Annex I were unable to submit in 2015 some of the information required under Article 7, paragraph 1, of the Kyoto Protocol, or their reports to facilitate the calculation of the assigned amount for the second commitment period pursuant to Article 3, paragraphs 7 bis, 8 and 8 bis, of the Kyoto Protocol, and to demonstrate capacity to account for emissions and the assigned amount,¹

Also noting the revised modalities for accounting, reporting and review under Articles 5, 7 and 8 of the Kyoto Protocol for the purposes of the implementation of the second commitment period contained in decisions 3/CMP.11² and 4/CMP.11,³

Expressing the concern that additional work will be needed to ensure that all 2015 greenhouse gas inventories undergo the review process stipulated in decision 13/CP.20 and other relevant decisions, such as those relating to the review processes under the Kyoto Protocol, and that meeting the mandated timelines of the review process may be challenging because of this additional work,

1. *Requests* the secretariat to organize the review of the 2015 and 2016 greenhouse gas inventory submissions from Parties included in Annex I to the Convention that are also Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (Parties included in Annex I), including the review of the supplementary information submitted under Article 7, paragraph 1, of the Kyoto Protocol, in conjunction with each other and with the review of those inventory submissions under the Convention;

2. *Also requests* the secretariat to organize, in accordance with decisions 2/CMP.8 and 4/CMP.11,³ the review of the reports to facilitate the calculation of the assigned amount for

¹ Ukraine was the only Party in 2015 that submitted its initial report for the second commitment period (on 14 August 2015).

² Decision 3/CMP.11 “Implications of the implementation of decisions 2/CMP.7 to 4/CMP.7 and 1/CMP.8 on the previous decisions on methodological issues related to the Kyoto Protocol, including those relating to Articles 5, 7 and 8 of the Kyoto Protocol, part I: implications related to accounting and reporting and other related issues”.

³ Decision 4/CMP.11 “Implications of the implementation of decisions 2/CMP.7 to 4/CMP.7 and 1/CMP.8 on the previous decisions on methodological issues related to the Kyoto Protocol including those relating to Articles 5, 7 and 8 of the Kyoto Protocol, part II: implications related to review and adjustments and other related issues”.

the second commitment period in conjunction with the reviews referred to in paragraph 1 above, striving to complete each review no later than one year after the submission date of the report;

3. *Further requests* the secretariat to continue to make improvements to the CRF Reporter functionality, prioritizing the resolution of outstanding issues related to transparency and accuracy, noting that the CRF Reporter is not yet fully functioning;

4. *Invites* Parties included in Annex I that have not yet submitted their 2015 greenhouse gas inventories and supplementary information required under Article 7, paragraph 1, of the Kyoto Protocol to do so as soon as possible;

5. *Takes note* of the estimated budgetary implications of the activities to be undertaken by the secretariat pursuant to the provisions contained in paragraphs 1 and 2 above;

6. *Requests* that the actions of the secretariat called for in this decision be undertaken subject to the availability of financial resources.

*8th plenary meeting
10 December 2015*

Decision 11/CMP.11

Administrative, financial and institutional matters

The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol,

Recalling Article 13, paragraph 5, of the Kyoto Protocol,

Also recalling decision 27/CP.19, in particular paragraph 11,

Further recalling paragraph 11 of the financial procedures of the Conference of the Parties, which also applies to the Kyoto Protocol,¹

Taking note of decision 21/CP.21,

Having considered the information contained in the documents prepared by the secretariat on administrative, financial and institutional matters,²

I. Budget performance for the biennium 2014–2015

1. *Takes note* of the information contained in the report on budget performance for the period 1 January 2014 to 30 June 2015³ and the status of contributions to the trust funds administered by the secretariat as at 15 November 2015;⁴
2. *Welcomes* the Executive Secretary's efforts to address budgetary limits by enhancing effectiveness and efficiency, including reducing staffing costs through post management;
3. *Expresses appreciation* to Parties that have made contributions to the core budget and the international transaction log⁵ in a timely manner;
4. *Urges* Parties that have not made contributions to the core budget and the international transaction log⁶ in full for the current and/or previous bienniums to do so without delay;
5. *Calls upon* Parties to make their contributions to the core budget and the international transaction log for the biennium 2016–2017 in a timely manner, bearing in mind that contributions are due on 1 January of each year in accordance with the financial procedures of the Conference of the Parties;
6. *Expresses appreciation* for the contributions received from Parties to the Trust Fund for Participation in the UNFCCC Process and to the Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities;
7. *Urges* Parties to contribute further to the Trust Fund for Participation in the UNFCCC Process, in order to ensure the widest possible participation in the negotiations in 2016, and to the Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities;

¹ Decision 15/CP.1, annex I, as revised by decision 23/CP.20.

² FCCC/SBI/2015/13, FCCC/SBI/2015/INF.10 and FCCC/SBI/2015/INF.17.

³ FCCC/SBI/2015/13.

⁴ FCCC/SBI/2015/INF.17.

⁵ FCCC/SBI/2015/INF.17, table 7.

⁶ As footnote 5 above.

8. *Reiterates its appreciation* to the Government of Germany for its annual voluntary contribution to the core budget of EUR 766,938 and its special contribution of EUR 1,789,522 as Host Government of the secretariat;

II. Audit report and financial statements for 2014

9. *Takes note* of the audit report of the United Nations Board of Auditors,⁷ which includes recommendations and the financial statements for 2014, and the comments of the secretariat thereon;

10. *Expresses its appreciation* to the United Nations for arranging the audits of the accounts of the Convention and for the valuable observations and recommendations of the auditors;

11. *Urges* the Executive Secretary to implement the recommendations of the auditors, as appropriate.

*8th plenary meeting
10 December 2015*

⁷ FCCC/SBI/2015/INF.10.

Decision 12/CMP.11

Programme budget for the biennium 2016–2017

The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol,

Recalling Article 13, paragraph 5, of the Kyoto Protocol,

Also recalling decision 8/CMP.11 on the methodology for the collection of international transaction log fees in the biennium 2016–2017,

Taking note of decision 22/CP.21, in particular paragraph 1,

Having considered the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2016–2017 submitted by the Executive Secretary,¹

1. *Endorses* decision 22/CP.21 on the programme budget for the biennium 2016–2017 as it applies to the Kyoto Protocol;²
2. *Adopts* the indicative scale of contributions for 2016 and 2017 contained in annex I, covering 28.8 per cent of the indicative contributions specified in table 1 of decision 22/CP.21;
3. *Invites* all Parties to the Kyoto Protocol to note that contributions to the core budget are due on 1 January of each year in accordance with paragraph 8(b) of the financial procedures for the Conference of the Parties, its subsidiary bodies and the secretariat,³ and to pay promptly and in full for each of the years 2016 and 2017 the contributions required to finance the approved expenditures set out in decision 22/CP.21;
4. *Takes note* of the financing requirements for the clean development mechanism and joint implementation proposed by the Executive Board of the clean development mechanism and the Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee, respectively;⁴
5. *Approves* the budget for the international transaction log for the biennium 2016–2017, amounting to EUR 5,351,356 for the purposes specified in the proposed budget for the international transaction log;⁵
6. *Decides* to maintain the level of the working capital reserve at 8.3 per cent of the estimated expenditure for the Trust Fund for the International Transaction Log;
7. *Adopts* the fees for the international transaction log for the biennium 2016–2017 as contained in annex II.

¹ FCCC/SBI/2015/3.

² Recognizes that, in accordance with decision 13/CP.20, three operational approaches may be used for implementing the technical review of the greenhouse gas inventories of Parties included in Annex I to the Convention, namely desk reviews, centralized reviews and in-country reviews, assuming available resources, and recognizes that the secretariat may implement such reviews according to decision 13/CP.20 in 2016–2017, taking into account the programme budget and supplementary resources provided for under this decision.

³ Decision 15/CP.1, annex I, as revised by decision 23/CP.20.

⁴ FCCC/SBI/2015/3/Add.1.

⁵ FCCC/SBI/2015/3/Add.3.

Annex I

[English only]

**Indicative scale of contributions from Parties to the Kyoto Protocol for
the biennium 2016–2017**

<i>Party</i>	<i>United Nations scale of assessments for 2015</i>	<i>Kyoto Protocol adjusted scale for 2016</i>	<i>Kyoto Protocol adjusted scale for 2017</i>
Afghanistan	0.005	0.007	0.007
Albania	0.010	0.013	0.013
Algeria	0.137	0.178	0.178
Angola	0.010	0.013	0.013
Antigua and Barbuda	0.002	0.003	0.003
Argentina	0.432	0.562	0.562
Armenia	0.007	0.009	0.009
Australia	2.074	2.696	2.696
Austria	0.798	1.037	1.037
Azerbaijan	0.040	0.052	0.052
Bahamas	0.017	0.022	0.022
Bahrain	0.039	0.051	0.051
Bangladesh	0.010	0.013	0.013
Barbados	0.008	0.010	0.010
Belarus	0.056	0.073	0.073
Belgium	0.998	1.297	1.297
Belize	0.001	0.001	0.001
Benin	0.003	0.004	0.004
Bhutan	0.001	0.001	0.001
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	0.009	0.012	0.012
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.017	0.022	0.022
Botswana	0.017	0.022	0.022
Brazil	2.934	3.814	3.814
Brunei Darussalam	0.026	0.034	0.034
Bulgaria	0.047	0.061	0.061
Burkina Faso	0.003	0.004	0.004
Burundi	0.001	0.001	0.001
Cabo Verde	0.001	0.001	0.001
Cambodia	0.004	0.005	0.005
Cameroon	0.012	0.016	0.016
Central African Republic	0.001	0.001	0.001
Chad	0.002	0.003	0.003
Chile	0.334	0.434	0.434
China	5.148	6.693	6.693
Colombia	0.259	0.337	0.337
Comoros	0.001	0.001	0.001
Congo	0.005	0.007	0.007
Cook Islands	0.001	0.001	0.001
Costa Rica	0.038	0.049	0.049
Côte d'Ivoire	0.011	0.014	0.014
Croatia	0.126	0.164	0.164
Cuba	0.069	0.090	0.090
Cyprus	0.047	0.061	0.061

<i>Party</i>	<i>United Nations scale of assessments for 2015</i>	<i>Kyoto Protocol adjusted scale for 2016</i>	<i>Kyoto Protocol adjusted scale for 2017</i>
Czech Republic	0.386	0.502	0.502
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	0.006	0.008	0.008
Democratic Republic of the Congo	0.003	0.004	0.004
Denmark	0.675	0.878	0.878
Djibouti	0.001	0.001	0.001
Dominica	0.001	0.001	0.001
Dominican Republic	0.045	0.059	0.059
Ecuador	0.044	0.057	0.057
Egypt	0.134	0.174	0.174
El Salvador	0.016	0.021	0.021
Equatorial Guinea	0.010	0.013	0.013
Eritrea	0.001	0.001	0.001
Estonia	0.040	0.052	0.052
Ethiopia	0.010	0.013	0.013
European Union	2.500	2.500	2.500
Fiji	0.003	0.004	0.004
Finland	0.519	0.675	0.675
France	5.593	7.271	7.271
Gabon	0.020	0.026	0.026
Gambia	0.001	0.001	0.001
Georgia	0.007	0.009	0.009
Germany	7.141	9.284	9.284
Ghana	0.014	0.018	0.018
Greece	0.638	0.829	0.829
Grenada	0.001	0.001	0.001
Guatemala	0.027	0.035	0.035
Guinea	0.001	0.001	0.001
Guinea-Bissau	0.001	0.001	0.001
Guyana	0.001	0.001	0.001
Haiti	0.003	0.004	0.004
Honduras	0.008	0.010	0.010
Hungary	0.266	0.346	0.346
Iceland	0.027	0.035	0.035
India	0.666	0.866	0.866
Indonesia	0.346	0.450	0.450
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	0.356	0.463	0.463
Iraq	0.068	0.088	0.088
Ireland	0.418	0.543	0.543
Israel	0.396	0.515	0.515
Italy	4.448	5.783	5.783
Jamaica	0.011	0.014	0.014
Japan	10.833	14.083	14.083
Jordan	0.022	0.029	0.029
Kazakhstan	0.121	0.157	0.157
Kenya	0.013	0.017	0.017
Kiribati	0.001	0.001	0.001
Kuwait	0.273	0.355	0.355
Kyrgyzstan	0.002	0.003	0.003
Lao People's Democratic Republic	0.002	0.003	0.003
Latvia	0.047	0.061	0.061
Lebanon	0.042	0.055	0.055

<i>Party</i>	<i>United Nations scale of assessments for 2015</i>	<i>Kyoto Protocol adjusted scale for 2016</i>	<i>Kyoto Protocol adjusted scale for 2017</i>
Lesotho	0.001	0.001	0.001
Liberia	0.001	0.001	0.001
Libya	0.142	0.185	0.185
Liechtenstein	0.009	0.012	0.012
Lithuania	0.073	0.095	0.095
Luxembourg	0.081	0.105	0.105
Madagascar	0.003	0.004	0.004
Malawi	0.002	0.003	0.003
Malaysia	0.281	0.365	0.365
Maldives	0.001	0.001	0.001
Mali	0.004	0.005	0.005
Malta	0.016	0.021	0.021
Marshall Islands	0.001	0.001	0.001
Mauritania	0.002	0.003	0.003
Mauritius	0.013	0.017	0.017
Mexico	1.842	2.395	2.395
Micronesia (Federated States of)	0.001	0.001	0.001
Monaco	0.012	0.016	0.016
Mongolia	0.003	0.004	0.004
Montenegro	0.005	0.007	0.007
Morocco	0.062	0.081	0.081
Mozambique	0.003	0.004	0.004
Myanmar	0.010	0.013	0.013
Namibia	0.010	0.013	0.013
Nauru	0.001	0.001	0.001
Nepal	0.006	0.008	0.008
Netherlands	1.654	2.150	2.150
New Zealand	0.253	0.329	0.329
Nicaragua	0.003	0.004	0.004
Niger	0.002	0.003	0.003
Nigeria	0.090	0.117	0.117
Niue	0.001	0.001	0.001
Norway	0.851	1.106	1.106
Oman	0.102	0.133	0.133
Pakistan	0.085	0.111	0.111
Palau	0.001	0.001	0.001
Panama	0.026	0.034	0.034
Papua New Guinea	0.004	0.005	0.005
Paraguay	0.010	0.013	0.013
Peru	0.117	0.152	0.152
Philippines	0.154	0.200	0.200
Poland	0.921	1.197	1.197
Portugal	0.474	0.616	0.616
Qatar	0.209	0.272	0.272
Republic of Korea	1.994	2.592	2.592
Republic of Moldova	0.003	0.004	0.004
Romania	0.226	0.294	0.294
Russian Federation	2.438	3.170	3.170
Rwanda	0.002	0.003	0.003
Saint Kitts and Nevis	0.001	0.001	0.001
Saint Lucia	0.001	0.001	0.001

<i>Party</i>	<i>United Nations scale of assessments for 2015</i>	<i>Kyoto Protocol adjusted scale for 2016</i>	<i>Kyoto Protocol adjusted scale for 2017</i>
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	0.001	0.001	0.001
Samoa	0.001	0.001	0.001
San Marino	0.003	0.004	0.004
Sao Tome and Principe	0.001	0.001	0.001
Saudi Arabia	0.864	1.123	1.123
Senegal	0.006	0.008	0.008
Serbia	0.040	0.052	0.052
Seychelles	0.001	0.001	0.001
Sierra Leone	0.001	0.001	0.001
Singapore	0.384	0.499	0.499
Slovakia	0.171	0.222	0.222
Slovenia	0.100	0.130	0.130
Solomon Islands	0.001	0.001	0.001
Somalia	0.001	0.001	0.001
South Africa	0.372	0.484	0.484
Spain	2.973	3.865	3.865
Sri Lanka	0.025	0.033	0.033
Sudan	0.010	0.013	0.013
Suriname	0.004	0.005	0.005
Swaziland	0.003	0.004	0.004
Sweden	0.960	1.248	1.248
Switzerland	1.047	1.361	1.361
Syrian Arab Republic	0.036	0.047	0.047
Tajikistan	0.003	0.004	0.004
Thailand	0.239	0.311	0.311
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	0.008	0.010	0.010
Timor-Leste	0.002	0.003	0.003
Togo	0.001	0.001	0.001
Tonga	0.001	0.001	0.001
Trinidad and Tobago	0.044	0.057	0.057
Tunisia	0.036	0.047	0.047
Turkey	1.328	1.726	1.726
Turkmenistan	0.019	0.025	0.025
Tuvalu	0.001	0.001	0.001
Uganda	0.006	0.008	0.008
Ukraine	0.099	0.129	0.129
United Arab Emirates	0.595	0.774	0.774
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	5.179	6.733	6.733
United Republic of Tanzania	0.009	0.012	0.012
Uruguay	0.052	0.068	0.068
Uzbekistan	0.015	0.020	0.020
Vanuatu	0.001	0.001	0.001
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	0.627	0.815	0.815
Viet Nam	0.042	0.055	0.055
Yemen	0.010	0.013	0.013
Zambia	0.006	0.008	0.008
Zimbabwe	0.002	0.003	0.003
Total	77.506	100.000	100.000

Annex II

[English only]

Fees for the international transaction log for the biennium 2016–2017

<i>Party</i>	<i>Fees for 2016 (EUR)</i>	<i>Fees for 2017 (EUR)</i>	<i>Scale of fees for 2016–2017^a (per cent)</i>
Australia	76 016	76 016	2.841
Austria	42 490	42 490	1.588
Belgium	52 791	52 791	1.973
Bulgaria	963	963	0.036
Croatia	2 114	2 114	0.079
Czech Republic	13 459	13 459	0.503
Denmark	35 399	35 399	1.323
Estonia	749	749	0.028
European Union	71 842	71 842	2.685
Finland	26 998	26 998	1.009
France	285 415	285 415	10.667
Germany	410 716	410 716	15.350
Greece	28 496	28 496	1.065
Hungary	11 693	11 693	0.437
Iceland	19 720	19 720	0.737
Ireland	21 325	21 325	0.797
Italy	243 219	243 219	9.090
Japan	399 718	399 718	14.939
Latvia	856	856	0.032
Liechtenstein	5 030	5 030	0.188
Lithuania	1 472	1 472	0.055
Luxembourg	4 094	4 094	0.153
Monaco	4 843	4 843	0.181
Netherlands	89 689	89 689	3.352
New Zealand	25 713	25 713	0.961
Norway	62 049	62 049	2.319
Poland	23 974	23 974	0.896
Portugal	25 232	25 232	0.943
Romania	3 345	3 345	0.125
Russian Federation	73 394	73 394	2.743
Slovakia	3 024	3 024	0.113
Slovenia	4 575	4 575	0.171
Spain	142 105	142 105	5.311
Sweden	51 293	51 293	1.917
Switzerland	73 849	73 849	2.760
Ukraine	19 934	19 934	0.745
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	318 084	318 084	11.888
Total	2 675 678	2 675 678	100.000

^a As contained in decision 8/CMP.11.8th plenary meeting
10 December 2015

Resolution 1/CMP.11

Expression of gratitude to the Government of the French Republic and the people of the city of Paris

Draft resolution submitted by Morocco


The Conference of the Parties and the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol,

Having met in Paris from 30 November to 11 December 2015 at the invitation of the Government of the French Republic,

1. *Express their profound gratitude* to the Government of the French Republic for having made it possible for the twenty-first session of the Conference of the Parties and the eleventh session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol to be held in Paris;
2. *Request* the Government of the French Republic to convey to the city and people of Paris the gratitude of the Conference of the Parties and the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol for the hospitality and warmth extended to the participants.

*9th plenary meeting
13 December 2015*

VI. 기타 참고 자료



1. ENB

PARIS CLIMATE CHANGE CONFERENCE: 29 NOVEMBER – 11 DECEMBER 2015

The Paris Climate Change Conference will convene from 29 November to 11 December 2015, in Paris, France. The Conference will comprise the 21st session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 21) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 11th session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 11). The 43rd sessions of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI 43) and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA 43) will also meet.

The 12th part of the second session of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP 2-12) convened its opening plenary in the evening on 29 November 2015. This opening plenary is summarized after the brief history of the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol and the intersessional highlights. The ADP convened a day early in order to establish spin-off groups so that technical negotiations could commence. ADP 2-12 will continue working under the agenda (ADP/2013/AGENDA) adopted at ADP 2-1, structured around workstream 1 (the 2015 agreement) and workstream 2 (pre-2020 ambition). The ADP is expected to work towards the expected conclusion of the ADP's mandate "to develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties" for adoption by COP 21.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE UNFCCC AND THE KYOTO PROTOCOL

The international political response to climate change began with the 1992 adoption of the UNFCCC, which sets out a legal framework for stabilizing atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHGs) to avoid "dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system." The Convention, which entered into force on 21 March 1994, has 196 parties. In December 1997, delegates to COP 3 in Kyoto, Japan, agreed to a protocol to the UNFCCC that committed industrialized countries and countries in transition to a market economy to achieve emissions reduction targets. These countries, known as Annex I parties under the UNFCCC, agreed to reduce their overall emissions of six GHGs by an average of 5% below 1990 levels in 2008-2012 (the first commitment period), with specific targets varying from country to country. The Kyoto Protocol entered into force on 16 February 2005 and now has 192 parties.

LONG-TERM NEGOTIATIONS, 2005-2009: Convening in Montreal, Canada, in 2005, the first session of the CMP established the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Annex I Parties' Further Commitments under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) in accordance with Protocol Article 3.9, which mandated consideration of Annex I parties' further commitments at least seven years before the end of the first commitment period.

In December 2007, COP 13 and CMP 3 in Bali, Indonesia, resulted in agreement on the Bali Roadmap on long-term issues. COP 13 adopted the Bali Action Plan (BAP) and established the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA), with a mandate to focus on mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology, capacity building and a shared vision for long-term cooperative action. Negotiations on Annex I parties' further commitments continued under the AWG-KP. The deadline for concluding the two-track negotiations was 2009 in Copenhagen.

COPENHAGEN: The UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, Denmark, took place in December 2009. The high-profile event was marked by disputes over transparency and process. Late in the evening of 18 December, these talks resulted in a political agreement, the "Copenhagen Accord," which was then presented to the COP plenary for adoption. After 13 hours of debate, delegates ultimately agreed to "take note" of the Copenhagen Accord, and to extend the mandates of the negotiating groups until COP 16 and CMP 6 in 2010. In 2010, over 140 countries indicated support for the Accord. More than 80 countries also provided information on their national mitigation targets or actions.

CANCUN: The UN Climate Change Conference in Cancun, Mexico, took place in December 2010, where parties adopted the Cancun Agreements and extended the mandates of the two AWGs for another year.

Parties agreed to consider the adequacy of the global long-term goal during a 2013-2015 review. The Cancun Agreements also established several new institutions and processes, including the Cancun Adaptation Framework, the Adaptation Committee and the Technology Mechanism, which includes the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN). The Green Climate Fund (GCF) was created and designated as an operating entity of the Convention's financial mechanism.



DURBAN: The UN Climate Change Conference in Durban, South Africa, took place in November and December 2011. The Durban outcomes covered a wide range of topics, notably a decision on long-term cooperative action under the Convention and agreement on the operationalization of the GCF.

Parties also agreed to launch the ADP with a mandate “to develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties.” The ADP is scheduled to complete these negotiations no later than 2015, with the new instrument entering into force in 2020. In addition, the ADP was mandated to explore actions to close the pre-2020 ambition gap in relation to the below 2°C target.

DOHA: The UN Climate Change Conference in Doha, Qatar, took place in November and December 2012. The conference resulted in a package of decisions, referred to as the “Doha Climate Gateway.” These included amendments to the Kyoto Protocol to establish its second commitment period (2013-2020) and agreement to terminate the AWG-KP’s work. Parties also agreed to terminate negotiations under the BAP, including the AWG-LCA.

WARSAW: The UN Climate Change Conference in Warsaw, Poland, took place in November 2013. The meeting adopted an ADP decision that, *inter alia*, invites parties to initiate or intensify domestic preparations for their intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs). Parties also adopted a decision establishing the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts (WIM), and the Warsaw Framework for REDD+ (reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, conservation of existing forest carbon stocks, sustainable forest management and enhancement of forest carbon stocks).

LIMA: The UN Climate Change Conference in Lima, Peru, took place in December 2014. Negotiations in Lima focused on outcomes under the ADP necessary to advance toward an agreement at COP 21 in Paris in 2015. Following lengthy negotiations, COP 20 adopted the “Lima Call for Climate Action” (Decision 1/CP.20), which sets in motion the negotiations towards a 2015 agreement, including the process for submitting and reviewing INDCs. The decision also addresses enhancing pre-2020 ambition. Parties also adopted 19 decisions, 17 under the COP and two under the CMP that, *inter alia*: help operationalize the WIM; establish the Lima work programme on gender; and adopt the Lima Ministerial Declaration on Education and Awareness-raising.

The Lima Conference was able to lay the groundwork for Paris by capturing progress made in elaborating the elements of a draft negotiating text for the 2015 agreement and adopting a decision on INDCs, including their scope, upfront information, and steps to be taken by the Secretariat after their submission.

ADP 2-8: ADP 2-8 took place in February 2015, in Geneva, Switzerland. The objective of the session, as mandated by COP 20, was to develop the negotiating text based on the elements for a draft negotiating text annexed to Decision 1/CP.20. The Geneva negotiating text (GNT) adopted at ADP 2-8 serves as the basis for the negotiations of the 2015 agreement.

ADP 2-9: ADP 2-9 convened in June 2015 in Bonn, Germany, and undertook streamlining and consolidation, clustering and conceptual discussions of the GNT, including on: preamble; general/objective; mitigation; adaptation and loss and damage; finance; technology development and transfer; capacity building; transparency; timeframes; implementation and compliance; and procedural and institutional provisions. The ADP also discussed

workstream 2 (pre-2020 ambition), in particular its mandate, and proposed elements that could comprise a decision on workstream 2.

ADP 2-10: ADP 2-10 convened in August-September 2015, in Bonn, Germany. To guide the work, the ADP Co-Chairs produced, at the request of parties, a “Tool” based on the streamlined and consolidated text resulting from ADP 2-9. Delegates engaged on various parts of the Tool in facilitated groups and “spin-offs,” or informal meetings of the facilitated groups. The groups considered placement of paragraphs in the Tool, engaged in conceptual discussions on key issues, and, in some cases, started developing textual proposals. The ADP Co-Chairs were mandated to produce a revised non-paper to serve as the basis for further negotiations.

ADP 2-11: ADP 2-11 convened in October 2015, in Bonn, Germany. The ADP Co-Chairs opened the session proposing to begin text-based negotiations on the basis of the text they prepared, including the non-papers (ADP.2015.8.InformalNote and ADP.2015.9.InformalNote) with draft agreement and decision text under workstream 1, and draft decision text under workstream 2.

After meeting in a contact group to reinsert “must-haves” into the non-paper text on workstream 1, parties convened in spin-off groups to advance negotiations on specific sections in the agreement and decision text, and in an open-ended contact group to take stock of progress and discuss issues not addressed in spin-off groups.

Parties agreed to forward the revised non-paper, dated 23 October at 23:30, which captured the work undertaken by parties at ADP 2-11, to serve as the basis for further negotiations under the ADP. Parties also requested that the Secretariat prepare a technical paper, which would identify closely related paragraphs and duplication within sections, and possible areas for streamlining, without making any changes to the content of the text.

INTERSESSIONAL HIGHLIGHTS

MONTREAL PROTOCOL MOP 27: The 27th Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol (MOP 27) took place from 1-5 November 2015, in Dubai, the United Arab Emirates. After years of debate, the Open-ended Working Group was able to commence work under a contact group on feasibility and managing of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs). Parties decided to work towards an HFC amendment to the Montreal Protocol, considered an important step towards limiting use of these gases with high global warming potential.

PRE-COP: Over 60 ministers convened at the Pre-COP meeting in Paris, France, from 8-10 November 2015, to explore possible compromises, generate political momentum and prepare for resumption of negotiations at COP 21. The meeting was organized around four themes: equity and differentiation; ambition; post-2020 financing; and pre-2020 action and support. According to the incoming COP 21/CMP 11 Presidency’s press release, the meeting found: common determination to reach a universal agreement; large consensus on periodic review of national contributions and regular presentation of new contributions; a consensus on “no backtracking”; increased support for a single system, with flexibility depending on capability, with regard to fairness; positive signals for new financial announcements during COP 21 to achieve the US\$100 billion goal; and strong support for continuation of the Lima Paris Action Agenda launched by the COP 20/CMP 10 Presidency in 2014.

CVF MEETING: The Climate Vulnerable Forum (CVF) met from 9-11 November 2015, in Manila, the Philippines, issuing the Manila Communiqué, *inter alia*, calling for COP 21 to: enshrine the 1.5°C goal and five-year commitment cycles in the 2015 agreement; enable CVF countries to upscale adaptation and mitigation actions contained in INDCs through means of implementation; and mainstream climate considerations into development processes. The CVF is expected to meet on 30 November 2015 to adopt the Manila-Paris Declaration and 2016-2018 Roadmap.

G20 SUMMIT: The Group of 20 (G20) Summit convened from 15-16 November 2015, in Antalya, Turkey. Leaders addressed climate change in their communiqué, reaffirming: “the below 2°C goal as stated in the Lima Call for Climate Action”; their commitment to adopting a legally-binding agreement in Paris at COP 21; that renewable energy and energy efficiency are important to addressing climate change; and their commitment to rationalizing and phasing out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies.

APEC ECONOMIC LEADERS’ MEETING 2015: The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) economic leaders met from 18-19 November 2015, in Manila, the Philippines. 21 heads of state issued the Manila Declaration of APEC Leaders, which, *inter alia*, reaffirms APEC members’ aspirational goal to reduce aggregate energy intensity by 45% by 2035, double renewable energy in the regional energy mix by 2030, and rationalize and phase out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies over the medium term.

PARIS HIGHLIGHTS SUNDAY, 29 NOVEMBER 2015

ADP OPENING PLENARY

ADP Co-Chair Ahmed Djoghlaif (Algeria) invited delegates to begin ADP 2-12 with one minute of silence in remembrance of the innocent victims of terrorism and the late Maurice Strong, one of the founding fathers of several multilateral environmental processes. He said that reaching a Paris agreement that enables the world to live “in a climate of peace and in harmony with nature” is the best way to honor those who have passed.

COP 20/CMP 10 President Manuel Pulgar-Vidal, Minister of Environment, Peru, explained that, with the Paris agreement, along with the adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals in September 2015, “we are framing the new paradigm of development.” He called on delegates to show solidarity and work efficiently in a time-bound manner to find textual solutions.

Incoming COP 21/CMP 11 President Laurent Fabius, Foreign Minister, France, expressed hope that the 150 heads of state and government at the Leaders Event on Monday, 30 November, would provide political impetus for decisive negotiations. Underscoring the need to conclude negotiations by Friday, 11 December, he called on delegates to build compromises so as to leave few pending issues for ministers to decide on during the second week of COP 21. He said he would work hand-in-hand with COP 20/CMP 10 President Pulgar-Vidal through the end of the meeting.

VENEZUELA raised a point of order noting difficulties in entering the plenary. ADP Co-Chair Djoghlaif assured the plenary that necessary measures would be taken to ensure access by parties.

On agenda item 3, ADP Co-Chair Daniel Reifsnyder (US) highlighted informal notes on workstream 1 and workstream 2 (ADP.2015.10-11.InformalNote), and a technical paper produced by the Secretariat identifying closely related concepts, duplications and areas for streamlining (ADP.2015.12.InformalNote). He noted that the ADP Co-Chairs, along with

representatives of the COP 21 Presidency, had convened 33 consultation meetings with parties and groups of parties. Outlining the mode of work, he said the open-ended contact group would review progress made by spin-off groups and allow for coherence on cross-cutting issues.

He noted that spin-off groups would begin meeting on Monday, 30 November, on: technology development and transfer, and capacity building; workstream 2; facilitating implementation and compliance, and final clauses; and preamble, purpose and general. He said the open-ended contact group would begin work on Tuesday, 1 December, and would consider mitigation, adaptation and loss and damage, and transparency of action and support, and that, after a report back from spin-off groups, the contact group would consider global stocktake, decision paragraphs not linked to any particular article, and definitions.

ADP Co-Chair Reifsnyder further noted that the informal notes issued on 6 and 10 November (ADP.2015.10-12.InformalNote) would form the basis for negotiations, with the exception of discussions on finance, which would be based on the 23 October text, which was issued at the close of ADP 2-11. He said a consolidated new draft would be prepared by Friday, 4 December, and the outcome of the ADP would be forwarded to the COP for its consideration on Saturday, 5 December.

ADP Co-Chair Djoghlaif welcomed the positive spirit and lauded parties’ willingness to make use of the limited time available.

TUVALU acknowledged the importance of making progress and accelerating the pace to complete the ADP’s work by the end of the week. While expressing appreciation at the Co-Chairs’ emphasis on transparency, he questioned it in practice, underlining his disappointment that informal party-led work had already commenced with very little advance notice.

ADP Co-Chair Djoghlaif recalled the principles the Co-Chairs had set in January to guide their work, including transparency, inclusiveness and an open-door policy, adding that the outcome of the informal open-ended ADP meeting held on Saturday, 28 November, had been uploaded online. He thanked the co-facilitators for their work and looked forward to delivering the ADP mandate by noon on Saturday, 5 December.

IN THE CORRIDORS

On Sunday, Day 0 of COP 21, the venue was sparsely attended until the evening, when over 1,300 delegates, ministers and observers assembled in a packed plenary room at Le Bourget for a brief opening of the ADP, enabling negotiations to start in spin-off groups on Monday evening.

With incoming COP 21/CMP 11 President Laurent Fabius expressing hope that the Leaders Event on Monday would provide “political impetus” for the negotiations, many delegates spoke of their expectations for the first days of this “decisive meeting.” While some hoped the leaders’ presence would “grease the wheels,” another wondered how 150 brief statements could ever provide a common sense of direction. One veteran observed that the “real currency” of the gathering would be the opportunity it offers for informal discussions at the highest political level.

The real action on Sunday took place outside the venue, with an estimated 10,000 people forming a human chain leading to 22,000 shoes, representing those who would have demonstrated in support of an ambitious climate agreement had the terrorist attacks on Paris not happened. The array of shoes was said to include shoes from UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and Pope Francis. One observer hoped that the world leaders arriving in Paris on Monday would be inspired to start walking in those shoes.



Climate Change Policy & Practice

Climate Change Policy & Practice (formerly called Climate-L.org) is a knowledge management project carried out by the International Institute for Sustainable Development Reporting Services (IISD RS) in collaboration with the UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination.

This knowledgebase of UN and intergovernmental activities addressing the challenge of global climate change features:

- news on UN and intergovernmental activities related to international climate change policy, updated on a daily basis;
- an iCal of upcoming climate change events;
- guest articles by key figures of the climate community and UN leaders; and
- policy updates.

New posts to the knowledgebase are distributed through the Climate Change Daily Feed, which is distributed exclusively through our community listserve, CLIMATE-L.

Climate Change Policy & Practice: <http://climate-l.iisd.org/>

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PARIS HIGHLIGHTS: MONDAY, 30 NOVEMBER 2015

On Monday, 30 November, the opening of COP 21 took place in the morning. The Leaders Event commenced with an opening session followed by two parallel sessions in the morning, afternoon and evening to hear statements by heads of state and government.

In the evening, spin-off groups under ADP 2-12 took place on: preamble, purpose (Article 2) and general (Article 2*bis*); technology development and transfer (Article 7); capacity building (Article 8); implementation and compliance (Article 11), the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Agreement (CMA) (Article 12) and final clauses (Articles 13-26); and workstream 2.

OPENING OF COP 21

Observing that we are in a “spectacular year,” COP 20/CMP 10 President Manuel Pulgar-Vidal, Peru, underscored that fulfilling the Durban mandate for a universal, legally-binding agreement will help frame sustainable development for the next generation.

Parties then elected Laurent Fabius, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Development, France, as COP 21/CMP 11 President by acclamation. Fabius outlined the role of the French presidency as: listening to all views; ensuring transparency and inclusiveness; seeking an ambitious agreement; ensuring compromise among parties; and leaving only “final points” for consideration by ministers during the second week.

UNFCCC Executive Secretary Christiana Figueres emphasized parties’ responsibility to finalize an agreement that “enables the achievement of national climate change goals, delivers necessary support for the developing world and catalyzes increasing action by all.”

Echoing Figueres’ assertion that “never before has a responsibility so great been in the hands of so few,” His Royal Highness Charles, the Prince of Wales, called on delegates “in pursuing national interest, not to lose sight of international necessity.”

LEADERS EVENT

OPENING OF THE LEADERS EVENT: President François Hollande, France, expressed gratitude for the friendship and support shown in the wake of the recent terrorist attacks.

He said the Paris outcome will be a success if it: determines a credible path to limit temperature rise below 2°C, or 1.5°C if possible; responds to climate change with solidarity so that no state can abstain from its commitments; and mobilizes all societies and sectors to act.

Stressing that leaders convening in Paris had the moral and political responsibility to show leadership for present and future generations, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said that the Paris agreement must: be lasting; be dynamic; preserve the balance between the leading role of developed countries and growing responsibilities of developing countries according to their resources and level of development; and be credible, with the current level of ambition “as the floor.”

COP 21/CMP 11 President Fabius outlined three conditions for success in Paris: mobilizing heads of state and government; bringing together and obtaining commitments from non-governmental actors; and reaching a universal, ambitious climate agreement that is differentiated, fair, lasting, dynamic, balanced, legally-binding and ensures staying below 2°C.

STATEMENTS BY HEADS OF STATE AND

GOVERNMENT: Room La Loire: In the morning, President Ollanta Humala, Peru, urged leaders to empower their negotiators to produce an ambitious and equitable agreement with, *inter alia*, verifiable and progressive mitigation actions.

President Rafael Correa Delgado, Ecuador, called for free access to mitigation technologies and the creation of an international court for environmental justice.

President Danilo Medina Sánchez, the Dominican Republic, stressed that the weight of historical responsibility still rests on developed countries, and also called for emerging economies to “play their new roles in the international community,” noting that “today’s world is not the same world in which the Kyoto Protocol was signed.”

President Simonetta Sommaruga, Switzerland, advocated a new climate agreement that is legally-binding, ambitious and based on the same obligations and rules for all parties. She announced a 75% increase in Switzerland’s annual contribution to the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF).

Calling on developed countries to play a leadership role, President Robert Gabriel Mugabe, Zimbabwe, said COP 21 provides an opportunity to restore trust between developed and developing countries.



President Macky Sall, Senegal, said equity implied international support for electrification of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) by renewable sources and called for more resources to the GCF to support adaptation.

Stating that women are both victims of, and part of the solution to, climate change, President Michelle Bachelet, Chile, stressed the need for countries to seek inclusion of gender to ensure climate justice.

President Juan Hernández, Honduras, called for, *inter alia*, making the Warsaw Framework for REDD+ and WIM binding, and stressed the global average temperature rise should not exceed 1.5°C above the pre-industrial era.

Prince Albert II, Monaco, called for binding commitments from each state and said current models of economy and energy need to be changed.

President Park Geun-hye, Republic of Korea, underscored the importance of a global carbon market that brings together developed and developing countries.

Saying that COP 21 builds on the “historic and bold decisions taken at COP 17,” President Jacob Zuma, South Africa, called for a legally-binding agreement based on equity and differentiation that will enable ambitious action through the provision of means of implementation (MOI).

Emphasizing common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) as the cornerstone of the Paris agreement and suggesting that differentiation is a condition of the agreement’s effectiveness, President Dilma Rousseff, Brazil, called for MOI to ensure that all countries will have the conditions to achieve “our common objective.”

President Evo Morales, Bolivia, shared the outcome of the World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth, which took place in October 2015, in Cochabamba, Bolivia, and called on COP 21 to address capitalism, which he emphasized as the origin of the climate crisis.

In the afternoon, the session was opened by Prime Minister John Key, New Zealand. President Baron Waqa, Nauru, stressed the need to make sure that every country is able to achieve and overachieve their mitigation and adaptation goals, and called for those with resources to “step up and help,” in solidarity with each other.

President Almazbek Sharshenovich Atambaev, Kyrgyzstan, called for an agreement that will prevent further adverse impacts of climate change and stimulate adaptation.

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey, said differentiation needs to be addressed “first and foremost” by introducing a “realistic and flexible” system while maintaining the principle of CBDR.

In the Paris agreement, President Tommy Remengesau, Palau, called for *inter alia*: a regular review process that drives ambition; robust transparency rules; and a permanent loss and damage mechanism.

President Maithripala Sirisena, Sri Lanka, emphasized the necessity of deep cuts in global emissions, considering the principle of historical responsibility, and said that technology transfer will ensure adaptation and nationally suitable mitigation actions in developing countries.

Stressing the need to turn climate change into a development opportunity, and noting that poverty and climate change are intertwined, President Thomas Boni Yayi, Benin, called for a legally-binding global agreement that will, *inter alia*, keep global warming below 2°C and provide African countries with means to adapt.

Describing climate change as a “threat multiplier,” President Klaus Iohannis, Romania, called for a robust, legally-binding instrument that incorporates a dynamic approach, reflecting changing economic realities and national circumstances.

President Mahmoud Abbas, State of Palestine, stressed the importance of a two-state solution for Palestine to address environmental challenges, and said that peace was predicated on justice and international law.

President Muhammadu Buhari, Nigeria, reminded of the need for parties to fulfil their existing pre-2020 obligations, and called on countries to “scale up our commitment to ensure a successful outcome in Paris and contribute to transforming our world through sustainable development.”

Drawing attention to the urgent need to contain the adverse effects of climate change, President Paul Biya, Cameroon, called on COP 21 to address the degradation of forests in Central Africa and desertification affecting countries around Lake Chad.

President Idriss Déby Itno, Chad, underscored the need to address the deteriorating condition of Lake Chad and called for more robust action to support the people of the Sahel.

In the Paris agreement, President Sauli Niinistö, Finland called for: a clear goal; common rules on transparency and accountability; and stocktaking every five years.

President Benigno Aquino III, the Philippines, called for recognizing that the fight against climate change is a matter of survival for some countries. He asked parties to give consideration to a proposal for more financing made by the Vulnerable Twenty Group in October and highlighted the CVF Manila-Paris Declaration, adopted on Monday, 30 November, on the sidelines of COP 21.

President Petro Poroshenko, Ukraine, called on a global climate agreement that, *inter alia*, is legally-binding and flexible, and allows for use of, and non-discriminatory access to, market and non-market instruments.

Noting that the Paris agreement must reflect equity and fairness, President Joko Widodo, Indonesia, called for progress on the mobilization of US\$100 billion, noting that the commitment should be increased going forward.

President Filip Vujanović, Montenegro, emphasized the links between the expected Paris agreement with the Sustainable Development Goals and the outcome of the Financing for Development Summit.

Calling for resolute action, President Ameenah Gurib-Fakim, Mauritius, said the Paris agreement should, *inter alia*: respect and maintain the principles of equity and CBDR; and treat adaptation and loss and damage as separate components of the agreement, anchoring loss and damage in it as a permanent mechanism.

President Ali Bongo Ondimba, Gabon, urged parties to “act in order not to be responsible for something that we still can avoid,” and called for technology transfer in the areas of agriculture, forestry and clean energy, suggesting this is “the price of shared responsibility.”

President Seretse Khama, Botswana, emphasized the role of natural capital accounting and expressed hope that the “experiment” of engaging heads of state before ministers finalize the agreement would deliver a strong outcome.

President Fuad Masum, Iraq, called for the adoption of environmentally-beneficial technologies, including in oil extraction processes, and called for greater cooperation to create favorable environments to support those investments.

Describing the transition to sustainable development as “an indispensable condition for the survival of mankind,” President Ikililou Dhoinine, Comoros, called for prioritizing climate finance allocations to poor countries, and disbursing them in a more balanced manner between mitigation and adaptation.

President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, Equatorial Guinea, expressed the need for the conservation of forest ecosystems and biodiversity to be accompanied by alternative programmes to safeguard people’s livelihoods.

Prime Minister Xavier Bettel, Luxembourg, called for: a dynamic mechanism for review and clear rules for transparency. He said the conference needs to send a strong signal to the poorest and most vulnerable countries about provision of support in the Paris agreement.

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Japan, highlighted his country’s support to developing countries, including in the areas of clean energy and early warning systems, and innovation in low-carbon technologies.

Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, Australia, announced his country will ratify the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, taking second commitment period targets. He advocated for a “truly global climate agreement” that drives humanity’s capacity for inventiveness.

Prime Minister Erna Solberg, Norway, announced that her country would double its contribution to the GCF by 2020 in the context of verifiable emissions reductions from REDD+.

Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen, Denmark, said a key goal of COP 21 is to make clean energy widely affordable, and highlighted efforts to increase support for renewable technologies.

Describing climate risk as an economic and ethical matter, Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, Italy, reminded that development is not possible unless climate change is addressed, and cautioned against jeopardizing nature.

Statements by heads of state and government continued into the evening, with 30 leaders remaining on the speakers list at 6:00pm. The webcast of the remaining statements is available at: <http://unfccc6.meta-fusion.com/cop21/events/2015-11-30-14-45-leaders-event-statements-by-heads-of-state-and-government-la-loire-part-2>

Room La Seine: In the morning, President Horacio Manuel Cartes, Paraguay, highlighted that COP 21 is a chance for countries to curb the causes and consequences of climate change in the interest of the planet’s survival.

Prince Moulay Rachid, Morocco, called for building on what is attainable through effective action and tangible results, and stressed promoting technology transfer to, and raising funds for, developing countries.

President Barack Obama, US, recognized the role of his country in creating climate change, stating that the US “embraces its responsibility to do something about it.” He called for the

agreement to, *inter alia*, create a durable framework, pave the way for progressively ambitious targets and ensure countries in need receive support. He highlighted that the US would pledge new risk insurance initiatives on Tuesday, 1 December, that help vulnerable populations rebuild stronger after climate-related disasters.

President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh, Djibouti, stressed the need for technology transfer to developing countries and finance for adaptation actions to be balanced with finance for mitigation.

President Xi Jinping, China, stressed that the Paris agreement should: follow the principles and focus on the full implementation of the UNFCCC; create institutional arrangements that compel concerted efforts; respect differences in countries’ economic structures and capacities; and not deny the legitimate needs of developing countries to improve living standards and develop economically.

President Dalia Grybauskaitė, Lithuania, called for: ambitious legally-binding mitigation targets with regular reviews; robust transparency rules; technology development; and results-based financial support.

President Abdel Fattah El Sisi, Egypt, said the new agreement should: not harm African countries’ efforts to eradicate poverty, or their right to develop; be based on the principle of CBDR; include a commitment that global average temperature increase not exceed 1.5°C; and include a global target on adaptation.

Noting that current INDCs are voluntary and thus far not ambitious enough to attain the 2°C temperature goal, a goal insufficient for small island nations, Chancellor Angela Merkel, Germany, called for a binding review mechanism with a five-year cycle to begin in 2020 to ensure credibility and increased ambition. She also stressed: decarbonization of economies; profound transformation of all industry sectors; and that developed countries’, in recognition of their responsibility for past emissions, take the lead in funding technology “advancement.”

President Vladimir Putin, Russian Federation, highlighted that it is possible to ensure economic development and take care of the environment, saying Russia stands ready to exchange energy efficiency solutions. He called for the new climate agreement to build on the principles of the UNFCCC, be legally-binding and include participation of developing countries.

President János Áder, Hungary, underlined the need to support research and development of climate-friendly technologies.

President Enrique Peña Nieto, Mexico, presiding over the afternoon session, highlighted that his country was the first developing country to submit an INDC and urged delegates to remember that at COP 21 “we are deciding what quality of life we want for the 21st century.”

President Tomislav Nikolić, Serbia, called for just, efficient measures set in a legally-binding format that respect international principles and the particularities of every country.

President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, Mauritania, stressed environmental challenges caused by climate change including desertification and noted the Great Green Wall initiative for the Sahara and the Sahel as an example of national and regional efforts to meet such challenges.

President Anote Tong, Kiribati, encouraged delegates to focus on the necessary steps and sacrifice to ensure that those on the frontline of climate change can remain in their homes, and highlighted a call from the Pacific for a global moratorium on new investments in coal mines.

President Serzh Sargsyan, Armenia, noted his country's commitment to take quantitative emission limitations despite its insignificant share in global GHG emissions.

President Mariano Rajoy Brey, Spain, called for an agreement that creates continuous improvement in commitments from all countries on the basis of capabilities and national circumstances, with review mechanisms to assess improvements and levels of ambition, adding that Spain will increase its annual climate finance for developing countries, doubling contributed funds by 2020.

President Issoufou Mahamadou, Niger, stressed the need for: increased resilience of peoples and ecosystems; ambitious global efforts to limit global temperature rise to below 1.5°C; balancing mitigation and adaptation finance; and developed countries to take the lead according to the polluter pays principle.

President Emomali Rahmon, Tajikistan, called for the new climate change agreement to serve as an effective instrument to reduce CO₂ emissions globally and implement projects aimed at adaptation.

President Juan Carlos Varela, Panama, proposed setting up an international center for facilitating a network of public and private actors to combat deforestation, promote sustainable forestry and reduce carbon emissions.

President Bujar Nishani, Albania, shared his country's efforts to decarbonize its economy, notably having already achieved a total decarbonization in the electricity sector.

President Rosen Plevneliev, Bulgaria, described fighting climate change as both a moral obligation and sound economic policy for the world, calling for an agreement that catalyzes the transformation of the global economy and enhances transparency and accountability through regular reporting and review.

Prime Minister John Key, New Zealand, announced support of NZ\$200 million for climate-related actions over the next four years, primarily for Pacific nations.

President Christopher Loeak, the Marshall Islands, underscored that current contributions are not enough to limit warming to 1.5°C, saying nations should reset their targets every five years.

President Uhuru Kenyatta, Kenya, supported a long-term global goal of a maximum 1.5°C temperature increase and continuing the Convention's financial mechanism and the WIM.

President Peter Christian, Federated States of Micronesia, called on UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to declare a global state of emergency due to climate change.

Prime Minister Enele Sose Sopoaga, Tuvalu, called for a permanent mechanism for loss and damage to be anchored in the "treaty" and easy access to predictable finance.

President Elbegdorj Tsakhia, Mongolia, stressed: accountability; adequate finance and technical support; and *per capita* emissions as a measure to track emission footprints and allow for comparability of efforts.

President Hage Geingob, Namibia, urged countries to forge a fair deal that unlocks financing to alleviate the negative impact of climate change on developing countries.

President Ashraf Ghani, Afghanistan, highlighted infrastructure investment and regional collaboration as critical in the effort to address climate change.

President José Mário Vaz, Guinea-Bissau, said it is time to develop a framework for effective sharing of responsibilities among international players.

King Norodom Sihamoni, Cambodia, called for: maintaining the impetus provided by the initial capitalization of the GCF; funding for LDCs; and stimulating private investments in renewable energy and energy efficiency.

King Abdullah II ibn Al Hussein, Jordan, underlined that responding to individual crises as they arise is not enough and called on countries to act responsibly with foresight and determination.

Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, Canada, underscored the role of Canadian provinces, territories, indigenous peoples and cities in combating climate change and at COP 21. He highlighted that Canada will take on a new leadership role internationally, calling for an ambitious agreement that all parties will be able to adopt and implement.

Urging developed countries to reduce their emissions, President John Mahama, Ghana, said developing countries cannot follow the Western development model or unsustainable lifestyle.

Prime Minister Keith Mitchell, Grenada called for, *inter alia*: a protocol based on the principles of the Convention and with a goal of maintaining global temperature rise below 1.5°C; ambitious mitigation efforts to be reviewed as of 2018 and renewed every five years; and anchoring loss and damage in the agreement.

Statements by heads of state and government continued into the evening, with 36 speakers remaining on the speakers list at 6:00pm. The webcast of the remaining statements is available at: <http://unfccc6.meta-fusion.com/cop21/events/2015-11-30-14-45-leaders-event>

IN THE CORRIDORS

On Monday, the Paris Climate Change Conference officially launched, proceeding at a rocket's pace. The rapid influx of 150 heads of state and government and thousands of delegates, observers and media turned the usual COP opening day buzz into a thunderous roar. The statements of leaders dominated the day, which were scrutinized by those seeking clues to what will happen on key issues, such as the legal form of the agreement or finance. Pledges by 11 countries totalling US\$248 million to the LDCF was cautiously welcomed as a hopeful prologue to the climate finance discussions ahead.

Despite the uplifting spirit many leaders sought to convey in their interventions, some shared the sentiment of Nauru's President Baron Waqa who cautioned that countries should not become "complacent" in their rhetoric. Others, looking back for lessons from the past, recalled that US President Obama's speech received the same "initial delight" in Copenhagen in 2009. One observer, anxious to see the negotiators roll up their sleeves, was caught agonizing "nothing gets done while the leaders are here." However, several negotiators were seen engaging with each other in corners and cafeterias around the venue perhaps getting a head start on their work to unlock numerous issues that still remain to be resolved.

PARIS HIGHLIGHTS: TUESDAY, 1 DECEMBER 2015

On Tuesday, 1 December, COP 21 and CMP 11 convened in the morning in plenary to adopt their agendas and organization of work, and hear opening statements. The SBSTA opening plenary met in the morning and the SBI opening plenary convened in the afternoon.

The ADP contact group commenced work and met throughout the day. ADP spin-off groups and "informal informals" were held throughout the day on: preamble, purpose and general; adaptation; mitigation; finance; technology development and transfer; capacity building; global stocktake; transparency; and workstream 2.

COP 21 PLENARY

ORGANIZATIONAL MATTERS: Parties agreed to apply the draft rules of procedure (FCCC/CP/1996/2), with the exception of draft rule 42 on voting.

The COP adopted the agenda (FCCC/CP/2015/1 and Add.1) as proposed, with the agenda item on the second review of the adequacy of Convention Articles 4.2 (a) and (b) (developed countries' mitigation) held in abeyance. The COP also agreed to the organization of work.

The COP referred to the SBI the items and sub-items on: reporting from and review of Annex I parties; reporting from non-Annex I parties; capacity building under the Convention; gender and climate change; matters relating to LDCs; the audit report and financial statements for 2014; and budget performance for the biennium 2014-2015.

The COP further referred to the SBI and SBSTA the items and sub-items on: the report of the Adaptation Committee and the WIM; the Joint Annual Report of the TEC and the CTCN; and the implementation of the Buenos Aires programme of work on adaptation and response measures (Decision 1/CP.10).

COP 21 President Laurent Fabius indicated consultations on the election of officers would be conducted. Parties agreed to the accreditation of observer organizations (FCCC/CP/2015/5).

COP 21 President Fabius highlighted a high-level action day on Saturday, 5 December, in the context of the Lima Paris Action Agenda (LPAA). He urged creativity and flexibility to achieve success in Paris, emphasizing time management.

CMP 11 PLENARY

ORGANIZATIONAL MATTERS: Parties adopted the agenda (FCCC/KP/CMP/2015/1) and agreed to the organization of work. CMP 11 President Fabius indicated consultations would be held on the election of replacement officers.

The CMP referred to the SBSTA the item on clarification of the text in section G (Article 3, paragraph 7ter) of the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, and the sub-item on Protocol Article 2.3 (adverse effects of policies and measures).

The CMP referred to the SBI the items on: capacity building under the Kyoto Protocol; administrative, financial and institutional matters; reporting from and review of Annex I parties; as well as the sub-item on Protocol Article 3.14 (minimizing adverse effects).

JOINT COP/CMP PLENARY

Australia, for the UMBRELLA GROUP, said Paris must deliver an agreement that creates regular updates for ambition. He highlighted the role of civil society and business, especially the hundreds of initiatives under the LPAA.

South Africa, for the G-77/CHINA, the EU, Saudi Arabia, for the ARAB GROUP, and Sudan, for the AFRICAN GROUP, said their statements would be uploaded to the UNFCCC website.

Angola, for the LDCs, stated that the 2°C limit is inadequate and should be strengthened to 1.5°C.

The Republic of Korea, for the ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRITY GROUP, called for the adoption of an agreement that is applicable to all, includes a flexible approach to differentiation, and has common rules and a mechanism to increase ambition over time.

China, for BRAZIL, SOUTH AFRICA, INDIA and CHINA, emphasized conducting work in an open, transparent, inclusive and party-driven manner, and said that the Paris agreement should be in line with CBD and respective capabilities. On the pre-2020 period, he stressed that developed countries must meet their commitments and define a clear roadmap to achieving the US\$100 billion goal.

Maldives, for the ALLIANCE OF SMALL ISLAND STATES (AOSIS), called for the agreement to establish, *inter alia*, medium- and long-term emission reduction pathways capable of delivering less than 1.5°C of warming.

Guatemala, for the INDEPENDENT ALLIANCE OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, pledged support for the efforts to adopt a legally-binding, equitable and ambitious agreement.

WOMEN AND GENDER urged countries to limit temperature rise to 1.5°C and avoid concepts such as net zero, carbon neutrality and offsetting.

BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY NGOS (BINGOs) highlighted the role of business in building understanding of enabling conditions to mobilize and leverage the private sector for innovation, investment and access to energy.

Saying "we are far from where we need to be," Climate Action Network (CAN), for ENVIRONMENTAL NGOS (ENGOS), called for creating five-year cycles and matching conditional INDCs with finance.

FARMERS underlined the role of agriculture, pointing to the 87 INDCs referencing agriculture.

INDIGENOUS PEOPLES urged, *inter alia*: respecting indigenous peoples' rights; recognizing traditional knowledge and practices; and providing direct access to climate finance.



LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES highlighted the contributions of local governments to mitigation and adaptation, while calling for a 1.5°C temperature limit.

RESEARCH AND INDEPENDENT NGOS (RINGOs) outlined how research and its application can, *inter alia*, help increase energy efficiency, identify vulnerabilities, improve climate resilience, evaluate success of efforts and give meaning to equity.

Underlining that “there are no jobs on a dead planet,” TRADE UNION NGOS (TUNGOS) called for enhanced ambition and promoting a just transition for workers.

SBSTA OPENING PLENARY

ORGANIZATIONAL MATTERS: Parties adopted the agenda (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/3) and agreed to the organization of work. SBSTA Chair Lidia Wojtal (Poland) reported that consultations on the election of officers other than the Chair would be coordinated by the COP/CMP Presidency.

NAIROBI WORK PROGRAMME: Parties agreed that SBSTA Chair Wojtal produce draft conclusions on this item (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/4 and INF.8).

The UN Environment Programme highlighted the progress of the Lima Adaptation Knowledge Initiative (LAKI) in various sub-regions and outlined its two aims, to identify and prioritize knowledge gaps at the sub-regional level and to fill those gaps. BOTSWANA and SRI LANKA welcomed LAKI’s progress and future workshops.

DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGIES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TECHNOLOGY MECHANISM: Joint Annual Report of the TEC and the CTCN: Parties agreed that joint SBSTA/SBI informal consultations, facilitated by Carlos Fuller (Belize) and Elfriede More (Austria), will consider this item (FCCC/SB/2015/1 and INF.3).

TEC Chair Kunihiro Shimada (Japan) reported key achievements, including enhanced access to climate technology finance and support for development of national systems of innovation.

Chair of the CTCN Advisory Board Jukka Uosukainen (Finland) said the CTCN now has over 100 network members providing technical assistance in response to developing country requests.

MATTERS RELATING TO SCIENCE AND REVIEW:

Research and Systematic Observation: Parties agreed that informal consultations, facilitated by Chris Moseki (South Africa) and Stefan Rösner (Germany), will consider this item.

The GLOBAL CLIMATE OBSERVING SYSTEM reported on progress made against the implementation plan and the assessment of the adequacy of the global observing network.

The WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORGANIZATION (WMO) reported, *inter alia*, that the WMO Global Framework for Climate Services (GFCS) developed a supplement to the technical guidelines for national adaptation plans (NAPs) and that the WMO Congress adopted a policy on climate data and products for the GFCS.

The COMMITTEE ON EARTH OBSERVATION SATELLITES reported that, on sensing, data from the essential climate variable inventory were provided to complement the existing database, and highlighted progress on the implementation of carbon observation from space.

The INTERGOVERNMENTAL OCEANOGRAPHIC COMMISSION OF UN EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION underlined that ocean observation is integral to the climate observation system and highlighted challenges sustaining observations often supported by short-term research budgets.

METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES UNDER THE CONVENTION: GHG Data Interface: Parties agreed to defer consideration of this item until SBSTA 44.

Emissions from Bunker Fuels: Parties agreed that SBSTA Chair Wojtal will produce a draft decision on this item (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/MISC.5).

The INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION (ICAO) reported on efforts to improve fuel efficiency, encourage alternative fuels and more efficiently manage air traffic.

The INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION (IMO) reported agreement on a three-step approach to data collection and on technology cooperation and capacity-building efforts.

Saudi Arabia, for the G-77/CHINA, underscored the importance of multilateral solutions and supported working through the IMO and ICAO while respecting the principles of the Convention and avoiding unilateral measures.

ARGENTINA, for a number of developing countries, said that measures should not constitute a disguised restriction on international trade. She urged the further technical analysis of a market-based mechanism proposed under ICAO and said such a mechanism could only be based on mutual and multilateral consent and, with CHINA, should include CBD.

On the IMO, CHINA expressed concern on the adoption of the European system to monitor CO₂ emissions from ships in its ports.

JAPAN, SINGAPORE and the EU said the IMO and ICAO are the suitable places to address these issues. The REPUBLIC OF KOREA urged parties to work toward agreement in these organizations.

REPORTS ON OTHER ACTIVITIES: Parties took note of the Annual Report on the Technical Review of Information Reported under the Convention Related to Biennial Reports (BRs) and National Communications (NCs) by Annex I Parties to the Convention (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/INF.5) and the Report on the Implementation of Domestic Action by Annex I Parties, as Defined in Protocol Article 1.7, Based on Information Reported in their National Communications (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/INF.4).

OTHER AGENDA ITEMS: The following agenda items and sub-items were briefly considered and forwarded to contact groups:

- the 2013-2015 review (joint with SBI);
- all sub-items under the impact of the implementation of response measures (joint with SBI);
- the sub-item on methodologies for the reporting of financial information by Annex I parties to the Convention;
- the sub-item on implications of the implementation of Decisions 2/CMP.7 to 4/CMP.7 and 1/CMP.8 on the previous decisions on methodological issues to the Kyoto Protocol, including those relating to Protocol Articles 5, 7 and 8;
- the sub-item on accounting, reporting and review requirements for Annex I parties without Quantified Emissions Limitation and Reduction Commitments for the second commitment period; and
- the sub-item on clarification of the text in Section G (Article 3.7ter) of the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol.

The following agenda items and sub-items were forwarded to informal consultations:

- report of the Adaptation Committee (joint with SBI);
- issues relating to agriculture;
- report of the Executive Committee of the WIM (joint with SBI);
- the sub-item on the annual report on the technical review of Annex I parties’ GHG inventories; and
- the sub-item on the annual report on the technical review of Annex I parties’ GHG inventories and other information report.

Parties agreed that SBSTA Chair Wojtal would produce outcomes on the agenda item on land use, land-use change and forestry and on all sub-items under market and non-market mechanisms.

OPENING STATEMENTS: South Africa, for the G-77/CHINA, Australia, for the UMBRELLA GROUP, the EU, Sudan, for the AFRICAN GROUP, Angola, for the LDCs, Maldives, for AOSIS, and Panama, for the Coalition for Rainforest Nations, said they would upload their statements to the UNFCCC website.

RINGOs underscored the importance of research partnerships. WOMEN AND GENDER criticized land-sector market mechanisms and called for addressing loss and damage.

TUNGOS called for a work programme on a just transition to build on SBSTA's previous work on response measures. FARMERS expressed support for the SBSTA's work programme on agriculture, particularly the early warning systems and risk assessment workshop.

BINGOs expressed support for the Technology Mechanism. CAN, for ENGOs, called for encouraging ICAO and IMO to set interim targets and adopt criteria for alternative fuels.

SBI OPENING PLENARY

ORGANIZATIONAL MATTERS: Parties adopted the agenda (FCCC/SBI/2015/11) with the item on information in non-Annex I national communications held in abeyance. Parties agreed to the organization of work as presented. SBI Chair Amena Yauvoli (Fiji) indicated that consultations on the election of officers other than the Chair would be conducted by the COP/CMP Presidency.

Multilateral Assessment Working Group Session under the International Assessment and Review (IAR) Process: SBI Chair Yauvoli informed that the multilateral assessment of Belarus and Kazakhstan would complete the third and final multilateral assessment working group session of the first round of the IAR process.

Report of the Executive Committee of the WIM: The report of the Executive Committee of the WIM (FCCC/SB/2015/3) was presented by Executive Committee Co-Chair Pepetua Latasi (Tuvalu). Parties agreed to joint SBI/SBSTA informal consultations, co-facilitated by Beth Lavender (Canada) and Kishan Kumarsingh (Trinidad and Tobago).

Administrative, Financial and Institutional Matters: Noting the situation of outstanding contributions as pressing, UNFCCC Deputy Executive Secretary Richard Kinley presented the budget performance for the biennium 2014-2015 as at 30 June 2015 (FCCC/SBI/2015/13) and status of contributions as at 15 November 2015 (FCCC/SBI/2015/INF.17).

OTHER AGENDA ITEMS: The following agenda items and sub-items were briefly considered and forwarded to joint contact groups of the SBI and SBSTA: the 2013-2015 review and all sub-items under the impact of the implementation of response measures.

The following agenda items and sub-items were briefly considered and forwarded to informal consultations:

- all sub-items under development and transfer of technologies and implementation of the Technology Mechanism;
- the sub-item on review of the joint implementation (JI) guidelines;
- all sub-items under capacity building;
- the sub-item on outcome of the first round of the IAR process;
- the sub-item on work of the Consultative Group of Experts on NCs from Non-Annex I parties;
- the sub-item on review of the modalities and procedures for the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM);
- matters relating to LDCs;
- NAPs; and
- report of the Adaptation Committee (joint with SBSTA).

The SBI agreed that Chair Yauvoli prepare draft conclusions, with the assistance of the Secretariat and in consultation with parties on: revision of the "Guidelines for the Preparation of National Communication by Parties Included in Annex I to the Convention Part II"; provision of financial and technical support; modalities for expediting the continued issuance, transfer and acquisition of JI emission reduction units; and gender and climate change.

The Global Environment Facility and the Adaptation Committee provided oral reports on relevant aspects of their work. BURKINA FASO informed it had submitted its NAP, constituting the first of its kind from an LDC.

The SBI also took note of: the status of submission and review of sixth NCs and first BRs from Annex I parties (FCCC/SBI/2015/INF.9); the report on national GHG inventory data from Annex I parties for 1990-2013 (FCCC/SBI/2015/21); summary reports on the technical analysis of Biennial Update Reports from non-Annex I parties; the report of the administrator of the International Transaction Log (FCCC/SBI/2015/INF.12); the audited financial statements for the year 2014 (FCCC/SBI/2015/INF.10); and the summary report on the 3rd Dialogue on Article 6 of the Convention (FCCC/SBI/2015/15). On the Dialogue Convention Article 6 (education, training and public awareness), the SBI endorsed replacing "Article 6 of the Convention" with "Action for Climate Empowerment."

The SBI further recommended that the CMP take note of the annual compilation and accounting report for Annex B parties under the Kyoto Protocol for 2015 (FCCC/KP/CMP/2015/6 and Add.1/Rev.1).

OPENING STATEMENTS: South Africa, for the G-77/CHINA, Australia, for the UMBRELLA GROUP, Sudan, for the AFRICAN GROUP, Maldives, for AOSIS, the EU and Angola, for the LDCs, said their statements would be uploaded to the UNFCCC website.

The LDCs highlighted that the outcome of the Structured Expert Dialogue suggests the need to strengthen the global goal by lowering it to a global average temperature increase of 1.5°C.

Maldives, for AOSIS, emphasized a review of CDM modalities would create greater confidence in the CDM as a mitigation tool.

WOMEN AND GENDER requested ADP negotiations to address the linkages between gender, technology and mitigation.

CAN, for ENGOs, called for sufficient funding for the work under the WIM, including for a new five-year work plan on legal and policy frameworks.

SBI MULTILATERAL ASSESSMENT

SBI Chair Yauvoli opened the third working group session of the multilateral assessment.

BELARUS noted significant decoupling of its emissions and economic growth in 1995-2012, and highlighted energy conservation and efficiency improvements, and development of renewable energy sources. Responding to a question by AUSTRALIA on mitigation actions planned to enable Belarus to meet its 2020 emissions reduction target, he outlined, *inter alia*, renewable energy and energy conservation laws.

KAZAKHSTAN highlighted mitigation actions and measures, including legislation, renewable energy feed-in tariffs, an emissions trading system and an energy service company framework. On a question by CANADA on mitigation-relevant sectoral plans included in Kazakhstan's Strategic Development Plan, she mentioned water and waste management, transport and energy efficiency.

SBI Chair Yauvoli closed the session thanking all for the "great work that has been achieved" and noting that, over the last three sessions, 43 parties had been assessed, 651 questions had been asked during the official three-month question-and-answer period, and a similar amount during the sessions.

ADP

CONTACT GROUP: ADP Co-Chair Ahmed Djoghlaif opened the session. ADP Co-Chair Daniel Reifsnnyder outlined the mode of work for the day. Spin-off group co-facilitators reported back on Monday evening's meetings.

On mitigation (Article 3, *3bis* and *3ter*), Co-Facilitator Franz Perrez (Switzerland) noted that informal work would focus on clusters, including individual efforts, timing, cooperative approaches, features, information, long-term strategies, housing, and regional and economic organizations.

On finance (Article 6), Co-Facilitator Georg Børsting (Norway) noted his group's division of issues into three clusters: predictability; institutional arrangements; and actions and commitments.

On transparency (Article 9) Co-Facilitator Fook Seng Kwok (Singapore) suggested that the spin-off group base its work on the clusters: support; scope and consideration; and a post-

Paris work programme for 2016-2020. He proposed several cross-cutting issues, such as information related to INDCs, be addressed in the contact group.

SOUTH AFRICA reported from G-77/China consultations and requested difficulties in attending parallel meetings be taken into account.

Malaysia, for Like-Minded Developing Countries, requested overflow rooms for spin-off groups to guarantee inclusiveness for civil society.

On capacity building (Article 8), Artur Runge-Metzger (EU) reported back from "productive" spin-off group discussions on Monday, 30 November, saying "issues" remained on differentiation. He said party-led informal informals had begun discussing principles and public support.

On adaptation (Article 4), Co-Facilitator Andrea Guerrero (Colombia) identified clusters of issues and noted that discussions on global goal, vision, linkages between mitigation and adaptation, and principles for adaptation efforts would take place in the spin-off group. On the loss and damage cluster, she noted that bilateral discussions were taking place.

Co-Facilitator Sarah Bashaan (Saudi Arabia) noted little progress in the spin-off group on implementation (Article 11), the CMA (Article 12) and final clauses (Articles 13-26).

Reporting back on preamble, and purpose and general (Articles 2 and 2bis), Co-Facilitator Diann Black-Layne (Antigua and Barbuda) said that a drafting group would convene on purpose and general.

Co-Facilitator Tosi Mpanu-Mpanu (Democratic Republic of the Congo), reporting back from technology development and transfer (Article 7), noted that the African Group presented a revised option for the technology framework that was well-received and informed that views remained divergent on the global goal.

ADP Co-Chair Reifsnnyder summarized discussions under the spin-off group for workstream 2, highlighting cancellation of Kyoto Protocol units and internationally transferred mitigation outcomes as contentious issues.

The contact group then took up discussions on matters not related to any specific article.

The RUSSIAN FEDERATION, opposed by CHINA, recommended deleting the option of "implementing agreement" from the title of the draft agreement.

TUVALU proposed adding language stating that the new agreement was being adopted in the context of Convention Article 17 (protocols). SAUDI ARABIA, the EU and the US opposed. Co-Chair Djoghlaif suggested discussing the issue during lunchtime.

In the afternoon, the ADP contact group continued discussing decision paragraphs not allocated to spin-off groups. On paragraphs related to the adoption of the agreement, parties converged on paragraph 5 on parties provisionally applying the provisions of the agreement pending entry into force.

On a body to prepare for entry into force, parties agreed that the ADP Co-Chairs and Secretariat would streamline the three options into one, representing the various proposals for the body raised by parties, including: using the ADP, changing its mandate and name, and importing all its previously agreed operational arrangements; using the SBI and/or the SBSTA; or creating a new body.

Parties added brackets around a paragraph related to requesting the Secretariat to publish INDCs on its website.

On support for preparation and communication of INDCs, parties exchanged views on calling on "parties with economies in transition in a position to do so" to provide support but decided to keep the text as it is, given divergent views.

On clarifying information provided in the INDCs, after discussions on the paragraph's purpose and its intended outcome, Co-Chair Reifsnnyder invited parties to propose modified language to be taken up at a later stage.

On the synthesis report of the aggregate effect of the INDCs, parties decided to take note of the document. After intensive discussions on the various elements of the paragraph, including the gap between the aggregate effect of the INDCs and emissions

consistent with 2°C or 1.5°C, Co-Chair Reifsnnyder proposed: mentioning the gap resulting from the aggregate effect of INDCs communicated by 1 October 2015; inserting figures to concretize the gap; and including language from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change on lowest-cost emission pathways. He noted a revised text would be proposed by the ADP Co-Chairs and the Secretariat.

Spin-off groups on mitigation, adaptation, finance, and transparency of action and support reported back to the contact group in the evening session.

SPIN-OFF GROUPS: Adaptation and Loss and Damage (Articles 4 and 5): In the morning, the spin-off group facilitated by Andrea Guerrero (Colombia) heard initial comments on agreement text paragraphs on, *inter alia*: a global goal or long-term vision; links between the level of mitigation and adaptation; adequacy of support from developed countries; adaptation efforts, needs and costs in developing countries; principles; and cooperation. Parties identified areas to focus their work on, clarified their preferences and highlighted text they found problematic.

A drafting group focusing on these same paragraphs convened in the afternoon.

Finance (Article 6): In the afternoon, Co-Facilitator Georg Børsting (Norway) identified two clusters of issues for the spin-off group to address during the day, including *ex ante* communications and their linkages with the global stocktake, and scale and scaling up. He proposed proceeding with two drafting groups. The G-77/CHINA agreed to the two drafting groups, but asked for flexibility to discuss issues as appropriate in the groups, which parties accepted.

Transparency (Article 9): In the afternoon spin-off group co-facilitated by Fook Seng Kwok (Singapore) parties focused on support to developing countries for transparency. Parties discussed how to clarify that support for the Cancun monitoring, reporting and verification system will continue, and differed on whether developing countries "shall" or "be eligible to" receive support. The group then met informally to discuss the latter issue.

Mitigation (Article 3, 3bis and 3ter): In the afternoon, Co-Facilitator Franz Perrez (Switzerland) facilitated the spin-off group. Based on reports from informal consultations, parties agreed to replace the text on the long-term goal in the agreement with the text developed by the informal group, and to continue working on: timing; cooperative approaches and mechanisms; and the individual efforts, differentiated efforts, progression, ambition and framing cluster. Facilitator Perrez reported from bilateral consultations that no landing zone existed yet on information, housing and long-term strategies.

IN THE CORRIDORS

On Tuesday, substantive negotiations kicked off under the Convention and its bodies at Le Bourget conference site, which doubles as an airport.

With the cool December wind blowing through the venue, some delegates enthused that negotiations seemed to be "taking off." Others expressed concern at the rapidly expanding schedule, wondering how they could participate in the numerous parallel spin-off, "informal informal" and contact group meetings of the ADP, in addition to attending the SBs' work. One delegate pointed out that the contact group had become the hub for the ADP's work, which "really helped the transparency of the process."

Amidst a debate over parties' right to insert text, some advocates of exercising restraint at this late stage were left wondering if President Fabius' calls on Monday to focus on substance were "gone with the wind." As the day progressed, co-facilitators implored delegates to show flexibility and move from known positions. Grabbing shuttle buses in the evening, participants mused whether the much-needed "wind of change" would soon blow through Le Bourget.

PARIS HIGHLIGHTS: WEDNESDAY, 2 DECEMBER 2015

On Wednesday, 2 December, COP 21 and CMP 11 convened in plenary to continue opening agenda items. Under the ADP, the contact group continued throughout the day, taking stock of progress in the evening. Spin-off groups and informal informals convened on: adaptation; mitigation; transparency; global stocktake; capacity building; finance; final clauses; purpose; technology development and transfer; implementation and compliance; and workstream 2.

Contact groups and informal consultations under the SBI and SBSTA convened throughout the day.

COP 21 PLENARY

In the morning, COP 21 Vice-President Cheikh Ndiaye Sylla (Senegal) opened the plenary, reporting that African parties endorsed Morocco to host COP 22, and invited parties from the Asia Pacific and Eastern European regions to identify hosts for COP 23 and 24. Philippe Lacoste (France) will conduct informal consultations.

CONSIDERATION OF PROPOSALS BY PARTIES UNDER

ARTICLE 17 OF THE CONVENTION: Parties agreed that, in line with previous practice, this item will be kept open and COP 21 Vice-President Sylla will report to the closing plenary on proposals by Japan (FCCC/CP/2009/3), Tuvalu (FCCC/CP/2009/4), the US (FCCC/CP/2009/7), Australia (FCCC/CP/2009/5), Costa Rica (FCCC/CP/2009/6) and Grenada (FCCC/CP/2010/3).

CONSIDERATION OF PROPOSALS BY PARTIES FOR AMENDMENTS TO THE CONVENTION UNDER ARTICLE

15: Proposal by the Russian Federation: Parties agreed that Xavier Sticker (France) will conduct informal consultations (FCCC/CP/2011/5).

Proposal by Papua New Guinea and Mexico: Parties agreed that Xavier Sticker (France) will conduct informal consultations on this item (FCCC/CP/2011/4/Rev.1).

DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGIES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TECHNOLOGY

MECHANISM: Linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism of the Convention: Parties agreed that Carlos Fuller (Belize) and Elfriede More (Austria) will conduct informal consultations on this item (FCCC/CP/2014/6, FCCC/SB/2015/1, and FCCC/CP/2015/3 and Add.1).

MATTERS RELATED TO FINANCE: Long-Term Finance:

Parties agreed to establish a contact group to jointly consider this sub-item (FCCC/CP/2015/2 and INF.1) and the sub-item on the report of the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF) (FCCC/CP/2015/8), co-chaired by Andres Mogro (Ecuador) and Mark Storey (Sweden).

Report of the SCF: SCF Co-Chair Hussein Alfa Nafu (Mali) reported that, for the first time, the Committee had provided two draft compiled texts on guidance to the GCF and Global Environment

Facility (GEF). He highlighted areas of work for 2016-2017, including consideration of linkages between the Adaptation Fund and other institutions under the Convention.

Report of the GCF and Guidance to the GCF: GCF Board Co-Chair Henrik Harboe (Norway) highlighted key milestones including: nomination of 136 National Designated Authorities; accreditation of 20 entities to channel finance into action on the ground; and signed contribution agreements representing 58% of the initial US\$10 billion in pledges.

Parties agreed to establish a contact group to jointly consider this sub-item (FCCC/CP/2015/3, Add.1 and Add.1/Corr.1, FCCC/CP/2015/8, INF.2 and MISC.1) and the sub-item on guidance to the GEF (FCCC/CP/2015/4 and Add.1, FCCC/CP/2015/8 and INF.2), co-chaired by Stefan Schwager (Switzerland) and Nauman Bashir Bhatti (Pakistan).

Report of the GEF and Guidance to the GEF: Chizuru Aoki, the GEF, reported on the GEF's support for INDC preparation, support to small island developing states, and support for NCs and biennial update reports. On INDCs, she stated that the GEF supported 46 countries in their INDC preparation, 44 of which have since communicated their INDCs.

ADMINISTRATIVE, FINANCIAL AND INSTITUTIONAL

MATTERS: Decision-making in the UNFCCC Process: Javier García (Peru) reported on informal consultations conducted in June 2015, and underlined that, while parties' views on the outcome of the process differ, there is a "shared sense" that it is useful to have a space to bring forward concerns with the decision-making process. Parties agreed that François Delattre (France) and Javier García (Peru) will conduct informal consultations.

CMP 11 PLENARY

In the morning, CMP Vice-President Cheikh Ndiaye Sylla (Senegal) opened the plenary.

ORGANIZATIONAL MATTERS: Status of Ratification of the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol: The Secretariat reported that, as of 30 November, 55 instruments of acceptance of the 144 required had been received. The CMP took note of the information.

ISSUES RELATED TO THE CDM: CDM Executive Board Chair Lambert Schneider (Germany) reported (FCCC/KP/Board/2015/5) that revisions to project standards, and validation and verification standards had been adopted with a focus to streamlining the work of the CDM. He also noted with concern the continuing low demand and prices for Certified Emission Reduction units (CERs), and outlined ways in which the Board continues to encourage voluntary cancellation of CERs.

The WORLD BANK underscored that the CDM sends a price signal for carbon, and called for, *inter alia*, simplifying the project cycle, streamlining programme activities and standardizing MRV procedures.



Parties established a contact group, co-chaired by Karoliina Anttonen (Finland) and Jeffery Spooner (Jamaica).

ISSUES RELATED TO JI: JI Supervisory Committee Chair Julia Justo Soto (Peru) reported that activity under JI has “virtually stopped,” saying that there are no new requests for projects or for issuances of emission reduction units. Parties established a contact group, co-chaired by Dimitar Nikov (France) and Yaw Osafo (Ghana) on this item (FCCC/KP/CMP/2015/4).

REPORT OF THE COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE: Facilitative Branch Chair Delano Ruben Verwey (the Netherlands) outlined the activities of the enforcement and facilitative branches, including the Committee’s continued interaction with expert review teams. The CMP took note of the report (FCCC/KP/CMP/2015/3) and invited parties to contribute to the Trust Fund.

REPORT OF THE ADAPTATION FUND BOARD: Adaptation Fund Board Chair Hans Olav Ibrekk (Norway) reported that the “fund has never been more in demand” and has delivered effectively on its mandate, but that the sustainability of the fund is “in danger.” Parties established a contact group co-chaired by Richard Muyungi (Tanzania) and Herman Sips (the Netherlands) on this item (FCCC/KP/CMP/2015/2).

REPORT ON THE HIGH-LEVEL MINISTERIAL ROUNDTABLE ON INCREASED AMBITION OF KYOTO PROTOCOL COMMITMENTS: CMP Vice-President Sylla recalled there was no consensus on this issue at CMP 10 (FCCC/KP/CMP/2014/3). Saying that the high-level roundtable did not increase the ambition of Annex I parties, CHINA, opposed by the EU, AUSTRALIA and NORWAY, proposed a contact group. Parties agreed to informal consultations on a way forward facilitated by Paul Watkinson (France).

ADP

CONTACT GROUP: In the morning, Co-Facilitator George Wamukoya (Kenya) reported on the informal work on general and purpose (Articles 2 and 2bis) and preamble, saying all parties wanted precise text but differed on ways to streamline.

Co-Facilitator Tosi Mpanu-Mpanu (Democratic Republic of the Congo) reported that an informal informal on technology development and transfer (Article 7) had addressed cooperative action, technology goal, technology framework, and institutional arrangements, noting many brackets remained.

On capacity building (Article 8), Co-Facilitator Artur Runge-Metzger (EU) reported that parties worked on objective, principles, support and reporting, paring each to one option through a bridging proposal, and saying that differentiation is a crosscutting issue that remained unresolved.

On implementation and compliance (Article 11) and final clauses, Co-Facilitator Sarah Baashan (Saudi Arabia) said CMA (Article 12) was now clean, but disagreements remained on a compliance committee/mechanism in Article 11 and the type of threshold to use for determining entry into force (Article 18).

On decision paragraphs not allocated to spin-off groups, parties engaged in a long discussion on requesting the Secretariat to “provide information on the fairness and ambition of the INDCs communicated by parties” in a paragraph on updating the INDC synthesis report.

Malaysia, for the LIKE-MINDED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (LMDCs), INDIA, Saudi Arabia, for the ARAB GROUP, and the RUSSIAN FEDERATION, among others, called for deleting the text. Others made alternative proposals, with TUVALU suggesting “information on how parties have reported on fairness and ambition.” Interested parties agreed to work on a new proposal.

Also on INDCs, parties shortly considered a paragraph on, *inter alia*, enhancing ambition, and level of ambition in INDCs compared to nationally determined contributions, and decided to return to it later.

On decision paragraphs regarding giving effect to the agreement, specifically on efforts of all actors, BOLIVIA opposed juxtaposing local communities and indigenous peoples with the private sector. The ARAB GROUP proposed deleting two paragraphs, on requesting all

actors to scale up and demonstrate efforts, cautioning against passing the burden to actors outside the Convention. Parties requested the ADP Co-Chairs to work on a new text proposal.

Parties briefly considered paragraphs on administrative and budgetary matters, agreeing that the ADP Co-Chairs would work on a proposal based on input provided.

ADP Co-Chair Reifsnnyder presented a revised proposal, for paragraphs: on taking note of the synthesis report on the aggregate effect of INDCs; noting the ambition gap; and noting expressed adaptation needs. SAINT LUCIA, opposed by the ARAB GROUP who suggested deleting reference to “degrees” altogether, called for including a request for consideration of consistency with 1.5°C scenarios. Parties decided that those interested would work on a new proposal.

In the afternoon, the ADP contact group continued its work on decision text. Brackets were removed from the paragraph on taking note of the synthesis report on the INDCs. SAINT LUCIA, supported by a number of parties, and opposed by the ARAB GROUP, introduced a new paragraph urging the update to the synthesis report to take into account 1.5°C scenarios.

After a discussion on insertion of new language and consideration of an amended paragraph on updating the synthesis report, Co-Chair Reifsnnyder asked Saint Lucia to work on an insertion to the existing paragraph on updating the synthesis report that would address the party’s concerns. Parties agreed to resume consideration of these two paragraphs at a later stage.

On the role of non-state actors, a new proposal by the Co-Chairs deleted reference to local communities and indigenous peoples in the paragraph on welcoming the efforts of all actors to address climate change, and added a new paragraph recognizing the knowledge, technologies and efforts made by local communities and indigenous peoples to address and respond to climate change.

At the request of the ARAB GROUP, two paragraphs, on non-state actors scaling up efforts and on using the NAZCA portal, were bracketed over concerns about legal implications of “inviting” non-state actors’ activities that may then cause environmental, social or other harm. Several parties emphasized the important role of non-state actors and suggested the verbs “welcoming” or “encouraging” as a compromise. The contact group will return to this issue later.

Parties considered a textual proposal by the ADP Co-Chairs for paragraphs on a body to prepare for entry into force, and converged on using an existing body, specifically the ADP under a new name, by “importing” its governance and arrangements as proposed by Colombia, for the INDEPENDENT ALLIANCE OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (AILAC).

Parties emphasized the need to convey that the ADP’s mandate was completed successfully. They agreed the Co-Chairs would revise the text to reflect that the ADP would be given, in addition to a new mandate, a new name, with suggestions ranging from intergovernmental preparatory committee (IPC) or intergovernmental negotiating committee, to *ad hoc* preparatory committee or open-ended Paris committee.

Several parties registered concerns that language on recommending decisions to the CMA from the COP would undermine the COP as the supreme body of the Convention. Co-Chair Djoghlaif said this issue would be resolved in consultation with legal experts.

In the evening, South Africa, for the G-77/CHINA, proposed that: the Secretariat provide a compilation text by 9:00am Thursday, 3 December; the contact group discuss which informal groups must continue and where no further progress is likely; and the contact group consider cross-cutting issues. She suggested that the deadline for the ADP could be extended, which NORWAY and the US opposed.

Malaysia, for the LMDCs, requested that civil society be admitted into spin-off groups and, with Maldives, for AOSIS, underlined the need to consider the number of parallel groups meeting.

The EU and Switzerland, for the Environmental Integrity Group, supported the proposal for a compilation text. Guatemala, for AILAC, supported by NORWAY and the US, suggested asking facilitators to propose bridging text, which the G-77/CHINA suggested be captured in another document.

The EU and Sudan, for the AFRICAN GROUP, supported the proposal to address cross-cutting issues in the contact group. NORWAY suggested that the ADP Co-Chairs prepare a reflection note for the Presidency, which the G-77/CHINA opposed at this time.

Co-Chair Djoghlaif stated that a compilation text capturing progress made as of 9:00pm on Wednesday, 2 December, would be available by 10:00am on Thursday, 3 December. He further stated that bridging proposals made by the co-facilitators would be available in a separate document. He stated that the contact group will consider cross-cutting issues Thursday, 3 December, followed by stocktaking in the evening.

SPIN-OFF GROUPS: Transparency (Article 9): This morning session was facilitated by Fook Seng Kwok (Singapore). Parties identified respective views: on text providing for the CMA to adopt common modalities, procedures and guidelines building on lessons learned on reporting or on arrangements related to transparency, both under the Convention; and a proposed text for a provision on providing, in the transparency framework, flexibility for developing countries, in light of their capabilities, capacities, or including capacity-building support received.

The group also discussed placing in the agreement or decision text provisions on: types or modalities of flexibility; a periodic review of future transparency modalities and guidelines; and providing for the transparency system to be guided by Convention principles and to be implemented in an, *inter alia*, non-intrusive, non-punitive manner respectful of national sovereignty. Parties discussed these paragraphs further informally.

Global Stocktake (Article 10): This morning session was facilitated by Roberto Dondisch (Mexico). Parties focused on the decision portion of the text.

On inputs to the global stocktake, parties exchanged views on, *inter alia*: connections with the long-term goal; relevance of individual and overall or aggregate efforts; outcomes of the 2013-2015 review; linkages with MRV processes; and the role of non-state actors.

Some parties preferred the no text option on inputs for the global stocktake, arguing that a prescriptive approach should be avoided and that a mandate to develop modalities was sufficient at this stage. Others disagreed, saying initial guidance to an IPC or similarly constituted body was necessary.

Parties also considered the possibility of aligning the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's work with the global stocktake and the degree of specificity needed in the modalities for the IPC. Parties will consider agreement and decision text together, on 3 December.

Workstream 2: In the morning, Co-Facilitator Aya Yoshida (Japan) reported that informals resulted in clean paragraphs on inviting developed countries to increase pledges under the Cancun Agreements, housing of the mitigation technical examination process (TEP) and assessment of the TEP.

On accelerated implementation, parties made progress on reducing options and agreed to discuss the issue further in bilaterals. One party proposed language in the mitigation section on welcoming the Montreal Protocol's work on HFCs, and the importance of addressing shipping and aviation emissions. With many opposing introducing language at this point, parties agreed to return to this issue at the next spin-off group. A proposal on streamlining the adaptation section was circulated for consideration in afternoon informals.

Mitigation (Article 3, 3bis and 3ter): In the afternoon, the group heard reports from the facilitators of the party-led informal discussions on: features; individual and differentiated efforts, progression, ambition and framing; accounting; timing; support; cooperative approaches and mechanisms; and REDD+.

The reports reflected parties' textual work, small but significant progress in identifying clearer options in the draft agreement, and the wish of parties to continue their work. The group observed that parties' views continued to differ on, *inter alia*: support; differentiation; and accounting. Co-Facilitator Franz Perrez (Switzerland) reported back from consultations with parties on unilateral measures, international transport and regional economic integration organizations.

He noted work by two parties on a textual proposal on response measures, and, in response to several requests, said that he would notify those parties to invite the G-77/China representative on this issue to join in on this work.

INDIA indicated interest in further consultations on unilateral measures. BRAZIL emphasized the importance of the concept of "developed country parties taking the lead."

Technology Development and Transfer (Article 7): In the afternoon, the group discussed bridging proposals on long-term vision and technology framework that parties had worked on during informals. Swaziland, for the AFRICAN GROUP, proposed a new paragraph as an alternative option.

CHINA and UKRAINE, opposed by some parties, introduced amendments highlighting attention to developing countries and economies in transition respectively. INDIA called for language on promoting access to technologies. A few parties noted that Swaziland's proposal was no longer a bridging one with the amendments introduced. Co-Facilitator Tosi Mpanu-Mpanu (Democratic Republic of the Congo) said only the original bridging proposals would be carried over.

SUBSIDIARY BODIES

CONTACT GROUPS: Forum and Work Programme on Response Measures (SBI/SBSTA): SBI Chair Amena Yauvoli and SBSTA Chair Lidia Wojtal opened the contact group, co-facilitated by Delano Verwey (the Netherlands) and Eduardo Calvo (Peru), which considered draft decision text. The US said the text needed further consideration and that, because of ongoing negotiations under the ADP, the US would not be "in a position to adopt the decision text."

The EU noted that the text attempts to bridge different visions, but acknowledged the need to know how all discussions on this issue in Paris will come together. Argentina, for the G-77/CHINA, Ghana, for the AFRICAN GROUP, and SAUDI ARABIA expressed concern around linking this item to the ADP, with SINGAPORE suggesting the draft decision would focus on pre-2020 measures. The EU said the pre-2020 focus is not indicated in the text. Parties agreed to continue discussions in informal consultations.

IN THE CORRIDORS

On Day 3, the Paris conference hit full swing, with negotiators disappearing into multiple simultaneous "informal informals" in Hall 6. Beyond the work of the ADP, delegates turned attention to the ongoing work of the Convention. A lunchtime consultation on finance sought to elucidate how discussions on finance under the different bodies, the COP, SBSTA, SCF, and ADP, relate to each other. A seasoned observer suggested the event had been useful while another wished for clarity on the way forward.

In the ADP, many found the spirit to be positive and felt that areas of convergence were finally being harvested. At the same time, some were dismayed at the slow pace and about what was characterized as a tense atmosphere in the ADP contact group, all with eyes toward the looming ADP deadline.

As the ADP evening stocktaking closed, many worried about the large amount of text still to be addressed, with one party saying that "now is the time to reflect that we might not deliver what we want to deliver by next week." With formal consultations on the mode of work for the second week commencing, some observers still hoped for demonstrable progress under the ADP before the text is handed off.

PARIS HIGHLIGHTS: THURSDAY, 3 DECEMBER 2015

On Thursday, 3 December, the ADP 2-12 contact group continued consideration of the negotiating text of the agreement and associated decisions. Spin-off groups and informal informals under the ADP addressed: preamble and purpose/general; mitigation; adaptation, and loss and damage; finance; technology development and transfer; capacity building; transparency; global stocktake; implementation and compliance, and final clauses; and workstream 2.

Contact groups and informal consultations continued throughout the day under the COP, SBI and SBSTA.

ADP

CONTACT GROUP: In the morning, the ADP contact group discussed decision text on: a facilitative dialogue; request to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) for a special report; decisions to give effect to the new agreement; and adoption of the agreement.

On a facilitative dialogue, several parties proposed a wider scope, beyond mitigation. The EU expressed flexibility on this, suggesting referring to the purpose of the agreement. CHINA and SAUDI ARABIA expressed concern that a facilitative dialogue could represent an *ex ante* review and opposed this. The EU and the US said a dialogue would inform the next round of INDCs.

On the request to the IPCC to provide a special report on the impact of a temperature increase of 1.5°C, SAUDI ARABIA and others questioned its added value beyond the IPCC assessment reports. TUVALU noted that newer information may be available that was not considered during the last assessment report cycle. INDIA and CHINA underscored the need for information on how to achieve temperature goals. Several parties requested, and ADP Co-Chair Daniel Reifsnyder agreed, to consult with the IPCC.

On decisions to give effect to the new agreement, ADP Co-Chair Reifsnyder presented, and parties agreed to, a proposal to create a new section of the decision for the paragraphs on all actors. With the clarification that parties “welcome,” rather than “invite,” all actors to scale up and demonstrate efforts, parties removed the brackets around these paragraphs.

On adoption of the agreement, ADP Co-Chair Ahmed Djoghlaif then presented a proposal to rename the ADP as the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on the Paris Outcome (APO), and that the APO: prepare for the entry into force of the agreement and

convene the first session of the CMA; oversee implementation of the work programme resulting from relevant requests in the decision; report to the COP; and hold its first session in 2016.

TUVALU, supported by SAUDI ARABIA, COLOMBIA and others, suggested adding a new paragraph, after clarifying that the ADP has finished its mandate, which decides to establish the APO. The US, CHINA, SAUDI ARABIA, IRAN and others, asked for more clarity on the working modalities, particularly chairing arrangements.

In the afternoon, the contact group discussed differentiation with all parties agreeing that the new agreement needs to reflect differentiation. Several parties observed the need to recognize the special circumstances of small island developing states (SIDS) and LDCs, with SAUDI ARABIA noting that this is already in the Convention.

Sudan, for the AFRICAN GROUP, proposed a formula for relevant sections: state the level of obligation or precision for developed and developing countries; provide flexibility for developing countries, such as “all countries willing to do so,” which Tuvalu, for the LDCs, supported; and provide further flexibility for African countries, LDCs and SIDS. CHINA and INDIA opposed phrases such as “willing to do so.”

Saying the world has not changed, Malaysia, for the LMDCs, underlined that historical responsibility lies with developed countries. He underscored that developed countries have yet to meet their Convention or Protocol obligations regarding mitigation and MOI, which the EU and AUSTRALIA disputed in their cases.

On mitigation, the EU, Colombia, for AILAC, the US and others said that the INDCs imply self-differentiation. The EU stated all countries should seek economy-wide targets but there should not be shared timelines. The US added that developing countries should be eligible for support in implementing their contributions, and that LDCs and others should have flexibility to submit at their discretion without expectation. JAPAN stated that only vulnerable countries should have “partly conditional” INDCs.

The AFRICAN GROUP and LMDCs underlined that developed country parties should have quantified economy-wide targets. SOUTH AFRICA said binding obligations to implement should “back up” developed countries’ commitment to take the lead.

On finance, the EU, NEW ZEALAND and the US stated developed countries should meet their obligations, and that others in a position to do so should contribute. AILAC envisioned CBDR and respective capabilities (CBDRRC) and



developed country parties and countries “willing to do so” providing support. The LMDCs underlined that finance should be from developed to developing countries.

On transparency, the LDCs opposed a one-size-fits-all approach to reporting. The EU, AILAC, the US and others supported a common framework, with flexibility regarding the timing and detail in the reporting, and with support to developing countries.

In the evening, Co-Chair Reifsnyder proposed, on the mode of work, concluding the work of the spin-off groups and producing a new Co-Chairs’ compilation text that both brings together progress made and provides bridging proposals developed in consultations with spin-off group co-facilitators, to be considered by the contact group on Friday, 4 December. This was supported by the EU, NORWAY and TURKEY.

BOLIVIA expressed “profound disappointment” over parties inserting “no text” options on issues that are of great interest to developing countries in the adaptation spin-off group. The LMDCs urged consideration of issues important to developing countries in good faith.

TUVALU expressed worry that there had not yet been substantive discussions on loss and damage.

The EU emphasized that his commitment to mobilize climate finance would continue after 2020 and the US\$100 billion commitment could be scaled up with an expansion of the donor base.

After consultations, the G-77/CHINA proposed that: the Co-Chairs produce an updated, clean and streamlined text; clear options and bridging proposals be kept in a separate document; spin-off groups be used when necessary; and the contact group agree on the text for consideration by the COP.

ADP Co-Chair Reifsnyder responded that the G-77/CHINA proposal was in line with what he had proposed and parties agreed to the mode of work. He adjourned the session noting that the Co-Chairs would be meeting with the co-facilitators overnight.

SPIN-OFF GROUPS: Mitigation (Article 3, 3bis and 3ter)

In the morning, a spin-off group co-facilitated by Franz Perrez (Switzerland) convened to review the compilation text, and new agreement and decision text proposals prepared by the co-facilitator and two party facilitators that sought to capture existing options on: accounting, and methods and guidance; and cooperative approaches and a mechanism to support sustainable development. He requested parties examine whether the texts reflected parties’ views, stressing they were intended only to provide a better starting point for discussions.

On the compilation text, parties briefly discussed the treatment of support in the agreement article and agreed to an amended footnote that states that “this is a placeholder until decided where support should be dealt with.”

On the text proposals on accounting, and methods and guidance, parties, *inter alia*, bracketed references to land use, to enable more parties to engage on related options.

On the text proposals on cooperative approaches and mechanisms, parties made minor amendments. In response to several parties’ requests to add references to INDCs alongside those to nationally determined mitigation contributions/ nationally determined mitigation commitments or contributions, Co-Facilitator Perrez clarified that existing references were placeholders, and there was a “clear understanding” that this cross-cutting issue would be solved “in the end.” Parties agreed to add the references and refer the issue to the ADP Co-Chairs.

Parties also agreed to forward the new text proposals, as amended, to the contact group as a starting point for discussions.

Finance (Article 6): In the morning, Co-Facilitator Georg Børsting (Norway) proposed to undertake a read-through of the text to identify areas of convergence.

On institutional arrangements, bridging proposals that parties had worked on during informals were introduced. Parties discussed, *inter alia*: the necessity of listing existing funds in the text; relevance of existing guidance from the COP to the operating entities; and the ability of the CMA to recommend decisions to the COP.

Several parties recommended keeping the language simple and succinct. A few parties suggested returning to this section at a later stage. Co-Facilitator Børsting requested Gabriela Blatter (Switzerland) and Rafael da Soler (Brazil) to further refine the bridging proposals.

Parties then exchanged views on the special treatment and access modalities for LDCs and African countries, and the status of paragraphs on enabling environments, results-based payments, carbon pricing and variety of sources, among others.

In the afternoon, new textual proposals, emphasizing climate finance as specifically defined in the new agreement, developing country parties’ needs, and food security, among others, prompted many parties to express concerns about little progress. One group suggested “moving on to the next stage at the political level.”

Ensuing discussions focused on, *inter alia*, the need to simplify procedures for accessing financial resources; and whether certain provisions on MRV of support could be better placed within the transparency section of the agreement.

Parties agreed on language stating that the provision of financial resources should or shall aim to achieve a balance between adaption and mitigation, taking into account country-driven strategies, and the priorities and needs of developing country parties.

Preamble, and Purpose/General (Article 2 and 2bis):

Co-Facilitator Diann Black-Layne (Antigua and Barbuda) presented an update from informal work on general (Article 2bis), reflecting work advanced after the Thursday, 3 December compilation of the text. Parties made minor revisions to the text. Co-Facilitator George Wamukoya (Kenya) presented an updated version of purpose (Article 2) based on informal work.

One party, opposed by another, suggested replacing “transformation” with “tractable shift” in a paragraph referencing sustainable development.

On a paragraph on principles, many parties called for references to human rights and gender equality.

Parties then considered all preambular paragraphs in order, using a version of the text developed during informal work. With many saying that terms or concepts fall outside the Convention, parties remained divided on paragraphs regarding, *inter alia*: vulnerability; historical emissions; human rights; food security; land use; forestry; sinks and reservoirs; and carbon pricing.

The co-facilitators explained that they, with the Secretariat, would attempt to capture all the bracketing and textual suggestions made, and use them to guide their consultations with parties. Work continued in an informal informal in the afternoon.

Transparency (Article 9): In the afternoon spin-off group facilitated by Fook Seng Kwok (Singapore), discussions focused on revised text on agreement paragraphs related to the purpose of transparency systems for action and support, and provision of information, and on decision text paragraphs related to transparency. On Co-Facilitator Kwok’s invitation, parties shared their concerns and provided specific proposals and amendments.

On the paragraphs on provision of information, some countries expressed hesitance to language on, *inter alia*, frequency, pointing to a lack of textual assurances of support to improving national capabilities. Others expressed willingness to explore text that would provide such assurances.

On the decision paragraphs, parties discussed, *inter alia*, the level of detail required in providing guidance for development of modalities and procedures for transparency.

Parties agreed that Co-Facilitator Kwok develop a bridging proposal for Friday, 4 December, on all text related to transparency, based on text developed by the group jointly, and on parties' oral and textual inputs submitted to the co-facilitator by 7:00pm on Thursday, 3 December.

Workstream 2: In the afternoon, Co-Facilitator Aya Yoshida (Japan) reported that the evening spin-off group was able to remove many brackets and insert bridging text. Turning to the mitigation section, parties removed some brackets and introduced compromise language on paragraphs related to the TEP, TEMs, summary for policymakers and "co-champions."

A party reported some progress in informal discussions about adaptation, but said there is no consensus on the content, institutional location and timing of a proposed adaptation TEP. One group of parties opposed housing it under an existing institution.

On support, parties introduced language recalling decision 1/CP.19 (Further Advancing the Durban Platform), paragraphs 3 and 4(e).

Parties then turned briefly to the preamble of the workstream 2 draft decision. After disagreement on whether a party could insert, in brackets, two new preambular paragraphs referencing the Montreal Protocol's work on HFCs and transport emissions, Co-Facilitator Yoshida said she would consult with the ADP Co-Chairs on remaining contentious issues.

Global Stocktake (Article 10): In the afternoon, Co-Facilitator Roberto Dondisch (Mexico) presented proposed agreement and decision text. A number of parties felt the proposal reflected substantial progress.

One party suggested deleting a decision paragraph requesting the SBSTA to provide advice on how the IPCC assessment reports could inform the stocktaking. Another requested adding CBDRRC, which was then bracketed.

One party requested bracketing text on MOI, the "outcome" of the stocktake and purpose, in the agreement text. One group of parties requested adding a paragraph in the agreement stating that developing country parties' participation depends on provision of financial resources.

After extensive debate on which version of the text to forward to the contact group, parties agreed that the co-facilitator and Secretariat would capture the discussions in a revised version of the proposal to be presented to the contact group in brackets.

Technology Development and Transfer (Article 7): The afternoon spin-off group considered a bridging proposal prepared by Co-Facilitator Tosi Mpanu-Mpanu (Democratic Republic of the Congo) on institutional arrangements for both the agreement and decision portions of the text. Parties were supportive of the bridging proposal in general with minor edits.

Views diverged on whether to include language requesting the TEC and CTCN to support implementation of the Paris agreement by strengthening work on technology research, development and demonstration. The bridging proposal will replace the existing paragraph on this issue in the compilation text.

COP 21

CONTACT GROUPS: Climate Finance Items: In the morning, Co-Chair Andrés Mogro (Ecuador) and Mark Storey (Sweden) introduced the items on long-term finance and the report of the SCF. The EU noted this is "the right place to discuss pre-2020 finance." Bolivia, for the G-77/CHINA, requested a workshop on finance needs of developing countries,

in particular for adaptation, in 2016. Malawi, for the LDCs, emphasized, *inter alia*, improving procedures to facilitate access to finance.

On the report of the SCF, the G-77/CHINA emphasized, *inter alia*, financing for forests, transaction costs of climate finance and MRV of finance.

On the GCF and GEF reports, Co-Chairs Ayman Shasly (Saudi Arabia) and Stefan Schwager (Switzerland) introduced these items. The G-77/CHINA queried whether discussions on complementarity had begun between the GCF and GEF with regards to financing of biennial update reports.

The EU, with South Africa, for the AFRICAN GROUP, proposed working on the basis of the draft decisions contained in the SCF report. Palau, for AOSIS, suggested focusing on streamlining application processes. Parties will submit their proposals in advance of the next session.

SUBSIDIARY BODIES

CONTACT GROUPS: Forum and Work Programme on Response Measures (SBI/SBSTA): The group agreed to forward to the COP the draft decision and draft conclusions prepared, on the basis of parties' input, by the co-facilitators with help of the Secretariat. SBI Chair Amena Yauvoli (Fiji) and SBSTA Chair Lidia Wojtal (Poland) thanked parties and co-facilitators Delano Verwey (the Netherlands) and Eduardo Calvo (Peru).

2013-2015 Review (SBI/SBSTA): Co-Chair Gertraud Wollansky (Austria) opened the session. In the draft text, the PHILIPPINES, supported by BANGLADESH, introduced language reflecting the human rights consequences of a global average temperature increase of 2°C. Co-Chair Wollansky then presented a "tool" prepared by the Co-Chairs with four options on outcomes for this item.

Many parties preferred option 3, which contains procedural and substantive conclusions. Saudi Arabia, for the ARAB GROUP, preferring only procedural conclusions, opposed. As views remained divergent, this item will be forwarded for consideration by the COP.

IN THE CORRIDORS

As spin-off group co-facilitators walked into the evening ADP contact group on Thursday, their faces betrayed the last-minute push many had given to close on as much text as possible before the 6:00pm deadline. One delegate noted that progress had been highly uneven, with some success in capturing low-hanging, non-controversial text in some groups.

Earlier in the day, a negotiator emerging from the finance spin-off group worried that the text had actually regressed, saying the options were less clear than they were just a day before, and wondering how ministers would negotiate on such a basis. One particularly disheartened delegate likened moving the negotiations to the next stage as "a matter of survival."

According to some, placement of cross-cutting issues "continued to bedevil the negotiators." Many issues in mitigation, finance and transparency were flagged as belonging to multiple sections, with views differing on where. Meanwhile, the ADP engaged in retracing their positions on differentiation, albeit with a new fervor, which led one observer to wonder if the exchange wasted valuable hours.

As focus started to shift to the new consolidated draft that the Co-Chairs would release in the morning of Friday, 4 December, many looked forward to a good night of sleep ahead of what promised to be a very full day of negotiations.



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PARIS HIGHLIGHTS:

FRIDAY, 4 DECEMBER 2015

On Friday, 4 December, the ADP contact group considered a revised compilation text throughout the day. In the morning and afternoon, informal consultations and contact groups finalized work under the SBs, and a contact group under the COP took place. The SBI and SBSTA closing plenaries took place in the evening.

ADP CONTACT GROUP

In the morning, ADP Co-Chair Ahmed Djoghlaif invited comments on two documents, a revised draft agreement and decision text on workstreams 1 and 2, "the compilation text," and a document containing the work of the ADP contact group incorporating bridging proposals by the co-facilitators, "the compilation text with bridging proposals," both issued on Friday, 4 December, at 10:00am.

South Africa, for the G-77/CHINA, requested time to consult, noting the group's surprise that the second document contained bridging proposals embedded within the compilation text. Indicating readiness to work with the texts, the EU noted that seeing bridging proposals in a textual context was helpful.

Malaysia, for the LMDCs, underscored the understanding that only the revised draft agreement was to be treated as a working document and that the Secretariat would highlight the bridging proposals in the second document. Co-Chair Djoghlaif then suspended the contact group to allow for groups to consult.

In the afternoon, parties considered the compilation text and the compilation text with bridging proposals. Co-Chair Djoghlaif proposed that parties complete a first reading of the text without spin-off groups, with the aim of creating a shorter but comprehensive document for the ministers.

South Africa, for the G-77/CHINA, supported by many parties, expressed willingness to negotiate on the basis of the compilation text with bridging proposals, and proposed that parties be allowed to insert language where necessary and meet separately to discuss specific proposals.

On purpose/general (Articles 2 and 2bis), Co-Chair Djoghlaif suggested progress was not yet possible. Several parties raised points of order, noting it was only the first reading and parties should be allowed to comment.

After comments on Articles 2 and 2bis and interventions on the mode of work, the Co-Chairs and the COP 21 Presidency consulted on the way forward.

Laurence Tubiana, COP 21 Presidency, highlighted that the compilation text with bridging proposals provides a "good base" and urged parties to focus on producing a text for the COP. Malaysia, for the LMDCs, proposed that parties be allowed to identify key elements of concern that, together with the compilation text with bridging proposals, would be forwarded for negotiations under the COP.

After TUVALU, the US, the EU, VENEZUELA, CUBA and COLOMBIA expressed general support for using the compilation text with bridging proposals in line with the LMDCs' proposal, parties began indicating key elements of concern.

On mitigation (Article 3), the EU, supported by Colombia, for AILAC, Maldives, for AOSIS, and the US called for clarifying the date for the submission of contributions. NICARAGUA and BOLIVIA called for Mother Earth to be reinserted in the text.

At the end of a preambular paragraph on special needs, EL SALVADOR requested adding "and the Central American isthmus." In a paragraph on the long-term vision for technology development and transfer (Article 7), MEXICO asked that "socially and environmentally sound technology" be reinserted.

In the evening, parties continued to identify key elements that they wished to be reflected. On mitigation (Article 3), BOLIVIA, with VENEZUELA, urged the inclusion of non-market mechanisms.

On finance (Article 6), Costa Rica, for AILAC, asked for a clear roadmap, including a short-term goal, and balance between mitigation and adaptation. She said that language on vulnerability was being coordinated within the G-77/China.

On purpose (Article 2), VENEZUELA supported "stabilization" of GHG emissions and, with SAUDI ARABIA and PAKISTAN, opposed the inclusion of "decarbonization" and "carbon neutrality." KYRGYZSTAN asked to include vulnerability of mountains in the preambular section.

TUVALU urged reinsertion of language on loss and damage that preserves the issue as an independent article. CHINA, among others, called for the CMA to determine cycles after 2030.

On adaptation (Article 4), Bolivia, for the G-77/CHINA, asked to include details on a long-term vision and urged avoiding prescriptive language.

The G-77/CHINA said MRV of finance from developed countries is missing in finance (Article 6), and INDIA urged inclusion of such MRV in transparency (Article 9). The AFRICAN GROUP called exclusion of "African countries" from preambular paragraphs on specific needs "a red line."

Adjourning the meeting, Co-Chair Djoghlaif indicated, and parties agreed, that a reflection note capturing parties' comments would be provided alongside the compilation text with bridging proposals and that work would resume in the morning, on Saturday, 4 December.

COP 21

CONTACT GROUPS: Joint Implementation (JI): This contact group, co-chaired by Yaw Osafo (Ghana), met in the morning. The EU called for, *inter alia*: reviewing changes necessary to the rules of procedure of the JI Supervisory Committee (JISC); providing a mandate to the JISC for third-party review; and taking concerns of stakeholders into account.



JAPAN stressed the importance of revitalizing JI. SWITZERLAND asked for an analysis on the role of JI beyond 2020, and synergies with other market mechanisms. Parties agreed that the Co-Chairs would prepare a draft decision for consideration at the next contact group meeting.

SBI CLOSING PLENARY

ORGANIZATIONAL MATTERS: Election of Officers Other than the Chair: SBI Chair Amena Yauvoli (Fiji) said that consultations on the nomination of the SBI Vice-Chair had been concluded, but no nominations had been received for the SBI Rapporteur.

The SBI agreed to nominate Zhihua Chen (China) as the SBI Vice-Chair and that Sidat Yaffa (The Gambia) shall remain in office until his replacement has been elected.

REPORTING FROM AND REVIEW OF ANNEX I PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION: Outcome of the First Round of the IAR Process (2014-2015): The SBI adopted conclusions (FCCC/SBI/2015/L.20).

Revision of the "Guidelines for the Preparation of National Communications by Parties Included in Annex I to the Convention Part II: UNFCCC Reporting Guidelines on National Communications": The SBI adopted conclusions (FCCC/SBI/2015/L.23).

REPORTING FROM NON-ANNEX I PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION: Work of the Consultative Group of Experts on National Communications from Non-Annex I Parties to the Convention: The SBI adopted conclusions (FCCC/SBI/2015/L.21).

Provision of Financial and Technical Support: The SBI adopted conclusions (FCCC/SBI/2015/L.24).

MATTERS RELATED TO THE MECHANISMS UNDER THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: Review of the Modalities and Procedures for the CDM: The SBI adopted conclusions (FCCC/SBI/2015/L.28).

Review of the JI Guidelines: The SBI adopted conclusions (FCCC/SBI/2015/L.30).

Modalities for Expediting the Continued Issuance, Transfer and Acquisition of JI ERUs: The SBI adopted conclusions (FCCC/SBI/2015/L.25).

MATTERS RELATING TO LDCS: The SBI adopted conclusions (FCCC/SBI/2015/L.22).

NATIONAL ADAPTATION PLANS: The SBI adopted conclusions and forwarded a draft decision (FCCC/SBI/2015/L.32 and Add.1) for consideration and adoption by COP 21.

REPORT OF THE ADAPTATION COMMITTEE: The SBI adopted conclusions and forwarded a draft decision for consideration and adoption by COP 21 (FCCC/SB/2015/L.3).

REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE WIM: The SBI adopted conclusions and forwarded a draft decision for consideration and adoption by COP 21 (FCCC/SB/2015/L.5).

DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGIES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TECHNOLOGY MECHANISM: Joint Annual Report of the TEC and the CTCN: The SBI adopted conclusions and forwarded a draft decision for consideration and adoption by COP 21 (FCCC/SB/2015/L.4).

Poznan Strategic Programme on Technology Transfer: The SBI adopted conclusions (FCCC/SBI/2015/L.29).

CAPACITY-BUILDING: Capacity-Building Under the Convention: Several Parties expressed willingness to further engage constructively on this item under the COP. The US, AUSTRALIA and JAPAN raised concerns about the process in which the draft conclusions were reached.

SWAZILAND, supported by the GAMBIA, noted the draft text "provides a landing ground and marks the beginning of defining capacity building."

The EU understood the need to strengthen capacity-building institutions under the Convention as "our common vision" and hoped for the establishment of a capacity-building committee as an outcome of COP 21.

Senegal, for the LDCs, with the PHILIPPINES, thanked the EU for their positive spirit that has allowed capacity building to be taken up at a higher level. BURUNDI lamented that "the text is still bracketed" and emphasized capacity building as necessary for her country to adapt to climate change impacts.

The SBI adopted conclusions and forwarded draft decision text to the COP for further consideration (FCCC/SBI/2015/L.33).

Capacity Building under the Kyoto Protocol: The SBI adopted conclusions (FCCC/SBI/2015/L.34).

IMPACT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESPONSE MEASURES: Forum and Work Programme: The SBI adopted conclusions (FCCC/SB/2015/L.6).

Matters Relating to Protocol Article 3.14: The SBI agreed to continue consultations on this sub-item at SBI 44.

Progress on the Implementation of Decision 1/CP.10: The SBI agreed to continue consultations on this sub-item at SBI 44.

THE 2013-2015 REVIEW: SBI Chair Yauvoli reported that parties had been unable to complete work on this matter. The SBI agreed, on the basis of Decision 2/CP.17 (outcome of the work of the AWG-LCA) paragraph 166 (requesting the SBs to report on their considerations and findings to the COP), that the SBI and SBSTA Chairs seek the guidance of the COP on the matter.

Expressing extreme disappointment over the inability to complete the mandate of the review, Maldives, for AOSIS, stressed that the findings of the review underscore that the "guardrail of 2°C is wholly inadequate" and that "no outcome on the review is not an option."

Deploing the lack of agreement on a COP decision on the matter, SWITZERLAND suggested parties were nevertheless in an "excellent position" to fulfill the mandate of the review.

Expressing disappointment that the contact group had not been able to agree on draft conclusions or "provide draft text to the COP," the EU called on all parties to engage on the issue, noting that, for the most vulnerable countries "below 2°C is not enough."

GENDER AND CLIMATE CHANGE: The SBI adopted conclusions (FCCC/SBI/2015/L.31).

ADMINISTRATIVE, FINANCIAL AND INSTITUTIONAL MATTERS: Budget Performance for the Biennium 2014-2015 and Audit Report and Financial Statements for 2014: On these agenda sub-items, the SBI jointly adopted conclusions and forwarded draft decisions for consideration and adoption by COP 21 and CMP 11 (FCCC/SBI/2015/L.26 and L.27).

CLOSURE AND REPORT OF THE SESSION: During closing statements, South Africa, for the G-77/CHINA, called for, *inter alia*: the adoption of a decision on response measures; establishment, in Paris, of the necessary institutions to enhance capacity building; and enhancement of information provided in the IAR on support to developing countries.

Sudan, for the AFRICAN GROUP, lamented insufficient time to complete consideration of some issues, while welcoming progress on others.

Maldives, for AOSIS, called for the COP Presidency to take up the issue of 1.5°C "with some urgency" so as to ensure a substantive agreement on the 2013-2015 review.

Australia, for the UMBRELLA GROUP, expressed disappointment over parties' inability to agree on how to communicate the 2013-2015 review outcome.

Emphasizing that the final report of the structured expert dialogue (SED) "sends a very clear signal that the 2°C limit is inadequate," Angola, for the LDCs, expressed disappointment that a "handful of countries" did not engage to reach a substantive outcome on the review.

The EU highlighted progress on adaptation, the WIM, technology transfer and cooperation, and gender mainstreaming, as well as some progress on market mechanisms, with the exception of the CDM review.

CAN, for ENGOs, expressed deep concern about the failed outcome of the review. Underscoring that some delegations rely on technical assistance from NGOs, Climate Justice Now! (CJN!), for ENGOs, called on the COP 21 Presidency to ensure "a fair, just and transparent process forward."

YOUTH NGOs (YOUNGOs) emphasized that the work of the SBI is crucial for implementation of mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage. The Secretariat informed parties of the administrative and budgetary implications of the conclusions adopted by the SBI.

SBI Rapporteur Sidat Yaffa (The Gambia) presented, and the SBI adopted, the draft report of SBI 43 (FCCC/SBI/2015/L.19). SBI Chair Yauvoli thanked all delegates for their work and noted SBI 43 accomplished much work, including the completion of the first round of IAR. SBI 43 was gavelled to a close at 9:23pm.

SBSTA CLOSING PLENARY

ORGANIZATIONAL MATTERS: Election of Officers Other than the Chair: SBSTA Chair Lidia Wojtal (Poland) announced that Tibor Schaffhauser (Hungary) would serve as SBSTA Vice Chair and Aderito Santana (São Tomé and Príncipe) would serve as Rapporteur.

NAIROBI WORK PROGRAMME: The SBSTA adopted the conclusions (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/L.19).

REPORT OF THE ADAPTATION COMMITTEE: The SBSTA adopted the conclusions and forwarded a draft decision for consideration and adoption by the COP (FCCC/SB/2015/L.3).

DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGIES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TECHNOLOGY MECHANISM: Joint Annual Report of the TEC and the CTCN: The SBSTA adopted the conclusions and forwarded a draft decision for consideration and adoption by the COP (FCCC/SB/2015/L.4).

ISSUES RELATING TO AGRICULTURE: SBSTA Chair Wojtal clarified that references to paragraphs 87 to 89 should read 83 to 89, and with this editorial amendment, the SBSTA adopted the conclusions (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/L.17).

REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE WIM: The SBSTA adopted the conclusions and forwarded a draft decision for consideration and adoption by the COP (FCCC/SB/2015/L.5).

MATTERS RELATING TO SCIENCE AND REVIEW: Research and Systematic Observation: The SBSTA adopted the conclusions (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/L.18).

The 2013-2015 Review: SBSTA Chair Wojtal reported that parties were unable to reach agreement on this item and will seek the guidance of the COP.

NORWAY, the US, JAPAN and SAINT LUCIA expressed their disappointment that the contact group was unable to agree to a decision on this item.

IMPACT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESPONSE MEASURES: Forum and Work Programme: The SBSTA adopted the conclusions and forwarded a draft decision for consideration and adoption by the COP (FCCC/SB/2015/L.6).

Matters Relating to Protocol Article 2.3: SBSTA Chair Wojtal recalled that this agenda sub-item was considered with the forum and work programme and that this would be reflected in the meeting report.

METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES UNDER THE CONVENTION: Methodologies for the Reporting of Financial Information by Annex I Parties to the Convention: The SBSTA adopted the conclusions and forwarded a draft decision for consideration and adoption by the COP (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/L.22).

Emissions from Bunker Fuels: The SBSTA adopted conclusions (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/L.16).

METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES UNDER THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: Implications of the Implementation of Decisions 2/CMP.7 to 4/CMP.7 and 1/CMP.8 on the Previous Decisions on Methodological Issues Related to the Kyoto Protocol, Including Those Relating to Articles 5, 7 and 8 of the Kyoto Protocol: The SBSTA adopted conclusions and forwarded a draft decision for consideration and adoption by the COP (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/L.27, Add.1 and Add. 2).

Accounting, Reporting and Review Requirements for Annex I Parties without QELRCs for the Second Commitment Period: The SBSTA adopted conclusions (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/L.28).

Clarification of the Text in Section G (Article 3.7ter) of the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol: The SBSTA adopted conclusions and forwarded a draft decision for consideration and adoption by the COP (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/L.29 and Add.1).

LULUCF under Protocol Article 3.3 and 3.4, and under the CDM: The SBSTA adopted conclusions (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/L.20).

MARKET AND NON-MARKET MECHANISMS UNDER THE CONVENTION: SBSTA Chair Wojtal reported that parties could not reach agreement on this issue for any of the sub-items: the framework for various approaches; non-market based approaches; and new market-based approaches. She said that, according to Rule 16 of the draft rules of procedure being applied, this item would be taken up at the next SBSTA session.

REPORTS ON OTHER ACTIVITIES: Annual Report on the Technical Review of GHG Inventories from Annex I Parties to the Convention: The SBSTA adopted the draft conclusions and forwarded a draft decision for consideration and adoption by the COP (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/L.21 and Add.1).

Annual Report on the Technical Review of Annex I Parties' GHG Inventories and Other Information Reported by Annex I Parties, as Defined in Protocol Article 1.7: The SBSTA adopted conclusions and forwarded a draft decision for consideration and adoption by the COP (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/L.30 and Add.1).

CLOSURE OF THE SESSION: SBSTA Rapporteur Stasile Znutiene (Lithuania) presented, and the SBSTA adopted, its report (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/L.15).

South Africa, for the G-77/CHINA, said that the negative implications of response measures on developing countries must be minimized. On bunker fuels, he underscored that this issue should be dealt with multilaterally.

The EU highlighted the package of decisions on methodological issues under the Kyoto Protocol as key to ending the "long preparatory work" for the implementation of the second commitment period.

Australia, for the UMBRELLA GROUP, welcomed the finalization of rules for the second commitment period.

Maldives, for AOSIS, emphasized that outcomes of the SED include support of the 1.5°C long-term global goal and expressed dismay that the actions of a few countries prevented the communication of these findings to the COP.

Angola, for the LDCs, emphasized the importance of discussing the review under the COP.

Sudan, for the AFRICAN GROUP, expressed concern where no progress was made due to time constraints.

SAINT LUCIA said that with the delivery of a set of rules regarding the second commitment period, parties can look forward to additional ratifications and the period's entry into force.

YOUNGOs called for, *inter alia*, a globally funded feed-in tariff scheme, and avoiding land-based sequestration as the science behind this is "questionable."

CAN, for ENGOS, underscored that ICAO and IMO are failing to address the significant impacts of aviation and shipping.

CIN!, for ENGOS, opposed the inclusion of "false solutions," calling for an end to discussions on market-based approaches.

FARMERS urged more inclusive processes for the next agriculture workshop to allow the constituency to share their knowledge.

Thanking everyone for their efforts during this intensive and brief SBSTA session, SBSTA Chair Wojtal gavelled the meeting to a close at 10:26pm.

IN THE CORRIDORS

Friday morning opened with delegates frantically trying to "digest" the two new documents produced overnight by the ADP Co-Chairs in cooperation with the co-facilitators. Many worried about bridging proposals being incorporated into the compilation text, both for their loss of visibility and the unclear status of this new text.

Tensions ran high in the ADP contact group as the Saturday, 5 December deadline loomed for the ADP to transmit text to the COP. The mode of work for the second week thus became a hotly anticipated question. One delegate speculated that ministers would be asked to chair spin-off groups. Another wondered if ministers should be convened in a roundtable format. An optimistic participant hoped that the transparent process in week one would not be lost in week two.

Indeed, Laurence Tubiana, for the COP Presidency, repeatedly assured the ADP contact group that "negotiations haven't ended" and the focus now had to be on a "smooth transition" of the text to the COP.



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PARIS HIGHLIGHTS: SATURDAY, 5 DECEMBER 2015

On Saturday, 5 December, the ADP contact group convened in the morning, followed by the ADP closing plenary, which adopted its conclusions, and forwarded the draft agreement and decision to the COP. The COP met in the evening to hear the report of the ADP. Informal consultations under the COP and the CMP continued throughout the day.

ADP

CONTACT GROUP: In the morning, ADP Co-Chair Daniel Reifsnyder presented ADP draft conclusions (FCCC/ADP/2015/L.6), with the draft agreement and decision text on workstream 1 and 2 in annex I, and a reflection note in annex II. He explained that the draft text had not changed from the compilation text with bridging proposals, and that the reflection note contained the comments made during those discussions. He said that, should there be a comment that a party was unable to make due to time constraints, or an inaccuracy or omission in the reflection note, parties could make submissions until 1:00pm on Saturday, 5 December.

Parties agreed to forward the draft conclusions to the ADP plenary.

CLOSING PLENARY: ADP Co-Chair Reifsnyder opened the plenary. After thanking the parties and co-facilitators for their hard work and dedication, ADP Co-Chair Reifsnyder turned to ADP agenda item 3 (implementation of all the elements of Decision 1/CP.17), noting significant progress had been made in reducing gaps between parties' positions, and saying the ADP's work would now be passed on to the COP to "complete the last leg."

Following assurances by ADP Co-Chair Reifsnyder, *inter alia*, that the reflections note would be revised to include parties' remaining comments, including all definitions presented in the Friday, 4 December, contact group, and that "nothing has been decided or left behind," including the issue of loss and damage, the ADP adopted conclusions (FCCC/ADP/2015/L.6) to be forwarded to the COP for further consideration.

Laurence Tubiana, COP 21 Presidency, called parties that negotiations would continue on the basis of the ADP text that was agreed. She highlighted the importance of party ownership to make progress.

South Africa, for the G-77/CHINA, expressed willingness to work on the basis of the ADP text, and called for a balanced and equal treatment of all elements of the Durban mandate, and an outcome under the Convention in accordance with its principles and provisions.

Switzerland, for the EIG, emphasized that, in contrast to COP 15 in Copenhagen, "we now have a strong basis for negotiations developed by all parties together" with a text that reflects important political positions that need to be resolved.

Australia, for the UMBRELLA GROUP, described the number of INDCs as "a demonstration of our collective commitments" and sought a way to reflect differentiation in line with modern day realities.

The EU reminded parties of their responsibility to deliver an ambitious Paris agreement applicable to all and acceptable by all.

Suggesting that Paris will lead to a historical agreement, Sudan, for the AFRICAN GROUP, affirmed the group's confidence in the COP Presidency.

Maldives, for AOSIS, said the process ensured party ownership and stressed that the principles of the Convention must be honored to reach an agreement that positively impacts the lives of vulnerable people.

Angola, for the LDCs, looked forward to engaging in "the work that remains to be done on the draft text in addition to some political decision making." TURKEY stressed "making this an inclusive agreement where no country is left behind."

Calling for a REDD+ mechanism to be reflected in the agreement, Panama, for the COALITION FOR RAINFOREST NATIONS, recalled that heads of state sent a "strong" political signal on the role of forests and biodiversity in their speeches.

Malaysia, for the LMDCs, stressed the need to "recognize that the principles of equity and CBDR must be preserved in all their facets and forms." He urged parties to look at the best available social science to assess modern realities and stressed that civil society must have access to negotiations.

Lamenting that, in the first week, the text had been reopened for new insertions, Saudi Arabia, for the ARAB GROUP, expressed readiness to engage with the COP Presidency and looked forward to a "fair process that will take us to a fair outcome."

Venezuela, for the BOLIVARIAN ALLIANCE FOR THE PEOPLES OF OUR AMERICA, called for sustaining the principles of party-drivenness, transparency and inclusiveness "until the final second of the COP."

Saying parties had never before been so close to delivering an ambitious outcome, Guatemala, for AILAC, called for moving beyond national positions to a "solution cognizant of our collective interest."



Stressing “this is a global crisis,” MARSHALL ISLANDS reminded that, while a “favorite phrase here is nationally determined,” parties are in Paris “to fight for what is globally necessary.”

In closing, ADP Rapporteur Yang Liu presented, and parties adopted, the report of the meeting (FCCC/ADP/2015/L.5).

Saying that “sometimes words cannot capture our feelings,” ADP Co-Chair Ahmed Djoghlaif congratulated parties for their achievement so far, and thanked parties for their trust.

UNFCCC Executive Secretary Christiana Figueres noted her appreciation for the full dedication of parties on this “complex” task and said work needed to continue next week.

Thanking all, ADP Co-Chair Reifsnnyder gavelled the plenary to a close at 1:07pm.

COP PLENARY

REPORT OF THE ADP: In the evening, COP 21 President Laurent Fabius presided. ADP Co-Chairs Reifsnnyder and Djoghlaif presented and transmitted the draft agreement and decision (FCCC/ADP/2015/L.6/Rev.1) and suggested changes (FCCC/ADP/2015/L.6/Rev.1/Add.1) to the COP.

Parties agreed to the mode of work outlined by COP 21 President Fabius, including the “Paris Committee,” an open-ended single-setting group, presided over by the COP 21 President, to progress the text and facilitate compromise. He said the committee would work under the principle, *inter alia*, of “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed,” and its meetings would be transmitted to screens at the conference site to facilitate transparency.

He further outlined four informal working groups facilitated by ministers to work on cross-cutting issues: support, facilitated by Emmanuel Isoze-Ngondet (Gabon) and Jochen Flasbarth (Germany); differentiation in the context of mitigation, transparency and finance, including pre-2020 finance, facilitated by Izabella Teixeira (Brazil) and Vivian Balakrishnan (Singapore); ambition, long-term objectives and periodic review, with facilitators to be announced; and acceleration of pre-2020 ambition, with facilitators to be announced.

He stated that the outcome should be concluded in time for a review group on legal and language matters to address related issues before Friday, 11 December.

South Africa, for the G-77/CHINA, emphasized the importance of clarity and predictability in the negotiation process, and asked that the reflection note be updated with suggestions that are still missing.

Maldives, for AOSIS, asked for clarity on how the issues of adaptation, and loss and damage would be handled.

In response to the RUSSIAN FEDERATION, COP 21 President Fabius said that the Russian language version is being finalized and that all languages will be respected.

Sudan, for the AFRICAN GROUP, noted that important issues have been left out of the agreement, but expressed certainty that parties will address these issues. MARSHALL ISLANDS called for the Paris agreement to include, *inter alia*, a 1.5°C temperature goal and assurances on long-term climate finance.

Australia, for the UMBRELLA GROUP, said the ADP text is party-driven and party-owned. Saudi Arabia, for the ARAB GROUP, emphasized that setting a goal for governments’ efforts “needs to be substantiated by proven science,” provided by the IPCC.

Guatemala, for AILAC, called for awareness that “this is our text and it will be our ability to listen to one another and our ability to articulate our needs” that will enable an effective agreement. Angola, for the LDCs, expressed disappointment that the

COP Bureau “formulation” was used to form the review group, excluding the LDCs.

Malaysia, for the LMDCs, underscored the group’s commitment to goodwill and expressed concern over the repeated use of the refrain “the world has changed.” Asking developed countries to take the lead, CHINA underlined that an ambitious Paris outcome should give equal weight to all of the Durban mandate components.

AZERBAIJAN asked his insertions to be incorporated into the reflection note. Noting that his country did not belong to any negotiating group, TURKEY asked to be considered as a group for consultations on negotiations. NEPAL highlighted the fragility of mountain ecosystems.

COP 21 President Fabius noted that the SBSTA and SBI had concluded their work but three items remained unresolved: the 2013-2015 review; capacity building under the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol; and impact of the implementation of response measures. COP 21 President Fabius said the 2013-2015 review would be considered by the long-term goal informal working group. On the remaining two items, COP 21 President Fabius said he will hold consultations and propose a way forward.

The four working groups will commence and ministers will meet to discuss modalities of work on Sunday, 6 December.

COP 21 President Fabius then suspended the meeting.

IN THE CORRIDORS

Saturday kicked off in what many called an “unexpectedly harmonious mood.” Friday’s tense exchanges had left many wondering if spirits of past, less successful COPs had come to haunt Le Bourget. On Saturday morning, many arrived with the expectation that the procedural debates and common refrains would continue, and were surprised with the dramatic change in tone in the conversation.

As one delegate put it, parties had managed to “exorcise” Copenhagen’s lack of transparency. Several parties welcomed the new ADP text, a compilation of parties’ work and co-facilitators’ bridging proposals, coupled with a reflection note capturing parties’ comments. While not as advanced as most would have wished, several delegates seemed reassured that their inputs were reflected.

Looking to the second week when ministers arrive, many hoped that the agreed mode of work, centered around the Paris Committee, together with ministerial consultations, would serve as a strong basis for inclusive negotiation. A negotiator from a smaller delegation, however, could not help but worry that talks would move away from the Committee and end up behind closed doors for prioritized issues.

A number of delegates worried over some issues receiving more attention than others. With ministerial attention now fixed on just four issues in the working groups, some delegates were concerned that issues of importance to them were being left at “the bottom of the pile.”

Yet, one observer pointed out that the issues on the ministers’ “to-do list” seemed to be selected on the basis of whether they were likely to make or break the Paris agreement. Despite the fundamental importance of a number of other issues, finance, mitigation and – “the oldest ghost of all” – differentiation will undoubtedly be in the spotlight in week two.

Delegates, however, seemed generally reassured by the COP Presidency on transparency and hoped that the agreed mode of work would stop ghosts from emerging again.

PARIS HIGHLIGHTS:

MONDAY, 7 DECEMBER 2015

On Monday, 7 December, the joint COP/CMP high-level segment convened throughout the day. A contact group on JI met under the CMP. In the morning and afternoon, minister-led informal consultations under the Paris Committee addressed “support: MOI (finance, technology and capacity building),” and co-facilitators conducted bilaterals on: acceleration of pre-2020 action; ambition, including long-term goals and periodic review; differentiation, in particular with regard to mitigation, finance and transparency; and “support: MOI (finance, technology and capacity building).” In the evening, the Paris Committee convened.

JOINT COP/CMP HIGH-LEVEL SEGMENT

COP 21/CMP 11 President Laurent Fabius entreated ministers that the “time for decisions has come” and called on ministers to share their political views on the compromises necessary to reach a universal agreement.

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called Paris the “opportunity to define destiny,” and said the new agreement should, *inter alia*, send a signal to the private sector that a low-emission transition is imminent, and include adaptation and mitigation support.

UN General Assembly President Mogens Lykketoft underlined that the Paris meeting needs to, and can, deliver a political agreement with equity and ambition at its core, while promoting resilience and scaling up public and private finance.

Noting that, by the end of the year, global average temperature rise could reach 1°C above pre-industrial levels, IPCC Chair Hoesung Lee said that science has outlined the problem and is providing solutions.

UNFCCC Executive Secretary Christiana Figueres called on ministers to exercise political leadership to craft an agreement that meets national and local needs, lives up to scientific integrity, safeguards the vulnerable and promotes sustainable prosperity for all.

The high-level segment then continued with statements from heads of state and government, deputy heads of state and government, ministers and other heads of delegation. A webcast of the statements is available at: <http://unfccc6.meta-fusion.com/cop21/events/2015-12-07-10-30-joint-high-level-segment> and <http://unfccc6.meta-fusion.com/cop21/events/2015-12-07-15-00-conference-of-the-parties-cop-7th-meeting-conference-of-the-parties-serving-as-the-meeting-of-the-parties-to-the-kyoto-protocol-cmp-5th-meeting>

PARIS COMMITTEE

COP 21 President Fabius recalled the agreed method of work, announcing additional consultation processes to begin on: adaptation, and loss and damage, led by René Orellana (Bolivia) and Åsa Romson (Sweden); cooperative mechanisms, led by Catherine McKenna (Canada) and a co-facilitator yet to be announced; and forests, led by Daniel Vicente Ortega Pacheco (Ecuador) and a co-facilitator yet to be announced. He also announced a working group on response measures. The co-facilitators then reported on their consultations during Sunday, 6 December and Monday, 7 December.

On support/MOI, Emmanuel Isoze-Ngondet (Gabon) reported consultations on climate finance made “headway.” He noted progress toward possible common ground on, *inter alia* provision of support and mobilization of climate finance. He reported reassurances with regard to the fulfillment of existing commitments and continued leadership of developed countries. He further outlined specific proposed language on how the role of other parties could be captured, such as “voluntary contributions,” “contributions by others in a position/willing/able to do so” or reference to South-South cooperation. He said some parties expressed strong reservations, calling for consistency with existing provisions and principles of the Convention.

On access and readiness support, Jochen Flasbarth (Germany) reported parties had developed a textual bridging proposal. On technology development and transfer, he noted convergence on cooperative action, a long-term vision, a technology framework and the Technology Mechanism.

On capacity building, he reported parties had reached convergence on work to be undertaken pre-2020 and the establishment of a “Paris Committee on Capacity Building.” In addition, he announced mostly clean text on the pre-2020 work programme on capacity building.

On differentiation, Vivian Balakrishnan (Singapore) characterized the INDCs as an “innovation” allowing all parties to operationalize their diverse starting points and make continuous improvements over time. He said that assurances of no backsliding and that developed countries would continue to take the lead “resonated strongly.” He reported that the group discussed purpose (Article 2), general (Article 2*bis*) and mitigation (Article 3).

On differentiation in the sections on transparency and finance, Luiz Machado (Brazil) reported on assurances that developed countries will continue to take the lead without backsliding, and on general convergence that differentiation will be operationalized through flexibility for developing countries.



On transparency, he reported “broad acknowledgement” that capacity building and support are key reflections of differentiation. On finance, he reported that several parties underscored there is no intention to create new legal obligations for developing countries, but an encouragement to voluntarily contribute.

On ambition, Tine Sundtoft (Norway) outlined the questions posed to parties, including on how to: frame a possible reference to a 1.5°C limit; identify an acceptable long-term goal for mitigation over different timeframes; have a common “global moment” every five years for taking stock and informing future nationally-determined efforts on mitigation, adaptation and support; and provide reassurances that the global stocktake would not impinge on national determination of commitments.

James Fletcher (Saint Lucia) said that, while several developed and developing country parties indicated willingness to refer to a 1.5°C limit, others reaffirmed the temperature limit in the Cancun Agreements. He said there is general interest to express a collective long-term goal for mitigation, which could be expressed in quantitative or qualitative terms, such as a transformation to carbon neutrality or decarbonization. He also reported convergence on a common “global moment” every five years to take stock and review aggregate progress, and provide an opportunity to confirm or raise targets, but without an obligation to do so.

On pre-2020 action, Amber Rudd (UK) reported parties considered a compromise proposal containing a facilitative dialogue, potentially in 2017, that would examine the state of, and options to further enhance, implementation under the Convention for all parties with a stronger focus on developed countries’ undertakings.

She relayed that parties had found common ground on an adaptation TEP that would add value, as long as it does not duplicate work under existing bodies under the Convention. Parties agreed that the mitigation TEP could inform the proposed adaptation TEP, with the caveat that parties are continuing to test and refine elements of the existing TEP.

TUVALU, the RUSSIAN FEDERATION and GEORGIA requested more advance notice for meetings and the topics to be discussed.

Malaysia, for the LMDCs, underlined the need for text-based and inclusive negotiations, and suggested a “reality check” where parties can provide feedback to the reports provided by the co-facilitators. The MARSHALL ISLANDS emphasized the need to trust the Presidency and ministers, opposing “procedural approaches” such as parties negotiating the ways that ministers summarize consultations. The EU said that “process cannot constrain progress.”

Guatemala, for AILAC, supported the current process initiated by the minister-led informal consultations and stressed the need to find common landing ground with specific text proposals. She suggested, supported by the EU, an additional group for compliance.

SOUTH AFRICA suggested involving the ADP co-facilitators in the development of textual options, based on ministerial facilitation and the draft Paris outcome text, and with the assistance of the Secretariat. She said that the legal and linguistic review group could work on text as it becomes available.

COP 21 President Fabius reflected parties’ desire to accelerate drafting, possibly engaging the ADP co-facilitators, and said he would consider these proposals and find a solution that could be applied from Tuesday, 8 December.

CMP 11

CONTACT GROUPS: JI: Co-Chair Yaw Osafo (Ghana) presented the draft decision, noting parties still had two sets of brackets to resolve. At JAPAN’s request, parties moved a paragraph, reiterating concern for the difficult market situation faced by JI participants, out of the operational section.

Parties also discussed a paragraph on requesting recommendations from the JISC for SBI 44’s consideration in the context of the review of the JI guidelines. The EU, SWITZERLAND and JAPAN reformulated the paragraph, and parties agreed to reflect that recommendations presented by the JISC will present options to address concerns raised by stakeholders and for validation by an accredited independent entity of post-registration changes. Parties expressed their common understanding that such validation could include public commenting periods.

Parties also agreed for the JISC to analyze experiences and lessons learned. Parties agreed to forward the draft decision to the CMP.

IN THE CORRIDORS

On Monday morning, the number of participants swelled, and seasoned delegates among them quickly began commenting that, after four years of intense work, negotiations “have come full circle.” The minister-led informal consultations, also referred to as *indabas*, occurred under the new Paris Committee, in a format reminiscent of COP 17, in Durban, where parties could openly express their views. In 2011, this procedural innovation was widely credited with facilitating the emergence of the Durban Mandate, which is to conclude here in Paris.

Yet, early views were mixed on whether these French *indabas* would facilitate the significant work still to be completed for a new agreement. Some of the delegates still standing after a number of tireless days working on the new agreement expressed slight disappointment over Sunday’s initial consultations, as one worried that “we did not move beyond statements of positions.” However, many thought the next two days would be the real harbinger of what progress can be achieved on key issues.

“We really have the chance to achieve something extraordinary here,” said one. Another hopeful participant pointed to possible compromises discussed in bilaterals on workstream 2 where parties had found common ground “on many of the crunch issues.” A seasoned negotiator said she was “cautiously optimistic” about a strong workstream 2 outcome, “especially if there is progress on accelerated implementation and adaptation.”

In the first official meeting of the Paris Committee, ministers who facilitated discussions reported uneven progress. One delegate, emerging from the informal discussions on technology access said she was “relieved” that a landing zone might be emerging on the sticky issue of intellectual property rights. Another delegate said she was “not surprised” that discussions on differentiation had not really moved along and wondered if higher-level political guidance was needed.

Meanwhile, some of last week’s disappointment regarding the lack of progress on the 2013-2015 review of the long-term goal was turning into hope as word of a “high ambition coalition” spread among negotiators. “1.5°C is still a possibility, we can’t give up” said an observer. Another noted “we need more than a lowest common denominator agreement” and hoped that “we can finally change the mindset about ambitious action.”

Yet, similarly to the *indabas* in Durban, the Paris informal consultations are closed to observers, with only the Paris Committee open, albeit for many via television at the venue. One forgiving civil society member understood that “negotiation space is necessary so we will refrain from an outcry.” Others were less happy about the new arrangements.

Looking ahead, many wondered how President Fabius’ timeline to have an agreement ready by Wednesday for legal review could be possible. With roughly 800 brackets in the text, and two days remaining in that ambitious timeline, the *indabas* and Paris Committee will, in the words of some, “need to work miracles.”

PARIS HIGHLIGHTS:

TUESDAY, 8 DECEMBER 2015

On Tuesday, 8 December, the joint COP/CMP high-level segment continued throughout the day, with statements by ministers and other heads of delegation. Under the COP Presidency, negotiations advanced on the draft Paris outcome in various settings, with minister-led informal consultations, bilaterals and party-led breakout groups under the Comité de Paris, convening throughout the day on: support: MOI (finance, technology and capacity building); acceleration of pre-2020 action (workstream 2, excluding pre-2020 finance); adaptation, and loss and damage; differentiation, in particular with regard to mitigation, finance and transparency; ambition, including long-term goals and periodic review; facilitating implementation and compliance; preamble; forests; cooperative mechanisms; and response measures.

Informal consultations and contact groups continued throughout the day under the COP and CMP to finalize decisions on their agenda items.

COMITÉ DE PARIS

COP 21 President Laurent Fabius invited reports on minister-led *indabas*, bilaterals and other consultations. On support/MOI, Jochen Flasbarth (Germany) reported progress on post-2020 finance (Article 6). He emphasized, *inter alia*, an emerging understanding on how to improve the current text, including coherence and overall structure, but underscored further work is “required as the text cannot yet be perceived as agreed text.”

Emmanuel Issoze-Ngondet (Gabon) reported that parties found convergence on technology development and transfer (Article 7), and related decision text, with common ground on, *inter alia*, cooperative action, long-term vision and the technology framework.

On capacity building (Article 8), he reported agreement on a Paris capacity-building committee and an understanding on a long-term work programme on capacity building, and said work would continue on the modalities of the committee.

On differentiation, Vivian Balakrishnan (Singapore) noted that “parties are not yet ready to place their final positions on the table,” saying the co-facilitators would work with the Presidency and Secretariat to crystallize existing fault lines in the text.

On ambition, James Fletcher (Saint Lucia) said a meeting with the ADP co-facilitators who had worked on related matters had enabled identification of potential landing zones.

Tine Sundtoft (Norway) presented messages, including that, *inter alia*: most parties are willing to reflect a 1.5°C temperature limit in the purpose of the agreement, with accompanying provisions related to sustainable development, MOI, equity and food security; the two options identified on a global mitigation goal are a goal with quantitative elements for different time periods and a long-term qualitative goal; and there is support for a comprehensive and facilitative global stocktake, and a five-year cycle for successive communications.

On workstream 2, Pa Jarju Ousman (the Gambia) highlighted emerging convergence on mirroring the mitigation TEP’s institutional arrangements for an adaptation TEP, with a key role for the Adaptation Committee. On accelerating implementation, he noted divergence of views.

On adaptation, and loss and damage, René Orellana (Bolivia) highlighted landing zones on: a clear goal for adaptation, with a link to Convention Article 2 (objective); recognition of the link between mitigation and adaptation; and a communication process that is flexible and does not further burden developing countries.

Åsa Romson (Sweden) highlighted cross-cutting issues needing resolution, including references to a temperature goal, vulnerability and CBDR. On loss and damage, she noted ongoing discussions on institutional arrangements, saying there was no convergence.

On forests, Henri Djombo (the Congo) reported a shared view that the Paris outcome could send a strong signal to facilitate sustainable forest management.



On cooperative mechanisms, Catherine McKenna (Canada) reported that parties considered guiding principles, including, *inter alia*: environmental integrity; avoiding double counting; and the voluntary nature of such approaches. On mechanisms to support sustainable development (Article 3*ter*), she reported some parties stressed that such mechanisms would need to be durable over time, while others said they should not be part of the agreement.

Raymond Tshibanda N'Tungamulongo (Democratic Republic of the Congo) noted suggestions that funds coming from certified activities support adaptation.

On response measures, Jan Szyszko (Poland) said that the group would convene later Tuesday evening, 8 December.

On facilitating implementation and compliance, Rafael Pacchiano Alamán (Mexico) noted general acknowledgement on the need for the agreement to define nature and purpose, leaving modalities and procedures for later. He identified divergence on whether or not to reflect differentiation in this part.

On preamble, Claudia Salerno (Venezuela) proposed to begin work on Tuesday evening, 8 December.

COP 21 President Fabius outlined, and parties agreed to, the next steps going forward. He said a "clean text," based on the ADP outcome text, and recommendations by the facilitators of the ministerial consultations and co-facilitators of the ADP spin-off groups, will be presented at 1:00pm on Wednesday, 9 December. He said the Comité de Paris will: convene later on Wednesday afternoon to consider first reactions; work for the rest of Wednesday; and be organized on Thursday based on pending issues identified.

Many parties supported the suggested mode of work and underlined the need for continued transparency.

South Africa, for the G-77/CHINA, urged sufficient time be given for regional and negotiating groups to consider the text. Maldives, for AOSIS, urged the text to take into account the special needs of SIDS.

Malaysia, for the LMDCs, observed the report of a "no provision" option in workstream 2 (pre-2020 ambition), explaining this would have serious impacts on the Paris outcome.

Angola, for the LDCs, highlighted the need to elaborate, in the new text, a temperature goal consistent with science, welcoming reports on convergence on the 1.5°C target.

COP 21 President Fabius then closed the session.

IN THE CORRIDORS

On Tuesday, with the list of issues under ministerial negotiation became twice as long as the previous day, the Paris conference seemed to enter a critical phase. A generally positive mood regarding the mode of work continued among negotiators, with one hoping that the French Presidency would guide countries "through the last mile" in a similar spirit.

With ministers hidden from sight in *indabas*, bilateral consultations and party-led spin-offs, speculation on issues being discussed and possible deals struck was thick in the air at the open areas around Le Bourget.

One of the hotly-discussed issues was potential movement toward a reference to 1.5°C as the long-term temperature goal in the Paris agreement. Despite announcements by Canada and other countries that the agreement should reference 1.5°C, some delegates quietly said that this "seemed a long way off," expecting that some countries would only accept an "under 2°C" goal. The issue was more positively framed in the report backs of the Comité de Paris, with the facilitator of the consultations on ambition saying "most" support reference to 1.5°C.

Others worried that the focus on quantitative goals risked overshadowing other, important qualitative guiding lights such as decarbonization, net-zero, indigenous peoples' rights, human rights and gender equality. The report back at the Comité de Paris in the evening did not surprise some observers by including qualitative terms such as food security that referred back to Convention Article 2 (objective).

Civil society too demonstrated for "surviving and thriving at 1.5°C," while an observer wondered whether the world could "celebrate an agreement simply because it includes reference to 1.5°C," without asking whether it contains the mechanisms to review and ratchet up ambition to realize those goals.

Those not in the closed rooms listened with an attentive ear to the BASIC press conference, looking for hints on the state of negotiations from ministers from Brazil, South Africa, India and China. Some delegates paid attention to references made to language on finance and transparency in the US-China Joint Presidential Statement on Climate Change from September 2015, with one noting "a *déjà vu* from Lima" where language on differentiation was taken near-verbatim from a US-China joint announcement.

Finance, an issue many see as crucial for any agreement in Paris, seemed to occupy much of the time in the informal ministerial consultations on MOI. That group, according to the report from the co-facilitators, also yielded significant progress on capacity building, which one delegate credited to a positive spirit in the room, with interested parties huddling over text.

With the days remaining to reach an agreement dwindling fast, many delegates walking out of the evening meeting of the Comité de Paris were pleased that a "clean" text would be produced by the minister facilitators, the Presidency and the ADP co-facilitators for Wednesday afternoon.

Despite quietly shared fears of some parties over the work still remaining ahead, and potential "surprises" and reports of "fault lines" on differentiation by facilitators, all parties continued to praise the transparency and positive spirit in the Comité de Paris. One long-time observer noted that negotiators understood that "positivity may now pay dividends in this last mile on their long journey from Durban to an ambitious Paris agreement, in spite of possible obstacles."

PARIS HIGHLIGHTS: WEDNESDAY, 9 DECEMBER 2015

On Wednesday, 9 December, negotiations advanced under the COP Presidency on the draft Paris outcome. At 3:00pm the Comité de Paris convened for the presentation of a revised version of the draft Paris outcome. The session was then immediately closed to allow for parties to review and consult on the text. At 8:00pm the Comité reconvened to hear parties' first impressions on the text.

Consultations continued throughout the night in an *indaba* and a consultation, the first on differentiation, finance and ambition, facilitated by COP 21 President Laurent Fabius, and the second on other issues still requiring work, such as loss and damage, response measures, cooperative approaches and mechanisms, and preamble, facilitated by COP 20 President Manuel Pulgar-Vidal (Peru).

Contact groups and informal consultations continued throughout the day under the COP and CMP to finalize decisions on their agenda items.

COMITÉ DE PARIS

In the afternoon, COP 21 President Laurent Fabius informed parties that, as agreed on Tuesday, 8 December, the Secretariat would distribute a new version of the draft Paris outcome, saying the text: is "inspired" by the ADP draft Paris outcome from Saturday, 5 December; incorporates ministerial facilitators' recommendations; and draws from ADP co-facilitators' suggestions and experience. He explained the 29-page text, which contains three-fourths fewer brackets than the previous draft, aims to provide an overview of progress made and identify clear options on three cross-cutting issues still to be settled at the political level.

On progress made, he said compromise or significant progress had been made on capacity building, adaptation, transparency, and technology development and transfer. He noted initial progress had been made on forests, cooperative approaches and mechanisms, and preamble, and that progress on adaptation would enable parties to focus on loss and damage.

On the remaining political issues, COP 21 President Fabius identified differentiation, financing and the level of ambition of the agreement. He encouraged parties to scale up consultations on these. After requesting the Secretariat to distribute the new text, he proposed, and parties agreed, that the Comité de Paris reconvene at 8:00pm.

In the evening, COP 21 President Laurent Fabius outlined the purpose of the meeting as agreeing on the method of work for the evening and Thursday, 10 December, and allowing parties to express initial reactions on the new text.

On organization of work, he proposed that he would facilitate an *indaba* focusing on the cross-cutting issues of differentiation, finance and ambition. He identified loss and damage, response measures, cooperative approaches and mechanisms, and preamble as issues still requiring work, proposing that COP 20 President Pulgar-Vidal facilitate a single consultation on these issues, meeting in parallel with the *indaba*.

COP 21 President Fabius proposed a new version of the text be prepared by early afternoon on Thursday, 10 December. Noting time pressure relating to legal and linguistic review, he proposed that parties agree to submit already clean text in the final agreement clauses to the open-ended group of legal and linguistic experts.

He called on parties not to reopen compromises that had already been reached and instead focus on issues where work still remains.

Parties supported using the text as the basis for work. However, some noted the text remains unbalanced and many outlined their areas of concern.

South Africa, for the G-77/CHINA, and Egypt, for the AFRICAN GROUP, expressed concern on "delinking" textual language from the Convention and dilution of Convention principles, particularly on differentiation.

On differentiation, INDIA called for balance between ambition and differentiation, correctly reflecting the principles of the Convention, and operationalizing differentiation in all the elements. Malaysia, for the LMDCs, with BOLIVIA and NICARAGUA, emphasized capturing CBDR.

VIET NAM described CDBR and differentiation as gateways to greater ambition. BOLIVIA called for including historical responsibility and the right to development. VENEZUELA called for a package deal that addresses differentiation.

GEORGIA emphasized "equal treatment of transparency among parties" and clear accounting rules as important for building trust. Australia, for the UMBRELLA GROUP, noted the text leaves differentiation to be resolved.

On support, the G-77/CHINA lamented a lack of adequate reassurances on MOI. Angola, for the LDCs, highlighted the need to ensure access to finance. The AFRICAN GROUP noted concern on the reflection of individual commitments without references to support.



The EU underlined that after 2020, countries in a position to do so should join in increasing financial flows to countries in need. Saudi Arabia, for the ARAB GROUP, further expressed concern with references to “those in a position to do so.”

The PHILIPPINES called for ensuring pre- and post-2020 adaptation finance through quantitative goals. BELARUS welcomed the reflection of the interests of countries that need support, including those with economies in transition.

TIMOR LESTE said developed countries should commit to provision of MOI to LDCs. SOUTH SUDAN emphasized the need for developed countries to provide new, additional, predictable, sustainable and verifiable finances.

The DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO suggested that financing to address deforestation and degradation of humid tropical forests be at levels equivalent to their share of global GHG emissions. BANGLADESH asked for special consideration of LDCs and SIDS to be reintroduced in Article 6 (finance).

On ambition, Maldives, for AOSIS, with Barbados, for the CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY (CARICOM), COSTA RICA, MALI, SAMOA, ECUADOR, the PHILIPPINES, BOLIVIA and SAINT LUCIA, stressed a below 1.5°C goal as critical. PALAU said the agreement must send a quantitative signal to the world on “where we need to be mid-century.”

The EU expressed concern that the mechanism to raise ambition over time had been significantly weakened. INDONESIA expressed preference for a 2°C limit, but said it was willing to work on another realistic and implementable threshold.

MOROCCO supported holding the global average temperature below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, while scaling up efforts to limit temperature increase to below 1.5°C.

On preamble, general and objective, Guatemala, for AILAC, with NORWAY, said the agreement should include references to gender issues, intergenerational matters and, with CHILE, the PHILIPPINES and MEXICO, human rights. NORWAY also suggested reference to health, just transition and, with CANADA, indigenous peoples’ rights.

NIGERIA called for including the Sustainable Development Goals alongside the reference to sustainable development. The PHILIPPINES called for ensuring integrity of a variety of ecosystems. INDONESIA called for equal recognition of the rights of local communities.

VIET NAM and MEXICO called for including gender equality. TANZANIA cautioned against referencing human rights “which could be used as barrier to access support.”

On mitigation, AILAC supported a quantified or quantifiable unilateral component in “features” under the mitigation article. The ARAB GROUP, called for the reinstatement of adaptation co-benefits coming in the “form” of mitigation.

The ARAB GROUP underscored that any goal that threatens their sustainable development, or ability to eradicate poverty and ensure food security will not be acceptable. The LMDCs expressed concern on language on NDMCs. The PHILIPPINES called for a mitigation goal that ensures full decarbonization by 2050.

On unilateral measures, the G-77/CHINA and the LMDCs expressed concern on the lack of text on this issue. The ARAB GROUP and the LMDCs opposed reference to carbon pricing.

On REDD+, CARICOM supported anchoring agreed COP decisions on REDD+ in the agreement. Panama, for the COALITION FOR RAINFOREST NATIONS, with CAMEROON, underscored the importance to “launch” a REDD+ mechanism in the Paris agreement.

PAKISTAN called for sending a strong signal that REDD+ is complete and ready to be implemented.

On adaptation, the G-77/CHINA lamented that many proposals were missing from the text. The AFRICAN GROUP noted key elements to operationalize the global goal on adaptation were missing. AILAC and CHILE called for a registry of adaptation actions.

On loss and damage, the G-77/CHINA, with VIET NAM and HAITI, emphasized the need for a distinct article on loss and damage. AILAC called for progress on loss and damage.

Maldives, for AOSIS, underscored that ongoing work among parties would result in new language on loss and damage. The EU stressed that the formulation on loss and damage is “deeply problematic.” TIMOR LESTE called for a standalone mechanism for loss and damage.

On circumstances of the most vulnerable, CARICOM, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO, BELIZE and SAINT LUCIA highlighted the special circumstances of SIDS, noting this “reality is not negotiable,” and said that arrangements for loss and damage are crucial.

EL SALVADOR and NICARAGUA called for the agreement to recognize the Central American isthmus as a particularly vulnerable area. BHUTAN, with NEPAL, regretted the specific needs of the LDCs had been diminished in the operative articles of the text and called for including countries with fragile mountainous ecosystems in any listing of vulnerable countries. NIGERIA called for inclusion of Africa. GUINEA stressed referencing “other vulnerable countries and regions.”

On cycles, the UMBRELLA GROUP and PALAU emphasized five-year cycles for reporting and review. COLOMBIA supported a mechanism to increase ambition through periodic presentation of commitments starting in 2021.

On entry into force, the EU, JAPAN and the ARAB GROUP noted that entry into force lacks a double threshold.

On decision text, AOSIS said a bracketed decision paragraph on a facilitative dialogue among parties to take stock of collective efforts in 2018 or 2019 must be included in the final decision to ensure the 1.5°C temperature goal stays within reach.

Parties also highlighted areas for further work, with Switzerland, for the EIG, identifying, *inter alia*, a mandatory provision for nationally determined mitigation contributions (NMDCs) and internationally transferred mitigation outcomes. The LDCs said further work is needed on compliance to ensure implementation.

The UMBRELLA GROUP stressed developed countries’ continued assurances to continue to lead in the context of a universal agreement in which all parties do their best.

China, for BASIC, welcomed the text as open and balanced, and indicated willingness to work towards an outcome that reflects fairness and ambition.

The LMDCs underscored progress under workstream 2 as fundamental for progress under workstream 1.

The EU lamented that some key parts of the agreement had been moved to decisions.

Special Envoy with Observer Organizations Manuel Pulgar-Vidal reported on issues of high importance for observers, including: differentiation; market mechanisms; access of observers and transparency; long-term goals; long-term finance; and raising ambition of developed countries.

Parties agreed to the mode of work proposed at the beginning of the session. COP 21 President Fabius asked parties to begin work on compromises, anticipating that the “penultimate” draft text should be ready in the afternoon on Thursday, 10 December.

COP 21

CONTACT GROUP: Climate Finance Items (a-b): In the morning, on the issue of long-term finance, contact group Co-Chair Andrés Mogro (Ecuador) noted time constraints prevented parties from tackling political issues that required further consideration, such as MRV of finance, biennial updates and private sector climate finance, and highlighted the draft decision's minimalist structure. Co-Chair Mogro proposed, and parties agreed, to forward the draft decision to the COP for consideration.

On the report of the SCF, contact group Co-Chair Mark Storey (Sweden) presented a draft decision for adoption, based on consultations carried out by the Co-Chairs. Parties then agreed on the need to approve the SCF's work plan and continue work on reviewing the functions of the SCF.

Co-Chair Storey proposed reflecting issues that had not been discussed due to time limitations in the report of the COP. Parties agreed to refer to recommendations of the SCF based on the conclusions of the SCF forum. Parties agreed to send the draft decision, as amended, to the COP for consideration.

Climate Finance Items (c-d): In the afternoon, parties considered draft decision texts proposed by Co-Chairs Stefan Schwager (Switzerland) and Nauman Bashir Bhatti (Pakistan).

On the report of the GEF to the COP and guidance to the GEF, parties developed compromise language welcoming the investments by the GEF in sustainable forest management and other activities referred to, harnessing multiple benefits from forests, and tackling deforestation and forest degradation. Parties debated whether to delete a proposal by ARGENTINA, URUGUAY and COLOMBIA on "tackling the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation."

On support for the NAP process through contributions to the LDCF and the Special Climate Change Fund, CHINA, supported by INDIA and MALAYSIA, proposed deleting language inviting "parties that may make voluntary financial contributions" to provide such support. The EU, with JAPAN and the US, suggested deletion of the whole paragraph if it lacks agreement. Zambia, for the LDCs, opposed.

On the report of the GCF to the COP and guidance to the GCF, JAPAN said it is premature to discuss replenishment and suggested deleting a request to the GCF Board to agree on replenishment arrangements. South Africa, for the AFRICAN GROUP, Bolivia, for the G-77/CHINA, and Antigua and Barbuda, for AOSIS, opposed.

On a paragraph noting that funding decisions by the GCF projects will contribute to "low-emission and climate-resilient" development, ARGENTINA, opposed by the EU, suggested referencing "sustainable" development instead. Parties continued consultations informally.

CMP 11

CONTACT GROUP: Issues Relating to the CDM: In the morning, a contact group co-chaired by Jeffery Spooner (Jamaica) focused on draft text produced on Tuesday evening, 8 December. Parties discussed six paragraphs that still remained bracketed.

On a paragraph on encouraging the CDM Executive Board (EB) to explore opportunities for financing through international climate financing institutions to foster the use of the CDM, parties agreed to keep a reference to the GCF while removing "to foster the use of the CDM."

On a paragraph inviting the CDM EB to host a workshop, back to back with SB 44, with international climate financing institutions, after consulting informally, parties agreed to an alternative proposal inviting the CDM EB to consider hosting an in-session workshop at SB 44, taking into account a request for the CDM EB to ensure transparent and prudent management of the resources of the CDM.

Parties then agreed to forward the draft decision to the CMP.

IN THE CORRIDORS

On Wednesday afternoon, plenary La Seine filled with anticipation and excitement as parties waited for COP 21 President Laurent Fabius to reveal the new "clean" text. Immediately after receiving their copies, delegates poured over the text. As some optimists had expected, the positive spirit prevailed throughout the afternoon Comité de Paris meeting, surprising some observers accustomed to drama as a regular feature of climate COPs.

Most delegates remained in full praise of the Presidency, commending their work with the facilitators and Secretariat to finish the text lasting into the wee hours of Wednesday morning. One negotiator explained the positive mood was a result of the Presidency "involving the ministers early and often in the process, which built relationships and facilitated constructive conversations on sticking points."

Pointing out that the three remaining political issues, differentiation, finance and ambition, are more than "small details," one long-time observer noted that "some brackets are more stubborn than others." Others' eyes initially spotted phrases that raised eyebrows, either negatively or positively depending on their perspective, like *per capita* emissions and respect for indigenous peoples' rights.

Still, some close to the ministerial process seemed confident, saying that the "agreement should be quite agreeable" to parties if they manage to "zoom out to see the bigger picture." Speculating on the evening, one delegate hoped the good mood would not be ephemeral, calling Wednesday evening the "defining moment" of the second week.

To witness that defining moment, delegates again flowed into La Seine in the evening. Many offered cautious optimism, with one saying that "all the elements are here, and relatively well balanced." Another cited the "quite clean" text on workstream 2.

The first round of applause was for the G-77/China's statement that the text formed an acceptable basis for negotiations. While there seemed to be a never-ending stream of groups' and parties' concerns with the text, their overwhelming general acceptance of the text as the basis for further work represented to some a collective sigh of relief.

However, one delegate cautioned against assuming that if "everyone expresses concerns, that the text is indeed balanced." Some also worried parties were regressing to stated positions.

Leaving La Seine for the two midnight sessions announced by COP 21 President Fabius, many looked ahead to some political deals occurring in the coming hours. As they entered into the midnight consultations, one group of delegates hoped Friday would be a day of rest, while the legal and linguistic group reviews the text.



However, with COP 21 President Fabius describing the next iteration of the text, expected for Thursday afternoon, as the "penultimate text," many delegates wondered if their hopes of Paris being an exceptional COP in terms of timeliness could still materialize.



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PARIS HIGHLIGHTS: THURSDAY, 10 DECEMBER 2015

On Thursday, 10 December, negotiations continued on the draft Paris outcome. Following all night consultations, parties continued meeting bilaterally while waiting for the revised draft Paris outcome text.

In the afternoon, the open-ended group of legal and linguistic experts conducting the review of the paragraphs of the draft agreement forwarded by the Comité de Paris convened.

The COP plenary considered agenda items and adopted decisions on organizational matters, matters related to finance and capacity building, and the reports of the subsidiary bodies, the Adaptation Committee, and the TEC and CTCN, among other items.

The CMP plenary considered agenda items and adopted decisions, including on: organizational matters; issues related to the CDM and JI; and the report of the high-level ministerial on increased ambition of Kyoto Protocol commitments.

A revised draft Paris outcome text was presented in the Comité de Paris at 9:00pm, which then closed to allow for consultations by parties. An “*indaba* of solutions” then convened throughout the night to address all remaining unresolved items in the text.

COMITÉ DE PARIS

In the evening, COP 21 President Laurent Fabius reported that the previous night’s *indaba* and parallel consultation had made progress, and that, throughout the day on Thursday, 10 December, delegations remained in contact in an effort to find compromises. He added that the COP 21 Presidency continued to gather the opinions of groups and parties.

Asking the Secretariat to distribute the new text, COP 21 President Fabius said parties would have approximately two hours to study it, and explained that the new text contained a range of choices for the purpose of reaching balance, impartiality and reconciling differences.

Noting some brackets remained, he said that there are “open options” on the most complex issues of differentiation, finance and ambition. He asked delegates to examine the document with “a new perspective,” keeping the final agreement in mind, suggesting “we are extremely close to the finish line.”

He announced he would convene an “*indaba* of solutions” directed at compromise, not general statements, at 11:30pm. He further proposed that if difficulty arises on a particular point, he

would invite a facilitator to meet “in a corner” or another room with interested heads of delegation with the aim of coming back with a compromise within 30-40 minutes, to then be presented in the *indaba*. He indicated the progress achieved would be presented in the “final text” on Friday, 11 December.

COP 21 PLENARY

This meeting of the COP was chaired by COP 21 Vice-President Cheikh Ndiaye Sylla (Senegal).

ORGANIZATIONAL MATTERS: Election of Officers Other than the President: Noting the nomination for the COP Vice-President from the Asia-Pacific was outstanding, COP 21 Vice-President Sylla informed that the COP 20 Vice-President from the Asia-Pacific region would remain in office. The COP elected the officers of the Adaptation Committee, the Advisory Board of the CTCN and the TEC, and took note of nominations for the CGE and LEG.

Adoption of the Report on Credentials: The COP adopted the report on credentials (FCCC/CP/2015/9), in addition to credentials submitted for ten countries as reported orally by the Bureau.

Adoption of the Rules of Procedure: COP 21 Vice-President Sylla noted that consultations had not yielded consensus. The COP agreed to continue to apply the draft rules of procedure (FCCC/CP/1996/2) with the exception of the draft rule 42 on voting, and to continue consultations in 2016 and report back to COP 22.

Dates and Venues of Future Sessions: The COP adopted a decision on the dates and venues of future sessions (FCCC/CP/2015/L.4). MOROCCO, in the capacity of the future host of COP 22/CMP 12, thanked parties, in particular the African Group, for their trust, informing that the conference would take place in Marrakesh, from 7-18 November 2016.

REPORTS OF THE SUBSIDIARY BODIES: Report of the SBSTA: The COP took note of the oral report by SBSTA Chair Lidia Wojtal (Poland), and adopted the report of SBSTA 42, including three decisions on matters relating to REDD+ (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/2 and Add.1). The COP also adopted the report of SBSTA 43 (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/L.15) and two decisions recommended by SBSTA 43, on methodologies for the reporting of financial information by Annex I parties (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/L.22), with an amendment read out by SBSTA Chair Wojtal, and on the annual report on the technical review of GHG inventories from Annex I parties (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/L.21 and Add.1).



Report of the SBI: The COP took note of the oral report by SBI Chair Amena Yauvoli (Fiji) and adopted the report of SBI 42 (FCCC/SBI/2015/10 and Add.1), including a decision on the terms of reference for the intermediate review of the Doha work programme on Convention Article 6. The COP also adopted the report of SBI 43 (FCCC/SBI/2015/L.19) and a decision forwarded by SBI 43 on NAPs (FCCC/SBI/2015/L.32/Add.1).

CONSIDERATION OF PROPOSALS BY PARTIES FOR AMENDMENTS TO THE CONVENTION UNDER ARTICLE 15: Proposal from the Russian Federation: On amendments by parties under Article 15 (amendments to the Convention), COP 21 Vice-President Sylla noted that the Russian proposal (FCCC/CP/2011/5) had been considered in informal consultations. Due to divergent views, the COP decided to include this issue in the provisional agenda of COP 22.

Proposal from Papua New Guinea and Mexico: COP 21 Vice-President Sylla noted that informal consultations had not been able to resolve divergent views on this issue (FCCC/CP/2011/4/Rev.1) and the agenda item was forwarded to COP 22.

REPORT OF THE ADAPTATION COMMITTEE: The COP took note of the report of the Adaptation Committee (FCCC/SB/2015/L.3).

WIM: The COP took note of the WIM's report (FCCC/SB/2015/L.5/Rev.1).

DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGIES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TECHNOLOGY MECHANISM: Joint Annual Report of the TEC and the CTCN: The COP took note of the report of the Technology Mechanism (FCCC/SB/2015/L.4).

REPORTING FROM AND REVIEW OF ANNEX I PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION: The COP took note of two SBI conclusions on the outcome of the first round of IAR (2014-2015) (FCCC/SBI/2015/L.20), and the revision of guidelines for NCs by parties in Annex 1 to the Convention Part II (FCCC/SBI/2015/L.23).

REPORTING FROM NON-ANNEX I PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION: The COP took note of two SBI conclusions on the work of Consultative Group of Experts on National Communications from Non-Annex I Parties (FCCC/SBI/2015/L.21), and provision of financial and technical support (FCCC/SBI/2015/L.24).

CAPACITY BUILDING UNDER THE CONVENTION: The COP adopted a decision on this item (FCCC/CP/2015/L.6).

IMPLEMENTATION OF CONVENTION ARTICLE 4, PARAGRAPHS 8 AND 9: Matters Related to the Buenos Aires Programme of Work on Adaptation and Response Measures (Decision 1/CP.10): The COP took note of conclusions on the Nairobi work programme (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/L.19).

Matters Relating to LDCs: The COP adopted a decision on the extension of the mandate of the LDC Expert Group (FCCC/SBI/2015/10/Add.1).

GENDER AND CLIMATE CHANGE: The COP took note of SBI conclusions on this item (FCCC/SBI/2015/L.31).

OTHER MATTERS REFERRED TO THE COP BY THE SUBSIDIARY BODIES: The COP noted that no other matters were raised under this item.

ADMINISTRATIVE, FINANCIAL AND INSTITUTIONAL MATTERS: Audit Report for Financial Statements: The COP discussed this issue jointly with the budget performance for the biennium 2014-2015.

Budget Performance for the Biennium 2014-2015: The COP adopted a decision for this sub-item and the audit report for financial statements (FCCC/SBI/2015/L.27).

Programme Budget for the Biennium 2016-2017: The COP adopted a decision forwarded by SBI 42 on the programme budget for the biennium 2016-2017 (FCCC/SBI/2015/10/Add.1).

Decision Making in the UNFCCC Process: The COP decided to continue to hold discussions on this item at SBI 44 and report to COP 22.

MATTERS RELATING TO FINANCE: Long-term Climate Finance: The COP adopted a decision on this sub-item (FCCC/CP/2015/L.2).

Report of the SCF: The COP adopted a decision on this sub-item (FCCC/CP/2015/L.5).

Report of the GCF: COP 21 Vice-President Sylla said this sub-item is still under consideration.

Report of the GEF to the COP and Guidance to the GEF: The COP adopted a decision on this sub-item (FCCC/CP/2015/L.8).

ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA lamented the process of discussions on COP items on finance matters. She said that because focus was given to streamlining rather than to negotiations due to limited time, many issues important to SIDS were left out. She asked this to be reflected in the report of the COP. Echoing the same concerns, Bolivia, for G-77/CHINA, said the group reserves its right to bring up these issues at the next SBI.

The EU noted that parties agreed, in light of the exceptional circumstances of COP 21, to focus on streamlining a decision. She expressed support for the approach taken and looked forward to discussing the items again at COP 22.

COP 21 Vice-President Sylla said the comments will be reflected in the report of the COP. He then suspended the COP.

CMP 11 PLENARY

The meeting was chaired by CMP 11 Vice-President Cheikh Ndiaye Sylla (Senegal).

ORGANIZATIONAL MATTERS: Approval of the Report on Credentials: The CMP adopted the report on credentials (FCCC/CP/2015/9 and FCCC/KP/CMP/2015/7), with the addition of the Cook Islands, Egypt, Fiji, Haiti, Honduras, Kiribati, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Election of Replacement Officers: The CMP elected officers and alternative members to the Adaptation Fund Board, JISC, CDM EB, Compliance Committee, and the COP and CMP Bureaus. He noted the list of nominations is available on the UNFCCC website and urged parties to submit nominations for the remaining vacant positions by 29 January 2016.

Status of Ratification of the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol: CMP 11 Vice-President Sylla informed parties that, since the Secretariat's statement on 2 December 2015, two additional instruments of ratification, from Argentina and Sri Lanka, had been received, bringing the total to 57. He reported 87 more are required to bring the Amendment into force. The CMP took note of the information, urging all parties to ratify as soon as possible.

REPORTS OF THE SUBSIDIARY BODIES: Report of the SBSTA: The CMP took note of the oral report by SBSTA Chair Wojtal and adopted the report of SBSTA 42 (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/2 and Add.1 and Add.2), including one decision forwarded by SBSTA 42, on the training programme for members of expert review teams participating in annual reviews under Protocol Article 8 (on review by expert teams).

The CMP also adopted the report of SBSTA 43 (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/L.15). The CMP further adopted three decisions, forwarded by SBSTA 43 on methodological issues under the Kyoto Protocol (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/L.27/Add.1 and Add.2), and on a technical review in 2016 of GHG inventories and initial reports for the second commitment period from Annex I parties that are also parties to the Kyoto Protocol (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/L.30/Add.1).

Report of the SBI: The CMP took note of the oral report by SBI Chair Yauvoli, and adopted the report of SBI 42 (FCCC/SBI/2015/10 and Add.1) and the report of SBI 43 (FCCC/SBI/2015/L.19).

ISSUES RELATING TO THE CDM: The CMP adopted a decision on this item (FCCC/KP/CMP/2015/L.4).

ISSUES RELATING TO JI: The CMP adopted a decision on this item (FCCC/KP/CMP/2015/L.1).

REPORT ON THE HIGH-LEVEL MINISTERIAL ROUNDTABLE ON INCREASED AMBITION OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL COMMITMENTS: CMP 11 Vice-President Sylla informed that parties were unable to reach consensus on this issue. He noted that, pursuant to the draft rules of procedure being applied, the item will be included on the provisional agenda of CMP 12. Noting the urgency to reach a solution on this issue, he said the COP 21 Presidency will conduct intersessional consultations on the way forward.

REPORTING FROM AND REVIEW OF PARTIES INCLUDED IN ANNEX I: Annual Compilation and Accounting Report for Annex B Parties under the Kyoto Protocol: Upon the recommendation of SBI 43, the CMP took note of the report on this matter (FCCC/KP/CMP/2015/6 and Add.1/Rev.1).

CLARIFICATION OF SECTION G (ARTICLE 3.7) OF THE DOHA AMENDMENT: The CMP adopted a decision on this issue (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/L.29/Add.1).

CAPACITY-BUILDING UNDER THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: The CMP adopted a decision on this item (FCCC/KP/CMP/2015/L.6).

OTHER MATTERS REFERRED TO THE CMP BY THE SUBSIDIARY BODIES: The CMP took note of the information that no matters were raised under this item.

ADMINISTRATIVE, FINANCIAL AND INSTITUTIONAL MATTERS: Audit Report and Financial Statements for 2014: This item was considered with the budget performance for the biennium 2014-2015.

Budget Performance for the Biennium 2014-2015: The CMP adopted a decision on this sub-item and the sub-item on the audit report and financial statements for 2014 (FCCC/SBI/2016/L.26).

Programme Budget for the Biennium 2016-2017: Upon the recommendation of SBI 42, the CMP adopted two decisions on this sub-item, on the programme budget for the biennium 2016-

2017 and on the methodology for the collection of international transaction log fees in the biennium 2016-2017 (FCCC/SBI/2015/10.Add.1).

CMP 11 Vice-President Sylla said that the CMP would reconvene to address the remaining items on Friday, 11 December.

IN THE CORRIDORS

Thursday morning dawned with reports that the previous night's *indaba* and informal consultations had lasted until dawn. The few exhausted high-level delegates that were to be found in the hallways of Le Bourget gave mixed reports on progress in the informals.

Some seemed rather pessimistic, perhaps magnified by the lack of sleep, reporting on "very limited movement" on the key political issues and saying that parties had spent much of their time reading statements reiterating long-held positions. Another said that, perhaps, "just enough flexibility" had been shown to enable compromises to start materializing.

Those in the venue remained in limbo throughout the day, waiting impatiently for the "penultimate" draft text, as foreseen by COP 21 President Laurent Fabius on Wednesday evening. Others clustered informally to continue hashing out language to bridge various parties' proposals, in preparation for the final push towards an agreement expected by some as early as Thursday night.

The wait was longer than anticipated, with Thursday's Comité meeting being postponed twice, first from 3:00pm to 7:00pm, and then finally to 9:00pm. Throughout the day, delegates continued stressing that differentiation, finance and ambition remained the outstanding issues, a fact confirmed in the evening meetings of the Comité, where COP 21 President Laurent Fabius observed that these issues remained bracketed in the new text.

With the finish line in sight, the COP Presidency and the Secretariat seemed to be aiming to leave as little as possible to chance. Several delegates reported "unprecedented" personal attention by the French Presidency to engage parties' raising concerns in plenary and ensure their issues were addressed. One reported that the very highest levels were throwing all of their effort into smoothing the path towards agreement, with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon engaging in bilaterals with parties on key issues. As was to be expected, ministerial engagement ramped up as well, with a number of countries holding their own bilaterals.

Around the venue's cafeterias, several delegations expressed concern over the rapid pace of negotiations and the large number of bilaterals and consultations, saying these were overwhelming for small delegations while also noting that precious negotiation time was quickly ticking away. One committed, but exhausted, delegate quipped during the COP plenary, "I won't use the word disorganized, but we now find ourselves in a dynamic process that makes attending to all remaining issues difficult." Nevertheless, as the meeting turned nocturnal, after a long day of waiting and with a long night of negotiation ahead, another delegate reminded the weary, "there is just too much at stake to fail."

ENB SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS: The *Earth Negotiations Bulletin* summary and analysis of COP 21 will be available on Tuesday, 15 December 2015, online at: <http://www.iisd.ca/climate/cop21/enb/>



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Climate Change Policy & Practice (formerly called Climate-L.org) is a knowledge management project carried out by the International Institute for Sustainable Development Reporting Services (IISD RS) in collaboration with the UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination.

This knowledgebase of UN and intergovernmental activities addressing the challenge of global climate change features:

- news on UN and intergovernmental activities related to international climate change policy, updated on a daily basis;
- an iCal of upcoming climate change events;
- guest articles by key figures of the climate community and UN leaders; and
- policy updates.

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SUMMARY OF THE PARIS CLIMATE CHANGE CONFERENCE: 29 NOVEMBER – 13 DECEMBER 2015

The Paris Climate Change Conference convened from 29 November to 13 December 2015, in Paris, France. It included the 21st session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 21) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 11th session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 11). Three subsidiary bodies (SBs) also met, the 43rd sessions of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA 43) and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI 43), and the 12th part of the second session of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP 2-12).

The Paris Climate Change Conference brought together over 36,000 participants, nearly 23,100 government officials, 9,400 representatives from UN bodies and agencies, intergovernmental organizations and civil society organizations, and 3,700 members of the media.

Focus in Paris centered on advancing negotiations on the Paris Outcome, including a legally-binding agreement and associated decisions, to fulfill the mandate outlined in Durban, South Africa, at COP 17, for the ADP “to develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties” to be adopted at COP 21. The ADP opened a day early, on Sunday, 29 November, in order to launch technical negotiations.

A leaders event, which brought together over 150 Heads of State and Government, was held on Monday, 30 November, to generate political will towards an agreement. During the first week, work concentrated under the ADP, which launched a contact group to consider crosscutting issues and items not associated with agreement articles, and established spin-off groups to work on the text of individual articles in the draft agreement text and their associated decision text, as well as decision text on pre-2020 ambition.

Following the closure of the ADP on Saturday, 5 December, and the transmission of the ADP’s outcome to the COP, the Comité de Paris was established under the COP 21 Presidency to continue work on the draft agreement and decision text.

Minister-led *indabas*, bilaterals and other consultations took place under the Comité de Paris from Sunday through Saturday, 6-12 December. Following intensive consultations by the COP 21 Presidency on Thursday and Friday, 10-11 December, the Comité de Paris convened briefly on Saturday morning, 12 December, for the presentation of the final text. After consultations by groups of parties, the Comité de Paris reconvened in the evening to forward the final text of the Paris Agreement and associated decision to COP 21. At 7:29 pm, COP 21 adopted the Paris Agreement and the associated decision.

Parties also adopted 34 decisions, 23 under the COP and 12 under the CMP, that, *inter alia*: adopt the Paris Agreement; enhance technology development and transfer through the Technology Mechanism; decide on the process to assess progress made in the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans (NAPs); extend the mandate of the Least Developed Countries Expert Group (LEG); adopt the terms of reference for the third comprehensive review of the implementation of the capacity-building framework; address methodological issues under the Kyoto Protocol,

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including clarification of the Section G, Article 7.3*ter* of the Doha Amendment; provide methodological guidance for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries, and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks (REDD+); provide guidance to the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI); and approve the programme budget for the UNFCCC for the biennium 2016-2017.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE UNFCCC AND THE KYOTO PROTOCOL

The international political response to climate change began with the 1992 adoption of the UNFCCC, which sets out a legal framework for stabilizing atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHGs) to avoid “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” The Convention, which entered into force on 21 March 1994, has 196 parties. In December 1997, delegates to COP 3 in Kyoto, Japan, agreed to a protocol to the UNFCCC that committed industrialized countries and countries in transition to a market economy to achieve emissions reduction targets. These countries, known as Annex I parties under the UNFCCC, agreed to reduce their overall emissions of six GHGs by an average of 5% below 1990 levels in 2008-2012 (the first commitment period), with specific targets varying from country to country. The Kyoto Protocol entered into force on 16 February 2005 and now has 192 parties.

LONG-TERM NEGOTIATIONS, 2005-2009: Convening in Montreal, Canada, in 2005, the first session of the CMP established the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Annex I Parties’ Further Commitments under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) in accordance with Protocol Article 3.9, which mandated consideration of Annex I parties’ further commitments at least seven years before the end of the first commitment period.

In December 2007, COP 13 and CMP 3 in Bali, Indonesia, resulted in agreement on the Bali Roadmap on long-term issues. COP 13 adopted the Bali Action Plan (BAP) and established the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA), with a mandate to focus on mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology, capacity building and a shared vision for long-term cooperative action. Negotiations on Annex I parties’ further commitments continued under the AWG-KP. The deadline for concluding the two-track negotiations was 2009 in Copenhagen.

COPENHAGEN: The UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, Denmark, took place in December 2009. The high-profile event was marked by disputes over transparency and process. Late in the evening of 18 December, these talks resulted in a political agreement, the “Copenhagen Accord,” which was then presented to the COP plenary for adoption. After 13 hours of debate, delegates ultimately agreed to “take note” of the Copenhagen Accord, and to extend the mandates of the negotiating groups until COP 16 and CMP 6 in 2010. In 2010, over 140 countries indicated support for the Accord. More than 80 countries also provided information on their national mitigation targets or actions.

CANCUN: The UN Climate Change Conference in Cancun, Mexico, took place in December 2010, where parties adopted the Cancun Agreements and extended the mandates of the two AWGs for another year. Parties agreed to consider the adequacy of the global long-term goal during a 2013-2015 review. The Cancun Agreements also established several new institutions and processes, including the Cancun Adaptation Framework, the Adaptation Committee and the Technology Mechanism, which includes the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN). The Green Climate Fund (GCF) was created and designated as an operating entity of the Convention’s financial mechanism.

DURBAN: The UN Climate Change Conference in Durban, South Africa, took place in November and December 2011. The Durban outcomes covered a wide range of topics, notably a decision on long-term cooperative action under the Convention and agreement on the operationalization of the GCF. Parties also agreed to launch the ADP with a mandate “to develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties.” The ADP is scheduled to complete these negotiations no later than 2015, with the new instrument entering into force in 2020. In addition, the ADP was mandated to explore actions to close the pre-2020 ambition gap in relation to the below 2°C target.

DOHA: The UN Climate Change Conference in Doha, Qatar, took place in November and December 2012. The conference resulted in a package of decisions, referred to as the “Doha Climate Gateway.” These included amendments to the Kyoto Protocol to establish its second commitment period (2013-2020) and agreement to terminate the AWG-KP’s work. Parties also agreed to terminate negotiations under the BAP, including the AWG-LCA.

WARSAW: The UN Climate Change Conference in Warsaw, Poland, took place in November 2013. The meeting adopted an ADP decision that, *inter alia*, invites parties to initiate or intensify domestic preparations for their intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs). Parties also adopted a decision establishing the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts (WIM), and the Warsaw Framework for REDD+.

LIMA: The UN Climate Change Conference in Lima, Peru, took place in December 2014. Negotiations in Lima focused on outcomes under the ADP necessary to advance toward an agreement at COP 21 in Paris in 2015. Following lengthy negotiations, COP 20 adopted the “Lima Call for Climate Action” (Decision 1/CP.20), which sets in motion the negotiations towards a 2015 agreement, including the process for submitting and reviewing INDCs. The decision also addresses enhancing pre-2020 ambition. Parties also adopted 19 decisions, 17 under the COP and two under the CMP that, *inter alia*: help operationalize the WIM; establish the Lima work programme on gender; and adopt the Lima Ministerial Declaration on Education and Awareness-raising.

The Lima Conference was able to lay the groundwork for Paris by capturing progress made in elaborating the elements of a draft negotiating text for the 2015 agreement and adopting a decision on INDCs, including their scope, upfront information, and steps to be taken by the Secretariat after their submission.

ADP 2-8: ADP 2-8 took place in February 2015, in Geneva, Switzerland. The objective of the session, as mandated by COP 20, was to develop the negotiating text based on the elements for a draft negotiating text annexed to Decision 1/CP.20. The Geneva negotiating text adopted at ADP 2-8 served as the basis for the negotiations of the 2015 agreement.

ADP 2-9: ADP 2-9 convened in June 2015 in Bonn, Germany, and undertook streamlining and consolidation, clustering and conceptual discussions of the Geneva negotiating text, including on: preamble; general/objective; mitigation; adaptation and loss and damage; finance; technology development and transfer; capacity building; transparency; timeframes; implementation and compliance; and procedural and institutional provisions. The ADP also discussed workstream 2 (pre-2020 ambition), in particular its mandate, and proposed elements that could comprise a decision on workstream 2.

ADP 2-10: ADP 2-10 convened in August-September 2015, in Bonn, Germany. To guide the work, the ADP Co-Chairs produced, at the request of parties, a "Tool" based on the streamlined and consolidated text resulting from ADP 2-9. Delegates engaged on various parts of the Tool in facilitated groups and "spin-offs," or informal meetings of the facilitated groups. The groups considered placement of paragraphs in the Tool, engaged in conceptual discussions on key issues, and, in some cases, started developing textual proposals. The ADP Co-Chairs were mandated to produce a revised non-paper to serve as the basis for further negotiations.

ADP 2-11: ADP 2-11 convened in October 2015, in Bonn, Germany. The ADP Co-Chairs opened the session proposing to begin text-based negotiations on the basis of the text they prepared, including the non-papers (ADP.2015.8.InformalNote and ADP.2015.9.InformalNote) with draft agreement and decision text under workstream 1, and draft decision text under workstream 2. After meeting in a contact group to reinsert "must-haves" into the non-paper text on workstream 1, parties convened in spin-off groups to advance negotiations on specific sections in the agreement and decision text, and in an open-ended contact group to take stock of progress and discuss issues not addressed in spin-off groups.

Parties agreed to forward the revised non-paper, dated 23 October at 23:30, which captured the work undertaken by parties at ADP 2-11, to serve as the basis for further negotiations under the ADP. Parties also requested that the Secretariat prepare a technical paper, which would identify closely related paragraphs and duplication within sections, and possible areas for streamlining, without making any changes to the content of the text.

PARIS CLIMATE CONFERENCE REPORT

On Monday, 30 December, observing that we are in a "spectacular year," COP 20/CMP 10 President Manuel Pulgar-Vidal, Minister of Environment, Peru, underscored that fulfilling the Durban mandate for a universal, legally-binding agreement will help frame sustainable development for the next generation.

Parties then elected Laurent Fabius, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Development, France, as COP 21/CMP 11 President by acclamation. COP 21/CMP 11 President Fabius outlined the role of the French presidency as: listening to

all views; ensuring transparency and inclusiveness; seeking an ambitious agreement; ensuring compromise among parties; and leaving only "final points" for consideration by ministers during the second week.

UNFCCC Executive Secretary Christiana Figueres emphasized the parties' responsibility to finalize an agreement that "enables the achievement of national climate change goals, delivers necessary support for the developing world, and catalyzes increasing action by all."

Echoing Figueres' assertion that "never before has a responsibility so great been in the hands of so few," His Royal Highness Charles, the Prince of Wales, called on delegates "in pursuing national interest, not to lose sight of international necessity."

This report summarizes how the Paris Agreement and its associated decision were reached, under the "Paris Agreement," which includes discussions on the ADP, the COP and the Comité de Paris. This report also summarizes the discussions by the COP, CMP, SBI and SBSTA.

LEADERS EVENT

On Monday, 30 November, President François Hollande, France, opened the leaders event, which brought together over 150 Heads of State and Government, and said the Paris outcome would be successful if it: determines a credible path to limit temperature rise below 2°C, or 1.5°C if possible; responds to climate change with solidarity so that no state can abstain from its commitments; and mobilizes all societies and sectors to act.

Stressing that leaders convening in Paris had the moral and political responsibility to show leadership, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said that the Paris agreement must be: durable; dynamic; balance between the leading role of developed countries and growing responsibilities of developing countries according to their resources and level of development; and credible, with the current level of ambition "as the floor."

COP 21/CMP 11 President Fabius outlined conditions for success in Paris including mobilizing Heads of State and Government. The leaders event then continued with statements of Heads and Deputy Heads of State and Government. For a summary of the statements made during the leaders event, see: <http://www.iisd.ca/vol12/enb12653e.html>

COP 21 AND CMP 11 JOINT HIGH-LEVEL SEGMENT

On Monday, 7 December, COP 21/CMP 11 President Laurent Fabius opened the joint high-level segment, entreating ministers that the "time for decisions has come." UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called Paris the "opportunity to define destiny."

UN General Assembly President Mogens Lykketoft underlined that the Paris meeting needed to deliver a political agreement with equity and ambition at its core. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Chair Hoesung Lee said that science has outlined the problem and is providing solutions.

UNFCCC Executive Secretary Christiana Figueres called on ministers to exercise political leadership to craft an agreement that meets national and local needs, lives up to scientific integrity, safeguards the vulnerable and promotes sustainable prosperity for all.

The high-level segment then continued through Tuesday, 8 December, with statements from Heads of State and Government, Deputy Heads of State and Government, ministers and other heads of delegation. A webcast of the statements is available at: <http://unfccc6.meta-fusion.com/cop21/events/>

THE PARIS AGREEMENT

During the first week of the Paris Climate Change Conference, negotiations on the Paris Agreement, and the associated decision, took place under the ADP. Following transmission of the outcome of the ADP to COP 21 on Saturday, 5 December, the Comité de Paris, an open-ended body, was established by the COP to move negotiations forward. Negotiations during the second week took place under the Comité de Paris, including in the open-ended Comité, in informal ministerial *indabas*, informal consultations, and bilaterals.

ADP 2-12

On Sunday, 29 November, ADP Co-Chair Ahmed Djoghlaif (Algeria) opened ADP 2-12. COP 20/CMP 10 President Manuel Pulgar-Vidal called on delegates to show solidarity and work efficiently in a time-bound manner to find textual solutions. Incoming COP 21/CMP 11 President Laurent Fabius called on delegates to build compromises.

ADP Co-Chair Daniel Reifsnyder (US) highlighted informal notes on workstream 1 (the 2015 Agreement) and workstream 2 (pre-2020 ambition) (ADP.2015.10-11.InformalNote), and a technical paper produced by the Secretariat identifying closely related concepts, duplications and areas for streamlining (ADP.2015.12.InformalNote). Outlining the mode of work, he said the open-ended contact group would review progress made by spin-off groups and allow for coherence on cross cutting issues. He said that spin-off groups would address: preamble and purpose/general (draft Article 2 and 2bis), co-facilitated by George Wamukoya (Kenya) and Diann Black-Layne (Antigua and Barbuda); mitigation (draft Article 3, 3bis and 3ter), co-facilitated by Franz Perrez (Switzerland) and Fook Seng Kwok (Singapore); adaptation, and loss and damage (draft Articles 4 and 5) co-facilitated by Andrea Guerrero (Colombia) and Georg Børsting (Norway); finance (draft Article 6), co-facilitated by Georg Børsting (Norway) and Diann Black-Layne (Antigua and Barbuda); technology development and transfer (draft Article 7), co-facilitated by Tosi Mpanu-Mpanu (Democratic Republic of Congo) and Artur Runge-Metzger (EU); capacity building (draft Article 8), co-facilitated by Artur Runge-Metzger (EU) and Tosi Mpanu-Mpanu (Democratic Republic of Congo); transparency (draft Article 9), co-facilitated by Fook Seng Kwok (Singapore) and Franz Perrez (Switzerland); global stocktake (draft Article 10), co-facilitated by Roberto Dondisch (Mexico) and George Wamukoya (Kenya); implementation and compliance, and final clauses (draft Article 11 and Articles 12-26), co-facilitated by Sarah Baashan (Saudi Arabia) and Aya Yoshida (Japan); and workstream 2, co-facilitated by Aya Yoshida (Japan) and George Wamukoya (Kenya).

Parties agreed that the informal notes issued on 6 and 10 November (ADP.2015.10-12.InformalNote) would form the basis for negotiations, with the exception of discussions on finance, which would be based on the 23 October text, which was issued at the close of ADP 2-11. ADP Co-Chair Djoghlaif

said a consolidated new draft would be prepared by Friday, 4 December, and the outcome of the ADP would be forwarded to the COP for its consideration on Saturday, 5 December.

CONTACT GROUP: The ADP contact group first convened on Tuesday, 1 December, and daily throughout the first week. Each meeting of the contact group began with reports back from the co-facilitators of the spin-off groups. Matters not assigned to specific spin-off groups were discussed in the contact group, including both decision and agreement text. A compilation text capturing progress made in the ADP on the draft agreement and decision text was published on Thursday morning 3 December.

During the Thursday evening contact group, ADP Co-Chair Reifsnyder proposed concluding the work of the spin-off groups. Parties agreed that the ADP Co-Chairs would produce an updated, clean and streamlined text, with clear options, developed in consultation with spin-off group co-facilitators. They agreed that bridging proposals developed by the spin-off group co-facilitators would be kept in a separate document, and that spin-off groups be used when necessary to reach agreement.

On Friday morning, 4 December, ADP Co-Chair Ahmed Djoghlaif invited comments on two documents, a revised draft agreement and decision text on workstreams 1 and 2, "the compilation text," and a document containing the work of the ADP contact group incorporating bridging proposals by the co-facilitators, "the compilation text with bridging proposals." Parties agreed to negotiate on the basis of the compilation text with bridging proposals, indicated key elements of concerns and requested that a reflection note from the ADP Co-Chairs capturing parties' comments be provided alongside the compilation text with bridging proposals. These documents were then presented to and adopted by the ADP on Saturday, 5 December, and subsequently forwarded to the COP.

Decision Paragraphs Not Related to Specific Articles in the Draft Agreement: During substantive negotiations, discussions in the contact group on these issues centered around the adoption of the agreement and took place throughout the week.

Parties converged on provisionally applying the agreement pending entry into force, as well as on a body to prepare for entry into force, including using the ADP under a new name or mandate, with its operational arrangements.

Parties agreed to use an existing body, specifically the ADP under a new name, by "importing" its governance arrangements, particularly regarding the Bureau as proposed by Colombia, on behalf of the Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC). Parties emphasized the need to convey that the ADP's mandate was completed successfully. ADP Co-Chair Djoghlaif presented a proposal to rename the ADP as the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on the Paris Outcome, and that the working group: prepare for the entry into force of the agreement and convene the first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Agreement (CMA); oversee implementation of the work programme resulting from relevant requests in the decision; report to the COP; and hold its first session in 2016.

Tuvalu, supported by Saudi Arabia, AILAC and others, suggested adding a new paragraph, after clarifying that the ADP has finished its mandate, which decides to establish the *Ad Hoc*

Working Group on the Paris Outcome. The US, China, Saudi Arabia, Iran and others asked for more clarity on the working modalities, particularly chairing arrangements.

Views diverged on support for the communication of INDCs, their communication itself and noting the gap between the aggregate effect of the INDCs and emissions consistent with the 2°C or 1.5°C limit as well as information on the fairness and ambition of INDCs communicated by parties.

On a paragraph on updating the synthesis report on the aggregate effect of INDCs, parties engaged in a long discussion on text requesting the Secretariat to “provide information on the fairness and ambition of the INDCs communicated by parties.” Malaysia for the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDCs), India, Saudi Arabia for the Arab Group, and the Russian Federation, among others, called for deleting the text. Others made alternative proposals, with Tuvalu suggesting “information on how parties have reported on fairness and ambition.”

In a subsequent contact group meeting, ADP Co-Chair Reifsnnyder presented a revised proposal containing paragraphs on: taking note of the synthesis report on the aggregate effect of INDCs; noting the ambition gap; and noting expressed adaptation needs. Parties also considered an amended draft decision paragraph on updating the synthesis report.

Saint Lucia, supported by a number of parties, and opposed by the Arab Group, introduced a new paragraph urging the update to the synthesis report to take into account 1.5°C scenarios.

Parties also debated decision text on: giving effect to the agreement, specifically efforts by various actors; administrative and budgetary matters; a facilitative dialogue; and a request to the IPCC for a special report.

On the role of various actors, the Co-Chairs proposed replacing references to local communities and indigenous peoples in the paragraph on welcoming the efforts of all actors to address climate change with a new paragraph recognizing the knowledge, technologies and efforts made by local communities and indigenous peoples. Bolivia opposed juxtaposing local communities and indigenous peoples with the private sector.

The Arab Group proposed deleting paragraphs that request all actors to scale up and demonstrate efforts, cautioning against passing the burden to actors outside the Convention, and expressed concern about the legal implications of “inviting” non-state actors’ activities that may then cause environmental, social or other harm. With the clarification that parties “welcome,” rather than “invite,” all actors to scale up and demonstrate efforts, parties removed the brackets around these paragraphs.

On a paragraph requesting the IPCC to provide a special report on the impact of a temperature increase of 1.5°C, Saudi Arabia and others questioned its “added value” beyond the IPCC assessment reports. Tuvalu noted that newer information may be available that was not considered during the last assessment report cycle. India and China underscored the need for information on how to achieve temperature goals. Several parties requested, and ADP Co-Chair Reifsnnyder agreed, to consult with the IPCC.

General and Cross-Cutting Issues: The contact group took up issues of relevance to the agreement as a whole at various points during the week.

On the title of the draft agreement, the Russian Federation, opposed by China, recommended deleting the option of “implementing agreement.”

On differentiation, all parties agreed that the new agreement should reflect differentiation. Several parties observed the need to recognize the special circumstances of small island developing states (SIDS) and least developed countries (LDCs), with Saudi Arabia noting that this is already in the Convention.

Sudan, for the African Group, proposed a formula for inscribing differentiation in the relevant sections: state the level of obligation or precision for developed and developing countries; provide flexibility for developing countries, such as “all countries willing to do so,” which Tuvalu, for the LDCs, supported; and provide further flexibility for African countries, LDCs and SIDS. China and India opposed phrases such as “willing to do so.”

Saying the world has not changed, Malaysia, for the LMDCs, underlined that historical responsibility lies with developed countries. He underscored that developed countries have yet to meet their Convention or Protocol obligations regarding mitigation and means of implementation (MOI), which the EU and Australia disputed in their cases.

Preamble and Purpose/General (draft Articles 2 and 2bis) and Associated Decision Text: The preamble and purpose/general (draft Articles 2 and 2bis) were discussed on Monday, 30 November, and Thursday, 3 December, in spin-off groups. Informal consultations were held on Tuesday-Thursday, 1-3 December.

In the spin-off group, parties were divided on preamble paragraphs regarding, *inter alia*: vulnerability; historical emissions; human rights; food security; land use; forestry; sinks and reservoirs; and carbon pricing. Many pointed to one or more terms or concepts that fall outside the Convention, or are not internationally “agreed” or defined. Several countries called for deleting “in light of different national circumstances” in a paragraph on the pursuit of the Convention’s objective. Many developing countries called for references to vulnerability and special circumstances.

Two parties, opposed by two others, requested that language on response measures be bracketed in a paragraph on the intrinsic relationship between climate change, poverty eradication and sustainable development. Parties also disagreed on the clarity of the phrase “harmony with nature,” on the term “best available science,” and on the accuracy of a paragraph on historical and *per capita* emissions.

In the ADP text that was forwarded to the COP, brackets remained around the paragraphs on historical emissions and evolving economic and emission trends. In addition, phrases on people under occupation in the paragraph on human rights and REDD+ and joint mitigation and adaptation approach in the paragraph on sinks and reservoirs remained bracketed.

On general (Article 2), one developed country party noted the science is not in dispute and brackets should be removed from “on the basis of science.” Two other developed country parties stressed the importance of a “no text” option for this article. Parties were divided on whether to see climate change in isolation, or as intertwined with economic and social issues, human rights, gender equality, and rights of indigenous peoples

and local communities, among others. Some suggested these issues could be addressed in the preamble. Parties also differed on whether the agreement should “enhance implementation” or “further the objective” of the Convention. One group of parties, opposed by another, strongly supported the inclusion of a 1.5°C warming limit. One party, opposed by another, suggested replacing “transformation” with “tractable shift” in a paragraph referencing sustainable development. Another suggested “pathways” to sustainable development.

In the ADP text that was forwarded to the COP, most of the text remained bracketed, with particular disagreement on the long-term temperature goal and mention of response measures, loss and damage, and the rights of people under occupation. In addition, two options remained for enhancing implementation or achieving the objective of the Convention.

On purpose (draft Article 2*bis*), one group of parties, opposed by several parties, stressed that this article was needed as a crosscutting article to ensure all elements in the agreement, including transparency of action and support, are treated with parity in terms of differentiation. Another said the article might be a prudent way to determine differentiation without having to address it separately in every element of the agreement. Three parties opposed, saying that the article undermines the nuances of what is being negotiated in other parts of the agreement. Several parties noted that the language would have to be improved upon to make clear linkages with the rest of the agreement. One party asked that both paragraphs in the article be bracketed, noting the legal implications must be clear. A group of parties explained that the article was not intended to be a legal obligation but rather to guide the legal obligations in the rest of the agreement. In the ADP text that was forwarded to the COP, the entire text, and many terms and phrases within the text, remained bracketed.

On Friday, 4 December, the ADP contact group also took up these parts of the text briefly. On preambular paragraphs on special needs, El Salvador requested adding “and the Central American isthmus,” and the African Group called exclusion of African countries “a red line.” Kyrgyzstan asked to include the vulnerability of mountain areas.

On purpose (draft Article 2), Venezuela opposed language on sustainable development, saying it “belongs to a different agenda” and goes beyond low GHG emissions and climate resilience. She supported “stabilization” of GHG emissions, and, with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, opposed the inclusion of “decarbonization” and “carbon neutrality.” Bolivia called for the reinsertion of language on protecting the environmental integrity of Mother Earth. The US reiterated that purpose should be reflected in the respective parts of the agreement, preferring no text for this article.

Mitigation (draft Articles 3, 3*bis* and 3*ter*) and Associated Decision Text: On mitigation, parties discussed, *inter alia*, features, support and timing of contributions, and non-market mechanisms.

On Tuesday, 1 December, spin-off group Co-Facilitator Perrez reported from bilateral consultations that no landing zone existed yet on information, housing and long-term strategies. Parties agreed to replace agreement text on the long-term goal with text developed in informal consultations under the spin-off group.

On Wednesday, 2 December, the spin-off group heard reports from facilitators of party-led informal discussions, which reflected some progress in identifying clearer options in the draft agreement. The group observed that parties’ views continued to differ on, *inter alia*: support; differentiation; and accounting. Co-Facilitator Perrez also reported back from consultations, noting, *inter alia*, work by two parties on a textual proposal on response measures. India indicated interest in further consultations on unilateral measures. Brazil emphasized the importance of the concept of “developed country parties taking the lead.”

On Thursday, 3 December, parties reviewed a new compilation text, and new agreement and decision text proposals prepared by the co-facilitator and two party facilitators that sought to capture existing options on: accounting, and methods and guidance; cooperative approaches; and a mechanism to support sustainable development. On the compilation text, parties briefly discussed the treatment of support in the agreement article and agreed to an amended footnote that states that “this is a placeholder until decided where support should be dealt with.” On the text proposals on accounting, and methods and guidance, parties, *inter alia*, bracketed references to land use, to enable more parties to engage on related options.

On the text proposals on cooperative approaches and mechanisms, parties made minor amendments. Several parties also requested to add references to INDCs alongside those to nationally determined mitigation contributions/nationally determined mitigation commitments or contributions. Parties agreed to forward the new text proposals, as amended, to the contact group as a starting point for discussions.

On Thursday, 3 December, in the contact group, the EU, Colombia for AILAC, the US, and others said that the INDCs imply self-differentiation. The EU stated all countries should seek economy-wide targets but there should not be shared timelines. The US added that developing countries should be eligible for support in implementing their contributions, and LDCs and others should have flexibility to submit at their discretion without expectation. Japan stated that only vulnerable countries should have “partly conditional” INDCs.

Sudan, for the African Group, and Malaysia, for the LMDCs, underlined that developed country parties should have quantified economy-wide targets. South Africa said binding obligations to implement should “back up” developed countries’ commitment to take the lead.

On Friday, 4 December, the EU, supported by Colombia for AILAC, Maldives for the Alliance of Small Islands States (AOSIS), and the US called for clarifying the date for the submission of contributions. Nicaragua and Bolivia called for Mother Earth to be reinserted in the text. Bolivia, with Venezuela, urged the inclusion of non-market mechanisms.

Adaptation, and Loss and Damage (draft Articles 4 and 5) and Associated Decision Text: In the spin-off group, parties’ discussions focused on: the global goal or long-term vision; links between mitigation and adaptation; and cooperation. On the links between adaptation and mitigation, several parties supported referencing that the more parties mitigate, the less all countries will need to adapt, as a universal concept. Two parties underlined the need for this to be factually correct, noting that regardless

of mitigation actions there will be a need for countries to adapt. A group of parties underlined the need for an assessment of the adequacy of support from developed countries and recognition of the adaptation efforts by developing countries, or increasing adaptation costs and needs, and the limits to adaptation.

On the cluster of paragraphs related to cooperation, a group of developing country parties, supported by a developed country party, underlined the importance of strengthening institutional arrangements, and another noted a proposal to create a technical and knowledge platform. The US, EU and Canada suggested that the paragraph on the adequacy of support could be in decision text or the global stocktake.

On Wednesday, 2 December, in the contact group, Co-Facilitator Andrea Guerrero (Colombia) reported that despite progress on some parts of the text, there was substantial work remaining. On Thursday, 3 December, Bolivia, for the Group of 77 and China (G-77/China), asked to include details on a long-term vision and urged avoiding prescriptive language.

On Thursday, 3 December, Tuvalu expressed worry that there had not been substantive discussions on loss and damage in the spin-off group and urged reinsertion of language on loss and damage that preserves the issue as an independent article.

Finance (draft Article 6) and Associated Decision Text: Parties addressed finance in the context of the new agreement during the ADP contact group meetings and debated textual proposals in spin-off group meetings and party-led informal meetings throughout the week.

In the spin-off group, on Tuesday, 1 December, parties focused on *ex ante* communications and their linkages with the global stocktake, scale and scaling up, actions and commitments, as well as on predictability and institutional arrangements in informal meetings.

On institutional arrangements, parties identified some bridging proposals and discussed, *inter alia*: the necessity of listing existing funds in the text; relevance of existing guidance from the COP to the operating entities; and the ability of the CMA to recommend decisions to the COP.

On Thursday, 3 December, parties agreed on language stating that the provision of financial resources should or shall aim to achieve a balance between adaption and mitigation, taking into account country-driven strategies, and the priorities and needs of developing countries. Parties exchanged views: on the special treatment and access modalities for LDCs and African countries; the need to simplify procedures for accessing financial resources; whether certain provisions on measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) of support could be better placed within the transparency section of the agreement; text on enabling environments, results-based payments, carbon pricing and variety of sources, among others.

New textual proposals, including developing country parties' needs and food security, prompted many parties to express concern about little progress and one group suggested "moving on to the next stage at the political level." Parties agreed that the co-facilitators and Secretariat would capture the discussions in a revised version, which was then presented back to the contact group.

During the contact group meetings on Thursday and Friday, 3-4 December, delegates expressed their respective views on differentiation and MRV in the context of the provision of support, predictability of support, and the issue of balancing support between mitigation and adaptation.

Technology Development and Transfer (draft Article 7) and Associated Decision Text: The ADP decided to create a spin-off group on this topic on Sunday, 29 November, and the spin-off group reported back as needed.

A group of developing country parties introduced a new bridging proposal on the technology framework. After numerous amendments to the proposal, including on the role of developing countries and economies in transition and the need to enhance support for technology development and transfer, Co-Facilitator Mpanu-Mpanu agreed to forward the proposal as originally formulated.

Discussions in the spin-off groups further focused on the continued use of the TEC and the CTCN, with the possibility of supporting technology research, development and demonstration.

Capacity Building (draft Article 8) and Associated Decision Text: The ADP decided to create a spin-off group on this topic, which first met on Monday, 30 November, developing bridging proposals for options on objective, principles, support and reporting.

Transparency (draft Article 9) and Associated Decision Text: On Tuesday, 1 December, in the spin-off group, parties focused on support to developing countries for transparency. Parties discussed how to clarify that support for the Cancun MRV system will continue, and differed on whether developing countries "shall" or "be eligible to" receive support. The group then met informally to discuss the latter issue.

On Wednesday, 2 December, parties identified respective views: on text providing for the CMA to adopt common modalities, procedures and guidelines; and a proposed text for a provision on providing, in the transparency framework, flexibility for developing countries, in light of their capabilities, capacities, or capacity-building support received.

The group also discussed placing in the agreement or decision text provisions on: types or modalities of flexibility; a periodic review of future transparency modalities and guidelines; and providing for the transparency system to be guided by Convention principles and to be implemented in, *inter alia*, a non-intrusive, non-punitive manner respectful of national sovereignty. Parties further discussed these paragraphs informally.

On Thursday, 3 December, discussions focused on revised text on agreement paragraphs related to the purpose of transparency systems for action and support, and provision of information, and on decision text paragraphs related to transparency.

On the paragraphs on provision of information, some countries expressed hesitation to language on, *inter alia*, frequency, pointing to a lack of textual assurances on support for improving national capabilities. Others expressed willingness to explore text that would provide such assurances.

On the decision paragraphs, parties discussed, *inter alia*, the level of detail required in providing guidance for development of modalities and procedures for transparency.

Parties agreed that Co-Facilitator Kwok would develop bridging proposals based on parties' oral and textual inputs.

During discussions in the contact group, parties discussed the MRV of information provided by parties, several parties proposed a wider scope for facilitative dialogue that would go beyond mitigation. The EU expressed flexibility on this, suggesting referring to the purpose of the agreement. China and Saudi Arabia expressed concern that a facilitative dialogue could represent an *ex ante* review and opposed this. The EU and the US said a dialogue would inform the next round of INDCs.

On Thursday, 3 December, the LDCs opposed a one-size-fits-all approach to reporting. The EU, Colombia for AILAC, the US, and others supported a common framework, with flexibility regarding the timing and detail in the reporting, and with support to developing countries.

On Friday, 4 December, India urged inclusion of MRV of finance from developed countries in the agreement article on transparency.

Global Stocktake (draft Article 10) and Associated

Decision Text: The spin-off group first convened on Wednesday, 2 December. Discussions focusing on the decision portion of the text, centered around inputs to the global stocktake, including: connections with the long-term goal; relevance of individual and overall or aggregate efforts; outcomes of the 2013-2015 review; linkages with MRV processes; the role of non-state actors; and the possibility of a no text option on inputs for the global stocktake to avoid a prescriptive approach.

Parties also exchanged views on, *inter alia*: the need for and degree of specificity in modalities for a body to prepare for entry into force; the possibility of aligning the IPCC's work with the global stocktake; and request to the SBSTA to provide advice on how the IPCC assessment reports could inform the stocktaking.

Focusing on the agreement portion of the text, parties debated language on MOI and purpose and the "outcome" of the stocktake. Parties agreed that the co-facilitator and Secretariat would capture the discussions in a revised version, which was then presented back to the contact group.

Implementation and Compliance, and Final Clauses (draft

Article 11, 12-26) and Associated Decision Text: On final clauses and associated decision text, the ADP contact group discussed decision paragraphs not allocated to spin-off groups. Other compliance issues and final clauses were addressed by the compliance spin-off group and in informal discussions.

On Monday, 30 November, in the spin-off group, parties discussed the rules of procedure for the CMA. Many parties supported having the CMA adopt its own rules of procedure, or using the draft rules of procedure used by the COP. Some parties expressed support for developing the rules of procedure for the CMA before it meets, and suggested that if that option was not possible, a work programme could be developed for the adoption of such rules. Another delegation noted that such a work programme could prejudice that the CMA needs new rules of procedure. Colombia suggested a consultative process to determine if new rules of procedure are required and, if so, to develop the rules. Several parties supported only using the COP's rules of procedure without any additional processes.

Workstream 2: Pre-2020 ambition was primarily discussed in a spin-off group, starting on Monday, 30 November. In addition, informal consultations were held throughout the week, resulting in "clean" paragraphs on, *inter alia*, inviting developed countries to increase pledges under the Cancun Agreements, housing of the mitigation technical examination process (TEP), and assessment of the TEP. The informal consultations also considered the institutional location, timing and content of a new adaptation TEP.

During spin-off group discussions, developed country parties called for focusing on the mitigation section of the text, including the role of non-party stakeholders, the existing TEP's institutional location going forward and linkages to Convention bodies, while developing country parties emphasized accelerated implementation and adaptation.

On mitigation, parties introduced compromise language on paragraphs related to the participation of relevant experts in the TEP, engaging the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism in the Technical Expert Meetings and involving two high-level champions in preparing the summary for policymakers. One party proposed language welcoming the Montreal Protocol's work on hydrofluorocarbons, and the importance of addressing shipping and aviation emissions. Many opposed introducing language at this point in the negotiations.

On accelerated implementation, three groups of parties supported an option on an accelerated implementation process to assess progress on closing the mitigation and adaptation gaps and adequacy of MOI. Others introduced a bridging proposal on a paragraph establishing a facilitative dialogue in conjunction with COP 23. Preferring the "no text" option, developed country parties opposed inclusion of this section in the decision, noting overlaps with other assessment processes.

On adaptation, parties diverged on the content, institutional location and timing of a proposed adaptation TEP, with one group of parties opposed to housing it under an existing institution, such as the Adaptation Committee.

On support, one developing country party requested "a concrete roadmap" be inserted for achieving the US\$100 billion goal. Opposing this language, a developed country party suggested recalling Decision 1/CP.19 (Further Advancing the Durban Platform), paragraphs 3 and 4(e), on accelerating the full implementation of the Bali Action Plan and increasing MOI support from developed countries. Another developing country party called for language on a 2016-2017 review of gaps in implementation of developed country parties' mitigation commitments and MOI provision.

On the preamble of the workstream 2 draft decision text, one party proposed, opposed by many, referencing the Montreal Protocol's work on hydrofluorocarbons and international transport emissions, instead of including them in the mitigation section, as a compromise. One party requested bracketing 1.5°C, and adding "in accordance with common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR)" to a paragraph on recognizing the importance of international and regional cooperation in mobilizing ambitious climate action by all.

Parties agreed the co-facilitators would consult with the ADP Co-Chairs on remaining contentious issues.

ADP CLOSING: On Saturday morning, 5 December, in the ADP contact group, ADP Co-Chair Reifsnyder presented ADP draft conclusions (FCCC/ADP/2015/L.6), with the draft agreement and decision text on workstream 1 and 2 in Annex I, and a reflection note in Annex II providing textual suggestions by parties. He explained that the draft text had not changed from the compilation text with bridging proposals, and that should there be a comment that a party was unable to make due to time constraints, or an inaccuracy or omission in the reflection note, parties could make submissions until 1:00 pm on Saturday, 5 December. The contact group agreed to forward the draft conclusions to the ADP plenary.

ADP Co-Chair Reifsnyder then opened the ADP closing plenary. After thanking the parties and co-facilitators for their hard work and dedication, ADP Co-Chair Reifsnyder turned to ADP agenda item 3 (implementation of all the elements of Decision 1/CP.17), noting significant progress had been made in reducing gaps between parties' positions, and saying the ADP's work would now be passed on to the COP to "complete the last leg."

Following assurances by ADP Co-Chair Reifsnyder that, *inter alia*, the reflections note would be revised to include parties' remaining comments and "nothing has been decided or left behind," including the issue of loss and damage, the ADP adopted conclusions (FCCC/ADP/2015/L.6) to be forwarded to the COP for further consideration.

Laurence Tubiana, COP 21 Presidency, assured parties that negotiations would continue on the basis of the ADP text that was agreed. She highlighted the importance of party ownership to make progress.

Statements by parties during the closing plenary are available at: <http://www.iisd.ca/vol12/enb12658e.html>

In closing, ADP Rapporteur Yang Liu (China) presented, and parties adopted, the report of the meeting (FCCC/ADP/2015/L.5).

Saying that "sometimes words cannot capture our feelings," ADP Co-Chair Djoghlaflaf congratulated parties for their achievement so far, and thanked parties for their trust.

UNFCCC Executive Secretary Christiana Figueres noted her appreciation for the full dedication of parties on this "complex" task and said work needed to continue next week.

Thanking all, ADP Co-Chair Reifsnyder gavelled ADP 2-12 to a close at 1:07 pm.

COP 21

DURBAN PLATFORM FOR ENHANCED ACTION

(DECISION 1/CP.17): Report of the ADP: Following the closure of ADP 2-12, this item (FCCC/CP/2014/10/Add.1, FCCC/ADP/2014/4, FCCC/ADP/2015/2-5, FCCC/CP/2015/4, FCCC/TP/2015/4 and Add.1-2, and ADP.2015.6.NonPaper) was considered by the COP on Saturday evening, 5 December. ADP Co-Chairs Reifsnyder and Djoghlaflaf presented and transmitted the draft agreement and decision and reflection note (FCCC/ADP/2015/L.6/Rev.1 and Add.1) to the COP. The report of the ADP was adopted.

Parties agreed to the mode of work outlined by COP 21 President Fabius, including work in the Comité de Paris, an open-ended single-setting group, presided over by the COP 21 President, to progress the text and facilitate compromise. He

said the Comité de Paris would work under the principle, *inter alia*, of "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed," and its meetings would be transmitted to screens at the conference site to facilitate transparency.

He stated that the outcome should be concluded in time for a review group on legal and linguistic matters to address related issues before Friday, 11 December.

South Africa, for the G-77/China, emphasized the importance of clarity and predictability in the negotiation process, and asked that the reflection note be updated with suggestions that are still missing.

Maldives, for AOSIS, asked for clarity on how the issues of adaptation, and loss and damage would be handled.

Sudan, for the African Group, noted that important issues have been left out of the agreement, but expressed certainty that parties will address these issues. Marshall Islands called for the Paris agreement to include, *inter alia*, a 1.5°C temperature goal and assurances on long-term climate finance.

Australia, for the Umbrella Group, said the ADP text is party-driven and party-owned. Saudi Arabia, for the Arab Group, emphasized that setting a goal for governments' efforts "needs to be substantiated by proven science," provided by the IPCC.

Guatemala, for AILAC, called for awareness that "this is our text and it will be our ability to listen to one another and our ability to articulate our needs" that will enable an effective agreement. Angola, for the LDCs, expressed disappointment that the COP Bureau "formulation" was used to form the legal and linguistic review group, excluding the LDCs.

Malaysia, for the LMDCs, underscored the group's commitment to goodwill and expressed concern over the repeated use of the refrain "the world has changed." China underlined that an ambitious Paris outcome should give equal weight to all of the Durban mandate components and said developed countries should take the lead.

Azerbaijan asked his insertions to be incorporated into the reflection note. Turkey asked to be considered as a group for consultations on negotiations. Nepal highlighted the fragility of mountain ecosystems.

Comité de Paris: On Saturday, 5 December, after accepting the draft text from the ADP, COP 21 President Fabius outlined three principles for the Comité that: nothing is agreed until everything is agreed; all parties are included; and transparency is upheld.

He announced four informal ministerial consultations, referred to as *indabas*, that would convene under the Comité, on: support, facilitated by Emmanuel Isoze-Ngondet (Gabon) and Jochen Flasbarth (Germany); differentiation in the context of mitigation, transparency and finance, including pre-2020 finance, facilitated by Izabella Teixeira (Brazil) and Vivian Balakrishnan (Singapore); and ambition, long-term objectives and periodic review, facilitated by Pa Ousman (The Gambia) and Amber Rudd (UK).

On Monday, 7 December, COP President Fabius announced additional *indabas* on: adaptation, and loss and damage, led by René Orellana (Bolivia) and Åsa Romson (Sweden); cooperative approaches and mechanisms, led by Catherine McKenna (Canada) and Raymond Tshibanda N'Tungamulongo (Democratic Republic of the Congo); and forests, led by Daniel

Vicente Ortega Pacheco (Ecuador), Doris Leuthard (Switzerland) and Henri Djombo (Republic of the Congo). He also announced a working group on response measures, led by Jan Szyszko (Poland) and Khaled Mohamed Fahmy Abdelall (Egypt) and an *indaba* on the preamble, led by Claudia Salerno (Venezuela), and on facilitating implementation and compliance, led by Rafael Pacchiano (Mexico).

The *indabas* met Sunday, 6 December, through Tuesday, 8 December, and the Comité met Monday, 7 December, through Wednesday, 9 December, to hear reports from most of the *indabas*. The Comité continued to meet until Saturday, 12 December.

On **support/MOI**, the co-facilitators reported progress toward possible common ground on, *inter alia*, provision of support and mobilization of climate finance, and reported reassurances regarding the fulfillment of existing commitments and continued leadership of developed countries. They outlined specific proposed language on how the role of other parties could be captured, such as “voluntary contributions,” “contributions by others in a position/willing/able to do so,” or reference to South-South cooperation, but also reported that some parties expressed strong reservations, calling for consistency with existing provisions and principles of the Convention.

The co-facilitators reported that parties found convergence in the draft article on technology development and transfer (Article 7), and related decision text, with common ground on, *inter alia*, cooperative action, long-term vision and the technology framework.

On **capacity building**, they reported agreement on a Paris Committee on Capacity-building and an understanding on a long-term work programme on capacity building, and said work would continue on the modalities of the committee.

On **differentiation**, the co-facilitators said that assurances of no backsliding on commitments and that developed countries would continue to take the lead “resonated strongly.” On differentiation in the sections on transparency and finance, they reported on assurances that developed countries will continue to take the lead without backsliding, and on general convergence that differentiation will be operationalized through flexibility for developing countries.

On transparency, they reported “broad acknowledgement” that capacity building and support are key reflections of differentiation and, on finance, reported that several parties underscored there is no intention to create new legal obligations for developing countries, but an encouragement to voluntarily contribute.

On Wednesday, 9 December, co-facilitator Balakrishnan noted that “parties are not yet ready to place their final positions on the table,” saying the co-facilitators would work with the Presidency and Secretariat to crystallize existing fault lines in the text.

On **ambition**, the co-facilitators reported convergence on a common “global moment” every five years to take stock and review aggregate progress, and provide an opportunity to confirm or raise targets, but without an obligation to do so. They said that, while several developed and developing country parties indicated willingness to refer to a 1.5°C limit, others reaffirmed the temperature limit in the Cancun Agreements.

On Wednesday, 9 December, they reported that most parties were willing to reflect a 1.5°C temperature limit in the purpose of the agreement, with accompanying provisions related to sustainable development, MOI, equity, and food security.

On **pre-2020**, the co-facilitators reported parties considered a compromise proposal containing a facilitative dialogue, potentially in 2017, which would examine the state of, and options to further enhance, implementation under the Convention for all parties with a stronger focus on developed countries’ undertakings. They relayed that parties had found common ground on an adaptation TEP that would add value, as long as it does not duplicate work under existing bodies under the Convention. They reported emerging convergence on mirroring the mitigation TEP’s institutional arrangements for an adaptation TEP, with a key role for the Adaptation Committee. On accelerating implementation, they noted divergence of views.

On **cooperative approaches**, the co-facilitators reported that parties considered guiding principles, including, *inter alia*: environmental integrity; avoiding double counting; and the voluntary nature of such approaches. On mechanisms to support sustainable development (draft Article 3*ter*), she reported some parties stressed that such mechanisms would need to be durable over time, while others said they should not be part of the agreement.

On **adaptation, and loss and damage**, the co-facilitators highlighted landing zones on: a clear goal for adaptation, with a link to Convention Article 2 (objective); recognition of the link between mitigation and adaptation; and a communication process that is flexible and does not further burden developing countries. They also highlighted crosscutting issues needing resolution, including references to a temperature goal, vulnerability and CBDR. On loss and damage, they noted ongoing discussions on institutional arrangements, saying there was no convergence.

On **facilitating implementation and compliance**, the co-facilitator noted general acknowledgement on the need for the agreement to define nature and purpose, leaving modalities and procedures for later. He identified divergence on whether or not to reflect differentiation in this part.

On Wednesday, 9 December, COP 21 President Fabius presented a revised draft text of the Paris outcome. Parties welcomed the transparency of the process, and accepted the text as a basis for negotiations. Many parties expressed some concerns with the text.

South Africa, for the G-77/China, and Egypt, for the African Group, noted concern on “delinking” textual language from the Convention and dilution of Convention principles, particularly on differentiation. The G-77/China lamented the lack of adequate resources on MOI and, with the LMDCs, expressed concern about the lack of text regarding unilateral measures. She further called for a distinct article on loss and damage.

Malaysia, for the LMDCs, emphasized capturing CBDR and expressed concern on language on nationally determined mitigation contributions. With the Arab Group, he opposed references to carbon pricing. He further underscored that progress under workstream 2 is fundamental for progress under workstream 1.

Australia, for the Umbrella Group, stressed developed countries' continued assurances to continue to lead in the context of a universal agreement in which all parties do their best.

Angola, for the LDCs, highlighted the need to ensure access to finance.

The African Group noted concern on the reflection of individual commitments without references to support and worried that key elements to operationalize the global goal on adaptation were missing.

The EU underlined that after 2020 countries in a position to do so should join in increasing financial flows to countries in need and expressed concern that the mechanism to raise ambition over time had been significantly weakened.

Saudi Arabia, for the Arab Group, further expressed concern with references to "those in a position to do so" and called for the reinstatement of adaptation co-benefits coming in the "form" of mitigation. He, and the EU, noted the lack of a double threshold for compliance.

The Maldives, for AOSIS, with Barbados for the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and many others, stressed a below 1.5°C goal as critical. He underscored ongoing work among parties on language regarding loss and damage.

Guatemala, for AILAC, said the preamble should include a reference to gender and supported a quantified or quantifiable unilateral component in "features" under the mitigation article. She called for a registry of adaptation actions.

On Thursday, 10 December, COP 21 President Fabius presented a revised draft text at 9:00 pm, and announced that two groups would meet in parallel throughout the night, an "indaba of solutions," chaired by himself, and an informal consultation, chaired by COP 20 President Manuel Pulgar-Vidal (Peru).

During the *indaba* of solutions, parties discussed differentiation, ambition and finance. Many expressed support for differentiation, but disagreed on the extent to which differentiation should be reflected in the various provisions on mitigation, transparency and finance, among others. One party called the INDCs a "monument to differentiation," while another underscored that the differences between developed and developing countries must be reflected in the transparency system.

A spin-off group on differentiation reported progress on mitigation and transparency. Many parties underlined the need to reflect a 1.5°C temperature goal, which a few parties opposed. Several supported the need for five-year cycles.

On Friday, 11 December, parties met in informal consultations and conducted bilaterals throughout the day to resolve key issues surrounding ambition, differentiation and finance.

On Saturday, 12 December, the Comité de Paris reconvened at 11:30 am. COP 21 President Fabius announced the final text of a balanced ambitious agreement would be distributed after the meeting, underscoring it contained "the principle elements that we felt would be impossible to achieve: being differentiated, fair, durable, dynamic, balanced and legally binding." He stressed that this agreement is necessary for the entire world and for each country, that it will help island countries, expedite financial means, and assist fossil fuel countries in the attempt to diversify their economies, while aiding all countries in building low-carbon economies.

Noting the world has come to a defining moment on a journey dating back decades, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said parties would be presented with a document that is historic and promises to set the world on a new path to a low-emission, climate-resilient world. Underscoring that time has come to acknowledge that national interest is best served by acting in global solidarity, he called on parties to "finish the job" in a spirit of compromise.

Stressing "history is here" and postponement is not possible, French President François Hollande said negotiations had reached a decisive moment and only parties could answer the question: "Do we want an agreement?" Describing the draft text as ambitious but also realistic, he called on delegates to seize the opportunity to change the world by adopting the first universal agreement on climate change.

COP 21 President Fabius explained the final version of the draft Paris outcome was being translated into all UN languages and would be available at 1:30 pm. He suggested parties examine the text and that the Comité de Paris convene in plenary to take up "a series of necessary procedures."

At 5:30 pm, COP 21 President Fabius re-opened the Comité de Paris and outlined the organization of work: report back by the co-chairs of the open-ended group of legal and linguistic experts; clarifying remarks on the draft Paris outcome by the Secretariat (FCCC/CP/2015/L.9); and transmittal of the draft Paris outcome to the COP.

On the legal and linguistic review, Co-Chair Jimena Nieto Carrasco (Colombia) said the group had met on Thursday, 10 December, and Saturday, 12 December. She said the group recommended making technical amendments, noting that the language in translations in the draft agreement should be consistent with the Kyoto Protocol when the English version parallels the Protocol, and spelling out all of the acronyms.

UNFCCC Deputy Executive Secretary Richard Kinley listed technical corrections. These are now reflected in the revised document (FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1).

COP 21 President Fabius proposed and the parties agreed to transmit to the COP the draft Paris Agreement, reflecting the technical amendments made by the legal and linguistic review group and the Secretariat. The Comité de Paris closed at 7:25 pm.

Adoption of a Protocol, Another Legal Instrument, or an Agreed Outcome with Legal Force under the Convention Applicable to All Parties: The COP plenary convened to consider the draft Paris Agreement at 7:25 pm on Saturday, 12 December. COP 21 President Fabius invited the COP to adopt the decision contained in the document. With no objections,

the Paris Agreement was adopted at 7:26 pm. Many parties lauded the Agreement and the work of the French Presidency in achieving it. Many noted that while the Agreement is not perfect, it is necessary.

Quoting Nelson Mandela on "the long road to freedom," South Africa noted there is further technical work needed on the decisions and on increasing finance pre-2020.

Australia, for the Umbrella Group, said COP 21 has produced a global agreement that creates a framework for all nations to play a part in securing a prosperous future, noting the Agreement

confirms that developed countries will continue to lead in providing support for climate action, while recognizing the important role that others can play.

Lamenting the COP 21 Presidency had not acknowledged his country before adopting the Agreement, Nicaragua stressed the Agreement should include a paragraph allowing for the calculation of a global carbon budget in line with historical responsibilities and climate justice in case the results of the INDCs do not keep the global average temperature below 1.5°C from pre-industrial levels, and text allowing for the creation of a compensation fund based on historical responsibilities. He also lamented not being able to register reservations to the Agreement.

Switzerland, for Environmental Integrity Group, described the Agreement as legally-binding, ambitious and fair, saying it is flexible for future developments and provides an ambitious basis for combating climate change.

Welcoming the "historic agreement" as a landmark that will provide security and stability, the EU emphasized "we all have to translate this agreement to concrete actions." Echoing that "today we can celebrate but tomorrow we have to act," the EU noted the launch of the High-Ambition Coalition and underscored the EU "will scale up financial support as of 2020 and make it more predictable."

Egypt, on behalf of African Group, said the historic Paris Agreement had "far reaching consequences" for sustainable development and asked the COP 21 Presidency to convene consultations on Africa's special circumstances at SB 44. Sudan, for the African Group, emphasized issues of financing and transparency of support as the backbone of the implementation of the agreement.

Saint Lucia, for CARICOM, described the Paris Agreement as a resounding triumph of multilateralism and welcomed increased ambition, in the form of the 1.5°C goal, and the separate treatment of loss and damage in the agreement.

Maldives, for AOSIS, highlighted a recent and significant shift in action on climate change and bigger commitments in capitals around the world, and said "history will not judge us from what we did today, but what we do from this day forward."

Underscoring the importance and inclusion of human rights and gender, Colombia, for AILAC, lauded the Agreement for not only being applicable to all but also for belonging to all.

Saudi Arabia, for the Arab Group, congratulated the entire world for achieving an agreement that "allows us to better achieve sustainable development."

Panama, for Coalition for Rainforest Nations, said the mechanism to implement REDD+ would allow state and non-state actors to participate and serve communities that depend on the ecosystem services provided by tropical forests.

Angola, for the LDCs, noted the Agreement is applicable to all and encourages movement toward a common global temperature goal of 1.5°C through, *inter alia*, periodic reviews, global stocktake, and the recognition of specific needs.

Suggesting the Paris Agreement is only the beginning, President Hollande announced France will commit to revising, by 2020, its GHG emission reduction target and its financial

contribution, in particular to adaptation in vulnerable countries, and invited all to join a coalition to achieve a carbon price to reorient investments "starting from tomorrow."

Describing the Paris Agreement as a "monumental success for the planet and its people," UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon identified "solid results on all key points."

UNFCCC Executive Secretary Christiana Figueres said the Paris Climate Change Conference builds successfully on years of work by government delegates, individuals and institutions, and described the Paris Agreement as one of conviction, representing solidarity with the most vulnerable and a long-term vision to "turn this new legal framework into an engine of safe growth for the rest of this century."

Turkey said he expected the COP 21 Presidency to work towards finding a solution to issues raised by Turkey, related to parties with special circumstances that have been recognized by the COP having access to support under the agreement. COP 21 President Fabius assured he would undertake consultations on the issue.

Describing the agreement as fair, just, comprehensive, ambitious, effective and durable, China said it also reflects the balance between mitigation and adaptation, and action and support.

The US said the Paris Agreement, *inter alia*: "empowers us" to chart a new path forward while preventing the most devastating consequences of climate change, and sends a critical message to the global marketplace, while inspiring technological breakthroughs.

Noting that the agreement could have been more ambitious, particularly on the "fair share" by developed countries, India welcomed the Paris Agreement highlighting, among others, consistent application of differentiation.

Morocco said her country, as host of COP 22 in Marrakesh in 2016, would work with all stakeholders towards making the Paris Agreement operational.

Venezuela and Bolivia welcomed the Agreement's inclusion of, *inter alia*, climate justice and Mother Earth.

Senegal highlighted the "fully fledged" role of adaptation in the Paris Agreement and urged future work on support for vulnerable countries through internationally transferred mitigation outcomes. Ecuador called for quantifiable targets and highlighted the role of low emission development strategies.

The Philippines emphasized that the Agreement enshrines human rights and promised that his country, leading the Climate Vulnerable Forum, would continue to lead and sustain the fight against climate change for a safe and resilient future. Jamaica called the Paris Agreement a fair agreement that can be built upon, highlighting the reference to 1.5°C and loss and damage as a separate article.

Noting her country's lapel pins made of dried coconut fronds are worn by members of the High-Ambition Coalition, a youth representative from the Marshall Islands said "if this is the story of islands it is a story of the world." Tuvalu highlighted the leadership of his Prime Minister and said the Paris Agreement, in saving Tuvalu, will have saved the world.

Chile welcomed the recognition of carbon pricing, noting the Paris outcome marks the "beginning of the end of the fossil fuel era."

Bahamas congratulated COP 21 for delivering a legally-binding agreement that addresses the needs of SIDS, and looked forward to advancing the WIM.

Brazil saw implementation of the Agreement as a means of strengthening the multilateral system and called multilateralism “the best way to address our common challenges.”

Papua New Guinea, with the Central African Republic, expressed “satisfaction that REDD+ has been incorporated in the Paris Agreement.”

Guinea hoped the funds announced for capacity building and technology transfer would be effective.

Palestine announced his country would submit the instrument of accession to the UNFCCC, expressing his country’s pride for becoming the 196th member state and 197th party to the Convention.

Stressing “we are stronger together,” Business and Industry NGOs welcomed the role of the private sector in the Agreement.

Noting with concern that current INDCs remain “dangerously inadequate,” Climate Action Network (CAN), for Environmental NGOs (ENGOS), called on parties to improve their pledges in 2018 so that all will have ambitious targets for 2025.

Suggesting that “the denial in this room is palpable,” Climate Justice Now!, for ENGOS, said the Agreement is weak but the climate justice movement is strong and will deliver an energy revolution that serves people.

Expressing commitment to partnering to implement the Paris Agreement, Research and Independent NGOs said scientists and educators will provide support through, *inter alia*, building capacity, developing programmes and proposing policies.

Trade Unions noted that the Agreement would set the right goals but lacks clarity on mechanisms for its implementation.

Women and Gender called for an operationalization of gender equality “not a mere recognition of it.”

Youth lamented countries of the North had exempted themselves from assuming liability for climate change, “which your generation caused.”

Local Government and Municipal Authorities welcomed Morocco’s announcement to build on the Lima-Paris Action Agenda for COP 22.

Indigenous Peoples highlighted that their three messages had been partly incorporated into the agreement, though not to the full extent requested: rights of indigenous peoples; temperature goal of under 1.5°C; and recognition and respect for traditional knowledge.

Paris Agreement and Associated Decision: Paris

Agreement: The Paris Agreement (annexed to FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1) includes 16 preambular clauses and 29 operative clauses. The preamble addresses, among others:

- that the agreement is guided by the Convention’s principles, including the principle of equity and CBDR and respective capabilities, in light of different national circumstances;
- the need for an effective and progressive response to the urgent threat of climate change on the basis of the best scientific knowledge;
- the specific needs and special circumstances of developing country parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, in

particular the needs of LDCs, with regard to funding and transfer of technology;

- that parties may also be affected by the impacts of measures taken in response to climate change;
- the relationship between climate change actions, responses and actions, with equitable access to sustainable development;
- the priority of safeguarding food security and ending hunger;
- the imperatives of a just transition of the workforce;
- the need to respect, promote and consider human rights, the right to health, the rights of indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations, the right to development, gender equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity when taking action on climate change;
- conservation and enhancement of GHG sinks and reservoirs;
- ecosystem integrity, including oceans and the protection of biodiversity, recognized by some cultures as Mother Earth, and noting for some the importance of the concept of “climate justice”; and
- the importance of sustainable lifestyles and sustainable consumption and production.

Article 1 (Definitions): The definitions contained in Convention Article 1 apply to this Agreement. In addition “Convention” means the UNFCCC, “Conference of the Parties” means the COP of the Convention, and “Party” means party to the Agreement.

Article 2 (Purpose): This Agreement, in enhancing the implementation of the Convention, including its objective, aims to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change, in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty, including by:

- holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change;
- increasing the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and foster climate resilience and low GHG emissions development, in a manner that does not threaten food production; and
- making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low GHG emissions and climate-resilient development.

This Agreement will be implemented to reflect equity and the principle of CBDR and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.

Article 3 (Mitigation): As nationally determined contributions (NDCs) to the global response to climate change, all parties are to undertake and communicate ambitious efforts as defined in Articles 4, 7, 9, 10, 11 and 13 with the view to achieving the purpose of this Agreement (Article 2). The efforts of all parties will represent a progression over time, while recognizing the need to support developing country parties for the effective implementation of this Agreement.

Article 4 (Individual Contributions): This article provides that:

- in order to achieve the long-term temperature goal set out in Article 2, parties aim to reach global peaking of GHG

emissions as soon as possible, recognizing that peaking will take longer for developing country parties, and to undertake rapid reductions thereafter in accordance with best available science, so as to achieve a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of GHG in the second half of this century, on the basis of equity, and in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty;

- each party shall prepare, communicate and maintain successive NDCs that it intends to achieve. Parties shall pursue domestic mitigation measures, with the aim of achieving the objectives of such contributions;
- each party's successive NDC will represent a progression beyond the party's then current NDC and reflect its highest possible ambition, reflecting CBDR and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances;
- developed country parties should continue taking the lead by undertaking economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets. Developing country parties should continue enhancing their mitigation efforts, and are encouraged to move over time towards economy-wide emission reduction or limitation targets in the light of different national circumstances;
- support shall be provided to developing country parties for the implementation of this Article, in accordance with Articles 9, 10 and 11, recognizing that enhanced support for developing country parties will allow for higher ambition in their actions;
- the LDCs and SIDS may prepare and communicate strategies, plans and actions for low GHG emissions development reflecting their special circumstances;
- mitigation co-benefits resulting from parties' adaptation actions and/or economic diversification plans can contribute to mitigation outcomes under this Article;
- in communicating their NDCs, all parties shall provide the information necessary for clarity, transparency and understanding in accordance with Decision 1/CP.21 and any relevant decisions of the CMA;
- each party shall communicate an NDC every five years in accordance with Decision 1/CP.21 and any relevant decisions of the CMA, and be informed by the outcomes of the global stocktake referred to in Article 14;
- the CMA shall consider common time frames for NDCs at its first session;
- a party may at any time adjust its existing NDC with a view to enhancing its level of ambition, in accordance with guidance adopted by the CMA;
- NDCs communicated by parties shall be recorded in a public registry maintained by the Secretariat;
- in accounting for anthropogenic emissions and removals corresponding to their NDCs, parties shall promote environmental integrity, transparency, accuracy, completeness, comparability and consistency, and ensure the avoidance of double counting, in accordance with guidance adopted by the CMA;
- in the context of their NDCs, when recognizing and implementing mitigation actions with respect to anthropogenic emissions and removals, parties should take into account, as appropriate, existing methods and guidance under the

Convention, in the light of the provisions of paragraph 13 of this Article;

- parties shall take into consideration, in the implementation of this Agreement, the concerns of parties with economies most affected by the impacts of response measures, particularly developing country parties;
 - parties, including regional economic integration organizations and their member states, that have reached an agreement to act jointly under paragraph 2 of this Article shall notify the Secretariat of the terms of that agreement, including the emission level allocated to each party within the relevant time period, when they communicate their NDCs. The Secretariat shall in turn inform the parties and signatories to the Convention of the terms of that agreement;
 - each party to such an agreement shall be responsible for its emission level as set out in the agreement referred to in Article 4.16 above in accordance with paragraphs 13 and 14 of this Article and Articles 13 and 15;
 - if parties acting jointly do so in the framework of, and together with, a regional economic integration organization which is itself a party to this Agreement, each member state of that regional economic integration organization individually, and together with the regional economic integration organization, shall be responsible for its emission level as set out in the agreement communicated under paragraph 16 of this Article in accordance with paragraphs 13 and 14 of this Article and Articles 13 and 15; and
 - all parties should strive to formulate and communicate long-term low GHG emission development strategies, mindful of Article 2 taking into account CBDR and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances;
- Article 5 (Forests):** This article provides that:
- parties should take action to conserve and enhance, as appropriate, sinks and reservoirs of GHGs as referred to in Convention Article 4.1(d) including forests; and
 - parties are encouraged to take action to implement and support, including through results-based payments, the existing framework as set out in related guidance and decisions already agreed under the Convention for policy approaches and positive incentives for activities relating to REDD+, and alternative policy approaches, such as joint mitigation and adaptation approaches for the integral and sustainable management of forests, while reaffirming the importance of incentivizing, as appropriate, non-carbon benefits associated with such approaches.

Article 6 (Cooperative Approaches): This article provides that:

- parties recognize that some parties choose to pursue voluntary cooperation in the implementation of their NDCs to allow for higher ambition in their mitigation and adaptation actions and to promote sustainable development and environmental integrity;
- parties shall, where engaging on a voluntary basis in cooperative approaches that involve the use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes towards NDCs, promote sustainable development and ensure environmental integrity and transparency, including in governance, and shall apply robust accounting to ensure, *inter alia*, the avoidance of

double counting, consistent with guidance adopted by the CMA;

- the use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes to achieve NDCs under this Agreement shall be voluntary and authorized by participating parties;
- a mechanism to contribute to the mitigation of GHG emissions and support sustainable development is established under the authority and guidance of the CMA for use by parties on a voluntary basis. It shall be supervised by a body designated by the CMA, and shall aim to promote the mitigation of GHG emissions while fostering sustainable development, to incentivize and facilitate participation in the mitigation of GHG emissions by public and private entities authorized by a party, to contribute to the reduction of emission levels in the host party, which will benefit from mitigation activities resulting in emission reductions that can also be used by another party to fulfil its NDC, and to deliver an overall mitigation in global emissions;
- emission reductions resulting from the mechanism referred to in paragraph 4 of this Article shall not be used to demonstrate achievement of the host-party's NDC if used by another party to demonstrate achievement of its NDC;
- the CMA shall ensure that a share of the proceeds from activities under the mechanism referred to in paragraph 4 of this Article is used to cover administrative expenses as well as to assist developing country parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change to meet the costs of adaptation;
- CMA 1 shall adopt rules, modalities and procedures for the mechanism referred to in paragraph 4 of this Article;
- parties recognize the importance of the availability of integrated, holistic and balanced non-market approaches to assist in the implementation of their NDCs, in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication, in a coordinated and effective manner, including through, *inter alia*, mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology transfer and capacity building, as appropriate. These approaches shall aim to promote mitigation and adaptation ambition, enhance public and private sector participation in the implementation of NDCs, and enable opportunities for coordination across instruments and relevant institutional arrangements; and
- a framework for non-market approaches to sustainable development is defined to promote the non-market approaches referred to in paragraph 8 of this Article.

Article 7 (Adaptation): This article provides that:

- parties establish the global goal on adaptation of enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change, with a view to contributing to sustainable development and ensuring an adequate adaptation response in the context of the temperature goal referred to in Article 2;
- parties recognize that adaptation is a global challenge faced by all with local, subnational, national, regional and international dimensions, and that it is a key component of and makes a contribution to the long-term global response to climate change to protect people, livelihoods and ecosystems, taking into account the urgent and immediate needs of those

developing country parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change;

- the adaptation efforts of developing country parties shall be recognized in accordance with the modalities to be adopted by CMA 1;
- parties recognize that the current need for adaptation is significant and that greater levels of mitigation can reduce the need for additional adaptation efforts, and that greater adaptation needs can involve greater adaptation costs;
- parties acknowledge that adaptation action should follow a country-driven, gender-responsive, participatory and fully transparent approach, taking into consideration vulnerable groups, communities and ecosystems, and should be based on and guided by the best available science and, as appropriate, traditional knowledge, knowledge of indigenous peoples and local knowledge systems, with a view to integrating adaptation into relevant socio-economic and environmental policies and actions, where appropriate;
- parties recognize the importance of support for and international cooperation on adaptation efforts and the importance of taking into account the needs of developing country parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change;
- parties should strengthen their cooperation on enhancing action on adaptation, taking into account the Cancun Adaptation Framework, including with regard to: sharing information, good practices, experiences and lessons learned, including, as appropriate, as these relate to science, planning, policies and implementation in relation to adaptation actions; strengthening institutional arrangements, including those under the Convention that serve this Agreement, to support the synthesis of relevant information and knowledge, and the provision of technical support and guidance to parties; strengthening scientific knowledge on climate, including research, systematic observation of the climate system and early warning systems, in a manner that informs climate services and supports decision making; assisting developing country parties in identifying effective adaptation practices, adaptation needs, priorities, support provided and received for adaptation actions and efforts, and challenges and gaps, in a manner consistent with encouraging good practices; and improving the effectiveness and durability of adaptation actions;
- UN specialized organizations and agencies are encouraged to support the efforts of parties to implement the actions referred to in paragraph 7 of this Article, taking into account the provisions of paragraph 5 of this Article;
- each party shall, as appropriate, engage in adaptation planning processes and the implementation of actions, including the development or enhancement of relevant plans, policies and/or contributions, which may include: the implementation of adaptation actions, undertakings and/or efforts; the process to formulate and implement NAPs; the assessment of climate change impacts and vulnerability, with a view to formulating nationally determined prioritized actions, taking into account vulnerable people, places and ecosystems; monitoring and evaluating and learning from adaptation plans, policies, programmes and actions; and building the resilience of socio-

economic and ecological systems, including through economic diversification and sustainable management of natural resources;

- each party should, as appropriate, submit and update periodically an adaptation communication, which may include its priorities, implementation and support needs, plans and actions, without creating any additional burden for developing country parties;
- the adaptation communication referred to in paragraph 10 of this Article shall be, as appropriate, submitted and updated periodically, as a component of or in conjunction with other communications or documents, including a NAP, an NDC as referred to in Article 4, paragraph 2, and/or national communications (NC);
- the adaptation communications referred to in paragraph 10 of this Article shall be recorded in a public registry maintained by the Secretariat;
- continuous and enhanced international support shall be provided to developing country parties for the implementation of paragraphs 7, 9, 10 and 11 of this Article, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 9, 10 and 11;
- the global stocktake referred to in Article 14 shall, *inter alia*: recognize adaptation efforts of developing country parties; enhance the implementation of adaptation action taking into account the adaptation communication referred to in paragraph 10 of this Article; and review the adequacy and effectiveness of adaptation and support provided for adaptation; and
- review the overall progress made in achieving the global goal on adaptation referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article.

Article 8 (loss and damage): This article provides that:

- parties recognize the importance of averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including extreme weather events and slow onset events, and the role of sustainable development in reducing the risk of loss and damage;
- the WIM shall be subject to the authority and guidance of the CMA and may be enhanced and strengthened, as determined by the CMA;
- parties should enhance understanding, action and support, including through the WIM, as appropriate, on a cooperative and facilitative basis with respect to loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change;
- accordingly, areas of cooperation and facilitation to enhance understanding, action and support may include: early warning systems; emergency preparedness; slow onset events; events that may involve irreversible and permanent loss and damage; comprehensive risk assessment and management; risk insurance facilities, climate risk pooling and other insurance solutions; non-economic losses; and resilience of communities, livelihoods and ecosystems; and
- the WIM shall collaborate with existing bodies and expert groups under the Agreement, as well as relevant organizations and expert bodies outside the Agreement.

Article 9 (finance): This article provides that:

- developed country parties shall provide financial resources to assist developing country parties with respect to both

mitigation and adaptation in continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention;

- other parties are encouraged to provide or continue to provide such support voluntarily;
- as part of a global effort, developed country parties should continue to take the lead in mobilizing climate finance from a wide variety of sources, instruments and channels, noting the significant role of public funds, through a variety of actions, including supporting country-driven strategies, and taking into account the needs and priorities of developing country parties. Such mobilization of climate finance should represent a progression beyond previous efforts;
- the provision of scaled-up financial resources should aim to achieve a balance between adaptation and mitigation, taking into account country-driven strategies, and the priorities and needs of developing country parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change and have significant capacity constraints, such as the LDCs and SIDS, considering the need for public and grant-based resources for adaptation;
- developed country parties shall biennially communicate indicative quantitative and qualitative information related to paragraphs 1 and 3 of this Article, as applicable, including, as available, projected levels of public financial resources to be provided to developing country parties. Other parties providing resources are encouraged to communicate biennially such information on a voluntary basis;
- the global stocktake referred to in Article 14 shall take into account the relevant information provided by developed country parties and/or Agreement bodies on efforts related to climate finance;
- developed country parties shall provide transparent and consistent information on support for developing country parties provided and mobilized through public interventions biennially in accordance with the modalities, procedures and guidelines to be adopted by CMA 1, as stipulated in Article 13, paragraph 13. Other parties are encouraged to do so;
- the Financial Mechanism of the Convention, including its operating entities, shall serve as the financial mechanism of this Agreement; and
- the institutions serving this Agreement, including the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism of the Convention, shall aim to ensure efficient access to financial resources through simplified approval procedures and enhanced readiness support for developing country parties, in particular for the LDCs and SIDS, in the context of their national climate strategies and plans.

Article 10 (technology development and transfer): This article provides that:

- parties share a long-term vision on the importance of fully realizing technology development and transfer in order to improve resilience to climate change and to reduce GHG emissions;
- parties, noting the importance of technology for the implementation of mitigation and adaptation actions under this Agreement and recognizing existing technology deployment and dissemination efforts, shall strengthen cooperative action on technology development and transfer;

- the Technology Mechanism established under the Convention shall serve this Agreement;
 - a technology framework is established to provide overarching guidance to the work of the Technology Mechanism in promoting and facilitating enhanced action on technology development and transfer in order to support the implementation of this Agreement, in pursuit of the long-term vision referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article;
 - accelerating, encouraging and enabling innovation is critical for an effective, long-term global response to climate change and promoting economic growth and sustainable development. Such effort shall be, as appropriate, supported, including by the Technology Mechanism and, through financial means, by the Financial Mechanism of the Convention, for collaborative approaches to research and development, and facilitating access to technology, in particular for early stages of the technology cycle, to developing country parties; and
 - support, including financial support, shall be provided to developing country parties for the implementation of this Article, including for strengthening cooperative action on technology development and transfer at different stages of the technology cycle, with a view to achieving a balance between support for mitigation and adaptation. The global stocktake referred to in Article 14 shall take into account available information on efforts related to support on technology development and transfer for developing country parties;
- Article 11 (capacity building):** This article provides that:
- capacity building under this Agreement should enhance the capacity and ability of developing country parties, in particular countries with the least capacity, such as the LDCs, and those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, such as SIDS, to take effective climate change action, including, *inter alia*, to implement adaptation and mitigation actions, and should facilitate technology development, dissemination and deployment, access to climate finance, relevant aspects of education, training and public awareness, and the transparent, timely and accurate communication of information;
 - capacity building should be country-driven, be responsive to national needs, and foster country ownership of parties, in particular, for developing country parties, including at the national, subnational and local levels. Capacity building should be guided by lessons learned, including those from capacity-building activities under the Convention, and should be an effective, iterative process that is participatory, cross-cutting and gender-responsive;
 - all parties should cooperate to enhance the capacity of developing country parties to implement this Agreement. Developed country parties should enhance support for capacity-building actions in developing country parties;
 - all parties enhancing the capacity of developing country parties to implement this Agreement, including through regional, bilateral and multilateral approaches, shall regularly communicate these actions or measures on capacity building. Developing country parties should regularly communicate progress made on implementing capacity-building plans, policies, actions or measures to implement this Agreement; and

- capacity-building activities shall be enhanced through appropriate institutional arrangements to support the implementation of this Agreement, including the appropriate institutional arrangements established under the Convention that serve this Agreement. CMA 1 shall consider and adopt a decision on the initial institutional arrangements for capacity building.

Article 12 (education, training and public awareness):

Parties shall cooperate in taking measures, as appropriate, to enhance climate change education, training, public awareness, public participation and public access to information, recognizing the importance of these steps with respect to enhancing actions under this Agreement.

Article 13 (transparency): This article provides that:

- in order to build mutual trust and confidence and to promote effective implementation, an enhanced transparency framework for action and support, with built-in flexibility that takes into account parties' different capacities and builds upon collective experience is established;
- the transparency framework shall provide flexibility in the implementation of the provisions of this Article to those developing country parties that need it in the light of their capacities. The modalities, procedures and guidelines referred to in paragraph 13 of this Article shall reflect such flexibility;
- the transparency framework shall build on and enhance the transparency arrangements under the Convention, recognizing the special circumstances of the LDCs and SIDS, and be implemented in a facilitative, non-intrusive, non-punitive manner, respectful of national sovereignty, and avoid placing undue burden on parties;
- the transparency arrangements under the Convention, including national communications (NCs), biennial reports and Biennial Update Reports (BURs), international assessment and review (IAR) and international consultation and analysis, shall form part of the experience drawn upon for the development of the modalities, procedures and guidelines under paragraph 13 of this Article;
- the purpose of the framework for transparency of action is to provide a clear understanding of climate change action in the light of Article 2 of the Convention, including clarity and tracking of progress towards achieving parties' individual NDCs under Article 4, and parties' adaptation actions under Article 7, including good practices, priorities, needs and gaps, to inform the global stocktake under Article 14;
- the purpose of the framework for transparency of support is to provide clarity on support provided and received by relevant individual parties in the context of climate change actions under Articles 4, 7, 9, 10 and 11, and, to the extent possible, to provide a full overview of aggregate financial support provided, to inform the global stocktake under Article 14;
- each party shall regularly provide the following information: a national inventory report of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of GHGs, prepared using good practice methodologies accepted by the IPCC and agreed upon by the CMA; and information necessary to track progress made in implementing and achieving its NDC under Article 4;
- each party should provide information related to climate change impacts and adaptation under Article 7, as appropriate;

- developed country parties shall, and other parties that provide support should, provide information on financial, technology transfer and capacity-building support provided to developing country parties under Article 9, 10 and 11;
- developing country parties should provide information on financial, technology transfer and capacity-building support needed and received under Articles 9, 10 and 11;
- information submitted by each party under paragraphs 7 and 9 of this Article shall undergo a technical expert review, in accordance with Decision 1/CP.21. For those developing country parties that need it in the light of their capacities, the review process shall include assistance in identifying capacity-building needs. In addition, each party shall participate in a facilitative, multilateral consideration of progress with respect to efforts under Article 9, and its respective implementation and achievement of its NDC;
- the technical expert review shall consist of consideration of the party's support provided, as relevant, and its implementation and achievement of its NDC. The review shall also identify areas of improvement for the party, and include a review of the consistency of the information with the modalities, procedures and guidelines referred to in paragraph 13 of this Article, taking into account the flexibility accorded to the party under paragraph 2 of this Article. The review shall pay particular attention to the respective national capabilities and circumstances of developing country parties;
- CMA 1 shall, building on experience from the arrangements related to transparency under the Convention, and elaborating on the provisions in this Article, adopt common modalities, procedures and guidelines, as appropriate, for the transparency of action and support;
- support shall be provided to developing countries for the implementation of this Article; and
- support shall also be provided for the building of transparency-related capacity of developing country parties on a continuous basis.

Article 14 (global stocktake): This article provides that:

- the CMA shall periodically take stock of the implementation of this Agreement to assess the collective progress towards achieving the purpose of this Agreement and its long-term goals (referred to as the "global stocktake"). It shall do so in a comprehensive and facilitative manner, considering mitigation, adaptation and the means of implementation and support, and in the light of equity and the best available science;
- the CMA shall undertake its first global stocktake in 2023 and every five years thereafter unless otherwise decided by the CMA; and
- the outcome of the global stocktake shall inform parties in updating and enhancing, in a nationally determined manner, their actions and support, in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Agreement, as well as in enhancing international cooperation for climate action.

Article 15 (implementation and compliance): This article provides that:

- a mechanism to facilitate implementation of and promote compliance with the provisions of this Agreement is established;

- this mechanism shall consist of a committee that shall be expert-based and facilitative in nature and function in a manner that is transparent, non-adversarial and non-punitive. The committee shall pay particular attention to the respective national capabilities and circumstances of parties; and
- the committee shall operate under the modalities and procedures adopted by CMA 1 and report annually to the CMA.

The remaining articles of the Agreement include institutional provisions and final clauses: Article 16 (Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Agreement); Article 17 (Secretariat); Article 18 (SBSTA and SBI); Article 19 (Other SBs); Article 20 (Signature and Ratification); Article 21 (Entry Into Force); Article 22 (Amendment); Article 23 (Adoption and Amendment of Annexes); Article 24 (Settlement of Disputes); Article 25 (Voting); Article 26 (Depositary); Article 27 (Reservations); Article 28 (Withdrawal); and Article 29 (Official Languages). Article 21 on entry into force contains a double threshold, requiring ratification by at least 55 parties accounting for at least an estimated 55% of total global GHG emissions to enter into force.

Associated Decision: In the associated decision (FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1), on adoption, the COP:

- decides to adopt the Paris Agreement under the UNFCCC;
- requests the UN Secretary-General to be the Depositary of the Agreement and to have it open for signature in New York, US, from 22 April 2016 to 21 April 2017 and invites the Secretary-General to convene a high-level signature ceremony for the Agreement on 22 April 2016;
- invites all parties to sign the Agreement and to deposit their respective instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, where appropriate, as soon as possible;
- notes that the work of the ADP, in accordance with Decision 1/CP.17, paragraph 4, has been completed and decides to establish the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA) under the same arrangement, *mutatis mutandis*, as those concerning the election of officers to the Bureau of the ADP;
- decides that the APA shall prepare for the entry into force of the Agreement and for the convening of the first session of the CMA;
- decides to oversee the implementation of the work programme resulting from the relevant requests contained in this decision;
- requests the APA to report regularly to the COP on the progress of its work and to complete its work by CMA 1; and
- decides that the APA shall hold its sessions starting in 2016 in conjunction with the sessions of the SBs and shall prepare draft decisions to be recommended through the CMA for consideration and adoption at CMA 1.

On INDCs, the COP:

- welcomes the INDCs that have been communicated by parties;
- reiterates its invitation to all parties to communicate to the Secretariat their INDCs towards achieving the objective of the Convention as set out in its Article 2 as soon as possible and well in advance of COP 22 and in a manner that facilitates the clarity, transparency and understanding of the INDCs;

- requests the Secretariat to continue to publish the INDCs communicated by parties on the UNFCCC website;
- reiterates its call to developed country parties, the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, and any other organizations in a position to do so to provide support for the preparation and communication of the INDCs of parties that may need such support;
- takes note of the synthesis report on the aggregate effect of INDCs communicated by parties by 1 October 2015 (FCCC/CP/2015/7);
- notes with concern that the estimated aggregate GHG emission levels in 2025 and 2030 resulting from the INDCs do not fall within least-cost 2°C scenarios but rather lead to a projected level of 55 gigatonnes in 2030, and also notes that much greater emission reduction efforts will be required than those associated with the INDCs in order to hold the increase in the global average temperature to below 2°C above pre-industrial levels by reducing emissions to 40 gigatonnes or to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels by reducing to a level to be identified in the requested IPCC special report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels;
- notes, in this context, the adaptation needs expressed by many developing country parties in their INDCs;
- requests the Secretariat to update the synthesis report (FCCC/CP/2015/7) so as to cover all the information in the INDCs communicated by parties by 4 April 2016;
- decides to convene facilitative dialogues among parties in 2018 to take stock of the collective efforts of parties in relation to progress towards the long-term goal referred to in Agreement Article 4.1, and to inform the preparation of NDCs pursuant to Agreement Article 4.8; and
- invites the IPCC to provide a special report in 2018 on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global GHG emission pathways.

Under the sub-heading “Decisions to give effect to the Agreement,” the COP addresses a number of issues including mitigation, adaptation, loss and damage, finance, technology development and transfer, capacity building, transparency of action and support, global stocktake, facilitating implementation and compliance, and final clauses.

On mitigation, the COP, *inter alia*:

- invites parties to communicate their first NDC no later than when the party submits its respective instrument of ratification, accession, or approval of the Paris Agreement. If a party has communicated an INDC prior to joining the Agreement, that party shall be considered to have satisfied this provision unless that party decides otherwise;
- urges those parties whose INDCs pursuant to Decision 1/CP.20 contains a time frame up to 2025 to communicate by 2020 a new NDC and to do so every five years thereafter pursuant to Agreement Article 4.9;
- requests those parties whose INDCs pursuant to Decision 1/CP.20 contains a time frame up to 2030 to communicate or update by 2020 these contributions and to do so every five years thereafter pursuant to Agreement Article 4.9;
- decides that parties shall submit to the Secretariat their NDCs referred to in Agreement Article 4 at least 9-12 months in advance of the relevant meeting of the CMA with a view to

facilitating the clarity, transparency and understanding of these contributions, including through a synthesis report prepared by the Secretariat;

- requests the APA to develop further guidance on features of the NDCs for consideration and adoption by CMA 1;
- agrees that the information to be provided by parties communicating their NDCs, in order to facilitate clarity, transparency and understanding, may include, as appropriate, *inter alia*, quantifiable information on the reference point (including, as appropriate, a base year), time frames and/or periods for implementation, scope and coverage, planning processes, assumptions and methodological approaches, including those for estimating and accounting for anthropogenic GHG emissions and, as appropriate, removals, and how the party considers that its NDC is fair and ambitious, in the light of its national circumstances, and how it contributes towards achieving the objective of the Convention as set out in its Article 2;
- requests the APA to develop further guidance for the information to be provided by parties in order to facilitate clarity, transparency and understanding of NDCs for consideration and adoption by CMA 1;
- requests the SBI to develop modalities and procedures for the operation and use of the public registry referred to in Agreement Article 4.12, for consideration and adoption by CMA 1;
- further requests the Secretariat to make available an interim public registry in the first half of 2016 for the recording of NDCs submitted in accordance with Agreement Article 4, pending the adoption by the CMA of the modalities and procedures;
- requests the APA to elaborate, drawing from approaches established under the Convention and its related legal instruments as appropriate, guidance for accounting for Parties’ NDCs, as referred to in Agreement Article 4.13, for consideration and adoption by CMA 1;
- decides that parties shall apply the guidance mentioned above to the second and subsequent NDCs and that parties may elect to apply such guidance to their first NDC;
- decides that the Forum on the Impact of the Implementation of response measures, under the SBs, shall continue, and shall serve the Agreement;
- further decides that the SBSTA and the SBI shall recommend, for consideration and adoption by CMA 1, the modalities, work programme and functions of the Forum on the Impact of the Implementation of response measures to address the effects of the implementation of response measures under the Agreement by enhancing cooperation among parties on understanding the impacts of mitigation actions under the Agreement and the exchange of information, experiences, and best practices among parties to raise their resilience to these impacts;
- invites parties to communicate, by 2020, to the Secretariat mid-century, long-term low GHG emission development strategies in accordance with Agreement Article 4.19 and requests the Secretariat to publish on the UNFCCC website parties’ low GHG emission development strategies as communicated;

- requests the SBSTA to develop and recommend the guidance referred to under Agreement Article 6.2 (cooperative approaches that involve the use of internationally traded mitigation outcomes towards INDCs) for adoption by CMA 1, including guidance to ensure that double counting is avoided on the basis of a corresponding adjustment by parties for both anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks covered by their NDCs under the Agreement;
- requests the SBSTA to develop and recommend rules, modalities and procedures for the mechanism (on contributions to mitigation and support for sustainable development) for consideration and adoption by CMA 1;
- requests the SBSTA to undertake a work programme under the framework for non-market approaches to sustainable development referred to in Agreement Article 6.8 with the objective of considering how to enhance linkages and create synergy between, *inter alia*, mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology transfer and capacity building, and how to facilitate the implementation and coordination of non-market approaches; and
- requests the SBSTA to recommend a draft decision on the work programme, for consideration and adoption by CMA 1.

On adaptation, the COP, *inter alia*:

- requests the Adaptation Committee and the LEG to jointly develop modalities to recognize the adaptation efforts of developing country parties, as referred to in Agreement Article 7.3, and make recommendations for consideration and adoption by CMA 1 to review in 2017 the work of adaptation related institutional arrangements under the Convention, and to consider methodologies for assessing adaptation needs;
- requests the Adaptation Committee, taking into account its mandate and its second three-year work plan, and with a view to preparing recommendations for consideration and adoption by CMA 1;
- requests parties to strengthen regional cooperation on adaptation where appropriate, and where necessary, establish regional centers and networks, in particular in developing countries, taking into account Decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 13;
- requests the Adaptation Committee and the LEG, in collaboration with the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF) and other relevant institutions, to develop methodologies, and make recommendations for consideration and adoption by CMA 1 on taking the necessary steps to facilitate the mobilization of support for adaptation in developing countries in the context of the limit to global average temperature increase referred to in Agreement Article 2, and reviewing the adequacy and effectiveness of adaptation and support referred to in Agreement Article 7.14(c); and
- requests the GCF to expedite support for the LDCs and other developing country parties for the formulation of NAPs, consistent with Decisions 1/CP.16 and 5/CP.17, and for the subsequent implementation of policies, projects and programmes identified by them.

On loss and damage, the COP, *inter alia*:

- decides on the continuation of the WIM, following the review in 2016;
- requests the Executive Committee of the WIM to establish a clearinghouse for risk transfer that serves as a repository

for information on insurance and risk transfer, in order to facilitate the efforts of parties to develop and implement comprehensive risk management strategies;

- requests the Executive Committee of the WIM to establish, according to its procedures and mandate, a task force to complement, draw upon the work of, and involve, as appropriate, existing bodies and expert groups under the Convention including the Adaptation Committee and the LEG, as well as relevant organizations and expert bodies outside the Convention, to develop recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change;
- requests the Executive Committee of the WIM to initiate its work, at its next meeting, to operationalize the provisions above, and to report on progress thereon in its annual report; and
- agrees that Agreement Article 8 does not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation.

On finance, the COP, *inter alia*:

- decides that, in the implementation of the Agreement, financial resources provided to developing countries should enhance the implementation of their policies, strategies, regulations, action plans and their climate change actions with respect to both mitigation and adaptation to contribute to the achievement of the purpose of the Agreement (Article 2);
- decides that, in accordance with Agreement Article 9.3 (developed country parties taking the lead in mobilizing finance), developed countries intend to continue their existing collective mobilization goal through 2025 in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation; prior to 2025, the CMA shall set a new collective quantified goal from a floor of US\$100 billion per year, taking into account the needs and priorities of developing countries;
- recognizes the importance of adequate and predictable financial resources, including for results-based payments, as appropriate, for the implementation of policy approaches and positive incentives for REDD+, as well as alternative policy approaches, such as joint mitigation and adaptation approaches for the integral and sustainable management of forests, while reaffirming the importance of non-carbon benefits associated with such approaches; encouraging the coordination of support from, *inter alia*, public and private, bilateral and multilateral sources, such as the GCF, and alternative sources in accordance with relevant decisions by the COP;
- decides to initiate, at COP 22, a process to identify the information to be provided by parties, in accordance with Agreement Article 9.5 (*ex ante* communication of support), with the view to providing a recommendation for consideration and adoption by CMA 1;
- decides to ensure that the provision of information in accordance with Agreement Article 9.7 (biennial communications on support) shall be undertaken in accordance with modalities, procedures and guidelines referred to below;
- requests SBSTA to develop modalities for the accounting of financial resources provided and mobilized through public

interventions in accordance with Agreement Article 9.7 for consideration by COP 24, with the view to making a recommendation for consideration and adoption by CMA 1;

- decides that the GCF and the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the entities entrusted with the operation of the Financial Mechanism of the Convention, as well as the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) and the Special Climate Change Fund, administered by the GEF, shall serve the Agreement;
- recognizes that the Adaptation Fund may serve the Agreement, subject to relevant decisions by the CMP and the CMA, and invites the CMP to consider the issue and make a recommendation to CMA 1;
- recommends that the CMA provide guidance to the entities entrusted with the operation of the Financial Mechanism of the Convention on the policies, programme priorities and eligibility criteria related to the Agreement for transmission by the COP;
- decides that the guidance to the entities operating the Financial Mechanism of the Convention in relevant decisions of the COP, including those agreed before adoption of the Agreement, shall apply *mutatis mutandis*;
- decides that the SCF shall serve the Agreement in line with its functions and responsibilities established under the COP; and
- urges the institutions serving the Agreement to enhance the coordination and delivery of resources to support country-driven strategies through simplified and efficient application and approval procedures, and through continued readiness support to developing country parties, including the LDCs and SIDS, as appropriate;

On technology development and transfer, the COP, *inter alia*:

- takes note of the interim report of the TEC on guidance on enhanced implementation of the results of technology needs assessments (TNAs) (FCCC/SB/2015/INF.3);
- decides to strengthen the Technology Mechanism and requests the TEC and the CTCN, in supporting the implementation of the Agreement, to undertake further work relating to, *inter alia*, technology research, development and demonstration, and the development and enhancement of endogenous capacities and technologies;
- requests SBSTA 44 to initiate the elaboration of the technology framework established under Agreement Article 10.4 and to report on its findings to the COP, with a view to the COP making a recommendation on the framework to CMA 1 for consideration and adoption;
- decides that the TEC and the CTCN shall report to the CMA, through the SBs, on their activities to support the implementation of the Agreement;
- also decides to undertake a periodic assessment of the effectiveness of and the adequacy of the support provided to the Technology Mechanism in supporting the implementation of the Agreement on matters relating to technology development and transfer; and
- requests SBI 44 to initiate the elaboration of the scope of and modalities for the periodic assessment taking into account the review of the CTCN as referred to in Decision 2/CP.17, Annex VII, paragraph 20 and the modalities for the global stocktake

(Agreement Article 14) for consideration and adoption by the COP 25.

On capacity building, the COP, *inter alia*:

- decides to establish the Paris Committee on Capacity-building whose aim will be to address gaps and needs, both current and emerging, in implementing capacity building in developing country parties and further enhancing capacity-building efforts, including with regard to coherence and coordination in capacity-building activities under the Convention;
- also decides that the Paris Committee on Capacity-building will manage and oversee a work plan, and further decides to launch the work plan for the period 2016-2020;
- decides that the Paris Committee on Capacity-building will annually focus on an area or theme related to enhanced technical exchange on capacity building, with the purpose of maintaining up-to-date knowledge on the successes and challenges in building capacity effectively in a particular area;
- requests the SBI to organize annual in-session meetings of the Paris Committee on Capacity-building;
- also requests the SBI to develop the terms of reference for the Paris Committee on Capacity-building, in the context of the third comprehensive review of the implementation of the capacity-building framework, with a view to recommending a draft decision on this matter for consideration and adoption by COP 22;
- invites parties to submit their views on the membership of the Paris Committee on Capacity-building by 9 March 2016 and requests the Secretariat to compile the submissions into a miscellaneous document for consideration by the SBI 44;
- decides that the inputs to the Paris Committee on Capacity-building will include, *inter alia*, submissions, the outcome of the third comprehensive review of the implementation of the capacity-building framework, the Secretariat's annual synthesis report on the implementation of the framework for capacity-building in developing countries, the Secretariat's compilation and synthesis report on capacity-building work of bodies established under the Convention and its Kyoto Protocol, and reports on the Durban Forum and the capacity-building portal;
- requests the Paris Committee on Capacity-building to prepare annual technical progress reports on its work, and to make these reports available at the sessions of the SBI coinciding with the sessions of the COP;
- requests COP 25 to review the progress of the Paris Committee on Capacity-building, including need for extension, its effectiveness and enhancement, and to take any action it considers appropriate, with a view to making recommendations to CMA 1 on enhancing institutional arrangements for capacity building consistent with Agreement Article 11.5 (institutional arrangements);
- calls upon all parties to ensure that education, training and public awareness, as reflected in Convention Article 6 and in Agreement Article 12 are adequately considered in their contribution to capacity building; and
- invites CMA 1 to explore ways to enhance the implementation of, public awareness, public participation and public access to information so as to enhance actions under the Agreement.

On transparency of action and support, the COP, *inter alia*:

- decides to establish a Capacity-building Initiative for Transparency in order to build institutional and technical capacity, both pre- and post-2020. This initiative will support developing country parties, upon request, in meeting enhanced transparency requirements as defined in Agreement Article 13 (transparency) in a timely manner;
- decides that the Capacity-building Initiative for Transparency will aim to strengthen national institutions for transparency-related activities in line with national priorities, provide relevant tools, training and assistance for meeting the provisions stipulated in Agreement Article 13 (transparency), and assist in the improvement of transparency over time;
- urges and requests the GEF to make arrangements to support the establishment and operation of the Capacity-building Initiative for Transparency as a priority reporting-related need, including through voluntary contributions to support developing countries in the sixth replenishment of the GEF and future replenishment cycles, to complement existing support under the GEF;
- decides to assess the implementation of the Capacity-building Initiative for Transparency in the context of the seventh review of the financial mechanism;
- requests that the GEF include in its annual report to the COP the progress of work in the design, development and implementation of the Capacity-building Initiative for Transparency starting in 2016;
- decides that, in accordance with Agreement Article 13.2 (flexibility in implementation), developing countries shall be given flexibility in the implementation of the provisions of that article, including in the scope, frequency and level of detail of reporting, and in the scope of review, and that the scope of review could provide for in-country reviews to be optional, while such flexibilities shall be reflected in the development of modalities, procedures and guidelines referred to below;
- decides that all parties, except for LDCs and SIDS, shall submit the information referred to in Article 13.7-10, as appropriate, no less frequently than on a biennial basis, and that LDCs and SIDS may submit this information at their discretion;
- requests the APA to develop recommendations for modalities, procedures and guidelines in accordance with Article 13.13 (modalities and procedures), and to define the year of their first and subsequent review and update, as appropriate, at regular intervals, for consideration by COP 24, with a view to forwarding them to CMA 1 for adoption;
- requests the APA, when developing the modalities, procedures and guidelines, to draw on the experiences from and take into account other on-going relevant processes under the Convention;
- requests the APA, when developing recommendations for modalities, procedures and guidelines, to enhance the transparency of support provided in accordance with Agreement Article 9 (finance);
- requests the APA to report on the progress of work on the modalities, procedures and guidelines to future sessions of the COP, and that this work be concluded no later than 2018;

- decides that the modalities, procedures and guidelines developed shall be applied upon the entry into force of the Paris Agreement; and
- decides that the modalities, procedures and guidelines of this transparency framework shall build upon and eventually supersede the MRV system established by Decision 1/CP.16, paragraphs 40 to 47 and 60 to 64, and Decision 2/CP.17, paragraphs 12 to 62, immediately following the submission of the final biennial reports and BURs.

On the global stocktake, the COP, *inter alia*:

- requests the APA to identify the sources of input for the global stocktake referred to in Agreement Article 14 and to report to the COP, with a view to the COP making a recommendation to CMA 1 for consideration and adoption, including, but not limited to, information on the overall effect of the NDCs communicated by parties, and the state of adaptation efforts, support, experiences and priorities from the communications referred to in Agreement Article 7.10 and 7.11, and reports referred to in Agreement Article 13.7, and the mobilization and provision of support, the latest reports of the IPCC and reports of the SBs;
- requests the SBSTA to provide advice on how IPCC assessments can inform the global stocktake of the implementation of the Agreement pursuant to its Article 14 and to report on this matter to APA 2; and
- requests the APA to develop modalities for the global stocktake referred to in Agreement Article 14 and to report to the COP, with a view to making a recommendation to CMA 1 for consideration and adoption.

On facilitating implementation and compliance, the COP, *inter alia*:

- decides that the committee referred to in Agreement Article 15.2 (compliance mechanism) shall consist of 12 members with recognized competence in relevant scientific, technical, socio-economic or legal fields, to be elected by the CMA on the basis of equitable geographical representation, with two members each from the five regional groups of the UN and one member each from SIDS and LDCs, while taking into account the goal of gender balance; and
- requests the APA to develop the modalities and procedures for the effective operation of the committee referred to in Agreement Article 15.2 with a view to the APA completing its work on such modalities and procedures for consideration and adoption by CMA 1.

On final clauses, the COP also requests the Secretariat, solely for the purposes of Agreement Article 21 (entry into force), to make available on its website on the date of adoption of the Agreement as well as in the report of COP 21, information on the most up-to-date total and percent of GHG emissions communicated by parties to the Convention in their NCs, GHG inventory reports, biennial reports, or BURs.

Under the sub-heading enhanced action prior to 2020, the COP, *inter alia*:

- resolves to ensure the highest possible mitigation efforts in the pre-2020 period;
- encourages parties to promote the voluntary cancellation by party and non-party stakeholders, without double counting, of units issued under the Kyoto Protocol, including Certified

- Emission Reductions (CERs) that are valid for the second commitment period;
- urges host and purchasing parties to report transparently on internationally transferred mitigation outcomes, including outcomes used to meet international pledges, and emission units issued under the Kyoto Protocol with a view to promoting environmental integrity and avoiding double counting;
- resolves to strengthen, in the period 2016-2020, the existing TEP on mitigation as defined in Decision 1/CP.19, paragraph 5(a), and Decision 1/CP.20, paragraph 19, taking into account the latest scientific knowledge;
- encourages the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism of the Convention to engage in the Technical Expert Meetings and to inform participants of their contribution to facilitating progress in the implementation of policies, practices and actions identified during the TEP;
- resolves to enhance the provision of urgent and adequate finance, technology and capacity-building support by developed country parties in order to enhance the level of ambition of pre-2020 action by parties, and, in this regard, strongly urges developed country parties to scale up their level of financial support, with a concrete roadmap to achieve the goal of jointly providing US\$100 billion annually by 2020 for mitigation and adaptation while significantly increasing adaptation finance from current levels and to further provide appropriate technology and capacity-building support;
- decides to conduct a facilitative dialogue in conjunction with COP 22 to assess progress in implementing Decision 1/CP.19, paragraphs 3 and 4, and identify relevant opportunities to enhance the provision of financial resources, including for technology development and transfer and capacity-building support, with a view to identifying ways to enhance the ambition of mitigation efforts by all parties, including identifying relevant opportunities to enhance the provision and mobilization of support and enabling environments;
- agrees to convene, pursuant to Decision 1/CP.20, paragraph 21, building on the Lima-Paris Action Agenda, and in conjunction with each session of the COP during the period 2016-2020, a high-level event that, *inter alia*, further strengthens high-level engagement on the implementation of policy options and actions;
- decides that two high-level champions shall be appointed to act on behalf of the COP President, to facilitate through strengthened high-level engagement in the period 2016-2020, the successful execution of existing efforts and the scaling-up and introduction of new or strengthened voluntary efforts, initiatives and coalitions;
- decides that the high-level champions should normally serve for a term of two years, with their terms overlapping for a full year to ensure continuity;
- decides to launch, in the period 2016-2020, a TEP on adaptation;
- decides that the TEP on adaptation will endeavor to identify concrete opportunities for strengthening resilience, reducing vulnerabilities and increasing the understanding and implementation of adaptation actions;

- decides that the TEP should be organized jointly by the SBI and the SBSTA, and conducted by the Adaptation Committee;
- decides that the TEP on adaptation will take into account the process, modalities, outputs, outcomes and lessons learned from the TEP on mitigation;
- decides that, in conducting the process, the Adaptation Committee will engage with and explore ways to take into account, synergize with and build on the existing arrangements for adaptation-related work programmes, bodies and institutions under the Convention so as to ensure coherence and maximum value; and
- decides to conduct an assessment of the process so as to improve its effectiveness.

On non-party stakeholders, the COP, *inter alia*, invites non-party stakeholders to scale up their efforts and support actions to reduce emissions and/or to build resilience and decrease vulnerability to the adverse effects of climate change and demonstrate these efforts via the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action platform.

On administrative and budgetary matters, the COP, *inter alia*, emphasizes the urgency of making additional resources available for the implementation of the relevant actions, including actions referred to in this decision, and the implementation of the work programme, and urges parties to make voluntary contributions for the timely implementation of this decision.

CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES

On Tuesday, 1 December, COP 21 President Laurent Fabius opened the COP plenary. For a summary of statements made during the joint COP/CMP opening statements, see: <http://www.iisd.ca/vol12/enb12654e.html>

ORGANIZATIONAL MATTERS: On Tuesday, 1 December, parties agreed to apply the draft rules of procedure (FCCC/CP/1996/2), with the exception of draft rule 42 on voting.

The COP adopted the agenda (FCCC/CP/2015/1 and Add.1) as proposed, with the agenda item on the second review of the adequacy of Convention Articles 4.2(a) and (b) (developed countries' mitigation) held in abeyance. The COP also agreed to the organization of work (FCCC/CP/2015/1, FCCC/SBSTA/2015/3, FCCC/SBI/2015/11 and FCCC/ADP/2013/1).

The COP referred to the SBI the items and sub-items on: reporting from and review of Annex I parties; reporting from non-Annex I parties; capacity building under the Convention; gender and climate change; matters relating to LDCs; the audit report and financial statements for 2014; and budget performance for the biennium 2014-2015.

The COP further referred to the SBI and SBSTA the items and sub-items on: the report of the Adaptation Committee; the WIM; the Joint Annual Report of the TEC and the CTCN; and the implementation of the Buenos Aires Programme of Work on Adaptation and Response Measures (Decision 1/CP.10).

Parties agreed to the accreditation of observer organizations (FCCC/CP/2015/5).

Election of Officers Other Than the President: On Tuesday, 1 December, COP 21 President Fabius said that consultations on the election of officers would be conducted. On Thursday, 10 December, the COP elected members of

the COP Bureau: SBSTA Chair Carlos Fuller (Belize); SBI Chair Tomasz Chruszczow (Poland); COP Rapporteur Georg Borsting (Norway); Ismail El Gizouli (Sudan); Hakima El Haite (Morocco); Khalid Abuleif (Saudi Arabia); Ravi Shanker Prasad (India); Oleg Shamanov (Russian Federation); Walter Schuldt-Espinell (Ecuador); and Colin Beck (Solomon Islands).

The COP also elected the SBSTA Bureau, with Tibor Schaffhauser (Hungary) as Vice-Chair and Aderito M. F. Santana (São Tomé and Príncipe) as Rapporteur, and the SBI Bureau, with Zhihua Chen (China) as Vice-Chair and Sidat Yaffa (The Gambia) as Rapporteur.

The COP also elected the members of the Adaptation Committee, the Advisory Board of the CTCN, and the TEC, and took note of the nominations for the Consultative Group of Experts on National Communications from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention (CGE) and the LEG.

Dates and Venues of Future Sessions: On Thursday, 10 December, the COP adopted a decision on the dates and venues of future sessions. Morocco, in the capacity of the host of COP 22/CMP 12, thanked parties, in particular the African Group, for their trust, informing that the conference would take place in Marrakesh, from 7-18 November 2016.

Final Outcome: In its decision (FCCC/CP/2015/L.4), the COP, *inter alia*, decides to accept with appreciation the offer by Morocco to host COP 22 and CMP 12, and requests the Executive Secretary to continue consultations with Morocco and to negotiate and finalize a Host Country Agreement. On COP 23/CMP 13, the COP notes that in keeping with the principle of rotation among regional groups, the President of COP 23/CMP 13 would come from the Asia-Pacific States, and invites parties to undertake further consultations on the hosting of those sessions.

Adoption of the Report on Credentials: On Thursday, 10 December, the COP adopted the report on credentials (FCCC/CP/2015/9, FCCC/KP/CMP/2015/7), in addition to the credentials for ten countries as reported orally by the Bureau.

REPORTS OF THE SUBSIDIARY BODIES: On Thursday, 10 December, the COP adopted the reports of SBI 42 and SBI 43 (FCCC/SBI/2015/10 and Add.1, and FCCC/SBI/2015/L.19), and the reports of SBSTA 42 and SBSTA 43 (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/2 and Add.1-2, and FCCC/SBSTA/2015/L.15).

DURBAN PLATFORM FOR ENHANCED ACTION (DECISION 1/CP.17): Report of the ADP: This item (FCCC/CP/2014/10/Add.1, FCCC/ADP/2014/4, FCCC/ADP/2015/2-5, FCCC/CP/2015/4, FCCC/TP/2015/4 and Add.1-2, and ADP.2015.6.NonPaper) is summarized under the Paris Agreement (see page 4).

Adoption of a Protocol, Another Legal Instrument, or an Agreed Outcome with Legal Force under the Convention Applicable to All Parties: This item is summarized under the Paris Agreement (see page 4).

CONSIDERATION OF PROPOSALS BY PARTIES UNDER CONVENTION ARTICLE 17: This item was first taken up on Wednesday, 2 December. Parties agreed that, in line with previous practice, the item would be kept open and COP 21 Vice-President Cheikh Ndiaye Sylla (Senegal) would report to the closing plenary on proposals by Japan (FCCC/CP/2009/3),

Tuvalu (FCCC/CP/2009/4), Australia (FCCC/CP/2009/5), Costa Rica (FCCC/CP/2009/6), the US (FCCC/CP/2009/7) and Grenada (FCCC/CP/2010/3).

On Sunday, 13 December, COP 21 President Fabius said that in light of the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the COP could conclude its consideration of these proposals. The COP closed the item with no conclusions.

CONSIDERATION OF PROPOSALS BY PARTIES FOR AMENDMENTS TO THE CONVENTION UNDER ARTICLE 15: Proposal from the Russian Federation:

On Tuesday, 1 December, on amendments by parties under Article 15, COP Vice-President Sylla noted that the Russian proposal (FCCC/CP/2011/5) had been considered in informal consultations. Due to divergent views, the COP decided to include this item as a sub-item in the provisional agenda of COP 22.

Proposal from Papua New Guinea and Mexico: On Tuesday, 1 December, on the joint proposal by Papua New Guinea and Mexico on Convention Articles 17 and 18 (FCCC/CP/2011/4/Rev.1), Vice-President Sylla noted that informal consultations had not been able to resolve divergent views, and the item was forwarded to COP 22.

REPORT OF THE ADAPTATION COMMITTEE:

Discussions on this item are summarized under the SBI agenda item on the Adaptation Committee (see page 33).

WARSAW INTERNATIONAL MECHANISM: This item was referred to the SBSTA and SBI for consideration. Discussions on this item are summarized under the SBI agenda item on the WIM (see page 33).

DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFER OF

TECHNOLOGIES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TECHNOLOGY MECHANISM: Joint Annual Report of the TEC and the CTCN: On Thursday, 10 December, the COP took note of the report of the Technology Mechanism (FCCC/SB/2015/L.4).

Linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism of the Convention: On Wednesday, 2 December, parties agreed to hold informal consultations facilitated by Carlos Fuller (Belize) and Elfriede More (Austria) on this item (FCCC/CP/2014/6, FCCC/SB/2015/1, FCCC/CP/2015/3 and Add.1). On Sunday, 13 December, the COP adopted a decision.

Final Outcome: In its decision, the COP (FCCC/CP/2015/L.11), *inter alia*:

- requests the TEC, the CTCN and the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism to continue to consult on and further elaborate, including through an in-session workshop at SB 44, the linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism;
- requests the TEC to include, in its annual report, the findings arising from the consultation and the in-session workshop for consideration by COP 22; and
- invites the Board of the GCF, in line with its governing instrument, to consider ways to provide support for facilitating access to environmentally sound technologies in developing countries, and for undertaking collaborative research and development for enabling developing countries to enhance their mitigation and adaptation action.

THE 2013-2015 REVIEW: Discussions on this item are summarized under the SBI (see page 35).

MATTERS RELATING TO FINANCE: Long-Term

Climate Finance: On Wednesday, 2 December, parties decided to jointly consider this item (FCCC/CP/2015/2 and INF.1) with the sub-item on the report of the SCF (FCCC/CP/2015/8). Parties agreed to consider the items in a contact group co-chaired by Andrés Mogro (Ecuador) and Mark Storey (Sweden).

Noting ongoing negotiations under the ADP, parties had divergent views on where to discuss pre-2020 finance. Bolivia, for the G-77/China, requested a workshop on finance needs of developing countries. Malawi, for the LDCs, called for improving access to finance. After informal consultations, the COP adopted a decision on Thursday, 10 December.

Final Outcome: In its decision (FCCC/CP/2015/L.2) the COP, *inter alia*:

- urges parties to channel significant portions of public funds towards adaptation and calls for a greater balance between mitigation and adaptation;
- decides that the second high-level ministerial dialogue on climate finance will focus on adaptation finance, cooperation on enhanced enabling environments, and support for readiness activities; and
- requests the COP Presidency to prepare a summary of the second biennial high-level dialogue for consideration at COP 23.

Report of the SCF: Parties considered this item (FCCC/CP/2015/8) together with long-term finance. On the report of the SCF, the EU, with South Africa for the African Group, proposed working on the basis of the draft decisions contained in the SCF report. Co-Chairs Andrés Mogro (Ecuador) and Mark Storey (Sweden) invited proposals. After informal consultations, the COP adopted the decision on Thursday, 10 December.

Final Outcome: In its decision (FCCC/CP/2015/L.5), the COP, *inter alia*:

- endorses the work plan of the SCF for 2016-2017;
- requests the SCF, on MRV of support beyond the biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows, to continue to engage with relevant bodies under the Convention, multilateral and bilateral agencies, and international institutions;
- requests the SCF to report to COP 22 on progress in implementing its work plan; and
- decides to initiate the review of the functions of the SCF at COP 22, requests SBI 44 to prepare the review's terms of reference, and requests the members of the SCF, and invites parties and observer organizations, to submit their views.

Report of the GCF to the COP and Guidance to the GCF:

On Wednesday, 2 December, the COP agreed to establish a contact group to jointly consider this sub-item with the sub-item on report of the GEF to the COP and guidance to the GEF, co-chaired by Stefan Schwager (Switzerland) and Nauman Bashir Bhatti (Pakistan).

In the contact group on Thursday, 3 December, Co-Chair Bashir Bhatti introduced the item (FCCC/CP/2015/3, Add.1 and Add.1/Corr.1, FCCC/CP/2015/8, INF.2 and MISC.1). Parties considered draft decision text proposed by the Co-Chairs in informal meetings throughout the week and in the contact group

on Wednesday, 9 December. Views differed on requesting the GCF Board to agree on replenishment arrangements and on a reference that GCF projects will contribute to "low-emission and climate-resilient" or "sustainable" development. On Thursday, 10 December, in plenary, COP 21 Vice-President Sylla noted this sub-item was still under consideration. On Sunday, 13 December, the COP adopted the decision.

Final Outcome: In its decision (FCCC/CP/2015/L.7/Rev.1), the COP, *inter alia*:

- notes with appreciation that the GCF Board reached its aim of taking its first funding decisions by its third meeting of 2015, committing US\$168 million to eight public and private projects that will promote, in the context of sustainable development, the paradigm shift towards low-emission and climate-resilient development pathways, thereby making the GCF fully operational;
- urges parties that made pledges under the initial resource mobilization process of the GCF but have not yet confirmed through fully executed contribution arrangements or agreements to do so as a matter of high priority;
- reiterates the invitation for financial inputs from a variety of sources, public and private, including alternative sources, throughout the initial resource mobilization process;
- requests the Board of the GCF to agree on the arrangements for the first formal replenishment process of the GCF as soon as feasible;
- welcomes the decision of the GCF Board to develop a strategic plan for the GCF and to adopt it as soon as possible;
- welcomes the decision of the GCF Board to simplify the funding proposal template and concept note template in an expeditious manner;
- requests the GCF Board to ensure that the revised funding proposal template and concept note template are designed to facilitate the application process;
- requests the GCF Board to adopt a simplified process for approval of proposals for certain activities, in particular for small-scale activities, as soon as possible in 2016, to reduce complexities and costs involved in project proposal development;
- welcomes the decisions of the GCF Board to approve the accreditation of 20 national, regional, international and private entities to the GCF (noting in a footnote this number derives from five national, three regional, three private and nine international entities);
- urges the GCF Board to streamline the accreditation modalities and to seek a balance of diversity in accredited entities;
- takes note of the progress achieved to date in the implementation of the readiness and preparatory support programme of the GCF and stresses the importance of improving the approval process and timely disbursement of resources to facilitate readiness programme implementation;
- requests the GCF Board to prioritize the development of its initial risk management framework and to enhance transparency and stakeholder engagement;
- urges the GCF Board to operationalize the Independent Evaluation Unit, Independent Redress Mechanism and Independent Integrity Unit as a matter of urgency and to make

public the procedures parties and affected individuals should follow when seeking redress until the Independent Redress Mechanism is operationalized;

- invites the GCF Board to take into account in its programmatic priorities the Cancun Adaptation Framework, in particular the principles referred to in paragraph 12 (taking a country-driven, gender-sensitive, participatory and fully transparent approach, taking into consideration vulnerable groups, communities and ecosystems, and being based on and guided by the best available science and, as appropriate, traditional and indigenous knowledge, with a view to integrating adaptation into relevant social, economic and environmental policies and actions, where appropriate) and the activities referred to in decision 1/CP.16 (the Cancun Agreements) paragraph 14 (planning, prioritizing and implementing adaptation actions, impact, vulnerability and adaptation assessments, strengthening institutional capacities and enabling environments for adaptation, building resilience of socio-economic and ecological system, enhancing climate change related disaster risk reduction strategies and improving climate-related research among others); and
- invites the GCF Board to consider ways to provide support, pursuant to the modalities of the GCF, for facilitating access to environmentally sound technologies in developing countries, and for undertaking collaborative research and development for enabling developing countries to enhance their mitigation and adaptation action.

Report of the GEF to the COP and Guidance to the GEF:

This item (FCCC/CP/2015/4 and Add.1, FCCC/CP/2015/8 and INF.2) was first considered on Wednesday, 2 December. Parties agreed to establish a contact group to jointly consider this sub-item with the sub-item on report from the GCF and guidance to the GCF, co-chaired by Stefan Schwager (Switzerland) and Nauman Bashir Bhatti (Pakistan).

Parties considered draft decision text proposed by the Co-Chairs in informal meetings throughout the week and in the contact group on Thursday, 3 December, and Wednesday, 9 December. Parties debated a proposal by Argentina, Uruguay and Colombia to delete reference to tackling “the drivers” of deforestation and forest degradation.

On support for the NAP process through contributions to the LDCF and the Special Climate Change Fund, China, supported by India and Malaysia, proposed deleting language inviting “parties that may make voluntary financial contributions” to provide such support. China explained its preference for South-South cooperation. The EU, with Japan and the US, suggested deletion of the entire paragraph if it lacks agreement. Stressing the importance of the paragraph, Zambia, for the LDCs, called for retaining the paragraph.

On Thursday, 10 December, the COP adopted the decision. Antigua and Barbuda lamented the process of discussions on COP items on finance matters. She said that because focus was given to streamlining rather than to negotiations due to limited time, many issues important to SIDS were left out. She asked this to be reflected in the report of the COP.

Echoing the same concerns, Bolivia, for the G-77/China, said the group reserves its right to bring up these issues at the next SBI meeting. The EU noted that parties agreed, in light of the

exceptional circumstances of COP 21, to focus on streamlining the decision. She expressed support for the approach taken and looked forward to discussing the items again at COP 22. COP 21 Vice-President Sylla said the comments will be reflected in the report of the COP.

Final Outcome: In its decision (FCCC/CP/2015/L.8), the COP, *inter alia*:

- welcomes the investments by the GEF in sustainable forest management and activities referred to in Decision 1/CP.16 (the Cancun Agreements) paragraph 70 (policy approaches and positive incentives on issues relating to REDD+), harnessing multiple benefits from forests and tackling deforestation and forest degradation in line with the programming directions of the sixth replenishment of the GEF Trust Fund;
- invites the GEF to continue to provide finance to the activities referred to above, also taking into account Decision 9/CP.19, (Warsaw Framework for REDD+ work programme on results-based finance) paragraph 8 (alternative policy approaches, such as joint mitigation and adaptation approaches for the integral and sustainable management of forests) and this decision, as appropriate;
- encourages additional voluntary financial contributions to provide support for the NAP process through contributions to the LDCF and the Special Climate Change Fund;
- requests the GEF to carry out a technical review of the programme priorities of the LDCF,
- urges the GEF to work with all its agencies and recipient countries to ensure that these countries can take full advantage of the expanded network of agencies;
- welcomes the exploration of innovative non-grant instruments by the GEF and encourages the GEF to work with its agencies, recipient countries and the private sector to submit proposals; and
- welcomes the approval of projects by the GEF to support 46 developing country parties in preparing their INDCs and encourages the GEF to continue providing such support.

REPORTING FROM AND REVIEW OF ANNEX I

PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION: These discussions are summarized under the SBI (see page 31).

REPORTING FROM NON-ANNEX I PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION: These discussions are summarized under the SBI (see page 31).

CAPACITY BUILDING UNDER THE CONVENTION:

These discussions are summarized under the SBI (see page 33).

IMPLEMENTATION OF CONVENTION ARTICLE 4.8

AND 4.9: Implementation of the Buenos Aires Programme of Work on Adaptation and Response Measures (Decision 1/CP.10): These discussions are summarized under the SBI agenda item on the impact of the implementation of response measures (see page 34) and the SBSTA item on the Nairobi work programme on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change (NWP) (see page 37).

Matters Related to LDCs: These discussions are summarized under the SBI (see page 32).

GENDER AND CLIMATE CHANGE: These are summarized under the SBI (see page 36).

OTHER MATTERS REFERRED TO THE COP BY THE SUBSIDIARY BODIES: Issues Relating to REDD+:

On Thursday, 10 December, the COP considered three draft decisions forwarded from SBSTA 42, on: further guidance on transparency, consistency, comprehensiveness and effectiveness when informing on how all the safeguards referred to in Decision 1/CP.16 (the Cancun Agreements), Appendix I, are being addressed and respected; alternative policy approaches, such as joint mitigation and adaptation approaches for the integral and sustainable management of forests; and methodological issues related to non-carbon benefits resulting from the implementation of the activities referred to in Decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 70. The COP adopted the decisions.

Final Outcome: In its decision (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/2/Add.1) on further guidance on ensuring transparency, consistency, comprehensiveness and effectiveness when informing on how all the safeguards referred to in Decision 1/CP.16, Appendix I, are being addressed, the COP, *inter alia*:

- reiterates that developing country parties undertaking the activities referred to in Decision 1/CP.16 paragraph 70 (mitigation actions in the forest sector) should provide a summary of information on how all of the safeguards referred to in Decision 1/CP.16 Appendix I are being addressed;
- requests that the summary information on safeguards be provided on a periodic basis in accordance with Decisions 12/CP.17 and 12/CP.19;
- decides that developing country parties should provide information on which activity or activities (Decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 70) are included in the summary of information referred to above;
- encourages developing country parties, when providing the summary information, to include the following elements, where appropriate: national circumstances relevant to addressing and respecting safeguards; a description of each safeguard in accordance with national circumstances; a description of existing systems and processes relevant to addressing and respecting safeguards; and
- decides that there is no need for further guidance pursuant to Decision 12/CP.17, paragraph 6 (guidance on systems for providing information on how safeguards are addressed and respected), to ensure transparency, consistency, comprehensiveness and effectiveness when informing on how all the safeguards are being addressed and respected.

In its decision (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/2/Add.1) on alternative policy approaches, such as joint mitigation and adaptation approaches for the integral and sustainable management of forests, the COP, *inter alia*:

- decides that developing country parties seeking to receive support for the design and implementation of alternative policy approaches, such as joint mitigation and adaptation approaches for the integral and sustainable management of forests, may consider the following elements: development of national strategies or action plans for the implementation of the activities referred to in Decision 1/CP.16 paragraph 70; identification of support needs, including financial resources and technical and technological support; development of proposals demonstrating how alternative policy approaches, such as joint mitigation and adaptation approaches for

the integral and sustainable management of forests, are contributing to the activities referred to in Decision 1/CP.16 paragraph 70;

- notes that the financing entities referred to in Decision 9/CP.19, paragraph 5 (entities financing REDD-plus activities, including the GCF), are encouraged to continue to provide financial resources, including through the wide variety of sources referred to in Decision 2/CP.17, paragraph 65 (results-based finance), for alternative policy approaches;
- invites parties that want to implement alternative policy approaches, such as joint mitigation and adaptation approaches, to support the implementation of the activities referred to in Decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 70, to share information via the web platform on the UNFCCC website; and
- decides to conclude its consideration of alternative policy approaches, such as joint mitigation and adaptation approaches for integral and sustainable management of forests, in the context of Decision 1/CP.18, paragraph 39. In its decision (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/2/Add.1) on methodological issues related to non-carbon benefits resulting from the implementation of the activities referred to in Decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 70, the COP, *inter alia*:
- invites developing country parties seeking support for the integration of non-carbon benefits into activities to provide information addressing, *inter alia*, the nature, scale, and importance of the non-carbon benefits via the web platform on the UNFCCC website for consideration by interested parties and relevant financing entities, as appropriate;
- decides that methodological issues related to non-carbon benefits resulting from the implementation of the activities in Decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 70, do not constitute a requirement for developing country parties seeking to receive support for the implementation of the actions and activities referred to in Decision 1/CP.16 or results-based payments; and
- agrees to conclude, at this session, the work on methodological issues related to non-carbon benefits from the implementation of the activities referred to Decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 70.

Methodologies for the Reporting of Financial Information by Annex I Parties: These discussions are summarized under the SBSTA (see page 38).

Annual Report on the Technical Review of GHG

Inventories from Annex I Parties: These discussions are summarized under the SBSTA (see page 42).

Terms of Reference for the Immediate Review of the Doha Work Programme on Convention Article 6: On Thursday, 10

December, the COP considered a draft decision forwarded from SBI 42 on this item. The COP adopted the decision.

Final Outcome: In its decision (FCCC/SBI/2015/10/Add.1), the COP, *inter alia*:

- requests the SBI to launch the intermediate review of the implementation of the Doha work programme on Article 6 of the Convention at SBI 44;
- requests the GEF to report on the progress made in providing financial support and implementing activities to contribute to the implementation of the Doha work programme;

- invites multilateral and bilateral institutions and organizations, the private sector and donors to report on financial resources provided to support the activities relating to the implementation of Convention Article 6; and
- requests the Secretariat to prepare a report on the progress made, as well as emerging gaps, needs, among others.

NAPs: These discussions are summarized under the SBI (see page 32).

ADMINISTRATIVE, FINANCIAL AND INSTITUTIONAL MATTERS: Audit Report and Financial Statements for 2014: These discussions are summarized under the SBI (see page 36).

Budget Performance for the Biennium 2014-2015: These discussions are summarized under the SBI (see page 36).

Programme Budget for the Biennium 2016-2017: On Thursday, 10 December, the COP adopted a decision forwarded by SBI 42 on the programme budget for the biennium 2016-2017.

Final Outcome: In its decision (FCCC/SBI/2015/10/Add.1), the COP, *inter alia*:

- approves the programme budget for the biennium 2016-2017, amounting to €54,648,484, the Secretariat-wide staffing from the core budget, and a contingency budget for conference services;
- adopts the indicative scale of contributions for 2016 and 2017;
- urges parties to make voluntary contributions for the timely implementation of the decisions taken by COP 21 for which provisions are not made under the approved budget, using voluntary contributions and, to the extent possible, resources available under the core budget;
- invites parties to make contributions to the Trust Fund for Participation in the UNFCCC Process; and
- requests the Executive Secretary to report to COP 22 on income and budget performance, and to propose any adjustments that might be needed in the programme budget for the biennium 2016-2017.

Decision-Making in the UNFCCC Process: On Thursday, 10 December, the COP decided to continue to hold discussions on this item at SBI 44 and report to COP 22.

CONCLUSION OF THE SESSION: Adoption of the Report of COP 21: Following presentation of the report of the session (FCCC/CP/2015/L.1) by the Secretariat on behalf of Rapporteur Johanna Lissinger Peitz (Sweden), the COP adopted the report of the session.

Closure of the Session: The Secretariat reported on extra budgetary funds required, including €150,000 for matters related to economic diversification initiatives and €1.95 million for support to the Adaptation Committee. He explained that it was not possible to undertake an assessment of the implications of the Paris Agreement yet, but that a note on these financial implications would be posted to the UNFCCC website in the coming days.

COP 21 President Fabius invited, and parties agreed, to take note of the resolution presented by Morocco thanking France, as the host government, and the city of Paris (FCCC/CP/2015/L.3).

COP 21 President Fabius closed COP 21 at 12:28 am on Sunday, 13 December.

CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES SERVING AS THE MEETING OF THE PARTIES TO THE KYOTO PROTOCOL

On Tuesday, 1 December, CMP 11 President Laurent Fabius opened plenary. For a summary of the joint COP/CMP opening statements, see: <http://www.iisd.ca/vol12/enb12654e.html>

ORGANIZATIONAL MATTERS: On Tuesday, 1 December, parties adopted the agenda (FCCC/KP/CMP/2015/1) and agreed to the organization of work (FCCC/KP/CMP/2015/1, FCCC/SBSTA/2015/3 and FCCC/SBI/2015/11).

The CMP referred to the SBSTA the item on clarification of the text in section G (Article 3, paragraph 7*ter*) of the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, and the sub-item on Protocol Article 2.3 (adverse effects of policies and measures).

The CMP referred to the SBI the items on: capacity building under the Kyoto Protocol; administrative, financial and institutional matters; reporting from and review of Annex I parties; as well as the sub-item on Protocol Article 3.14 (minimizing adverse effects).

Election of Replacement Officers: On Thursday, 11 December, the CMP elected the members and alternative members to the Adaptation Fund Board, JI Supervisory Committee (JISC), CDM Executive Board (EB), and Compliance Committee. CMP Vice-President Cheikh Ndiaye Sylla (Senegal) noted the COP Bureau members would also serve as CMP Bureau members. He also noted that the list of nominations is available on the UNFCCC website and urged parties to submit nominations for the remaining vacant positions by 29 January 2016.

Approval of the Report on Credentials: On Thursday, 10 December, the CMP adopted the report on credentials (FCCC/CP/2015/9 and FCCC/KP/CMP/2015/7), with the addition of the Cook Islands, Egypt, Fiji, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Haiti, Honduras, Kiribati, Nicaragua, Pakistan and Panama.

Status of Ratification of the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol: On Wednesday, 2 December, the Secretariat reported that, as of 30 November, 55 instruments of acceptance of the 144 required had been received. The CMP took note of the information.

On Thursday, 10 December, CMP 11 Vice-President Sylla informed parties that, since the Secretariat's statement on 2 December 2015, two additional instruments of ratification, from Argentina and Sri Lanka, had been received, bringing the total to 57. He reported 87 more are required to bring the amendment into force. The CMP took note of the information, urging all parties to ratify as soon as possible.

REPORTS OF THE SUBSIDIARY BODIES: On Thursday, 10 December, the CMP adopted the reports of SBI 42 and SBI 43 (FCCC/SBI/2015/10 and Add.1, and FCCC/SBI/2015/L.19), and the reports of SBSTA 42 and SBSTA 43 (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/2 and Add.1 and 2, and FCCC/SBSTA/2015/L.15).

ISSUES RELATING TO THE CDM: On this item (FCCC/KP/CMP/2015/5), on Thursday, 3 December, CDM EB Chair Lambert Schneider (Germany) noted that revisions to project standards, and validation and verification standards had been adopted with a view to streamlining the work of the CDM. He noted with concern the low demand and prices for CERs, and outlined ways in which the Board continues to encourage

voluntary cancellation of CERs. Parties agreed to consider this item in a contact group, co-chaired by Karoliina Anttonen (Finland) and Jeffrey Spooner (Jamaica).

On Thursday, 10 December, the contact group focused on draft text produced during informal consultations on Tuesday evening, 8 December. After discussions on, among others, linkages between the CDM and the GCF, and the need for a workshop on international climate change financing institutions and the CDM, parties agreed to forward the draft decision to the CMP.

Final Outcome: It its decision (FCCC/KP/CMP/2015/L.4), the CMP, *inter alia*:

- welcomes the 2014-2015 report of the CDM EB and welcomes the launch of the online platform for voluntary cancellation of CERs;
- requests the CDM EB and the Secretariat to facilitate access to the sustainable development section of project and programme design documents on the online platform for voluntary cancellation of certified emission reductions;
- encourages the CDM EB to continue to simplify and streamline, among others, the project cycle, the registration and verification process, the development and approval of standardized baselines, the methodological standards and procedures, and the accreditation procedure;
- encourages the CDM EB to explore financing opportunities for the CDM through international institutions such as the GCF and, in this regard, invites the CDM EB to consider holding an in-session workshop at SB 44, and asks the CDM EB to report back to CMP 12;
- designates as operating entities those entities that have been accredited, and provisionally designated, as operational entities by the CDM EB to conduct sector-specific validation functions and/or sector-specific verification functions as contained in the annex;
- requests the CDM EB to analyze the means to ensure sustained participation of designated operational entities in the CDM;
- decides to allow requests to revise baseline and monitoring methodology without project specific information in cases where the CDM EB considers such information not necessary;
- requests the CDM EB to develop more cost-effective and context-appropriate approaches for MRV by addressing procedures to manage data gaps, regionally appropriate calibration requirements, and the use of sectoral and nationally collected data, where appropriate;
- requests the CDM EB to develop a stand-alone programme of activity guidance, consisting, among others, of a “CDM Programme of Activities standard,” a “CDM Programme of Activities validation and verification standard,” and a “CDM Programme of Activities cycle procedure”;
- requests the CDM EB to consider formulating a standardized registration template using objective criteria for activities that qualify as automatically additional;
- requests the designated operational entity to confirm that the request for issuance of emission reductions is submitted only to the CDM EB; and
- requests the CDM EB to expand the scope and scale of regional collaboration centers’ assistance activities in

developing countries by exploring the emerging technical and methodological areas.

ISSUES RELATING TO JI: On Thursday, 3 December, JISC Chair Julia Soto (Peru) reported that activity under JI has “virtually stopped,” saying that there are no new requests for projects or for instances of emissions reduction units. Parties agreed to establish a contact group, co-chaired by Dimitar Nikov (France) and Yaw Osafo (Ghana), on this item (FCCC/KP/CMP/2015/4).

In the contact group, parties exchanged views on: the necessity of changes to rules of procedure of the JISC; providing a mandate for third-party review; revitalizing JI; exploring synergies with other market mechanisms; and requesting an analysis on the role of JI beyond 2020. Parties agreed that the Co-Chairs would prepare a draft decision for consideration.

On Monday, 7 December, Co-Chair Osafo presented the draft decision. After exchanging views on, among others, the difficult market situation of JI, revision of JI guidelines, and incorporation of views of stakeholders, parties decided to forward the draft decision to the CMP with amendments.

Final Outcome: In its decision (FCCC/KP/CMP/2015/L.1), the CMP:

- requests the JISC to submit recommendations for consideration by SBI 44 on actions that would be necessary to implement the draft JI modalities, including changes to rules of procedure of the JISC as adopted by Decision 3/CMP.5, and provisions under other decisions of the CMP relating to JI;
- requests the JISC to submit recommendations for consideration by SBI 44 in the context of the review of JI guidelines, *inter alia*, to address concerns raised by stakeholders and validation by an accredited independent entity of post-registration changes;
- invites parties and admitted observer organizations to submit, by 31 March 2016, their views on experiences and lessons learned from JI for the possible design of mitigation mechanisms and on links and interactions with other tools;
- requests the JISC to reflect synergies between JI and other mitigation mechanisms to ensure the cost-efficient use of resources, the coherence of mitigation instruments and the avoidance of double counting; and
- requests the JISC to prepare recommendations and reflections based on an analysis of experiences and lessons learned for consideration by CMP 12.

REPORT OF THE COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE:

This item was first considered on Wednesday, 2 December. Facilitative Branch Chair Delano Ruben Verwey (the Netherlands) outlined the activities of the Enforcement and Facilitative Branches, including the Committee’s continued interaction with expert review teams. The CMP took note of the report (FCCC/KP/CMP/2015/3) and invited parties to contribute to the Trust Fund.

REPORT OF THE ADAPTATION FUND BOARD:

This item (FCCC/KP/CMP/2015/2) was first considered on Wednesday, 2 December. Adaptation Fund Board Chair Hans Olav Ibrek (Norway) reported that the “fund has never been more in demand” and has delivered effectively on its mandate,

but that the sustainability of the Fund is “in danger.” Parties established a contact group co-chaired by Richard Muyungi (Tanzania) and Herman Sips (the Netherlands).

On Sunday, 13 December, the COP adopted the report of the Adaptation Fund Board and a decision.

Final Outcome: In its decision (FCCC/KP/CMP/2015/L.3/Rev.1), the CMP, *inter alia*:

- requests the Adaptation Fund Board to continue efforts to simplify accreditation procedures for national implementing entities and report back on progress made at CMP 12;
- urges parties that responded to the fundraising target of the Adaptation Fund Board but have not yet made financial contributions to do as soon as possible;
- encourages the provision of voluntary support that is additional to the share of proceeds from CDM activities to support resource mobilization of the Adaptation Fund Board; and
- recommends the CMA consider that the Adaptation Fund may serve the Paris Agreement and invites COP 22 to request the APA to undertake necessary preparatory work and to forward a recommendation to the CMP for adoption no later than CMP 15.

REPORT ON THE HIGH-LEVEL MINISTERIAL ROUND TABLE ON INCREASED AMBITION OF KYOTO PROTOCOL COMMITMENTS: This item was first considered on Wednesday, 2 December. CMP Vice-President Sylla recalled there was no consensus on this issue at CMP 10 (FCCC/KP/CMP/2014/3). Saying that the high-level roundtable did not increase the ambition of Annex I parties, China, opposed by the EU, Australia and Norway, proposed a contact group. Parties agreed to informal consultations on a way forward facilitated by Paul Watkinson (France).

On Thursday, 10 December, CMP 11 Vice-President Sylla informed that parties were unable to reach consensus on this issue. The item will be included on the provisional agenda of CMP 12. The COP 21 Presidency will conduct intersessional consultations on the way forward.

REPORTING FROM AND REVIEW OF ANNEX I PARTIES: National Communications: These discussions are summarized under the SBI agenda item on the status of submission and review of the sixth NCs and first biennial reports from Annex I parties (see page 31).

Annual Compilation and Accounting Report from Annex B Parties under the Kyoto Protocol: This item was first taken up on Tuesday, 1 December. Upon the recommendation of SBI 43, the CMP took note of the report (FCCC/KP/CMP/2015/6 and Add.1/Rev.1).

CLARIFICATION OF THE TEXT IN SECTION G (ARTICLE 3.7TER) OF THE DOHA AMENDMENT TO THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: Discussions on this item are summarized under the SBSTA (see page 41).

CAPACITY BUILDING UNDER THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: These discussions are summarized under the SBI (see page 34).

MATTERS RELATING TO RESPONSE MEASURES: Protocol Articles 2.3 and 3.14: Discussions on these items are summarized under the SBI agenda item on the forum and work programme (see page 34). On Sunday, 13 December, CMP 11

President Fabius reported that parties were unable to conclude consideration of these items, and parties agreed to take note of this.

OTHER MATTERS REFERRED TO THE CMP BY THE SUBSIDIARY BODIES: Training Programme for Members of Expert Review Teams Participating in Annual Reviews under Protocol Article 8: On Thursday, 10 December, the CMP considered a draft decision forwarded by SBSTA 42 on this item. The CMP adopted the decision.

Final Outcome: In its decision (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/2/Add.2) the CMP, *inter alia*, requests the Secretariat to:

- update and implement the courses on national systems, application of adjustments, modalities for the accounting of assigned amounts under Protocol Article 7, paragraph 4, review of national registries and information on assigned amounts, and review of activities under Protocol Article 3, paragraph 3 included in the training programme for members of expert review teams; and
- develop and implement the courses if possible in time for the first inventory review of the second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol.

The annex to the decision contains an overview of the training programme for members of expert review teams, with one section on details of the training programme and another section on courses of the training programme, including descriptions of: national systems; application of adjustments; modalities for the accounting of assigned amounts under Article 7, paragraph 4; review of national registries and information on assigned amounts; and review of activities under Article 3, paragraphs 3 and 4, of the Kyoto Protocol.

Implications of the Implementation of Decisions 2/CMP.7 to 4/CMP.7 and 1/CMP.8 on the Previous Decisions on Methodological Issues Relating to Protocol Articles 5, 7 and 8: The discussions on the two draft decisions under this item are summarized under the SBSTA (see page 38).

Annual Report on the Technical Review of GHG Inventories of Annex I Parties to the Convention, as Defined in Protocol Article 1.7: These discussions are summarized under the SBSTA (see page 42).

ADMINISTRATIVE, FINANCIAL AND INSTITUTIONAL MATTERS: Audit Report and Financial Statements for 2014: These discussions are summarized under the SBI (see page 36).

Budget Performance for the Biennium 2014-2015: These discussions are summarized under the SBI (see page 36).

Programme Budget for the Biennium 2016-2017: On Thursday, 10 December, the CMP adopted two decisions, forwarded by SBI 42, on the programme budget for the biennium 2016-2017 and on the methodology for the collection of international transaction log (ITL) fees in the biennium 2016-2017.

Final Outcome: In its decision (FCCC/SBI/2015/10/Add.1), on the programme budget for the biennium 2016-2017, the CMP, *inter alia*:

- endorses the COP 21 decision on the programme budget for the biennium 2016-2017 as it applies to the Kyoto Protocol;
- adopts the indicative scale of contributions for 2016 and 2017;

- approves the budget for the ITL for the biennium 2016-2017, amounting to €5,351,356, for the purposes specified in the proposed budget for the ITL; and
- adopts the fees for the ITL for the biennium 2016-2017. In its decision (FCCC/SBI/2015/10/Add.1), on the methodology for the collection of ITL fees in the biennium 2016-2017, the CMP, *inter alia*:
 - adopts the scale of fees for the ITL for the biennium 2016-2017;
 - decides on the basis for the calculation of the fees for the ITL paid by a party for the biennium 2016-2017; and
 - requests the ITL administrator to provide, in its annual reports for 2016 and 2017, information on transactions of Kyoto Protocol units, and a table listing the scale and the level of fees and the status of payments for all parties connected to the ITL.

CONCLUSION OF THE SESSION: Adoption of the

Report of CMP 11: Following presentation of the report of the session (FCCC/KP/CMP/2015/L.2) by the Secretariat, on behalf of Rapporteur Johanna Lissinger Peitz (Sweden), the CMP adopted the report.

Closure of the Session: On resource implications of the decisions taken, UNFCCC Deputy Executive Secretary Richard Kinley noted the need for €325,000 to conduct the technical review of GHG inventories and initial reports of Annex I parties that are also parties to the Kyoto Protocol.

CMP 11 President Fabius invited, and parties agreed, to take note of the draft resolution presented by Morocco thanking France, as the host government, and the city of Paris (FCCC/KP/CMP/2015/L.5).

CMP 11 President Fabius gave CMP 11 to a close at 12:33 am on Sunday, 13 December.

SUBSIDIARY BODY FOR IMPLEMENTATION

On Tuesday, 1 December, SBI Chair Amena Yauvoli (Fiji) opened SBI 43. For a summary of opening statements see: <http://www.iisd.ca/vol12/enb12654e.html>

ORGANIZATIONAL MATTERS: On Tuesday, 1 December, parties adopted the agenda (FCCC/SBI/2015/11) with the item on information in non-Annex I national communications held in abeyance. Parties agreed to the organization of work as presented.

Multilateral Assessment Working Group Session under the International Assessment and Review (IAR) Process: On Tuesday, 1 December, SBI Chair Yauvoli informed that the multilateral assessment of Belarus and Kazakhstan would complete the third and final multilateral assessment working group session of the first round of the IAR process. For a summary of the presentations and discussions during this round, see: <http://www.iisd.ca/vol12/enb12654e.html>

Election of Officers Other than the Chair: On Tuesday, 1 December, SBI Chair Yauvoli indicated that consultations on the election of officers other than the Chair would be conducted by the COP 21/CMP 11 Presidency.

On Friday, 4 December, SBI Chair Yauvoli said that consultations on the nomination of the SBI Vice-Chair had been concluded, but no nominations had been received for the SBI

Rapporteur. The SBI agreed to nominate Zhihua Chen (China) as the SBI Vice-Chair and that Sidat Yaffa (The Gambia) shall remain in office until his replacement has been elected.

REPORTING FROM AND REVIEW OF ANNEX I PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION: Status of Submission and Review of Sixth National Communications (NCs) and First Biennial Reports (BRs) from Annex I Parties to the Convention: On Tuesday, 1 December, the SBI took note of the status of submission and review of sixth NCs and first BRs from Annex I parties (FCCC/SBI/2015/INF.9).

Outcome of the First Round of the IAR Process (2014-2015): On Tuesday, 1 December, parties agreed to conduct informal consultations, co-facilitated by Fatuma Mohamed Hussein (Kenya) and Helen Plume (New Zealand) on this item. On Friday, 4 December, the SBI adopted conclusions.

Final Outcome: In its conclusions (FCCC/SBI/2015/L.20), the SBI agrees to continue its consideration of the outcome of the first round of the IAR process at SBI 44.

Revision of the "Guidelines for the Preparation of National Communication by Parties Included in Annex I to the Convention Part II: UNFCCC Reporting Guidelines on National Communications": On Tuesday, 1 December, parties agreed that SBI Chair Yauvoli would prepare draft conclusions on this item (FCCC/TP/2015/3) in consultation with interested parties. On Friday, 4 December, the SBI adopted conclusions.

Final Outcome: In its conclusions (FCCC/SBI/2015/L.23), the SBI, *inter alia*, requests the Secretariat to organize a pre-session workshop, and prepare a report thereof, prior to SBI 44, under the guidance of the SBI Chair, in order to advance the discussion under this agenda sub-item, and agrees to continue its work on the revision of the UNFCCC reporting guidelines on NCs at SBI 44 with a view to finalizing and recommending them for adoption by COP 22.

Report on National GHG Inventory Data from Annex I Parties to the Convention for the Period 1990-2013: On Tuesday, 1 December, parties took note of the report on national GHG inventory data from Annex I parties for 1990-2013 (FCCC/SBI/2015/21).

Annual Compilation and Accounting Report for Annex B Parties under the Kyoto Protocol for 2015: This item was held in abeyance.

REPORTING FROM NON-ANNEX I PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION: Information Contained in National Communications from Non-Annex I Parties to the Convention: On Tuesday, 1 December, the SBI recommended that the CMP take note of the annual compilation and accounting report for Annex B parties under the Kyoto Protocol for 2015 (FCCC/KP/CMP/2015/6 and Add.1/Rev.1).

Work of the Consultative Group of Experts on National Communications from Non-Annex I Parties to the Convention (CGE): During the SBI opening plenary, parties agreed to conduct informal consultations, co-facilitated by Anne Rasmussen (Samoa) and Helen Plume (New Zealand), on this item (FCCC/SBI/2015/17, 18, 20 and FCCC/SBI/2015/INF.13). On Friday, 4 December, the SBI adopted its conclusions.

Final Outcome: In its conclusions (FCCC/SBI/2015/L.21) the SBI, *inter alia*:

- welcomes progress made by the CGE focusing on adaptation and the launch of the training programme to enhance the capacity of experts to conduct efficient and effective technical analysis of biennial update reports (BURs);
- notes the plan of the CGE to organize regional training workshops on the preparation of BURs in 2016;
- urges developed country parties in Annex II and other developed country parties in a position to do so to provide financial resources to enable the CGE to implement its work programme for 2016-2018;
- encourages the CGE to prioritize elements of its 2015 work programme that have not yet been undertaken; and
- invites multilateral programmes and organizations to collaborate with the CGE, as appropriate, in the provision of technical support to non-Annex I parties in preparing their NCs and BURs.

Provision of Financial and Technical Support: During the SBI opening plenary, parties agreed that SBI Chair Yauvoli would prepare draft conclusions on this item (FCCC/SBI/2015/INF.15 and FCCC/CP/2015/4). On Friday, 4 December, the SBI adopted its conclusions.

Final Outcome: In its conclusions (FCCC/SBI/2015/L.24), the SBI, *inter alia*:

- invites the GEF to continue to provide information on its activities relating to the preparation of NCs by non-Annex I parties and an approximate date for completion of draft NCs and for submission of final NCs to the Secretariat, for consideration at SBI 45;
- also invites the GEF to continue to provide information on its activities relating to the preparation of BURs, and an approximate date for submission of BURs to the Secretariat, for consideration at SBI 44;
- encourages non-Annex I parties that have not submitted their first BURs to complete and submit them in a timely manner;
- urges non-Annex I parties that have yet to submit their request to the GEF for support for the preparation of their first BUR to do so in a timely manner and encourages the GEF agencies to facilitate the preparation and submission of project proposals by non-Annex I parties for the preparation of their BURs;
- notes the information provided by the GEF in its report to COP 21 on the procedures available to facilitate access by non-Annex I parties to funding for the preparation of their NCs and multiple BURs with one application, and information provided on its Global Support Programme for NCs and BURs (GSP); and
- encourages non-Annex I parties to take advantage of the opportunities for technical assistance and support available under the GSP.

Summary Reports on the Technical Analysis of BURs from Non-Annex I Parties to the Convention: On Tuesday, 1 December, parties took note of summary reports on the technical analysis of BURs from non-Annex I parties.

MATTERS RELATED TO THE MECHANISMS UNDER THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: Review of the Modalities and Procedures for the CDM: On Tuesday, 1 December, parties

agreed to informal consultations, co-facilitated by Jeffery Spooner (Jamaica) and Karoliina Anttonen (Finland), on this item. On Friday, 4 December, the SBI adopted conclusions.

Final Outcome: In its conclusions (FCCC/SBI/2015/L.28), the SBI agrees to continue its consideration of this matter at SBI 44.

Review of the JI Guidelines: On Tuesday, 1 December, parties agreed to conduct informal consultations, co-facilitated by Yaw Osafo (Ghana) and Dimitar Nikov (France), on this item. On Friday, 4 December, the SBI adopted conclusions.

Final Outcome: In its conclusions (FCCC/SBI/2015/L.30), the SBI agrees to continue its consideration of this issue at SBI 44 on the basis of a draft decision text proposed by the co-facilitators of the informal consultations, as contained in the annex to the document.

Modalities for Expediting the Continued Issuance, Transfer and Acquisition of JI Emission Reduction Units (ERUs): On Tuesday, 1 December, parties agreed that SBI Chair Yauvoli would prepare draft conclusions on this item. On Friday, 4 December, the SBI adopted conclusions.

Final Outcome: In its conclusions (FCCC/SBI/2015/L.25), the SBI agreed to conclude its consideration of this matter.

Report of the Administrator of the International Transaction Log (ITL) under the Kyoto Protocol: On Tuesday, 1 December, parties took note of the report (FCCC/SBI/2015/INF.12).

MATTERS RELATING TO LDCS: On Tuesday, 1 December, parties considered the report of the LEG (FCCC/SBI/2015/19 and Corr.1) and information on the NAP Expo (FCCC/SBI/2015/INF.14). SBI agreed to conduct informal consultations, facilitated by Mamadou Honadia (Burkina Faso).

On Friday, 4 December, the SBI adopted conclusions.

Final Outcome: In its conclusions (FCCC/SBI/2015/L.22), the SBI, *inter alia*, notes that 32 project proposals for the implementation of national adaptation programmes of action (NAPAs) and for the process of NAPs, accounting for a total of US\$235.7 million, had been technically cleared by the GEF, but were awaiting funding under the LDCF. The SBI noted with appreciation the continued collaboration of the LEG with the Adaptation Committee and other constituted bodies under the Convention, the NWP and a wide range of relevant organizations, agencies and regional centers, and requests the LEG to continue to enhance this engagement.

NATIONAL ADAPTATION PLANS: On Tuesday, 1 December, the SBI considered the report of the LEG (FCCC/SBI/2015/19), GEF (FCCC/CP/2015/4), GCF (FCCC/CP/2015/3), Adaptation Committee (FCCC/SBI/2015/2), progress in the process to formulate and implement NAPs (FCCC/SBI/2015/INF.11) and information on the NAP Expo (FCCC/SBI/2015/INF.14). Parties agreed to conduct informal consultations, co-facilitated by Mamadou Honadia (Burkina Faso) and Jens Fugl (EU).

On Friday, 4 December, the SBI adopted conclusions and forwarded a draft decision to COP 21.

Final Outcome: In its decision (FCCC/SBI/2015/L.32 and Add.1), the COP, *inter alia*, requests the SBI to assess progress in the process to formulate and implement NAPs at SBI 44.

The COP also decides that the following steps are necessary for the SBI to initiate the assessment:

- to invite parties and relevant organizations to submit by 1 February 2018 information on their progress toward achieving the objectives of the process to formulate and implement NAP experiences, best practices, lessons learned, gaps and needs, and support provided and received in the process to formulate and implement NAPs;
- to invite parties to provide information, guided by a questionnaire, on an ongoing basis through NAP Central;
- to request the Secretariat to prepare a synthesis report on the progress made towards the achievement of the objectives of the process to formulate and implement NAPs; and
- to request the LEG, in collaboration with the Adaptation Committee, to organize a meeting of party experts, with a view to providing a summary of progress made in the process to formulate and implement NAPs, and to provide a report on the meeting.

REPORT OF THE ADAPTATION COMMITTEE:

On Tuesday, 1 December, SBI considered the report of the Adaptation Committee (FCCC/SB/2015/2) and parties agreed to joint SBI/SBSTA informal consultations, co-facilitated by Malia Talakai (Nauru) and Anton Hilber (Switzerland).

On Friday, 4 December, the SBI adopted the conclusions and forwarded a draft decision to the COP.

Final Outcome: In its decision (FCCC/SB/2015/L.3), the COP, *inter alia*:

- invites the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to enhance outreach activities that would facilitate policymakers' understanding of the impact of different levels of warming on adaptation planning and actions;
- requests the TEC, with the CTCN, the Adaptation Committee and the LEG, to consider how it can help parties to align their TNAs with the process to formulate and implement NAPs;
- invites parties to take into account climate risk screening of national development strategies and policies aimed at enhancing livelihoods and economic diversification to enhance climate resilience; and
- requests the Adaptation Committee to further strengthen cooperation with the SCF and other constituted bodies under the Convention, with a view to enhancing coherence and collaboration regarding adaptation finance as contained in the work plan of the Adaptation Committee.

REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE

WIM: On Tuesday, 1 December, the SBI considered the report of the WIM (FCCC/SB/2015/3) and parties agreed to discuss this issue in joint SBI/SBSTA informal consultations, co-facilitated by Beth Lavender (Canada) and Kishan Kumarsingh (Trinidad and Tobago). On Friday, 4 December, the SBI adopted the conclusions and forwarded a draft decision for consideration and adoption by the COP.

Final Outcome: In its decision (FCCC/SB/2015/L.5/Rev.1), the COP, *inter alia*:

- decides that the terms of the Co-Chairs who are currently in office will end immediately before the first meeting of the Executive Committee in 2017;
- notes with concern the limited progress made in the implementation of the initial two-year work plan; and

- decides that, as a consequence of the late nomination of members to the Executive Committee in 2015, the term of the members of the Committee currently in office will end immediately before the first meeting of the Executive Committee in 2018 for members with a term of two years, and immediately before the first meeting of the Executive Committee in 2019 for members with a term of three years.

DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFER OF

TECHNOLOGIES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TECHNOLOGY MECHANISM:

On Tuesday, 1 December, parties agreed to conduct informal consultations on all sub-items under the TM (FCCC/SB/2015/1 and INF.3, FCCC/SBI/2015/16 and FCCC/CP/2015/4), co-facilitated by Carlos Fuller (Belize) and Elfriede More (Austria).

Joint Annual Report of the TEC and the CTCN: Friday, 4 December, the SBI and SBSTA adopted conclusions on this joint item and forwarded a draft decision for consideration and adoption by the COP.

Final Outcome: In its decision (FCCC/SB/2015/L.4), the COP, *inter alia*:

- welcomes the joint annual report of the TEC and the CTCN and invites parties to consider its key messages;
- invites the TEC and the advisory board of the CTCN to update procedures for preparing the joint chapter in the joint report;
- welcomes the interim report of the TEC on enhanced implementation of TNAs; and
- invites the CTCN to use the TEC's guidance on technology action plans for informing the TNA process.

Poznan Strategic Programme on Technology Transfer

(PSP): On Friday, 4 December, the SBI adopted conclusions.

Final Outcome: In its conclusions (FCCC/SBI/2015/L.29), the SBI, *inter alia*, invites parties, the CTCN and relevant entities to act upon the recommendation provided in the TEC's evaluation report of the PSP, and encourages the GEF to share midterm evaluations of PSP technology transfer and finance centers and pilot projects of the fourth replenishment of the GEF, and being informed by these lessons, invites the TEC to update its report for consideration by the COP no later than COP 23, through the SBI.

CAPACITY BUILDING: Capacity Building under the

Convention: On Tuesday, 1 December, parties agreed to conduct informal back-to-back consultations with capacity building under the Kyoto Protocol, co-facilitated by Bubu Jallow (The Gambia) and Kunihiro Shimada (Japan), on this item (FCCC/SBI/2015/14 and FCCC/SBI/2015/INF.16).

On Friday, 4 December, several parties expressed willingness to further engage constructively on this item under the COP. The US, Australia and Japan raised concerns about the process by which the draft conclusions were reached. Swaziland, supported by The Gambia, noted the draft text "provides a landing ground and marks the beginning of defining capacity building." The EU understood the need to strengthen capacity-building institutions under the Convention as "our common vision" and hoped for the establishment of a capacity-building committee as an outcome of COP 21. Senegal, for the LDCs, with the Philippines, thanked the EU for their positive spirit that had allowed capacity building

to be taken up at a higher level. Burundi lamented that “the text is still bracketed” and emphasized capacity building as necessary for her country to adapt to climate change impacts.

The SBI adopted conclusions (FCCC/SBI/2015/L.33) and forwarded annexed draft decision text to the COP for further consideration.

The COP continued consideration of the draft decision text contained in the annex to the SBI conclusions. On Thursday, 10 December, the COP adopted the decision.

Final Outcome: In its decision (FCCC/CP/2015/L.6), the COP, *inter alia*:

- adopts the terms of reference for the third comprehensive review of the implementation of the framework for capacity building in developing countries, annexed to the decision;
- requests SBI 44 to conduct the comprehensive review on the basis of these terms of reference, with a view to recommending a draft decision for consideration and adoption at COP 22;
- requests the Secretariat to prepare a technical paper based on these terms of reference as input to the comprehensive review;
- invites parties and observer organizations to submit their views on the comprehensive review by 9 March 2016;
- urges relevant bodies established under the Convention to continue to undertake capacity-building activities in their work, as appropriate;
- decides that the fifth meeting of the Durban Forum, to be held during SBI 44, will explore potential ways for enhancing capacity building by sharing information and varied experiences; and
- invites parties to submit suggestions on additional topics for the fifth meeting of the Durban Forum and views on possible ways to enhance the information included in the capacity-building portal by 9 March 2016.

Capacity Building under the Kyoto Protocol: On Tuesday, 1 December, parties agreed to conduct informal back-to-back consultations with capacity building under the Convention, co-facilitated by Bubu Jallow (The Gambia) and Kunihiro Shimada (Japan), on this item (FCCC/SBI/2015/14 and FCCC/SBI/2015/INF.16).

On Friday, 4 December, the SBI adopted conclusions and forwarded on annexed draft decision text to CMP 11 for further consideration. CMP 11 continued consideration of the draft decision text contained in the annex to the SBI conclusions.

On Friday, 10 December, the CMP adopted a decision.

Final Outcome: In its conclusions (FCCC/SBI/2015/L.34), the SBI notes it was unable to conclude its consideration of this agenda sub-item and recommends that CMP 11 continue consideration of this matter on the basis of draft decision text contained in the annex to the conclusions.

In its decision (FCCC/KP/CMP/2015/L.6), the CMP:

- requests SBI 44 to conduct the third comprehensive review of the implementation of the framework for capacity building in developing countries, on the basis of the terms of reference contained in the annex to the COP 21 decision on capacity building under the Convention (FCCC/CP/2015/L.6), with a view to recommending a draft decision for consideration and adoption at CMP 12;

- decides that the fifth meeting of the Durban Forum, to be held during SBI 44, will explore potential ways for enhancing capacity building by sharing information and varied experiences related to the Kyoto Protocol; and
- invites parties to submit suggestions on additional topics related to the Kyoto Protocol for the fifth meeting of the Durban Forum by 9 March 2016.

IMPACT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESPONSE

MEASURES: Forum and Work Programme: During the SBI opening plenary on Tuesday, 1 December, parties agreed to establish a joint SBI/SBSTA contact group, co-chaired by SBI Chair Yauvoli and SBSTA Chair Lidia Wojtal (Poland) on this item, including to address the agenda sub-items on matters relating to Protocol Article 3.14 (adverse impacts) and progress on the implementation of Decision 1/CP.10 (Buenos Aires Programme of Work).

The contact group first met on Wednesday, 2 December, co-facilitated by Delano Verwey (the Netherlands) and Eduardo Calvo (Peru), and considered draft decision text contained in the annex to document FCCC/SB/2015/L.2, as decided by SBI 42 and SBSTA 42.

The US said the text needed further consideration and that, because of ongoing negotiations under the ADP, the US would not be “in a position to adopt the decision text.”

The EU noted that the text attempts to bridge different visions, but acknowledged the need to know how all discussions on this issue in Paris will come together. Argentina for the G-77/China, Ghana for the African Group, and Saudi Arabia expressed concern about linking this item to the ADP, with Singapore suggesting the draft decision should focus on pre-2020 measures. The EU said the pre-2020 focus is not indicated in the text. Parties agreed to continue discussions in informal consultations.

On Thursday, 3 December, the contact group agreed to forward to the COP the draft decision and draft conclusions prepared, on the basis of parties’ input, by the co-facilitators with the help of the Secretariat.

On Friday, 4 December, the SBI adopted its conclusions (FCCC/SB/2015/L.6) and forwarded the annexed draft decision text to the COP for further consideration.

On Sunday, 13 December, the COP adopted the decision.

Final Outcome: In its decision (FCCC/CP/2015/L.12) the COP, *inter alia*:

- decides to continue and improve the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures, which shall provide a platform to allow parties to share, in an interactive manner, information, experiences, case studies, best practices and views, and to facilitate assessment and analysis of the impact of the implementation of response measures, with a view to recommending specific actions;
- decides to focus work under the improved forum, *inter alia*, on the provision of concrete examples, case studies and practices in order to enhance the capacity of parties, in particular developing country parties, to deal with the impact of the implementation of response measures;
- requests the Chairs of the SBs to convene the improved forum to implement the work programme on the impact of the implementation of response measures, which will continue to be convened under a joint agenda item of the SBs, and operate

in accordance with the procedures applicable to contact groups;

- also requests the SBs, in order to advance the work of the improved forum, to constitute *ad hoc* technical expert groups, as appropriate, to elaborate on the technical work under the improved forum. The technical *ad hoc* expert groups shall consist of balanced regional representation of parties;
- adopts the work programme comprising the areas of economic diversification and transformation, just transition of the work force, and the creation of decent work and quality jobs;
- decides that the implementation of the work programme shall address the needs of all parties, in particular, developing country parties, and shall be informed, *inter alia*, by the assessment and analysis of impacts, including the use and development of economic modeling, and taking into account all relevant policy issues of concern;
- requests the SBs to review every three years, beginning at SB 49, the work programme of the improved forum, including the modalities for its operation;
- decides that the improved forum shall provide recommendations to the SBs on the actions referred to in paragraph 1 (under the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures) for their consideration, with a view to recommending those actions, as appropriate, to the COP, beginning at COP 23; and
- requests the Secretariat to prepare, subject to the availability of financial resources, a guidance document to assist developing countries to assess the impact of the implementation of response measures, including guidance on modeling tools, as well as technical materials to assist developing countries on their economic diversification initiatives, for consideration at SB 44.

Protocol Article 3.14: Discussions on this item are summarized under the SBI item on the impact of the implementation of response measures, sub-item on the forum and work programme (see page 34).

THE 2013-2015 REVIEW: This item was first considered on Tuesday, 1 December. SBI Chair Yauvoli and SBSTA Chair Wojtal proposed, and parties agreed to, a joint SBI/SBSTA contact group, co-chaired by Gertraud Wollansky (Austria) and Leon Charles (Grenada), on this item. The contact group first met on Tuesday, 1 December.

Most parties called for substantive conclusions on this item and a draft COP decision. Elements of the draft conclusions and decision included: taking note of the report of the structured expert dialogue (SED) (FCCC/SB/2015/INF.1); mentioning the ten messages highlighted in the SED report; stating that the goal to hold global temperature rise below 2°C is inadequate; noting negative impacts are already being felt at current levels of warming; and that in consideration of overall progress towards the long-term global goal, parties should act urgently and ambitiously, while recognizing the technological, economic and institutional challenges. The draft decision also contained various options that would have the COP: reaffirm the 2°C limit; reaffirm the 2°C limit and recognize the need to strive to 1.5°C; or strengthen the long-term goal to 1.5°C.

Saudi Arabia and China preferred procedural conclusions, such as taking note of the report and thanking those experts involved. Since other parties did not want to adopt only procedural conclusions, arguing that such conclusions would not fulfill the mandate of the review, no conclusions were adopted and no draft decision was forwarded to the COP.

On Friday, 4 December, SBI Chair Yauvoli and SBSTA Chair Wojtal reported that parties had been unable to complete work on this matter. The SBI and SBSTA agreed that the SBI and SBSTA Chairs would seek the guidance of the COP 21 President on the matter.

On Saturday, 5 December, COP 21 President Fabius said the 2013-2015 review would be considered together with ambition and long-term goal during discussions on the Paris agreement, as the review could help inform parties in their consideration of temperature targets and agreement on ambition could unlock a final decision on the 2013-2015 review. The issue was not specifically addressed in the ministerial consultations, which focused on the agreement.

On Sunday, 13 December, the COP adopted a decision on this item.

Final Outcome: In its decision (FCCC/CP/2015/L.10), the COP, *inter alia*:

- takes note of the work of the SED, which contributed to completing the phases of the 2013-2015 review and of the SED report, including the ten messages highlighted therein;
- decides, in relation to the adequacy of the long-term global goal, and in the light of the ultimate objective of the Convention, that the goal is to hold the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change;
- decides that, in light of the overall progress made towards achieving the long-term global goal, including consideration of the implementation of the commitments under the Convention, parties should act urgently and ambitiously under the Convention while recognizing the technological, economic and institutional challenges;
- notes that, although some progress has already been made by UNFCCC bodies in scaling up financial, technological and capacity-building support, significant gaps still exist in terms of both the scale and speed of such progress;
- notes that there continue to be information gaps in relation to the areas covered within the scope of the 2013-2015 review;
- encourages the scientific community to address information and research gaps identified during the SED, including scenarios that limit warming to below 1.5°C relative to pre-industrial levels by 2100 and the range of impacts at the regional and local scales associated with those scenarios;
- agrees that the next periodic review should be conducted in an effective and efficient manner, avoid duplication of work, and take into account the results of relevant work conducted under the Convention, its Kyoto Protocol and the subsidiary bodies;
- requests the SBSTA and SBI to consider the scope of the next periodic review with a view to forwarding a recommendation for consideration by the COP no later than 2018, as appropriate;

- agrees to reconvene the SED in conjunction with the next periodic review; and
- notes that the first periodic review fulfilled its mandate.

GENDER AND CLIMATE CHANGE: This item (FCCC/CP/2015/6 and FCCC/SBI/2015/12) was first considered on Tuesday, 1 December. SBI Chair Yauvoli proposed, and parties agreed, that he prepare draft conclusions on this item.

On Friday, 4 December, the SBI adopted conclusions.

Final Outcome: In its conclusions (FCCC/SBI/2015/L.31) the SBI, *inter alia*:

- takes note of the report by the Secretariat on the gender composition of constituted bodies established under the Convention and its Kyoto Protocol and party delegations attending sessions under the Convention and its Kyoto Protocol, and notes with concern that, since the last report, only one constituted body has seen an increase in the representation of women, which remains between 6% and 35% in the majority of constituted bodies;
- recalls Decision 23/CP.18 where parties agreed to review progress made towards the goal of gender balance at COP 22;
- welcomes the report by the Secretariat on the in-session workshop on gender-responsive climate policy with a focus on mitigation action and technology development and transfer;
- invites the Secretariat to include information on relevant tools and methods to assess the environmental, social and economic benefits of involving men and women equally in climate change related activities when preparing the technical paper on guidelines or other tools on integrating gender considerations into climate change related activities under the Convention;
- encourages parties to use the information contained in the report by the Secretariat on gender composition to inform, support and strengthen the implementation of gender responsive climate policy in the areas of mitigation action and technology development and transfer;
- notes with appreciation the efforts of parties and relevant organizations to support the implementation of Decision 18/CP.20 (Lima work programme on gender) and encourages interested parties, relevant organizations, and the Secretariat to continue such efforts pursuant to that decision; and
- encourages parties and admitted observer organizations to submit, by 3 February 2016, their views on the matters to be addressed at the in-session workshop on gender-responsive climate policy with a focus on adaptation and capacity building and training for delegates on gender issues to be held during SBI 44.

ADMINISTRATIVE, FINANCIAL AND

INSTITUTIONAL MATTERS: Budget Performance for the Biennium 2014-2015: On Tuesday, 1 December, noting the situation of outstanding contributions as pressing, UNFCCC Deputy Executive Secretary Richard Kinley presented the budget performance for the biennium 2014-2015 as at 30 June 2015 (FCCC/SBI/2015/13) and status of contributions as at 15 November 2015 (FCCC/SBI/2015/INF.17). The SBI agreed that SBI Chair Yauvoli would draft conclusions in consultation with interested parties.

On Friday, 4 December, the SBI adopted conclusions and forwarded draft decisions, jointly with the sub-item on audit report and financial statements for 2014, to the COP and CMP.

Final Outcome: In their decisions (FCCC/SBI/2015/L.26 and L.27), the CMP and COP:

- welcome the Executive Secretary's efforts to address budgetary limits by enhancing effectiveness and efficiency, via, among others, reducing staffing costs;
- urge parties that have not made contributions to the core budget to do so without delay and call upon parties to make contributions for the biennium 2016-2017 in a timely manner; and
- urge parties to further contribute to the Trust Fund for Participation in the UNFCCC.

Audit Report and Financial Statements for 2014: On Tuesday, 1 December, parties took note of the audited financial statements for the year 2014 (FCCC/SBI/2015/INF.10). The SBI agreed that SBI Chair Yauvoli would draft conclusions in consultation with interested parties.

On Friday, 4 December, the SBI adopted conclusions and forwarded draft decisions, jointly with the sub-item on budget performance for the biennium 2014-2015, to the COP and CMP.

Final Outcome: In their decisions (FCCC/SBI/2015/L.26 and L.27), on the audit report and financial statements for 2014, the CMP and COP take note of the audit report of the UN Board of Auditors and urge the Executive Secretary to implement the recommendations of the auditors, as appropriate.

REPORT ON OTHER ACTIVITIES: Summary Report on the 3rd Dialogue on Article 6 of the Convention: On Tuesday, 1 December, parties took note of the summary report on the 3rd Dialogue on Article 6 of the Convention (FCCC/SBI/2015/15). The SBI endorsed replacing "Article 6 of the Convention" with "Action for Climate Empowerment."

CLOSURE AND REPORT ON THE SESSION: On Friday, 4 December, SBI Rapporteur Sidat Yaffa (The Gambia) presented, and the SBI adopted, the report of SBI 43 (FCCC/SBI/2015/L.19). SBI Chair Yauvoli thanked all delegates for their work and noted SBI 43 accomplished much work, including the completion of the first round of the IAR. SBI 43 was gavelled to a close at 9:23 pm.

For a summary of statements made during the closing plenary of the SBI, see: <http://www.iisd.ca/vol12/enb12657e.html>

SUBSIDIARY BODY FOR SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL ADVICE

On Tuesday, 1 December, SBSTA Chair Wojtal opened the session. For a summary of opening statements, see: <http://www.iisd.ca/vol12/enb12654e.html>

ORGANIZATIONAL MATTERS: Parties adopted the agenda (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/3) and agreed to the organization of work.

Election of Officers other than the Chair: On Tuesday, 1 December, SBSTA Chair Wojtal reported that consultations on the election of officers other than the Chair would be coordinated by the COP 21/CMP 11 Presidency.

On Friday, 4 December, SBSTA Chair Wojtal announced that Tibor Schaffhauser (Hungary) would serve as SBSTA Vice Chair and Aderito Santana (São Tomé and Príncipe) would serve as Rapporteur.

NAIROBI WORK PROGRAMME: On Tuesday, 1 December, parties agreed that SBSTA Chair Wojtal would produce draft conclusions on this item (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/4 and INF.8).

The UN Environment Programme highlighted the progress of the Lima Adaptation Knowledge Initiative (LAKI) in various sub-regions and outlined its two aims, to identify and prioritize knowledge gaps at the sub-regional level and to fill those gaps. Botswana and Sri Lanka welcomed LAKI's progress and future workshops.

On Friday, 4 December, the SBSTA adopted the conclusions.

Final Outcome: In its conclusions, the SBSTA (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/L.19), *inter alia*, notes with appreciation the reports provided on good practices and lessons learned in adaptation planning and progress on implementing activities under the NWP, and the information provided by LAKI, the Adaptation Committee and the LEG.

The SBSTA further welcomes the launch of the Adaptation Knowledge Portal and recognized its role in enhancing the dissemination of knowledge developed under the NWP, the Adaptation Committee and the WIM Executive Committee.

REPORT OF THE ADAPTATION COMMITTEE:

Discussions on this item are summarized under the SBI (see page 33).

DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGIES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TECHNOLOGY MECHANISM: Joint Annual Report of the TEC and the CTCN: On Tuesday, 1 December, TEC Chair Kuniyuki Shimada (Japan) reported key achievements, including enhanced access to climate technology finance and support for development of national systems of innovation.

CTCN Advisory Board Chair Jukka Uosukainen (Finland) said the CTCN now has over 100 network members providing technical assistance in response to developing country requests.

Further discussions under this item are summarized under the SBI (see page 33).

ISSUES RELATING TO AGRICULTURE: On Tuesday, 1 December, the SBSTA considered the report of the workshop on early warning systems and contingency plans in relation to extreme weather events (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/INF.6) and the report on the assessment of risk and vulnerability of agricultural systems to different climate change scenarios (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/INF.7).

Parties agreed to discuss this issue in informal consultations, co-facilitated by Emmanuel Dlamini (Swaziland) and Heikki Granholm (Finland). Informal consultations convened Wednesday, 2 December.

On Friday, 4 December, the SBSTA adopted the conclusions, with minor amendments.

Final Outcome: In its conclusions (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/L.17), the SBSTA takes note of the reports and agreed to further consider reports and the additional issues already identified for workshops at SBSTA 44 and 45.

REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE WIM: Discussions on this item are summarized under the SBI (see page 33).

MATTERS RELATING TO SCIENCE AND REVIEW:

Research and Systematic Observation: This item was first considered on Tuesday, 1 December. SBSTA Chair Wojtal proposed, and parties agreed to, informal consultations, co-facilitated by Chris Moseki (South Africa) and Stefan Rösner (Germany).

The Global Climate Observing System (GCOS) reported on progress made against the implementation plan and the assessment of the adequacy of the global observing network.

The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) reported, *inter alia*, that the WMO Global Framework for Climate Services (GFCS) developed a supplement to the technical guidelines for NAPs and that the WMO Congress adopted a policy on climate data and products for the GFCS.

The Committee on Earth Observation Satellites reported that, on sensing, data from the essential climate variable inventory were provided to complement the existing database, and highlighted progress on the implementation of carbon observation from space.

The Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission of the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) underlined that ocean observation is integral to the climate observation system and highlighted challenges sustaining observations often supported by short-term research budgets.

Informal consultations were first held on Tuesday, 1 December. On Friday, 4 December, the SBSTA adopted conclusions.

Final Outcome: In its conclusions (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/L.18), the SBSTA, *inter alia*:

- recognizes the progress made in improving observing systems for climate, as relevant to the Convention, and encouraged GCOS to consider the outcomes of COP 21 when preparing the GCOS Implementation Plan 2016;
- invites GCOS to collaborate with relevant partners to continue enhancing access to, and understanding and interpretation of, data products and information to support decision-making on adaptation and mitigation at national, regional and global scales;
- urges parties to work towards addressing the priorities and gaps identified in the GCOS Status Report 2015, and invites parties and relevant organizations to provide inputs to, and contribute to the review of, the GCOS Implementation Plan 2016; and
- welcomes the WMO supplement to the Technical Guidelines for the NAP process outlining how GFCS could provide support.

The 2013-2015 Review: This item is summarized under the SBI (see page 35).

IMPACT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESPONSE

MEASURES: Forum and Work Programme: During the SBSTA opening plenary on Tuesday, 1 December, parties agreed to establish a joint SBI/SBSTA contact group, co-chaired by SBSTA Chair Wojtal and SBI Chair Yauvoli. Discussions and outcomes on this item are summarized under the SBI (see page 34).

Matters Relating to Protocol Article 2.3 (adverse effects of policies and measures): This sub-item was considered jointly with the forum and work programme (see page 34).

METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES UNDER THE CONVENTION: Methodologies for the Reporting of Financial Information by Annex I Parties to the Convention:

This item was first considered on Tuesday, 1 December.

SBSTA Chair Wojtal proposed, and parties agreed, to establish a contact group co-chaired by Hussein Alfa Nafu (Mali) and Roger Dungan (New Zealand). The contact group first met on Wednesday, 2 December. On Friday, 4 December, the SBSTA adopted the conclusions and forwarded a draft decision to the COP. On Thursday, 10 December, the COP adopted the decision.

Final Outcome: In its conclusions (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/L.22), the SBSTA recommends a draft decision for consideration by COP 21. In its decision, the COP, *inter alia*:

- recognizes the need to enhance common understanding on key terminology for reporting financial information under the Convention to facilitate transparency and comparability of information and data on support over time and across parties;
- decides to enhance consistency and transparency in reporting through adjustments in the reporting parameters in tables 7 (Provision of public financial support: summary information in 20XX-3), 7(a) (Provision of public financial support: contribution through multilateral channels in 20XX-3) and 7(b) (Provision of public financial support: contribution through bilateral, regional and other channels in 20XX-3) of the common tabular format;
- requests the Secretariat to revise the electronic reporting application for a common tabular format, in accordance with the provisions contained in the annex (Revised common tabular format for the “UNFCCC biennial reporting guidelines for developed country parties”), in time for the preparation and submission of parties’ biennial reports due in 2018;
- decides that developed country parties shall use the revised electronic reporting application, taking into account their national circumstances, when preparing and submitting their biennial reports in 2018;
- requests Annex II parties to continue to provide information on the underlying assumptions and the methodologies used in their biennial reports;
- requests the Secretariat to improve the software of the biennial report data interface to allow for search functions on the UNFCCC website to collect information per key category in tables 7, 7(a) and 7(b) of the common tabular format (i.e. category “recipient country/region, financial instrument”);
- requests the Secretariat to explore ways to create links to other reporting software and platforms to facilitate the importation and exportation of activity-level data and to inform the SCF to take this into consideration in its work plan;
- requests the Secretariat to update the UNFCCC national focal points when the information referred to above on climate finance directed to recipient countries as reported under the Convention is made available;
- requests the SCF to consider the enhanced information referred to above provided by Annex II parties in its biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows;
- requests the SCF to take into account the work on the methodologies for the reporting of financial information from Annex I parties in the context of its work plan on the MRV of support; and
- invites the SBI to take into consideration the adjustments referred to above in its revision of the “Guidelines for the Preparation of National Communications by Parties Included in Annex I to the Convention, Part II: UNFCCC Reporting Guidelines on National Communications,” to be completed at COP 22.

GHG Data Interface: On Tuesday, 1 December, during the SBSTA opening plenary parties agreed to defer consideration of this item until SBSTA 44.

Emissions from Bunker Fuels: This item (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/MISC.5) was first considered on Tuesday, 1 December. SBSTA Chair Wojtal proposed, and parties agreed, that she prepare a draft decision on this item.

The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) reported on efforts to improve fuel efficiency, encourage alternative fuels and more efficiently manage air traffic. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) reported agreement on a three-step approach to data collection and on technology cooperation and capacity-building efforts. Saudi Arabia, for the G-77/China, underscored the importance of multilateral solutions and supported working through the IMO and ICAO while respecting the principles of the Convention and avoiding unilateral measures. Argentina, for a number of developing countries, said that measures should not constitute a disguised restriction on international trade. She urged further technical analysis of a market-based mechanism proposed under ICAO and said such a mechanism could only be based on mutual and multilateral consent and, with China, should include CBDR. On the IMO, China expressed concern on the adoption of the European system to monitor CO₂ emissions from ships in its ports. Japan, Singapore and the EU said the IMO and ICAO are the suitable places to address these issues. The Republic of Korea urged parties to work toward agreement in these organizations.

On Friday, 4 December, the SBSTA adopted conclusions.

Final Outcome: In its conclusions (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/L.16), the SBSTA takes note of the information received from and progress reported by ICAO and IMO on their ongoing work, notes the views expressed by parties, and invites ICAO and IMO to continue to report, at future sessions of the SBSTA, on relevant work on this issue.

METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES UNDER THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: Implications of the Implementation of Decisions 2/CMP.7 to 4/CMP.7 and 1/CMP.8 on the Previous Decisions on Methodological Issues to the Kyoto Protocol, Including Those Relating to Articles 5, 7 and 8 of the Kyoto Protocol: This item was first considered on Tuesday, 1 December. SBSTA Chair Wojtal proposed, and parties agreed to, a contact group, co-chaired by Anke Herold (Germany) and Guilherme do Prado Lima (Brazil), on this item. The contact group first met on Tuesday, 1 December. On Friday, 4 December, the SBSTA adopted conclusions and forwarded a draft decision to the CMP.

Final Outcome: In its conclusions (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/L.27), the SBSTA recommends two draft decisions for consideration by CMP 11. In the decision (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/L.27/Add.1) regarding part I of the item, implications related to accounting and reporting and other related issues, the CMP, *inter alia*:

- decides that, for the purpose of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol and pending the entry into force of the Doha Amendment, contained in Annex I to Decision 1/CMP.8, any references in this decision and Decision 2/CMP.8 (implications of the implementation of Decisions 2/CMP.7 to 5/CMP.7 on the previous decisions on methodological issues related to the Kyoto Protocol, including those relating to Articles 5, 7 and 8 of the Kyoto Protocol) to Annex A, Annex B, Article 3.1*bis* (reducing overall emissions by 18% below 1990 levels and not exceeding assigned amounts), 3.1*ter* (Annex B party adjustments), 3.1*quater* (Annex I party adjustments), 3.7*bis* (assigned amounts for Annex I parties), 3.7*ter* (transfer of positive difference to cancellation account), 3.8 (insertion of reference to paragraph 7*bis*), 3.8*bis* (1995 or 2000 as base year for nitrogen trifluoride), 3.12*bis* (units generated from market-based mechanisms) and 3.12*ter* (share of these units used to cover administrative expenses and assist developing country parties to meet the costs of adaptation), and Articles 4.2 (informing the Secretariat of terms of acceptance of any amendment to Annex B) and 4.3 (agreement shall remain in operation for the duration of the commitment period specified in Article 3 (Annex I party GHG emission reductions) to which it relates), unless otherwise specified, shall be understood as referring to those articles and annexes as contained in the Doha Amendment, and that, upon the entry into force of the Doha Amendment, such references shall be read as references to the relevant articles of the Kyoto Protocol as amended;
- decides that, for the purpose of the second commitment period, Decisions 13/CMP.1 (modalities for the accounting of assigned amounts under Protocol Article 7.4 (requirement to adopt and review guidelines for the preparation of information required under Article 7)), 15/CMP.1 (guidelines for the preparation of the information required under Protocol Article 7), 18/CMP.1 (criteria for cases of failure to submit information relating to estimates of GHG emissions by sources and removals by sinks from activities under Protocol Articles 3.3 (net changes in GHG emissions by sources and removals by sinks from afforestation, reforestation and deforestation since 1990) and 3.4 (level of carbon stocks in 1990)) and 19/CMP.1 (guidelines for national systems under Protocol Article 5.1 (national system for the estimation of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks)) shall apply *mutatis mutandis*, except where otherwise specified in Decisions 1/CMP.8 and 2/CMP.8 and in this decision;
- clarifies that, for the purpose of the second commitment period, unless otherwise specified in this decision, any references in Decision 13/CMP.1 and in Annexes I (modalities for the accounting of assigned amounts under Protocol Article 7.4) and II (standard electronic format for reporting information on Kyoto Protocol units) to “parties included in

Annex I” or to “parties” shall be understood as referring to parties included in Annex I with commitments inscribed in the third column of Annex B; and

- clarifies that, for the purpose of the second commitment period, unless otherwise specified in this decision, any references in Decision 13/CMP.1 and Annexes I and II to parties included in Annex I or to parties are not applicable to the parties included in Annex I without Quantified Emission Limitation and Reduction Commitments (QELRCs) for the second commitment period.

The CMP also decides that, for the purpose of the second commitment period, the following changes shall apply to Decisions 13/CMP.1 and 15/CMP.1:

- all references to Article 3.1 (reducing overall emissions by 5% below 1990 levels and not exceeding assigned amounts) shall be read as references to Article 3.1*bis*, except those in paragraphs 12(e) (cancellation of ERUs, CERs, assigned amount units (AAUs) and/or removal units (RMUs) by a party not in compliance in previous commitment period) and 47(h) (quantity of ERUs, CERs, AAUs and/or RMUs by a party not in compliance reflected in national registry) of the annex (modalities for the accounting of assigned amounts under Protocol Article 7.4) to Decision 13/CMP.1;
- all references to Articles 3.7 (assigned amounts) and 3.8 (use of 1995 as base year for hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride), shall be read as references to Articles 3.7*bis*, 3.8 and 3.8*bis*, except in paragraph 4 (publication of the annual compilation and accounting reports) of Decision 13/CMP.1;
- all references to the first commitment period shall be read as references to the second commitment period, except that in paragraph 3(e) (failing to meet methodological and reporting requirements through an adjustment for any key source category that accounted for 2% or more of the party’s aggregate emissions) of Decision 15/CMP.1;
- all references to activities under Article 3.3 and elected activities under Article 3.4 shall be read as references to activities under Article 3.3, forest management under Article 3.4 and any elected activities under Article 3.4;
- all references to the “Revised 1996 IPCC Guidelines for National GHG Inventories” or to the IPCC “Good Practice Guidance and Uncertainty Management in National GHG Inventories” in decision 15/CMP.1 shall be read as references to the “2006 IPCC Guidelines for National GHG Inventories” (hereinafter referred to as the 2006 IPCC Guidelines), as implemented through the “Guidelines for the Preparation of National Communications by Parties Included in Annex I to the Convention, Part I: UNFCCC Reporting Guidelines on Annual GHG Inventories” and the “2013 Revised Supplementary Methods and Good Practice Guidance Arising from the Kyoto Protocol.” References to Chapter 7 (Methodological Choice and Recalculation) of the IPCC “Good Practice Guidance and Uncertainty Management in National GHG Inventories” shall be read as references to Chapter 4 (Methodological Choice and Identification of Key Categories) of Volume 1 of the 2006 IPCC Guidelines; and
- all references to Decision 16/CMP.1 (land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF)) shall be read as references

to Decision 2/CMP.7 and 6/CMP.9 (guidance for reporting information on activities under Articles 3.3 and 3.4 of the Kyoto Protocol).

The CMP also decides that:

- for the purpose of the second commitment period, paragraph 3(b) (failing to meet methodological and reporting requirements through lack of an estimate for an Annex A source category accounting for 7% or more of the party's aggregate emissions) of Decision 15/CMP.1 shall be replaced by the following paragraph, "3(b) The party concerned has failed to include an estimate for an Annex A source category (as defined in Chapter 4 of Volume I of the 2006 IPCC Guidelines) that individually accounted for 7% or more of the party's aggregate emissions, defined as the aggregate submitted emissions of the gases and from the sources listed in Protocol Annex A, in the most recent of the party's reviewed inventories in which the source was estimated";
- Decisions 14/CMP.1 (standard electronic format for reporting Kyoto Protocol units), 17/CMP.1 (good practice guidance for LULUCF activities under Articles 3.3 and 3.4 of the Kyoto Protocol) and 6/CMP.3 (good practice guidance for LULUCF activities under Articles 3.3 and 3.4 of the Kyoto Protocol) shall not apply for the purpose of the second commitment period; and
- Annex I parties without QELRCs for the second commitment period shall provide information on which voluntary activities under Protocol Article 3.4 they will include in their reporting, at the latest in their 2016 annual inventory submission.

The CMP adopts: the revisions to the modalities for the accounting of assigned amounts under Protocol Article 7.4 as set out in Annex I; the standard electronic format for reporting Kyoto Protocol units and the reporting instructions for the second commitment period contained in Annex II for reporting in accordance with paragraph 11 (information to be reported in standard electronic format) of the annex to decision 15/CMP.1; and the revisions to the "Guidelines for the Preparation of the Information Required under Article 7 of the Kyoto Protocol" for the second commitment period contained in Annex III.

The CMP also decides that each of the Annex I parties that have reached an agreement to fulfill its commitments under Protocol Article 3 jointly, in accordance with Protocol Article 4 (joint fulfillment), shall clarify in their reports, so as to facilitate the calculation of the assigned amount submitted pursuant to Decision 2/CMP.8, how the information listed in Annex I to that decision, the application of Article 3.7*ter*, including its technical implementation, and Chapter VI (continuation of ongoing activities into second commitment period) of Decision 1/CMP.8 are determined. Such clarification shall describe, in detail, methodologies and, if applicable, any relevant assumptions applied by those parties for their joint fulfillment in relation to:

- the application of paragraphs 23–26 (previous period surplus reserve accounts) of Decision 1/CMP.8;
- the calculation of base year emissions in accordance with Articles 3.5 (base year for Annex I parties in transition to a market economy), 3.7*bis*, 3.8 and 3.8*bis*;
- the calculation of those parties' assigned amounts in accordance with Articles 3.7*bis*, 3.8 and 3.8*bis*, and the respective emission level allocated to each of the parties as

set out in the agreement pursuant to Article 4.1 (meeting joint commitments);

- the calculation of those parties' commitment period reserves in accordance with Decision 11/CMP.1 (modalities, rules and guidelines for emissions trading under Protocol Article 17 (emissions trading)), Decision 1/CMP.8, paragraph 18 (regarding paragraphs 6–10 on commitment period reserve of the annex to Decision 11/CMP.1), and this decision; and
- the application and calculation pursuant to paragraph 13 (additions to the assigned amount from forest management) in the annex of Decision 2/CMP.7;

The CMP decides that:

- each Annex I party with a QELRC inscribed in the third column of Annex B shall annually report tables in a standard electronic format to the Secretariat, that any related information of a non-quantitative nature shall be submitted separately, and that, unless otherwise indicated, parties shall submit information for the previous calendar year (based on Universal Coordinated Time), which is referred to as the "reported year" (e.g. in the 2017 standard electronic format submission, the "reported year" will be the 2016 calendar year);
- an Annex I party without a QELRC inscribed in the third column of Annex B shall continue to provide relevant information on its national registry, or changes thereto, including information on the units in its registry, by submitting the standard electronic format tables in conjunction with its annual inventory submission for the second commitment period, in accordance with Decisions 13/CMP.1 and 15/CMP.1 and Annex I to this decision, if its registry is connected to the ITL at any time during the relevant calendar year;
- for the second commitment period, each Annex I party with a QELRC inscribed in the third column of Annex B shall submit its first standard electronic format for reporting Kyoto Protocol units for the second commitment period in conjunction with its first annual inventory submission for that commitment period, in accordance with paragraph 5 (submission of first standard electronic format in conjunction with first annual inventory submission) of Decision 2/CMP.8; and
- the contribution of assigned amount units as a share of proceeds shall be executed in the most transparent manner, taking into account environmental integrity at the international level.

The CMP also:

- decides that, where an Annex I party undertakes a corrective transaction to reflect a correction to the compilation and accounting database applied by the Compliance Committee, pursuant to Chapter V (Enforcement Branch), paragraph 5(b) (possibility of a correction to the compilation and accounting database in the event of a disagreement between an expert review team and the party not in compliance), of the annex to Decision 27/CMP.1 (procedures and mechanisms relating to compliance under the Kyoto Protocol), the information in the compilation and accounting database shall be appropriately amended to avoid double counting, following the review of

the corrective transaction in accordance with Protocol Article 8 and the resolution of any questions of implementation;

- decides to extend the code of practice for the treatment of confidential information for the review of inventories under Protocol Article 8 to the review of information on assigned amounts under Article 8; and
- requests the administrator of the ITL to develop an application to facilitate the submission of the standard electronic format referred to above and to report on progress made in the development and testing of that application in its annual report for 2015.

In the decision (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/L.27/Add.2) regarding part II of the item, implications related to the review and adjustments and other related issues, the CMP, *inter alia*, decides that:

- for the purpose of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol and pending the entry into force of the Doha Amendment, contained in Annex I to Decision 1/CMP.8, any references in this decision to Annex A, Annex B, Articles 3.1bis, 3.1ter, 3.1quater, 3.7bis, 3.7ter, 3.8, 3.8bis, 3.12bis and 3.12ter, and Articles 4.2 and 4.3, unless otherwise specified, shall be understood as referring to those articles and annexes as contained in the Doha Amendment, and that upon the entry into force of the Doha Amendment such references shall be read as references to the relevant Protocol Articles as amended;
- for the purpose of the second commitment period, Decisions 20/CMP.1 (good practice guidance and adjustments under Protocol Article 5.2) and 22/CMP.1 (guidelines for review under Protocol Article 8) shall apply *mutatis mutandis*, except where otherwise specified;

The COP also decides that for the purpose of the second commitment period, a list of reference changes shall apply to Decisions 18/CMP.1, 19/CMP.1, 20/CMP.1 and 22/CMP.1.

The CMP adopts the revisions to the “Guidelines for Review under Article 8 of the Kyoto Protocol” for the second commitment period contained in Annex I and the revisions to the “Good Practice Guidance and Adjustments under Article 5.2 (methodologies for estimating anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks) of the Kyoto Protocol” for the second commitment period set out in Annex II.

The CMP also:

- clarifies that for the purpose of the second commitment period, the adjustments under Article 5.2 of the Kyoto Protocol referred to above are not applicable to Annex I parties without QELRCs for the second commitment period;
- requests the Secretariat, in view of the revision of the “Guidelines for Review under Article 8 of the Kyoto Protocol,” to modify the relevant information technology tools, as needed, so as to support the implementation of the review process;
- recognizes that the deadline of June 2014, set out in Decision 6/CMP.9, paragraph 4, for providing the upgraded common reporting format (CRF) Reporter to parties in order to enable them to submit their inventories, was not met; and
- urges Annex I parties to submit the report to facilitate the calculation of the assigned amount referred to in Decision 2/CMP.8, paragraph 2, as soon as practically possible.

Accounting, Reporting and Review Requirements for Annex I Parties without QELRCs for the Second Commitment Period:

This item (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/L.10) was first considered on Tuesday, 1 December. Parties established a contact group, co-chaired by Anke Herold (Germany) and Guilherme do Prado Lima (Brazil), on this item. The contact group first met on Tuesday, 1 December. On Friday, 4 December, the SBSTA adopted conclusions.

Final Outcome: In its conclusions (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/L.28), the SBSTA agrees that its work under this agenda item has been completed, noting that the draft decisions contained in FCCC/SBSTA/2015/L.27/Add.1 and Add. 2 for the agenda item above (on implications of the implementation of Decisions 2/CMP.7 to 4/CMP.7 and 1/CMP.8 on the previous decisions on methodological issues to the Kyoto Protocol, including those relating to Articles 5, 7 and 8 of the Kyoto Protocol) address these matters sufficiently.

Clarification of the Text in Section G (Article 3.7ter) of the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol:

This item (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/L.11) was first considered on Tuesday, 1 December. SBSTA Chair Wojtal proposed, and parties agreed to, a contact group, co-chaired by Anke Herold (Germany) and Guilherme do Prado Lima (Brazil), on this item. The contact group first met on Tuesday, 1 December. On Friday, 4 December, the SBSTA adopted conclusions and forwarded a draft decision for consideration and adoption by the CMP.

Final Outcome: In its conclusions (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/L.29 and Add.1), the SBSTA recommends a draft decision for consideration by CMP 11. In its decision, the CMP:

- clarifies that Article 3.7ter of the Doha Amendment contained in Annex I to Decision 1/CMP.8 is applicable for the second commitment period to parties that did not have a QELRC during the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol;
- clarifies that, for the purpose of implementing Article 3.7ter, of the Doha Amendment, the reference in Article 3.7ter of the Doha Amendment to “average annual emissions for the first three years of the preceding commitment period” refers to the average of the annual emissions of a party for the years 2008, 2009 and 2010, and that parties with a QELRC inscribed in the third column of Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol contained in Annex I to Decision 1/CMP.8 shall clarify, in their reports to facilitate the calculation of the assigned amount submitted pursuant to Decision 2/CMP.8, whether they have used, in the calculation of the average annual emissions for the first three years of the preceding commitment period, the gases and sources listed in Annex A to the Kyoto Protocol, or the same GHGs, sectors and source categories as those used to calculate the assigned amount for the second commitment period; and
- decides that, for an Annex I party undergoing the process of transition to a market economy and without a QELRC in the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, the positive difference between the total emissions during the second commitment period and the assigned amount adjusted in accordance with Article 3.7ter of the Doha Amendment shall be added to the quantity of AAUs to be taken into account for the purpose of the assessment referred to in Decision 13/CMP.1, annex, paragraph 14 (basis for the compliance assessment), and that the added quantity shall be limited to

the quantity of AAUs cancelled by that party for the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, in accordance with Article 3.7*ter*, of the Doha Amendment.

LULUCF under Protocol Article 3.3 and 3.4, and under the CDM: On Tuesday, 1 December, parties agreed that SBSTA Chair Wojtal would produce a draft decision on this item. On Friday, 4 December, the SBSTA adopted conclusions.

Final Outcome: In its conclusions (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/L.20), the SBSTA takes note of the CDM Executive Board's (CDM EB) assessment of the applicability of the modalities and procedures to project activities involving revegetation, contained in the 2015 report of the CDM EB and requests the Secretariat to organize a workshop on the issue at SBSTA 44.

MARKET AND NON-MARKET MECHANISMS UNDER THE CONVENTION: On Tuesday, 1 December, parties agreed that SBSTA Chair Wojtal would produce a draft decision on the three sub-items of this agenda item. On Friday, 4 December, SBSTA Chair Wojtal reported that parties could not reach agreement on this issue for any of the sub-items: the framework for various approaches; non-market based approaches; and new market-based approaches. This item will be taken up at SBSTA 44.

REPORTS ON OTHER ACTIVITIES: On Tuesday, 1 December, parties took note of the Annual Report on the Technical Review of Information Reported under the Convention Related to Biennial Reports and NCs by Annex I Parties to the Convention (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/INF.5) and the Report on the Implementation of Domestic Action by Annex I Parties, as defined in Protocol Article 1.7, based on information reported in their NCs (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/INF.4).

Annual Report on the Technical Review of GHG Inventories from Annex I Parties to the Convention: This item (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/INF.9) was first considered on Tuesday, 1 December. SBSTA Chair Wojtal proposed, and parties agreed to, informal consultations, co-facilitated by Riitta Pipatti (Finland) and Washington Zhakata (Zimbabwe).

The informal consultations first convened on Tuesday, 1 December. On Friday, 4 December, the SBSTA adopted the draft conclusions and forwarded a draft decision to the COP. On Thursday, 10 December, the COP adopted the decision, with an amendment read out by SBSTA Chair Wojtal.

Final Outcome: In its conclusions (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/L.21 and Add.1), the SBSTA recommends a draft decision for consideration by COP 21. In its decision, the COP, *inter alia*:

- requests the Secretariat to organize, for Annex I parties that did not undergo a review of their annual GHG inventory in 2015, the review of their 2015 GHG inventory submissions under the Convention in conjunction with the review of their 2016 GHG inventory submission, ensuring that the reviews are organized in accordance with Decision 13/CP.20 (guidelines for the technical review of information reported under the Convention related to GHG inventories, biennial reports and NCs by Annex I parties);
- decides that the expert review teams shall review identical information only once and shall produce a separate, complete review report for each party for each year;
- decides that the exceptional measures taken for the review of the 2015 GHG inventory submissions referred to above for the years 2015 and 2016 shall not be precedent-setting for future work;
- requests the Secretariat to make every effort to facilitate future reviews in accordance with Decision 13/CP.20 and any subsequent relevant decisions, without exception; and
- requests the Secretariat to continue to make improvements to the Common Reporting Format Reporter functionality, prioritizing the resolution of outstanding issues related to transparency and accuracy.

Annual Report on the Technical Review of GHG

Inventories and Other Information Reported by Annex I Parties, as Defined in Protocol Article 1.7: On Tuesday, 1 December, the SBSTA considered the report (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/INF.10/Rev.1) and agreed to informal consultations, co-facilitated by Riitta Pipatti (Finland) and Washington Zhakata (Zimbabwe). On Friday, 4 December, the SBSTA adopted conclusions and forwarded a draft decision to the CMP.

Final Outcome: In its decision (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/L.30 and Add.1), the CMP requests the Secretariat: to organize a review of the 2015 and 2016 GHG inventory submissions from Annex I parties; requests the Secretariat to organize a review of the reports to facilitate the calculation of the assigned amount for the second commitment period, striving to complete each review no later than one year after the submission date of the report; and to continue to make improvements to the CRF reporter functionality, prioritizing the resolution of outstanding issues related to transparency and accuracy. The CMP invites Annex I parties that have not yet submitted their 2015 GHG inventories and supplementary information to do so as soon as possible.

CLOSURE OF THE SESSION: On Friday, 4 December, SBSTA Rapporteur Stasile Znutiene (Lithuania) presented, and the SBSTA adopted, its report (FCCC/SBSTA/2015/L.15). Thanking everyone for their efforts during this intensive and brief SBSTA session, SBSTA Chair Wojtal gavelled the meeting to a close at 10:26 pm.

For a summary of statements made during the closing plenary of the SBSTA, see: <http://www.iisd.ca/vol12/enb12657e.html>

A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE PARIS CLIMATE CHANGE CONFERENCE

In Paris, we have seen many revolutions.

The most beautiful, most peaceful revolution has been achieved, a climate revolution.

—François Hollande, President of France

The 2015 Paris Climate Change Conference was perhaps destined to succeed. After a bruising failure in Copenhagen in 2009 to produce a legally-binding agreement, many felt that Paris could not afford to fail. Yet there was also concern that the outcome would be watered-down or meaningless. In the end, the outcome of UNFCCC COP 21 exceeded expectations, producing an agreement that while perhaps not a revolution, is an important step in the evolution of climate governance and a reaffirmation of environmental multilateralism.

At COP 21, 195 countries gathered to complete the task they had set for themselves in Durban, in 2011, to complete a “protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all parties.” This brief analysis explores the extent to which parties fulfilled this mandate, in terms of universal participation, but also in terms of the Paris Agreement’s ability to catalyze ambitious action by parties and action by a wide range of actors, which many cited as indispensable to address the climate crisis.

EVOLUTION AND REVOLUTION

The Paris Agreement can be characterized as an evolution in climate governance, and a revolution in the UNFCCC COP process. At the center of the Paris Agreement are five-year cycles: each nationally determined contribution (NDC) cycle is to be more ambitious than the last and a global “stocktake” will inform collective efforts on mitigation, adaptation and support, and occur midway through the contribution cycle, every five years after 2023.

Through these cycles, parties are to “ratchet up” efforts to keep global temperature rise “well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.” To track progress, parties are bound to a transparency framework, which represents the legally-binding portion of the agreement, alongside an obligation to undertake and communicate their NDCs.

The Paris Agreement also anchors, strengthens and creates institutions and mechanisms, particularly for means of implementation. The decision supporting the Agreement identifies modalities to be created or established for several new mechanisms, such as the new Paris Committee for Capacity-building and the mitigation and sustainable development mechanism. The decision also requests SBSTA to develop new modalities to account for public climate finance.

As many pointed out during the COP closing plenary, the Paris Agreement, as a compromise, “is good, but not perfect.” The communication of NDCs is legally-binding, but their content and targets are not. The Agreement includes reference to loss and damage, and the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts, as a distinct article from adaptation. This separation was a “win” for many small island developing states (SIDS), yet the explicit exclusion of liability and compensation in the decision was a disappointment to many, as the costs associated with loss and damage cannot be covered by risk insurance alone.

In the immediate term, developed countries are not bound by the Agreement to increase their mitigation or support efforts beyond existing commitments. As many lamented, the US\$100 billion finance mobilization goal, set to be reached by developed countries in 2020, is “essentially extended in the decision through 2025,” after which time parties will have to negotiate a new collective goal, which some interpreted as including an expectation that some developing countries should participate in the mobilization.

The inclusion of human rights in the preamble of the agreement was celebrated by many, including Venezuela and Bolivia. This makes the Paris Agreement the first multilateral environmental agreement to recognize human rights. The preamble also includes concepts not traditionally considered

“climate issues,” such as intergenerational equity, climate justice and the right to health. Yet the Agreement does not operationalize these rights throughout, which disappointed, in particular, gender advocates who pointed out that the final text omits references to gender responsiveness that were present in a number of sections in earlier drafts.

In terms of the broader development of global climate governance, the Agreement reflects an evolution of the “bottom-up” approach. The Paris Agreement can be described as a hybrid between a top-down, rules-based system and a bottom-up system of pledge and review. The NDCs “codify” the bottom-up approach that emerged from Copenhagen. Yet, many pointed to “vestiges” of a Kyoto Protocol-type, top-down system, in the form of the common rules for transparency and the compliance mechanism, although some noted that the compliance mechanism is “merely” facilitative in nature as it lacks an enforcement branch. In short, the procedural aspects of the Paris Agreement are legally-binding. Nevertheless, most substantive elements, including the specific goals of the NDCs that will be housed in a public registry maintained by the Secretariat, are not legally-binding.

The Agreement also represents an evolution in how parties address differentiation. The Agreement builds on the compromise in Lima, which drew from a 2014 US-China joint announcement on climate change, that adds the element of “in light of different national circumstances” to the end of the familiar CBDR and respective capabilities. It makes no explicit mention of the annexes of the Convention, the historic harbingers of differentiation, but only developed and developing countries, with subtle re-alignments in various sections. The NDCs represent, as US Secretary of State John Kerry called them, a “monument to differentiation”: each country determines its “fair contribution,” according to its respective capabilities and in light of its “different national circumstances.”

The transparency framework is, according to one observer “subtly trifurcated,” asking all to take legally-binding reporting requirements, with recognition of developing countries’ need for support, and a further recognition of the special capacity-building needs of SIDS and least developed countries. As insisted by many developing countries, the provision of support is more strictly bifurcated, as developed countries “shall provide financial resources,” while other countries are encouraged to “provide such support voluntarily.”

Achieving such an evolution in global governance requires nothing short of a procedural revolution. This was the major innovation of the French Presidency. Under the guidance of COP 21 President Laurent Fabius, COP 21 managed to uphold a highly-transparent and inclusive process for parties, which catered to the needs of individual states, while challenging parties to craft an agreement that was more substantive than many thought possible.

The French borrowed the *indaba* model from the Durban COP, and learned from Copenhagen that Heads of State and Government provide political guidance and should not negotiate text. In a process that started before the 2014 Lima COP, the French Presidency worked in partnership with the Peruvian Presidency, to convene several ministerial meetings “to get the ministers well-acquainted.”

On the margins of the meetings organized by the French Presidency, a group of approximately 15 “like-minded” ministers from different regions and groups was brought together by the Marshall Islands. These informal meetings formed the basis of what became known as the “High-Ambition Coalition.” This loose alliance, eventually representing up to 100 countries, rallied around a list of “ambitious asks,” such as a clear long-term goal and five-year review cycles, creating a show of solidarity that some said effectively marginalized those not in the group. Many noted that these ambitious asks eventually found their way into the Agreement.

Another procedural revolution by the Presidency was to keep the full responsibility for the text’s development on the parties’ shoulders. Ministers had to engage with the lengthy, heavily bracketed text parties had developed in the ADP contact group, and subsequent iterations released during the second week faithfully reflected parties’ consultations. By not dropping a surprise text late in the proceedings, the French Presidency ensured that the text was party-owned and parties understood they had the collective responsibility for its success or failure. Many parties had quietly speculated throughout the meeting that the Presidency had its own text, but regardless of its existence, one was never unveiled. This galvanized ministers to do the heavy lifting of sorting through options and brackets themselves.

The transparency of the process, as one delegate put it, drove the ambition of what parties could achieve; this time, there was no “easy out of rejecting the President’s text.” Above all, the French Presidency said it would, and did, listen. That every party praised the Presidency is not only a tribute to the French Presidency, but a recognition that they all believed their positions were heard.

A PARTICIPATORY OR AN AMBITIOUS EVOLUTION?

Universal participation can come at the expense of ambition. Oftentimes, bringing all on board can result in a watering down of the overall level of ambition. At first glance, this appears to be the case, leading some observers to reject the deal as “business as usual.” Contributions that are nationally-determined, however, became a “necessity” to achieve universal participation because no single set of rules or targets could accommodate the vastly different circumstances of 195 states. The current set of 189 intended NDCs, representing 95% of global emissions—which many lauded as a remarkable level of participation—put collective efforts only on a path to an approximately 3°C temperature increase. For some, much of the success of the Paris Agreement will hinge on its ability to encourage parties to ratchet up their contributions to a sufficient level of ambition to safeguard the planet.

One way to increase ambition that many sought when they arrived in Paris was a legally-binding agreement. Yet specifying that an agreement is legally binding does not guarantee implementation and may reduce both ambition and participation. As Minister Vivian Balakrishnan of Singapore observed, “the Kyoto Protocol had the best of intentions,” yet was modest in its aims. It also lacked participation by key countries. While the NDCs represent significant participation, their non-legally binding character raised concerns over their low collective ambition.

Others viewed goal-setting as a way to increase the ambition of the agreement. The Agreement’s references to pursuing efforts to limit global average temperature rise to 1.5°C, coupled with references to peaking emissions as soon as possible, and achieving a balance between anthropogenic emissions and removals by sinks, a phrase many believe refers to net-zero emissions, are significantly more ambitious than many expected before COP 21. These new goals have implications for governments. As one delegate observed, the intended NDCs submitted before COP 21 need to be re-evaluated in light of the goals articulated in the Paris Agreement. Some observers hoped this would inspire at least some countries to revise their intended NDCs into more ambitious NDCs.

The transparency framework and the global stocktake were described by some as the Agreement’s “mechanisms for ambition.” The dual obligation to report and take stock of mitigation, adaptation and support every five years creates a collective assessment of achievements and needed efforts. Reviewing the extent of support provided “places a microscope” on developed countries to provide adequate support to meet developing countries’ mitigation and adaptation ambitions. Many hoped this would also provide assurances to help some countries remove the conditionalities from the mitigation section of their INDCs.

For many developing countries, post-2020 ambition relies on pre-2020 ambition. The Paris Outcome includes the Durban Platform’s workstream 2, tasked to address the pre-2020 mitigation gap, in a number of ways. These include a strengthened technical examination process (TEP) on mitigation that strives to involve more developing country experts and other actors, and formalizes the role of the technology and financial mechanisms of the Convention in the process. Also a new TEP is established on adaptation, welcomed by many developing countries where adaptation is as important as mitigation. Some viewed these institutional links as potentially moving the TEPs beyond “talk shops” and into “solutions spaces” where technologies and practices for both mitigation and adaptation become globally disseminated.

In addition, a facilitative dialogue at COP 22 will assess progress in pre-2020 implementation, and a high-level event at each COP from 2016-2020 will build on the current and previous COP Presidencies’ Lima-Paris Action Agenda (LPAA) initiative. Whether these processes together can raise pre-2020 ambition will only be determined in the coming years. For many, the answer to unlocking pre-2020 ambition lies in the Convention’s ability to engage transnational and subnational actors.

CREATING A “CLIMATE REVOLUTION FOR ALL”

As noted by COP 21 President Fabius, the success of the Paris conference would not only depend on a universal intergovernmental agreement. Action by state and non-state actors will ultimately determine whether Paris will go down in history as “the beginning of the end of the fossil fuel era,” as one country announced. The Paris Agreement could deliver in this area in three ways: through the agreement; by showcasing and mobilizing action by all actors; and by expanding the UNFCCC’s role in the fast-changing global implementation space.



At the Leaders Event on 30 November, numerous Heads of State and Government called for Paris to send strong long-term signals. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called on Paris to send a clear message to markets that transition to a low-carbon, climate resilient global economy is “inevitable, beneficial and already under way.” Also, some countries called for the Agreement to provide assurances that climate finance would be available and scaled up post-2020, in particular for the most vulnerable.

The Paris Agreement indeed sends strong signals for climate action by all. The ambitious goals of the Agreement, five-year review cycles, and the transparency framework were welcomed by many as much-needed signals to markets to enable investments to be redirected to low-carbon and climate-resilient development. Some also pointed out that the universal nature of the agreement and near-universal coverage of intended NDCs alone send signals that opportunities for investments, innovation and technology development are opening up around the world. Article 6 on cooperative approaches and mechanisms was also praised for “having something for everyone” and giving carbon markets a much-needed, renewed basis for support, complete with demand for credits driven by countries’ progressively ambitious NDCs.

Another important goal set for COP 21 was to accelerate climate action by both state and non-state actors. In forming the LPAA in late 2014, the Peruvian and French COP Presidencies, together with the UN Secretary-General and the UNFCCC Secretariat, built on the momentum achieved by the September 2014 UN Climate Summit to bring non-state actors “inside the COP walls,” as described by COP 20 President Manuel Pulgar-Vidal.

Despite some concern that COP 21 would be a one-off *tour de force* of state and non-state actor commitments, many initiatives were launched or strengthened in Paris that will build momentum in the longer term. These include India’s International Solar Alliance involving more than 120 countries and the private investor-led US\$2 billion Breakthrough Energy Coalition. Also, thousands of pledges of action and hundreds of billions of dollars in commitments to emission reductions and resilience measures were articulated through and alongside the LPAA, ranging from electrification in Africa to emission cuts in forest countries and climate risk insurance in SIDS.

Finally, many felt the Durban Platform, in particular its pre-2020 workstream, offered the UNFCCC a chance to reposition itself as the hub for global climate action. By Paris, this opportunity was seized at least three ways: the LPAA’s Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action (NAZCA) portal and the public registry for NDCs, both maintained by the UNFCCC Secretariat, will serve as important focal points for aggregated information on climate plans, actions and support. The strengthened mitigation TEP, new adaptation TEP, and the LPAA-based high-level events, too, are likely to spur accelerated engagement with non-state actors within the UNFCCC space. Also, while the Paris outcome decision simply includes an invitation to non-party stakeholders to scale up their efforts and support actions, UNFCCC COPs have already managed to establish themselves

firmly as the main annual “cross-fertilization space” for civil society, scientists, businesses and industry from all around the world to rally public attention, network and share best practices.

“VIVE L’UN, VIVE LA PLANETE, VIVE LA FRANCE”

—François Hollande, President of France

Getting to an agreement was an arduous, lengthy task, and yet, as many recalled during the closing plenary “the work starts tomorrow.” Work to catalyze climate action before 2020 is pressing, and immediately lying ahead is the substantial technical and methodological work in order to prepare the many modalities to support the Paris Agreement for when it enters into force. It was not lost for many that the entry into force is not a foregone conclusion, given that 55 countries representing at least 55% of global emissions are required to ratify. Before 2020, many eyes will be on the major emitters whose ratification is necessary for the Paris Agreement to “come into effect and be implemented by 2020,” thereby completing the final leg of the Durban mandate.

During the COP 21 closing plenary, many lauded the Paris Agreement as an ambitious, fair and universal climate agreement, and many more celebrated the return to successful multilateral efforts to address climate change. Some observers viewed Paris as the culmination of a vital year for the UN development agenda, with the adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, including its Sustainable Development Goals, and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on financing for development, which together with the Paris Agreement on climate change can be said to provide a strong basis for multilateralism for the coming decade.

After years of doubt and indecision, the Paris Agreement represents renewed faith that multilateralism can address pressing challenges facing the international community. With its adoption on Saturday, 12 December 2015, most participants agreed with UNFCCC Executive Secretary Christiana Figueres that “we must, we can and we did.”

UPCOMING MEETINGS

Sixth Session of the IRENA Assembly: The sixth session of the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) Assembly will convene in January 2016. The event will consider, among other things, the Agency’s work programme for 2016/2017 and review its medium-term strategy. **dates:** 16-17 January 2016 **location:** Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates **contact:** IRENA Secretariat **phone:** +971-2-417-9000 **email:** info@irena.org **www:** <http://www.irena.org/>

Abu Dhabi Sustainability Week: This global forum brings together leaders, policy makers and investors to address renewable energy and sustainable development. As part of the meeting the World Future Energy Summit, the International Water Summit and an EcoWASTE Exhibition will take place, among other events. **dates:** 16-23 January 2016 **location:** Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates **contact:** ADSW Secretariat **phone:** +971-2-653-3333 **fax:** +971-2-653-6002 **www:** <http://abudhabisustainabilityweek.com/>

Dialogue on Climate Services and Food Security: This event will be hosted by the World Food Programme (WFP) with key research, practitioner and user stakeholders to discuss the priorities for climate services in the food security and agriculture

sectors. **dates:** 18-19 January 2016 **location:** Rome, Italy **contact:** WFP **phone:** +39-06-65131 **fax:** +39-06-6590632 **email:** fiona.guy@wfp.org **www:** <https://www.wfp.org/climate-change/innovations/climate-services>

Asia-Pacific Forestry Week 2016: The Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO) is hosting this event under the theme "Growing Our Future!" One of the five thematic streams of the event is "Tackling Climate Change: Challenges and Opportunities." The week is being organized in partnership with, among others, the International Tropical Timber Organization, Secretariat of the Pacific Community and Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) of the CIGAR Consortium. **dates:** 22-26 February 2016 **location:** Pampanga, Philippines **contact:** FAO **phone:** +39-06-57051 **email:** AP-Forestry-Week@fao.org **www:** www.fao.org/about/meetings/asia-pacific-forestry-week/en

37th Meeting of the Open-Ended Working Group of the Montreal Protocol: OEWG 37 will meet in April 2016. **dates:** 4-8 April 2016 **location:** Geneva, Switzerland **contact:** Ozone Secretariat **phone:** +254-20-762-3851 **fax:** +254-20-762-0335 **email:** ozoneinfo@unep.org **www:** <http://ozone.unep.org/en/meetings>

IPCC-43: The 43rd session of the IPCC will be held in Nairobi, Kenya. **dates:** 11-13 April 2015 **location:** Nairobi, Kenya **contact:** IPCC Secretariat **phone:** +41-22-730-8208/54/84 **fax:** +41-22-730-8025/13 **email:** IPCC-Sec@wmo.int **www:** <http://www.ipcc.ch>

UNGA High-level Thematic Debate: Implementing Commitments on Sustainable Development, Climate Change and Financing: The President of the UN General Assembly (UNGA), Mogens Lykketoft, will convene a high-level thematic debate to support coherent implementation of commitments relating to sustainable development, climate change and financing. The event aims to mobilize and catalyze multilateral, collective, multi-stakeholder and individual actions and commitments in these areas, and to support early progress on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This event is one of three high-level events the President will convene during UNGA 70. **dates:** 11-12 April 2016 **location:** UN Headquarters, New York **contact:** Office of the President of the UNGA **email:** dowlatzshahi@un.org **www:** <http://www.un.org/en/ga/revitalization/>

High-Level Signature Ceremony for the Paris Agreement: The UN Secretary-General, as Depositary of the Agreement, is expected to host a signing ceremony at the UN on the day the Agreement is opened for signatures. **date:** 22 April 2016 **location:** UN Headquarters, New York **contact:** Executive Office of the UN Secretary-General **www:** <http://www.un.org/sg/>

Global Change and Forest Health: Climate Change, Biological Invasions, Air Pollution, Forest Pathology, Forest Entomology and Their Interactions (IUFRO All-Division 7 Conference): The International Union of Forest Research Organizations (IUFRO) will hold its Forest Health Division conference on how climate change is affecting forests, whether forests will be able to adapt to these threats and to what extent forests can mitigate global change effects. **dates:** 25-29 April 2016 **location:** Istanbul, Turkey **contact:** IUFRO

phone: +43-1-877-01-51-0 **fax:** +43-1-877-01-51-50 **email:** eckehard.brockerhoff@scionresearch.com **www:** <http://www.foresthealth2016.com/>

Living Planet Symposium: The European Space Agency (ESA) is organizing this event to, *inter alia*: present the progress and plans for the implementation of the ESA Earth Observation (EO) strategy and the relevance of ESA's EO Programme to societal challenges, science and economy; provide an international forum for scientists, researchers and users to present and share state of the art results based on ESA's Earth Observation and third-party mission data; review the development of Earth Observation applications; and report on ESA's Exploitation Programmes, including the Climate Change Initiative. **dates:** 9-13 May 2016 **location:** Prague, Czech Republic **contact:** ESA Living Planet Symposium Secretariat **phone:** +39-06-94180912 **fax:** +39-06-94180902 **email:** esa.conference.bureau@esa.int **www:** <http://lps16.esa.int/>

44th Sessions of the UNFCCC Subsidiary Bodies: The 44th sessions of the subsidiary bodies to the UNFCCC are expected to take place in May 2016. **dates:** 16-26 May 2016 **location:** Bonn, Germany **contact:** UNFCCC Secretariat **phone:** +49-228-815-1000 **fax:** +49-228-815-1999 **email:** secretariat@unfccc.int **www:** <http://unfccc.int>

World Humanitarian Summit: The first World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) is an initiative of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and is managed by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). It will bring together governments, humanitarian organizations, people affected by humanitarian crises and new partners, such as the private sector, to propose solutions to pressing challenges like climate change and set an agenda to keep humanitarian action fit for the future. **dates:** 23-24 May 2016 **location:** Istanbul, Turkey **contact:** WHS Secretariat **email:** info@whsummit.org **www:** <https://www.worldhumanitariansummit.org/>

Fourth Dialogue on Article 6 of the Convention: Organized by Action for Climate Empowerment (ACE), the two-day Fourth Dialogue on Article 6 of the UNFCCC will take place in conjunction with SBI 44 and will focus on public participation, public awareness, public access to information and international cooperation on these matters. **dates:** May 2016 **location:** Bonn, Germany **contact:** ACE/UNFCCC Secretariat **phone:** +49-228-815-1000 **fax:** +49-228-815-1999 **email:** secretariat@unfccc.int **www:** www.unfccc.int/ace

50th Meeting of the GEF Council: The GEF Council meets twice a year to approve new projects with global environmental benefits in the GEF's focal areas of biodiversity, climate change mitigation, chemicals and waste, international waters, land degradation, and sustainable forest management; and in the GEF's integrated approach programs on sustainable cities, taking deforestation out of commodity chains, and sustainability and resilience for food security in Sub-Saharan Africa. On 9 June the Council will convene as the 20th meeting of the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) and Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF), also at the same location. **dates:** 6-9 June 2016 **location:** Washington, DC, US **contact:** GEF Secretariat **phone:** +1-202-473-0508 **fax:** +1-202-522-3240 **email:** secretariat@thegef.org **www:** http://www.thegef.org/gef/council_meetings



Asia Clean Energy Forum: The Asia Clean Energy Forum (ACEF), organized since 2006, seeks to provide a space for sharing best practices in policy, technology and finance to support climate and energy security in the region. The event comprises plenary sessions, keynote presentations, panel discussions and workshops on specific topics. **dates:** 15-19 June 2016 **location:** Manila, Philippines **contact:** ADB **phone:** +63-2-632-4444 **fax:** +63-2-636-2444 **email:** cleanenergy@adb.org **www:** <http://www.asiacleanenergyforum.org/>

Fifth Asia-Pacific Climate Change Adaptation Forum 2016: The Asia-Pacific Adaptation Network (APAN) is organizing this event with the UN Development Programme, Asian Development Bank, Global Water Partnership, UN Environment Programme and other partners under the theme "Mainstreaming Adaptation into Development," with a focus on topics such as food security and adaptation financing. **date:** October 2016 **location:** Sri Lanka **contact:** APAN **e-mail:** info@asiapacificadapt.net **www:** www.asiapacificadapt.net

UN-HABITAT III: The Third UN Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development (Habitat III) aims to secure renewed political commitment for sustainable urban development, assess progress and accomplishments to date, address poverty, and identify and address new and emerging challenges. The conference is expected to result in an action-oriented outcome document and the establishment of the New Urban Agenda. **dates:** 17-20 October 2016 **location:** Quito, Ecuador **contact:** UN-Habitat **phone:** +1-917-367-4355 **email:** Habitat3Secretariat@un.org **www:** <https://www.habitat3.org/>

UNFCCC COP 22: The 22nd session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 22) to the UNFCCC is expected to take place in Morocco. **dates:** 7-18 November 2016 **location:** Marrakesh, Morocco **contact:** UNFCCC Secretariat **phone:** +49-228 815-1000 **fax:** +49-228-815-1999 **email:** secretariat@unfccc.int **www:** http://unfccc.int/meetings/unfccc_calendar/items/2655.php?year=2016

For additional meetings, see <http://climate-1.iisd.org/>

GLOSSARY

AAUs	Assigned amount units
ADP	<i>Ad Hoc</i> Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action
AILAC	Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean
AOSIS	Alliance of Small of Island States
APA	<i>Ad Hoc</i> Working Group on the Paris Agreement
BURs	Biennial update reports
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CBDR	Common but differentiated responsibilities
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
CDM EB	Clean Development Mechanism Executive Board
CERs	Certified emission reductions
CGE	Consultative Group of Experts
CMA	Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Agreement

CMP	Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol
COP	Conference of the Parties
CRF	Common reporting format
CTCN	Climate Technology Centre and Network
ERUs	Emission reduction units
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GHG	Greenhouse gas
IAR	International assessment and review
ICA	International consultation and analysis
INDCs	Intended nationally determined contributions
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
ITL	International Transaction Log
JI	Joint Implementation
JISC	Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee
LDCs	Least developed countries
LDCF	LDCs Fund
LEG	LDCs Expert Group
LMDCs	Like-Minded Developing Countries
LULUCF	Land use, land-use change and forestry
MOI	Means of implementation
MRV	Measurement, reporting and verification
NAPs	National adaptation plans
NCs	National communications
NDC	Nationally determined contribution
NWP	Nairobi work programme
REDD+	Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, conservation of existing forest carbon stocks, sustainable forest management and enhancement of forest carbon stocks
SB	Subsidiary Body
SBI	Subsidiary Body for Implementation
SBSTA	Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice
SCF	Standing Committee on Finance
SIDS	Small island developing states
TEC	Technology Executive Committee
TEP	Technical examination process
TNAs	Technology needs assessments
UNFCCC	UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
WIM	Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts

2. TWN

Key issues at COP 21 on the Paris Agreement

30 Nov, Paris (Meena Raman) - The Paris agreement is expected to be the most important outcome of the 21st meeting of the Conference of Parties (COP 21) to the UNFCCC, to be held from November 30 to December 11.

The negotiations taking place under the Ad hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) has two workstreams – one to deliver the Paris Agreement, which is to come into effect post-2020 under workstream 1 and the other, a decision on workstream 2 which deals with pre-2020 actions.

Under the Paris Agreement, negotiations will focus on a 31 pages document which comprises the draft agreement and a 19 page accompanying decision.

At the last session of the ADP in Bonn, Germany, in October, developing countries led by the G77 and China, rejected a non-paper produced by the ADP Co-chairs for the negotiations, as the document was found to be “unacceptable, unbalanced and lop-sided”. This led to many proposals from developing countries for insertion into the document in order to rebalance the texts. Developed countries also submitted proposals to the document, which led to the current document for Parties to begin negotiations in Paris.

The work of the ADP will commence on Sunday, 29 November (before COP 21 officially opens) and is expected to conclude its work on Saturday, 5 December, with the production of a revised draft agreement and accompanying decision for transmission to the COP for its eventual adoption.

In effect, negotiators have less than 5 days to arrive at an agreement under the ADP in the first week of the Paris talks. Issues that are not able to be resolved by then are expected to be

considered by Ministers in the second week, which begins on Monday, 7 December.

In the current text for negotiations, there are proposals on several key issues that reflect clear divergences between developed and developing countries. Whether resolution will be found to ensure an agreement, which is equitable and fair remains to be seen.

There is no expectation for an ambitious outcome that would ensure that Parties are on track to limit temperature rise to less than 2°C from pre-industrial levels, let alone 1.5°C.

The present temperature has now exceeded by 0.8 degrees. Global emissions are increasing by about 50 billion tonnes a year. The remaining “space” in the atmosphere to absorb more emissions (before the 2 degree limit is reached) will be exhausted in 20-25 years or so.

However, judging from what developed countries in particular have conveyed through their intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs) on their emission reduction targets for the post-2020 timeframe, we are far away from limiting temperature rise to less than 2 degree C.

In fact, a recent review by civil society organisations of the INDCs of Parties shows that developing countries are doing their fair share, while developed countries are far away from meeting their targets from a historical and equity perspective. (See <http://www.twn.my/title2/climate/info.service/2015/cc151106.htm>).

The NGOs involved in the study include ActionAid International, Asian Peoples Movement on Debt and Development, Center for International Environmental Law, Christian Aid, CIDSE, EcoEquity, Friends of the Earth International, International Trade Union

Confederation, LDC Watch International, Oxfam, Pan African Climate Justice Alliance, Third World Network, What Next Forum, and WWF

According to the review, a country's fair share depends on two factors: its historical responsibility, (i.e. its contribution to climate change in terms of cumulative emissions through the years), and capacity to take climate action, using national income over and above what is needed to provide basic living standards as the principal indicator.

The key findings of the study include:

- Together, the commitments captured in INDCs will not keep temperatures below 2°C, much less 1.5°C, above pre-industrial levels. Even if all countries meet their INDC commitments, the world is likely to warm by a devastating 3°C or more, with a significant likelihood of tipping the global climate system into catastrophic runaway warming.
- The current INDCs represent substantially less than half of the reduction in emissions required by 2030.
- The ambition of all major developed countries falls well short of their fair shares, which include not only domestic action but also international finance. Those with the starkest gap between their climate ambition and their fair shares include:
 - Russia: INDC represents zero contribution towards its fair share;
 - Japan: INDC represents about one tenth of its fair share;
 - United States: INDC represents about a fifth of its fair share;
 - European Union: INDC represents just over a fifth of its fair share.
- The majority of developing countries have made mitigation pledges that exceed or broadly meet their fair share, but they also have mitigation potential that exceeds their pledges and fair share.
- Most developed countries have fair shares that are already too large to fulfill exclusively within their borders. The remainder of their fair shares must therefore be accomplished by enabling an equivalent amount of emissions reduction in developing countries

through financing and other support. This accounts for almost half of the reductions that need to take place globally, which indicates the need for a vast expansion of international finance, technology and capacity-building support.

Hence, the challenge in the Paris deal is whether developed countries will agree to not only taking the lead in cutting their emissions adequately and according to the "fair shares", but also in providing the means to developing countries to undertake sufficient climate actions.

The test in Paris will be whether the agreement concluded will still be able to save the planet and the poor of the world in a timely fashion, with the right kind of 'enablers' for more ambition in the coming years, which is both equitable and fair.

This will indeed be a huge challenge, given the many complex and divergent positions that remain to be solved in so short a time.

What are the key issues that need to be resolved?

1. Differentiation

A key issue throughout the Paris agreement is whether and how the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC) will be operationalised in all the elements of the agreement.

The application of this principle in all the elements of mitigation, adaptation, the means of implementation and the transparency framework is expected to be deeply contentious.

Developed countries have been insisting that the agreement must reflect the "evolving economic and emission trends" of countries in the post-2020 timeframe, while developing countries continue to argue that given the historical emissions of developed countries, developed countries continue to bear the responsibility in taking the lead in emission reductions and in helping developing countries with the provision of finance, technology transfer and capacity-building as provided for under the UNFCCC.

It must be recalled that in Lima, at the last COP, Parties underscored their commitment to reaching an ambitious agreement in 2015 that reflects the principle of CBDR-RC, in light of different national circumstances.

2. Will the agreement be mitigation-centric?

Another underlying and very fundamental issue is whether the purpose of the Paris agreement will be to enhance the implementation of the Convention provisions in all the elements (mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology transfer, capacity building and transparency) as demanded by developing countries, or if it will be mainly a mitigation-centric agreement as preferred by developed countries.

The ‘battle’ over the nature of the agreement is located in Article 2 bis of the current negotiating text under the heading of ‘general’.

The proposal in Article 2 bis is from the Like-minded developing countries (LMDC) for all Parties to regularly prepare, communicate and implement their INDCs/NDCs towards achieving the purpose of the agreement/objective of the Convention. It also states further that the INDCs will represent a progression in light of Parties’ differentiated responsibilities and commitments under the Convention. It also includes a provision that successive INDCs will be communicated by Parties before the expiry of the previous contributions. (Parties have communicated either a 5 or 10 year contribution).

The other option in relation to Article 2 bis proposal is from developed countries not to have a text in this regard.

The proposal by the developing countries is to ensure that the contributions of Parties are viewed in a comprehensive manner, reflecting the respective obligations they have under the provisions of the Convention, and not to confine the contributions only to mitigation as desired by the developed countries.

Since the Warsaw COP in 2013, where the notion of INDCs was born, developed and developing countries have expressed a difference of views on what the INDCs should contain. Attempts by developed countries to define INDCs as only mitigation contributions were thwarted in Lima last year. For a large number of developing countries, the INDCs of developed countries are also supposed to reflect the contributions they will make on finance and technology transfer in addition to what they will do on mitigation as set out in the Convention and for developing countries, their contribution could be mitigation and adaptation, coupled with

an indication of their financial, technology and capacity building needs.

Hence, the Article 2 bis proposal is to provide for this comprehensive notion, and for progression to be shown on all the elements and not just limit this to only mitigation.

The ‘battle’ is also evident in how the mitigation contribution is termed as developed countries in Article 3 (on mitigation) prefer the notion of a ‘nationally determined mitigation contribution’ (NDMC), while developing countries want to use the term ‘nationally determined mitigation component of the contribution’ (NDMCC).

3. Will the Paris agreement be legally binding?

A major question is whether the Paris agreement will be legally binding, like for example the Kyoto Protocol.

While the Paris agreement can be legally binding, what commitments in respect of the various elements are actually legally binding depends on the precise language and their content in the final outcome. This has to be viewed in the context of each element. The test is whether the elements amount to actual commitments for Parties or are mere best endeavour clauses. Hence, the devil is in the detail.

4. Global goal

The ‘collective long-term global goal’ which is currently mitigation centric is reflected in the mitigation section of the agreement under Article 3. However, there is also a proposal under Article 2, under the heading of ‘purpose’ of the agreement.

Under the ‘purpose’, there are two options – one reflecting the option of having no text and the other which has the option of holding the increase in the global average temperature of below 2 degrees C, or below 1.5 degree C; as well as to pursue a transformation towards sustainable development, to foster societies that are resilient to climate change and economies that are low in greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) and to ensure food production and distribution is not threatened as well as to increase the ability of Parties to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and to effectively respond to the impacts of the implementation of response measures and loss and damage.

In Cancun in 2010, Parties already recognised the need for deep cuts in emissions so as to hold the increase in global average temperature below 2 °C above pre-industrial

level. Whether the Paris agreement will reflect the 1.5 degree C limit remains to be seen.

Under Article 3 on the ‘collective long-term goal’ in relation to mitigation, there are 3 options. The first option refers to notions of low carbon/emission transformation, climate or carbon neutrality, peaking of emissions by a certain time frame, reduction in net emissions of a certain percentage below 2010 levels by 2050; or reductions according to the distribution of a global carbon budget based on climate justice as well as net zero emissions over the course of the century.

The 2nd option is for Parties aiming to reach long-term global low-emission transformation, in the context of sustainable development and equitable access to atmospheric space.

The 3rd option has a number of sub-options including a reference to the long-term temperature goal referred to in Article 2; a rapid reductions of emissions by certain percentages; and decarbonisation of the global economy over the course of this century (the latter is a proposal from the United States).

With so many sub-options, negotiating a mitigation goal has proved to be difficult in the past since the Bali Action Plan in 2007, without the link to other goals on adaptation, finance and technology transfer.

Developing countries have been pushing for goals or a long-term vision on the other elements as well.

In the adaptation section under Article 4, the first para relates to the issue of a goal/or long-term vision on adaptation, which is viewed by many developing countries as an important idea to ensure parity between a long-term perspective in relation to mitigation and adaptation. The G77 and China has called for a global goal or long-term vision which inter-alia, covers an assessment of the adequacy of support from developed countries to developing countries; that recognises the adaptation efforts of developing countries and the recognition of increased adaptation needs and associated costs in light of mitigation efforts. There is a proposal for no text in this regard from developed countries.

As regards finance, the G77 and China has made a proposal for the provision and mobilisation of financial resources from developed countries to be scaled up from a floor of US100 billion per year from 2020, including a clear burden-sharing formula among them, with a clear road map with individual annual targets in the post-2020 period. This proposal does not indicate a clear number for the financial target post-2020 as developed countries are opposed to having any numerical figure. Whether developed countries will accept a scaling up of resources from the US100 billion per year from 2020 remains to be seen.

In relation to technology development and transfer, the LMDC has called for the establishment of a global goal on the transfer of technologies by developed countries’ and know-how as well as in providing financial resources for collaborative research and development of environmentally sound technologies and enhancing accesses of developing countries to such technologies that match technology needs of developing countries. The developed countries have resisted this and have called for no text in this regard.

5. Mitigation (Article 3)

a) Efforts to be undertaken

On the mitigation element, in terms of the efforts to be undertaken, the text generally provides that Parties will regularly prepare/communicate/implement their INDCs/ NDC or NDCMC. One option reflects the principle of CBDR-RC in this regard while the other does not.

A key issue to resolve is whether the commitment includes the implementation of the mitigation contribution or if it is just to communicate the contribution. In issue is whether the United States (US) can make a commitment internationally to implement its emission reduction target.

Also in issue is how the mitigation efforts among Parties will be differentiated with the following options on the table:

- The first option is for no text on ‘differentiated efforts’; which means Parties ‘self-differentiate’ among themselves, which is an option preferred by the Umbrella Group of countries in particular;
- the second option is for differentiation between developed and developing

countries with developed countries undertaking quantified economy-wide absolute emission reduction commitments/targets, which are comparable, measurable, reportable and verifiable, covering all GHGs and implemented domestically without any conditions and developing countries undertaking diversified enhanced mitigation actions/efforts in a measurable, reportable, and verifiable manner, in the context of sustainable development and supported and enabled by the provision of adequate finance, technology and capacity-building by developed country Parties. This is a proposal from the LMDC;

- the third option is to follow the Lima formula which is that the efforts are in accordance with CBDR-RC, in the light of national circumstances; and
- the fourth option is a proposal from Brazil which essentially proposes that each Party that has previously communicated/implemented absolute economy-wide emissions reduction or limitation targets to continue to do so and all Parties should aim to do so over time.

It is important to note that currently, under the Convention, only developed countries are required to undertake absolute economy-wide emission reductions. In Cancun in 2010, developing countries agreed to undertake nationally-appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs), which are to be supported and enabled by technology, finance and capacity-building. Under the NAMAs, it is up to developing countries to determine what kind of mitigation efforts they can undertake; whether they are absolute emission reduction targets, quantified targets relative to business as usual, carbon intensity of GDP or non-economy-wide actions.

b) Will the mitigation reduction targets/or contribution be legally binding?

To answer this question, where the intended NDMCs/NDMC/NDMCCs are 'housed' becomes relevant. The following are the various options in para 9 of Article 3.

There are 2 options – option 1 has the following options:

The mitigation contributions communicated shall be published on:

- an online registry maintained by the secretariat; or
- be in an annex to the agreement; or
- be on the UNFCCC website.

Option 2 is for the mitigation contributions of developed countries to be inscribed in Annex A to the agreement while that of developing countries be inscribed in Annex B to the agreement.

It has become clear from recent news reports that the US will not agree to the emission reduction targets being annexed to the agreement, which will make the targets legally-binding, if the Paris agreement is a legally-binding treaty, as is the case with the annex B of the Kyoto Protocol.

If the US concerns are taken on board, then the emission reduction targets will have to be housed outside of the Paris agreement, as was the case with the Cancun pledges which were contained in an information document maintained by the secretariat on the UNFCCC website, differentiated between developed and developing countries. In Lima last year, Parties agreed that the INDCs that they are to communicate are published on the UNFCCC website.

Given the US situation, it is unlikely for the emission reduction targets or contributions to be made legally binding under the Paris agreement.

c) Issue of progression

On the issue of 'progression', the current text provides that each Party's mitigation contribution will be progressively more ambitious over time. The LMDC has also proposed further additions that the progression of ambition of developing country mitigation contributions will be supported and enabled by enhanced means of implementation over time. Whether developed countries will accept the LMDC proposal is a challenge.

d) Should the mitigation contribution of developing countries be unconditional?

Another important issue to resolve is whether the mitigation contribution of developing countries is unconditional, or at least in part. 'Unconditional' means not conditional upon the provision of finance and technology transfer. In

response, developing countries refer to Article 4.7 of the Convention which provides that “the extent to which developing country Parties will effectively implement their commitments under the Convention will depend on the effective implementation by developed country Parties of their commitments under the Convention related to financial resources and transfer of technology.”

As regards the INDCs that have been announced, many developing countries have conditioned the full implementation of their mitigation contributions on the basis of the provision of finance and technology transfer. Some have also indicated an unconditional mitigation component alongside an enhanced conditional one.

e) Communication of successive mitigation contributions

Another issue that needs to be resolved relates to the ‘cycle’ or periodicity for the communication of a Party’s contribution.

As pointed out by the UNFCCC Secretariat’s synthesis report of the INDCs that have been submitted, “Most Parties communicated either a 5 or 10 year time frame for the implementation of their INDC. Many of the communicated INDCs refer to periods of implementation up to 2030, while a few INDCs specify a period up to 2025.”

There are proposals on the table for the mitigation contributions to be communicated every 5 years – an option preferred particularly by the European Union (EU). There is also an alternative option for successive contributions to be communicated before the completion of the current implementation cycle. The alternative proposal is from the LMDC to take into account those INDCs, which involve a 10-year timeframe for implementation.

Hence, whether there should be a harmonisation of the successive mitigation contributions will be the subject of debate.

A related question is whether there should only be a ‘cycle’ for mitigation, or if this should also apply to the implementation of other elements on adaptation, finance and technology transfer as well. Many developing countries are concerned that having a ‘cycle’ for mitigation alone would lead to a mitigation-centric approach, with the other elements being disregarded and de-linked

from the mitigation contribution. This relates to the proposal in Article 2 bis referred to above.

f) Should there be a consultative period or an ex ante consideration of the mitigation contributions?

Another vexatious issue relates to whether there should be a consultative period or ex ante consideration of mitigation contributions proposed by Parties, prior to their finalisation.

There are three options on the table in this regard. The first proposal provides that there be a 12-18 month period for a process related to consideration of the mitigation contributions including their aggregate effect in the light of the long-term temperature goal. The second option provides that there be no consultative period or an ex ante consideration, with the third option being that this issue be considered under the element on ‘transparency’.

A concern from a number of developing countries is that this consultation or ex ante consideration of the mitigation contributions could lead to developing countries having to bear the responsibility of filling the emissions gap that result from the very low ambition of developed countries’ emission reduction targets. With developed countries not doing their fair share of the mitigation effort, especially considering their historical emissions, the fear is that developing countries will be pressured to ramp up their mitigation targets and take on more of the burden, with the responsibility shifting from developed to developing countries.

This becomes all the more worrying when there is no consideration of whether the means of implementation for undertaking those efforts are adequate and provided for effectively to developing countries.

See also related discussion below on the issue of global-stocktake below.

g) Should Parties be allowed the use of international carbon markets?

Another issue of controversy is whether Parties will be allowed the use of international carbon markets in reducing their emissions. According to the synthesis report of the INDCs by the UNFCCC Secretariat, “over half of the communicated INDCs indicate that Parties plan to use or are considering the use of market-based instruments from international, regional or domestic schemes, including the clean

development mechanism (CDM).” The Secretariat has examined 119 INDCs communicated by 147 Parties by 1 Oct.

For several years now, even prior to the ADP negotiations, developed countries, with the European Union in particular, and some developing countries have been advancing proposals for new international market-mechanisms under the UNFCCC. Several developing countries have also opposed the creation of new market-mechanisms.

In the negotiating texts under consideration, there are proposals for the creation of new market-mechanisms. There is also an option that does not support any text in this regard, thus opposing the creation of such new mechanisms.

6. Adaptation (Article 4)

Apart from the issue of whether there should be a long-term vision or goal on adaptation as set out above, another issue of importance is whether each Party should or may submit an adaptation communication or undertaking, similar to what is being demanded by developed countries for a mitigation contribution.

There is a proposal from developing countries that the adaptation communication or undertaking is periodically provided, in conjunction with a mitigation cycle. There is an alternative option that there be no text on this.

Likewise, there is a proposal that the communications or undertakings on adaptation be recorded either in a registry or via another modality or be posted on the UNFCCC website. The counter proposal to this is to not have any text in this regard.

These proposals clearly indicate the push by developing countries especially to treat adaptation with the same parity as mitigation.

7. Loss and damage (Article 5)

On the issue of loss and damage, the main bone of contention between developing and developed countries is whether there should be an international mechanism on loss and damage defined under the Paris agreement. There are two options in the text: one from the G77 and China for such a mechanism to be spelt out while the other option reflects the position of the Umbrella Group that does not want any reference to loss and damage as a separate article.

8. Finance (Article 6)

On the issue of finance, the thrust of the developed countries position is to increase the scope of countries to include developing countries who should be ‘donors’ of climate finance by proposing terms in the text like ‘countries in a position to do so’ and to also reduce the scope of developing countries who are recipients of finance under the Convention, and to limit that to the ‘poorest and most vulnerable’. This issue is expected to be highly contentious.

Another problematic proposal from developed countries is contained in the decision text in para 45 in relation to finance which preconditions the support a developing country can obtain upon the communication of its mitigation contribution and the submission of ‘timely reports’ as regards transparency.

9. Technology transfer (Article 7)

Apart from the proposal by developing countries to establish a global goal on technology transfer as referred to above, there is a proposal from India for developed countries to provide financial resources to address barriers related to intellectual property rights (IPRs) and facilitate access to technologies. There is also a proposal from the LMDC for developed countries to provide support for research, development and application of environmentally sound technologies and facilitate their transfer and access to developing countries, including in addressing barriers to access and know-how.

The African Group also has proposed a technology framework to be adopted that will provide direction and guidance in relation to technology assessments, including in identifying options for enhancing access and to address barriers.

These proposals from developing countries are opposed by developed countries with options for no text in the agreement.

10. Capacity building (Article 8)

In capacity building, the G77 and China has called for an international capacity building mechanism to enhance and coordinate capacity building. Developed countries do not want the creation of any new mechanism.

11. Transparency framework (Article 9)

On the transparency framework covering both action and support, the main issue is whether such a framework should be differentiated between developed and developing countries.

Options include a differentiated framework between developed and developing countries building on existing arrangements (proposed by the LMDC); a unified system with built-in flexibility to take into account Parties differing capacities and applicable to all (proposed by the US and New Zealand); a tiered system based on self-differentiation with no backsliding (proposed by the Arab Group) and a framework, building on existing arrangements that takes into account Parties different capacity (a proposal from Brazil and the African Group).

12. Global stocktake (Article 10)

The main issue around the global stocktake is its purpose and scope. The idea is for a periodic stocktake of the implementation of the agreement and there are options as to the purpose: whether to assess the overall/aggregate/collective progress towards achieving the objective of the Convention or the agreement's long-term goal.

On the scope, for developed countries, the stocktaking is primarily for considering the aggregate effect of the mitigation contributions of Parties in light of the long-term mitigation goal, while for developing countries, it is to consider the overall implementation of obligations of Parties (consistent with the differentiated responsibilities), in relation to mitigation, adaptation and the means of implementation.

For the EU, the proposal is for a review process every five years to assess if Parties mitigation contributions are on track to meeting the long-term mitigation goal.

Conclusion

The above are just some of the key issues that reveal how contentious the Paris talks will be. Yet there is a universal desire to make Paris a success. This requires very skilful facilitation that is fair and inclusive as well as transparent. The gaps have to be bridged for the contentious issues.

With only a few negotiating days in Paris, time is not on our side. So, delegates and observers are all gearing up for a lot of pressure and working through late nights in the two weeks ahead.

The rocky road from Durban to Paris

30 November, Paris (TWN) — Around 7 am on a Sunday, 11 December 2011, the seventeenth session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 17) concluded in Durban, South Africa, with the establishment of a new subsidiary body to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The body was called the Ad hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP).

The ADP was established “to launch a process to develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention”, which would be “applicable to all Parties”. It was also decided that the ADP “shall complete its work as early as possible but no later than 2015 in order to adopt this protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force at the twenty-first session of the Conference of the Parties and for it to come into effect and be implemented from 2020.”

The four years have passed and COP21 is now scheduled to begin. Through the past four years, talks among over 195 countries, Parties to the UNFCCC, have been tough and lengthy and the road from Durban to Paris, rocky. The core issues continue to remain unresolved (*see TWN Update 1*).

However, the process to deliver a smooth outcome has been far from satisfactory, especially for developing countries. The consequences of right processes not being followed in the past along with what kind of process is followed here in Paris will have a bearing on how negotiations progress here and on the outcome as well.

Tracing the history of just the processes followed since Durban, it emerges that developing countries have had to struggle to even make their voices heard and their proposals included in negotiations texts. Their call that the process all the way up to Paris must be open, transparent,

inclusive, and Party-driven, marked by direct negotiations among the Parties on the basis of texts that they have produced themselves has not been easy.

For a successful and legitimate outcome in Paris, lessons from the past are valuable.

The incoming French Presidency of COP21 has assured through this year that they do not have a ‘Plan B’ and that there would be no surprises in Paris. They have stressed before that the French Presidency is not working on a text and neither does it want to produce one. All they want is an “orderly and timely” delivery of an agreement that lasts.

What follows are the highlights of processes followed since Durban, which also forewarns that for COP21 to be a success, the process needs to be driven by Parties and there should be no surprises with respect to negotiations or the texts. A review of the history will provide useful lessons.

Durban, 2011

The Durban climate talks were scheduled to close on 9 December, but it continued until the morning of 11 December. By then, several ministers and senior officials had already left. The draft decision pertaining to the ADP was provided at an informal plenary late on the night of Saturday 10 December. It was given to the remaining participants as part of a package of four decisions on a ‘take-it-or-leave it’ basis, with little time for the members to consider or discuss among themselves, in an unusual and unprecedented set of procedures. It was also unusual how a decision to launch such an important negotiation process was made with very little terms of reference to frame the talks or the outcome that would come from it. (It was

decided that the ADP would plan its work in the first half of 2012.)

At Durban, negotiations were also happening under two other negotiating tracks—the ad hoc working groups on long-term cooperative action (AWG-LCA) and Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP). Many of the differences were papered over in the ‘take-it-or-leave it’ decision-making mode of the final plenary meetings, and the objections of developing countries, especially to many parts of the report and decision from AWG-LCA and AWG-KP were simply brushed aside by their Chairs (who were from the United States and New Zealand respectively). The Chair then of the AWG-LCA was Daniel Reifsnyder of the US, who is now the current Co-chair of the ADP, along with his Algerian counterpart, Ahmad Djoghlaif.

Despite strong concerns raised by many developing countries over the lack of balance in the report of the outcome of the work of the AWG-LCA, the Chair in an unprecedented move, transmitted the report to the COP under his own authority. Many concerns raised especially by developing countries during the final session of the AWG-LCA were brushed aside with the unusual procedure of transmitting the outcome document to the COP under the authority of the Chair despite it not enjoying any consensus from the UNFCCC Parties.

Several developing countries raised concerns over many specific issues and the lack of balance in the text, especially in relation to mitigation actions of developed and developing countries, with the breaking down of the firewall between them, and the absence of the recognition of historical responsibility and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR).

Doha, 2012

Work under the ADP continued in roundtables and workshops around two workstreams: workstream 1 on post-2020 arrangements and workstream 2 on pre-2020 climate action.

Developing countries were concerned that the roundtables and workshops were being used to introduce new concepts and models for climate actions that moved Parties away from the Convention’s principles and provisions. They also called for a stop to the informal roundtables and workshops and proposed Party-driven negotiations to begin. Developing countries made it clear that any conclusions could only be drawn

from a formal, structured, open, participatory and Party-driven negotiating process.

Warsaw 2013, to Lima 2014

The ADP negotiations under the Co-Chairs Kishan Kumarsingh (Trinidad and Tobago) and Atur Runge-Metzger (EU) saw developing countries expressing their frustration over the process. In Lima, the talks under the ADP were even on the brink of collapse, only to be saved by the COP 20 President from Peru.

During the inter-sessionals in 2013, the G77 and China had called for negotiations to resume in a focused and Party-driven mode in Warsaw (COP19). However, when the Warsaw COP began, developing countries found themselves in a situation where their proposals were not included in the negotiating text. China articulated this and expressed surprise that at the end of long consultations on the text, the draft decision remained the same and was not a Party-driven outcome. Referring to textual changes proposed by the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC), China felt that nothing had been captured. It expressed serious problems in relation to the balance with more emphasis on mitigation and less on the means of implementation. It also referred to the proposal by the BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, China) ministers, which was supported by many Parties, but which was not reflected in the text.

The final plenary at Warsaw saw deep divide and exchanges between developed and developing countries in relation to preparations for the 2015 ‘agreement’ over attempts by developed countries to break down the ‘firewall’ and ‘differentiation’ between developed and developing countries, as currently exists in the Convention and its annexes. A last minute huddle to resolve differences during the plenary led to a text that allowed the decision to be adopted.

Over the course of 2014, developing countries reiterated and intensified their call for real negotiations to begin. They stressed that the process should be Party-driven and be fully inclusive and transparent. They also said that the process must build on inputs from Parties and any outputs of the process should reflect inputs from Parties. They repeated this statement several times over that year.

In the run up to Lima, the LMDC asked when actual negotiations would begin with text on the screen for Parties to negotiate. In response, Co-

Chair Runge-Metzger replied that, “as soon as all Parties agreed on how to proceed, if people say yes, then we are ready to go but we have not heard that yet”. To this, Ecuador asked: “Can I, through you, ask all the Parties who are against proceeding with text to state their reasons and indicate when we can begin with this procedure?” There was, however, no response from any developed country in this regard.

Meanwhile, developed countries were generally satisfied with the process and they felt that the discussions helped deepen understanding of Parties’ positions and registered their trust in the Co-Chairs’ guidance, while acknowledging that the pace of progress was not as fast as they would have liked it to be.

Developing countries were abundantly clear and gave ample warnings that they did not want to be faced with a situation of ‘take it or leave it’ approach with regard to the text to be adopted.

During the intersession in June 2014, Minister Xie Zhenhua, Vice Chairman of the National Development and Reform Commission of China, said that the Co-Chairs should not parachute a negotiating text and “we don’t want to see the repeat of a Copenhagen scenario”. (Minister Xie was referring to the Copenhagen Climate Conference in 2009 that ended in disarray because a secretive meeting of leaders of 26 countries convened by the Danish Presidency of the conference was seen as undemocratic by many developing countries, and the Copenhagen Accord arising from that meeting was thus only “noted” and not adopted.)

India also made a strong pitch for formal negotiations to begin, with text from Parties. But the developed countries appeared comfortable with the “workshop” mode of work with discussions based on issues posed by the Co-Chairs. Clear divergences remained as the Africa Group, the LMDC and the Arab Group preferred to progress work and negotiate on the basis of written proposals from Parties.

Developing countries were also opposed to having last minute “huddles” to resolve issues on the negotiating texts. Stressing the need for clarity on the way ahead, the G77 and China, said the format of the future sessions of the ADP had to be modified. The LMDC said that it “will not accept being made, due to a mismanaged process, to press around each other in an undemocratic, non-inclusive, and non-transparent ‘huddle’ at the

last hours and minutes of the COP just to finalize a decision”. “We want to see draft texts from Parties on screen, on paper, being directly negotiated by the Parties with each other, in order to narrow differences, find convergence and achieve consensus,” said Ecuador for the LMDC in the inter-sessional in October 2014.

Despite warnings through the year, the Lima COP proved disastrous on process for the developing countries. Their demands that the traditional method of work of putting texts on a screen, and making changes to the text as countries made their proposals, reached new heights as the countries perceived that the Co-chairs were less than interested in accepting their proposals.

The ADP Co-chairs instead seemed to continue what they had done in the previous year, which was to merely listen to comments and proposals made by the Parties and then for them to come out with new versions of the draft decision text. This was considered to be not a Party-driven but a chair-driven process by many of the developing countries, which was not acceptable to them.

With talks on the brink of failure as key red lines were missing from the text prepared by the ADP Co-Chairs, it took COP20 President Manuel Pulgar Vidal, the Minister of Environment of Peru, to step in and assume charge and ‘save the show’.

The road to Paris

The ADP talks this year have been held for about 25 days spread over February, June, September and October.

In February, countries took up an ‘elements text’ that came from the Lima climate talks in 2014, which was a mixed bag of proposals by the countries as well as the former ADP Co-Chairs.

Since this text did not reflect the proposals of all the countries, the current Co-Chairs used the February session to get countries to input their proposals into the elements text to give a sense of ownership to them. By the end of the February session, the countries had a 90-page text, which came to be known as the Geneva Negotiations Text (GNT). It was agreed that the GNT would be the basis of negotiations in Paris and the only legal text on the table. Finally, some semblance of trust in the process began to emerge, with a Party-owned text.

In the June session however, the countries found the negotiations text unwieldy and the session was spent streamlining the 90-page document. It was unclear though how the streamlining would be done and streamlining rules evolved as the days progressed but there were no real negotiations at this session. Since some trust was restored in the process, the Parties decided to seek the help of the ADP Co-Chairs to come up with some kind of a tool to help facilitate negotiations. The LMDC provided detailed guidelines to the Co-Chairs to take into consideration.

The Co-Chairs came up with a “tool” for the September session to help facilitate negotiations and divided this tool in three parts. The first part contained issues which they thought fit the core agreement, the second part contained issues which they thought merit inclusion in decisions and the third part included areas that they were not clear where to put.

Developing countries were unhappy with this “tool” as it did not contain the proposals of key importance to the developing countries in the draft core agreement.

Many issues such as the principle of CBDR, linkage between action by developing country Parties and support by developed country Parties, institutions on adaptation, finance, technology transfer and capacity-building, loss and damage, response measures and scope of climate contributions were in Part three of the tool. This created the impression that there is a doubt over whether these issues should be included in the agreement or not, even though these issues had the overwhelming support of the G77 and China to be included, for a balanced outcome in Paris.

Another disturbing development at the September session was that the developed countries were in no mood to negotiate. With Paris three months away and with no clear negotiations text, the developed countries wanted to “talk” about concepts such as differentiation between developed and developing countries, or why the issue of loss and damage should be included, if at all.

Developing countries set out the terms clearly that the text should be balanced and cover all the different elements and that none of their

proposals should fall off the table. Developing countries had also clearly indicated that the Co-Chairs should not operate on the basis of consensus, a key demand of the US and the EU, but to be inclusive and not leave any proposals out. The session ended with yet another mandate given to the Co-Chairs with the hope that they would produce a balanced text for the October session. But that did not happen.

The beginning of the October session was marked with developing countries, led by the G77 and China calling the Co-Chairs’ non-paper containing the text for negotiations as being “unacceptable”, “unbalanced” and “lop-sided”. For starters, none of their key proposals reflected in the document. The little trust that had emerged in the process in the Co-chairs fast disappeared.

Thus, negotiations could not begin as planned. Developing countries had once again called for their proposals to be back in the text, and proceeded to provide their inputs.

That is how Parties arrived at the present negotiations text and they agreed that this would be the basis of negotiations in Paris.

There have also been occasions where negotiating sessions have started without the G77 and China’s heads of delegations being present in the room. On one such occasion was during the last October session, where the G77 and China chair, Ambassador Nozipho Mxakato-Diseko of South Africa said to the Co-Chairs, “The Group is deeply affronted by the lack of consideration and respect for 134 developing countries that comprise the Group. You cannot wish the Group away. We are not an inconvenience to be ignored in order for you to keep to your schedule. Just as climate change might be an inconvenient truth, the G77 and China will not be side-lined to a footnote in a text.”

Developing countries have often come under attack from several quarters for raising process issues, perceived at delaying negotiations. However, the fact that process determines substance cannot be overemphasized enough.

A very valuable lesson in all this is to ensure a truly Party-driven, transparent and inclusive process, that embraces the trust of all Parties in delivering an outcome belonging to all Parties.

No surprises in Paris, assures French Presidency

Paris, 30 November (TWN) — Incoming French President of the 21st meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP 21) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Laurent Fabius, assured Parties that the process of reaching an agreement in Paris would be transparent and any text would be a result of engaging with all stakeholders.

Fabius is the Foreign Minister of France who will preside over the Paris talks.

“There will be no surprises and I ask the same of you,” said Fabius, during the opening of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) on 29 November.

The ADP resumed the twelfth part of its second session on 29 November, a day ahead of the official opening of the COP and the Conference of Parties meeting as Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP). The ADP will be in session until 5 December and the opening session was used to outline the mode of work for the week. The ADP opened a day ahead of the official opening of the COP given the limited negotiating days available for its work.

The ADP is co-chaired by Daniel Reifsnyder (USA) and Ahmed Djoghlaif (Algeria).

The opening of the COP/CMP on Monday will be marked by a high-level event where 150 heads of states and governments are expected to attend. According to Fabius, the idea behind the heads of state meet is to provide a political impetus and have decisive negotiations to conclude, on 11 December, for an ambitious programme for the climate. “The political language expressed will have to be translated into concrete mechanisms,” said Fabius.

Referring to the ADP mandate, Fabius said that Parties had decided to arrive at a legally binding agreement (that is to take effect post 2020), which meets the needs of climate change and sustainable development and the time to realize this had arrived.

He also said that over the two weeks, his priority would be to facilitate objectively the attainment of very ambitious agreement among all the countries. He also committed to a transparent process and said that within the rules of the COP, participation of civil society organisations can be ensured. While the first week would be devoted to preparing the agreement, the second week could deal with politically sensitive issues, he added. (There are many divergent issues between developed and developing countries over the Paris agreement that need resolution for a successful outcome).

Fabius asked Parties to give him a text for the Paris agreement as far finalized as possible, with “fewest” options. He said that based on the text agreed to in Bonn and consultations through the year, he was sure Parties would achieve a good result. He urged Parties to negotiate and compromise and their energy directed at finding solutions. He said that if they took the usual procedure for negotiations and wait for a miracle at the last hour it would not be possible. He also cautioned that the ministers and their representatives would have very little time to deal with all the issues.

“If we want a legally binding document and conclude on 11 December, the negotiations on the draft agreement will have to be finalized by mid-week of the second week. We have specific deadlines. We want a universal agreement. We cannot imagine this will happen in a chaotic way,” said Fabius.

On the mode of work for the second week, Fabius said he would propose it end of this week, which would be a “function of your recommendations”.

COP20 President (Peru) Manuel Pulgar Vidal stressed that Parties have to find solutions to the several sections of the text in very few days, both for the agreement and the main decision. “We must find textual solutions for all of them, in an articulated manner, under the guidance of the Co-Chairs and the COP Presidency, with the help of all, including the facilitators. To be effective, we need clear rules of engagement, in particular clear mandates for all consultations, which need to be text-specific, time-bound and solution-oriented, if we want to progress,” he stressed, underscoring the importance of trust.

He said that trust meant inclusiveness, transparency, sense of ownership, Party-driven processes and results. He added that the result should be a balanced, concise and strong draft agreement and decision by the end of the first week.

Outlining the mode of work for the first week, Reifsnnyder said that he along with his co-chair Djoghlaif had on 28 November, convened an informal meeting of the ADP on the mode of work.

Reifsnnyder said that the open-ended contact group was established as a central forum to harvest the results of Parties’ collective work. He added that the forum must deliver coherence to their deliberations, in particular on the crosscutting issues, which was a key demand of the Group of 77 and China (see highlights of the G77 statement below).

Reifsnnyder also said that to make the best use of time, they would continue with spin-off groups. Any task to a spin-off would be specific, time bound and with clear expectation of results and the open-ended contact group would ask the spin-off to get clean text as far as possible.

He added that the contact group would start on Tuesday (1 December) at 10 am. The spin-offs would convene on 30 November from 7 pm to 9 pm on ‘technology development and transfer’, ‘implementation and compliance’, and on Article 2 and Article 2bis (regarding the ‘purpose’ and

general section of the post 2020 agreement) and workstream 2 (on pre-2020 actions).

The contact group would take up the elements relating to ‘mitigation’, ‘adaptation and loss and damage’, ‘finance’, ‘transparency of action and support’, and would hear reports from the spin off groups. It would also consider the issue of ‘global stocktake’ and paragraphs in the decision not related to specific articles in the agreement.

He asked the Secretariat to prepare individual files with texts of articles based on the 10 November version of the negotiating text, and added that the finance section of the 23 October text would be the starting point for finance negotiations. (On 23 October 2015, the last day of the previous ADP session in Bonn, Parties had agreed on a text, which would serve as the basis of negotiations in Paris. This was edited and reissued on 10 Nov.)

On the format of the open-ended contact group, Reifsnnyder said that the contact group would meet in a square table format as it is more conducive to an open dialogue, which would help Parties negotiate. It would also be broadcast on the CCTV for maximum participation, he added. Observers would be in an overflow room, he added.

On deadlines, Reifsnnyder said that all the spin-off groups would need to complete work by 6 pm on Thursday (3 December) and the negotiations in the contact group would need to conclude at 9 pm on 3 December.

A consolidated, revised version of the draft agreement and decision would be made available to Parties on Friday (4 December) at 8 am. From 4-5 December, Parties would further develop the draft text in the contact group. The outcome of the work needs to be finalized by Saturday (5 December), and will be transmitted to the COP, he said, adding that the closing plenary of the ADP will be held on Saturday noon.

Responding to the Co-Chairs on the mode of work, Tuvalu noted the importance of transparency and expressed its disappointment that informal Party-led work had already commenced. “We had very little information about this process ... We want assurance that transparency is an important part of the process,” said Tuvalu.

Djoghlaif assured Tuvalu of transparency and said that there had been no surprises. He referred to the pre-session consultations with Parties and the Co-chairs which had taken place on 28 November. He also added that an ‘informal-informal’ meeting had been organized among the facilitators to prepare for the Paris meeting.

The ADP plenary was then adjourned and Parties statements were not read out but have been posted on the UNFCCC website.

Highlights of G77 and China’s statement

In its statement posted online by South Africa on behalf of the G77 and China, the Group recalled that when Parties met in Bonn in October, much time was lost because they started with a text that was very unbalanced. “There is not much time left to conclude our work and we must therefore engage in substantive negotiations. We must be all very conscious of the fact that process will be crucially important for the success of the COP,” the Group said, calling for negotiations to be open and transparent, inclusive and Party-driven.

“To make progress, we suggest that cross-cutting and overarching issues, e.g. purpose, long-term goal, differentiation, progression, ambition and the cross cutting aspects of finance and the legal nature of different obligations across the text, be discussed in the contact group. As progress on these cross-cutting issues is essential to unlock the difficulties that are experienced in the facilitation groups dealing with mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology transfer, capacity building, and final clauses, these discussions will accelerate the work in the facilitation groups. Postponing these important discussions in the contact group will not be helpful. We hasten to say that we do not have time for more conceptual discussions and these discussions must be aimed at developing concrete proposals in the facilitation groups.” (The G77 was referring to the spin-offs as regards facilitation groups).

The G77 and China also said that throughout the ADP process they have reiterated that not only do developing countries face threats to their achievement of sustainable development, but also the very existence and survival of countries, societies and the ecosystems of our Mother Earth.

“It is for this reason that developing countries have had no choice but to act against climate change, even in the absence of adequate finance, technology and capacity-building support by developed countries, as clearly demonstrated by the communication of INDCs (intended nationally determined contributions) by the majority of developing countries,” said South Africa.

The Group re-emphasized that the objective of the ADP is to enhance action and to promote the full and effective and sustained implementation of the Convention through the strengthening of the multilateral rules-based regime under the Convention. It is not within the ADP’s mandate to replace, rewrite or reinterpret the Convention, its principles and provisions, in particular the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities, the statement read. “These principles and provisions of the Convention must be reflected in the elements of the agreement.” The Group also urged the developed countries to provide enhanced finance, technology development and transfer and capacity-building support to developing countries for ambitious mitigation and adaptation actions.

Calling for equal balance to be accorded to workstream 2, the G77 and China said that addressing the pre-2020 ambition gap is vitally important to a successful outcome of the Paris COP and will lay a solid foundation for enhanced mitigation and adaptation action post-2020. “The fact is that commitments by developed countries related to the pre-2020 period still remain unrealized, including the delay in ratifying the Doha Amendment and increasing the emission reduction targets of developed countries to at least 25-40% by 2020.

(The ‘Doha amendment’ refers to the Kyoto Protocol’s second commitment period that required amendments to the Protocol’s annex on the emission reduction targets.)

“There is also, as yet, no clarity on how the commitment of developed countries of providing the US\$100 billion per year by 2020 to developing countries will be achieved, nor do we have any predictability on continuation of the provision of finance with clear targets for the post 2020 period,” the statement read.

Hollande calls for “universal, differentiated and binding” agreement, highlights historical responsibility.

1 Dec, Paris (Hilary Chiew) – French President Françoise Hollande said the agreement from the Paris climate talks can be universal, differentiated and binding where developed countries must assume their historical responsibility as they are the ones that for years had emitted the most greenhouse gases, while emerging economies must accelerate their economic transition, and developing countries must be supported to adapt to the impacts of climate change.

Hollande also said that accordingly, finance needs to be freed up for technology transfer, stressing that in Copenhagen the objective of US\$100 billion was set but now in Paris financial resources must be freed up with guarantees on their sources and availability (for developing countries).

Hollande had presided over the opening of the Leader’s Event segment on the first day of the 21st meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP21) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) that is taking place from 30 November to 11 December.

He also highlighted the links between the effects of climate change on the poorest countries that are least responsible for climate change, causing conflicts and mass migration.

Coming close on the heels of the 13 November Paris attacks and the migration crisis in European countries, Hollande said what is essentially at stake at the Paris climate talks is peace and urged countries to act in the name of climate justice.

“I am not choosing the fight between terrorism and the fight against global warming. These are two major challenges that we must overcome. We must leave our children a world free of terror but also a planet free of disasters ... a viable and liveable planet,” he said.

“No countries or regions are spared the event of climate change but how can we accept that it is the poorest countries with the lowest greenhouse gas emission that are the most vulnerable and they are even further affected?” he asked.

“Therefore, it is in the name of climate justice that I am speaking before you and in that name we must act. We need to wake up to the severity of challenges brought to the world,” stressed Hollande.

He said climate change brings conflicts just like clouds bring storms, causing migration and refugees to take flight, alluding to the fact that States that are no longer able to meet basic needs of their population are faced with conflicts where people are clashing over increasingly scarce resources like food and water, resulting in many being forced to migrate.

Describing the day as historic where 150 Heads of State and Government and thousands of delegates had gathered for the COP, Hollande said it is a recognition that at stake is the future of the planet and lives.

He expressed gratitude on behalf of the French people for the show of support in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, stressing that the tragic event “forced us to focus on what is important” and that “we do not have the right to disappoint as billions of human beings are watching us now”.

He set out three conditions for the success of the Paris COP.

First, the need to determine and sketch out a credible path allowing for limiting global warming to below 2°C or 1.5°C if possible. To be sure of being on the right path, Hollande said there is a need to provide for regular assessment of progress with a revision mechanism that corresponds to a five-year cycle.

Secondly, the response to that challenge requires solidarity of all States, and no State can abstain from its commitment even if there is a differentiation mechanism that takes into account the different levels of development. Stressing that no territories should be left alone to combat climate change and he wanted to be the voice of the vulnerable countries, Hollande said the agreement can be universal, differentiated and binding.

With regard to finance for technology, Hollande said that Copenhagen had set the US\$100 billion a year by 2020 objective, and now in Paris financial resources should be freed up with guarantees on their sources and availability (for developing countries).

Thirdly, all actors of society, State and non-State actors, who contribute to forming the global public mindset must understand that things have changed and they have to start moving.

Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki Moon, said Parties must take advantage of the political momentum presented by the presence of the 150 leaders and he urged the leaders to instruct their ministers and negotiators to choose the path of compromise, consensus and if necessary flexibilities.

He said Paris must mark a turning point and build a durable climate regime with clear rules that all countries can follow, noting that the national climate plans submitted so far (referring to the 183 Intended Nationally Determined Contributions), represent close to 90% of global emissions and it is a good start.

“But we need to go faster as the science has made plain that even with 2C temperature rise, we will have serious consequences,” he added.

Ban said the agreement must be dynamic and able to adapt to changes posed by global economics and without the necessity to renegotiate the commitment continuously. It is desirable that many of the provisions of the agreement can be addressed in different way without jeopardising collective efforts. He also said that the agreement must preserve the balance between the leading role of developed countries and the growing responsibilities of developing countries according to their resources and level of development.

Ban further said the current ambition level must be the floor and not the ceiling and a five-year cycle (of review) from 2020 is crucial and that all countries must move towards quantified economy-wide reduction target over time with flexibilities for developing countries with limited capacity.

“Developed countries must keep promises to mobilise US\$100 billion per year by 2020 and the amount should serve as a floor for post-2020 finance commitment. The new agreement must include a single transparency framework for monitoring, reporting and verification of progress. Countries with low capacity must be supported to meet requirement for this new system.

(According to several observers Ban appeared to mainly reflect the views of developed countries.)

Earlier, at the opening ceremony of the COP21 and the 11th session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP11), invited royal guest Prince Charles of the United Kingdom said rarely in the human history had so many people place their trust in the hands of so few.

“Your deliberations will decide the fate of not only those alive today but also generations yet unborn. I can only urge you to think of your grandchildren like I think of mine and those billions of people without voices ... those for whom hope is the rarest of sensation, those for whom secured lives is a distant prospect.

“On an increasingly crowded planet, humanity face many threats but none greater than climate change which can magnify every hazard and threaten our ability to feed ourselves, to remain healthy and safe from extreme weather, to manage natural resources that support our economies and to avert humanitarian disaster and mass migration and increasing conflicts.

“In damaging the climate, we become the architect of our own destruction. While the planet can survive the scorching of the earth and rising water, the human race cannot. The absurd thing is that we know what can be done, we know we cannot adapt sufficiently to go on as we are nor can we build ourselves a new atmosphere,” he warned.

Prince Charles said drastic emission reduction can be done with the knowledge, tools and money where only 1.7% of global annual consumption can put us on the low carbon pathway, noting that governments spent more than a trillion a year on subsidies for energy, agriculture and fisheries rather than using this vast sum to support sustainable energy rather than fossil fuel, deforestation and overexploitation of the sea.

He further lamented that when it comes to climate change, good science is ignored, adding that “if the planet is a patient, you would have treated her long ago. You have the power to put her on life support.

You must surely start the emergency procedure without further procrastination”.

“So today after far too long an interval, you are all here to set us on a road to a saner future. If at last the moment has arrived to take those long awaited steps to rescue us from impending catastrophe let us pursue that vital goal in a spirit of enlightened and humane collaboration,” he concluded.

Newly-elected President of COP21, French Foreign Affairs Minister Laurent Fabius underscored that the Paris COP is a special one as at the end of it, it must fulfil the mandate of the Durabn COP (2011) which is to adopt a new protocol, another legal instrument or an outcome with legal force applicable to all Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

“To achieve this, we have just 11 short days before us ... in fact, fewer, given the time necessary for some final legal verification and translation into the six UN languages. And we are obliged to succeed,” he said.

He emphasised that the role of the French Presidency and the success of the Paris COP lie on his ability to listen, ensure transparency of the process and Parties’ vision for an ambitious agreement and willingness to compromise.

“I should be and will be open to everything you have to say. From the start, I will make sure all points of view are taken into account and all countries are independent countries. I will be impartial and respect all till the end,” Fabius assured.

On transparency of the process, he reiterated that France has no hidden agenda, no secret plan and “no text in our pockets” and that his presidency will be inclusive and engender trust among Parties. “I will make sure I am deserving of your trust and I ask you to be frank and tell me on a day to day basis where there are still points which need agreement.”

He said the stakes are far too high and the threats to climate change are far too great for a minimalist

agreement and he would seek to meet the request for ambition.

Fabius also said there are many options in the draft agreement and the tasks of Parties are to deal with these options until the Co-Chairs of the Adhoc Working Group on Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) submit the draft to him. Following that, he said his objective is to concentrate with heads of states and ministers on the final political points that still need to be determined and work quickly with the support of the UNFCCC secretariat to facilitate convergence.

He noted that success is not yet assured but is within grasp and there are lots of work to do.

“Therefore, it is for us to meet our responsibilities head on so that in the evening of 11 December, we can say to the world that our mission is accomplished,” he concluded.

Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC Christiana Figueres said Paris is now more than ever a beacon of hope for the world. Living up to its title as the city of light, it is lighting the way for betterment of humanity.

“There is no doubt that the global climate agreement that we seek must be part of what Paris has become in the face of adversity and threat of many kinds. Paris must be where the world unite as one ... determined to collectively commit ourselves for the common good for global safety and enduring well being for all.

“The eyes of the world have been on Paris for weeks. Now the eyes of billions of people around the world are on you not just figuratively but literally. You have the opportunity, in fact, the responsibilities to finalise an agreement that enable the achievement of national climate change goals that deliver the necessary support for the developing world and the catalysing continuous ambition and actions by all. The world is counting on you,” she added.

Delegates under pressure as negotiations reach frenzy mode

Paris, 2 December (Meena Raman and T. Ajit) — Negotiations to reach a deal on the Paris agreement is in a frenzy mode, as delegates are under intense pressure to conclude their work by the evening of Thursday, 3 December, to arrive at a revised version of the draft negotiating text, which is to be considered by Parties on Friday, 4 December.

The negotiations are taking place under the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) which is packed with several meetings under the contact group, spin-off groups and informal-informal sessions where Parties are engaged in serious negotiations, drafting texts, bridging proposals and narrowing down options that are contained in the current draft text.

Parties have started working till late into the night to arrive at a negotiating text with clearer options for their ministers to consider in the second week of the talks.

Developing country delegations raised concerns to the ADP Co-chairs, Daniel Reifsnyder (USA) and Ahmed Djoghlaif (Algeria) on Tuesday and Wednesday at the meeting of the contact group about the difficulties they faced, especially by smaller delegations who are unable to cope with the various meetings.

Cuba, reflecting the sentiments of many developing countries at the meeting of the ADP contact group on Wednesday morning, said that its small delegation could not cope with multiple meetings and described the situation as “chaotic”. It expressed doubts if any successful outcome can be achieved through a “chaotic process” and called for “corrective measures”.

Reifsnyder, in response said that similar concerns had been expressed from a number of delegations but that Parties are at a difficult time where the work of the ADP must finish by Friday. He added that progress in

the spin-offs and informals has been slow with Parties not reaching compromises.

South Africa, speaking for the **G77 and China**, had on Tuesday, raised concerns about the scheduling of meetings and about the number of spin-offs being conducted. It wanted the sensitivities of Parties to be taken into account. It also called for cross-cutting issues to be dealt with in the contact group and for the spin-offs to be time-bound.

The ADP contact group will also meet on Wednesday evening (2 December), and Reifsnyder informed Parties that the President of the 21st meeting of the Conference of Parties (COP 21) to the UNFCCC, Laurent Fabius, will be present to assess where Parties are at this juncture of the negotiations.

The spin-offs and informal-informal sessions were closed to observers and convened till late into the night. On the issue of observer participation in the spin-off groups, **Malaysia** for the **Like Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)** raised the issue with the Co-Chairs during the contact group. “There is no spill over room for the NGOs for the spin-off groups. They play an invaluable role in terms of their timely support, especially to developing countries. We can have bigger rooms for spin-offs,” said Malaysia.

(The open ended contact group has an overflow room from which observers follow televised proceedings. Even for Parties, only three secondary badges are given to each delegation to go into the contact group.)

Reifsnyder responded that there was no opportunity to televise the spin-off group discussions. “We can look into the possibilities, but our intention is to have report backs here (in the contact group) so that everybody knows what is happening,” said Reifsnyder.

Various spin-off groups reported back to the contact group and the status of the work in progress is

available on the UNFCCC [website](#).

On substance, major differences continue to remain between developed and developing countries on the various elements of the agreement, especially on the issue of 'differentiation'.

According to sources, developed countries maintained their positions against differentiation between developed and developing countries as reflected under the Convention, and were working to sharpen their options so that this issue be resolved at the ministerial level.

For example, one developing country delegate said that in the finance informal-informal session, a proposal by the Umbrella Group raised the hackles of developing countries. The proposal presented was as follows: *“As part of a shared mobilization effort, Parties should...enhance the scale and effectiveness of climate finance by mobilizing climate finance from a wide variety of instruments and channels, provide, when in a position to do so, support for developing countries in need of support...”*

(Developing country negotiators view this proposal as a clear departure from the commitment of developed countries to provide climate finance to developing countries under the UNFCCC.)

“This (proposal) became a key bone of contention” and no advance was made in the negotiations, lamented a developing country negotiator.

Negotiations are expected to continue late into the night on Wednesday and whether more advance will be made in bridging divergent positions remains to be seen.

Meanwhile, in the contact group, the ADP Co-chairs have, since Tuesday, been facilitating the consideration of the draft decision text which accompanies the draft agreement, relating to the adoption of the agreement and the INDCs. (Further details will follow.)

Party-driven process must be ensured, say developing countries

Paris, 3 December (Chee Yoke Ling and Hilary Chiew) – The Group of 77 and China made a detailed proposal on moving forward the negotiations for the Paris agreement at a stocktake session of the Contact Group of the Ad hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) on Wednesday evening (2 December).

South Africa's Ambassador Nozipho Mxkato-Diseko, speaking on behalf of the Group, expressed concern over the slow and uneven progress of the negotiations, the proliferation of facilitation, informals and spin-off group meetings that take place concurrently on the same issues, as well as inconsistencies in the work approaches of the various groups. The Group's proposal sets out the next steps for a Party-driven process.

The President of the 21st session of the Conference of the Parties (COP21) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius, attended the stocktake in a packed room that was limited to three negotiators from each delegation. The meeting was televised in an overflow room where observers could join other Party delegates.

Parties agreed to the G77 and China proposal to have a collation text that captures the work done so far, by 8 am today (3 December). This [document](#) is now available: *"Draft agreement and draft decision on workstreams 1 and 2 of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action – Work of the ADP contact group"*.

Mxkato-Diseko said that this collation text could be considered by the Contact Group at 10 am where a very quick reading should take place. The Group suggested that spin-off groups then work further on the text by dealing with issues in a holistic manner to limit the number of spin-off groups that will work at the same time.

It was further suggested that a second collation of the text refined by spin-off groups be made available on Friday morning (4 December) for a next reading in the Contact Group and further work in spin-off groups.

The G77 and China reiterated its proposal that the Contact Group should address cross-cutting issues, such as differentiation and legal form as soon as possible in order to unlock consensus in areas where these issues are encountered under the specific elements. The Contact Group also needs to address the many duplications on the same issue across different issues that can only be consistently addressed if we have a holistic view of the text, Mxkato-Diseko stressed.

She conveyed the Group's sense of urgency when she emphasised that the Group's proposal is made "in the hope that it will assist you (Minister Fabius) in moving our process forward".

Malaysia on behalf of the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC) stressed that "We appreciate the deadline but we cannot sacrifice the content of a durable agreement at the altar of expediency. This will affect developing countries deeply and for a long time. While de jure there is inclusiveness and transparency, but de facto there are countries within (the LMDC) that are beginning to feel left out." Malaysia appealed to the COP21 President to resolve this issue "so that no one leaves this process with a bad taste in their mouth."

Following the exchange of Parties' views on the way forward, COP21 President Fabius outlined the Presidency's plan to begin consultations with all negotiating groups on the best way forward on 3 and 4 December. The consultations will be led by two French ambassadors, Philippe Lacoste and Francois Delattre, and former UNFCCC Executive Secretary Michael Zammit Cutajar of Malta who is Special Advisor to the French Delegation.

Fabius said that the consultations will focus on format, issues, transparency and timeline. Based on those consultations and his assessment, he will then make a proposal on Saturday (5 December) on how to move forward.

(The ADP's spin-off groups are scheduled to complete their work to produce the Paris agreement by 6 pm on Thursday, 3 December followed by the conclusion of the negotiations in the Contact Group by 9 pm of the same day, with 5 December as the target for transmitting the text to the COP. The ADP Co-chairs are Daniel Reifsnyder of the United States and Ahmed Djoghla of Algeria).

In his opening remarks when the stocktake started, Fabius said that, "I wanted to join you tonight because I think that it is useful to take stock of where we stand. We are three days after the opening and a bit less than three days before the Co-Chairs hand over the draft text (to the COP).

"Before I deal with the text, I have to fulfil a promise I gave to you ... I said to you that we have to determine the mode of work once the ADP closes. I repeated recently that there are no surprises. If we want to be legitimate, this process has to be conducted in a transparent, inclusive and open manner," he stressed.

He recalled that at the opening of the COP on Monday (30 November) 150 leaders carried clear messages that success is the only option (for the Paris COP). "We must not lose the momentum", he said, "but we must build on that and be faithful to the messages and the moment has arrived for all to implement the political guidance."

Fabius commended Parties for working hard and some progress been made on some issues, adding however, that, "we heard repeated sentences from co-facilitators that progress is too slow". (He was referring to the reports from the facilitators of the spin-off groups made to the Contact Group.)

"Therefore, we need to speed up ... ADP has to hand over text with a limited number of issues. What struck me in the different reports is that it is difficult in some areas to fully engage in discussion," he added.

Fabius stressed that sometimes there is a feeling that some groups are working without real consideration about time limit and expressed concern that new texts that were introduced might not be bridging proposals but ended up with longer text than the previous one, with more options.

In conclusion, he said he would leave it to the Co-chairs on the working method to achieve the objective but reiterated that the progress was too slow and need

to be accelerated. He expressed confidence that Parties could fulfil the Durban mandate and "adopt in a timely and orderly manner an ambitious and fair agreement".

Below are highlights of the views expressed by Parties during the stocktake.

Expressing concern that there is no clarity on the outcome of work, **Mxakato-Diseko speaking for the G77 and China** welcomed the timely opportunity to make an assessment of where we are and to make the necessary changes to accelerate the progress. She registered the Group's concern with the management of the process and with the progress made so far that need to be addressed.

"We believe that if these are addressed now, we will be in a better position to deliver a strong outcome under the ADP," she said, adding that "it is the Group's intention to resolve as many issues as we can, so that we do not create a situation where the ministers need to negotiate with each other. From our perspective, we need to provide texts with clear options to the ministers for them to make the political decisions. Giving them an unwieldy text would be a reflection of a process that would have failed them."

Mxakato-Diseko said the G77 and China is very concerned with the slow and uneven progress, noting that in some areas, partners do not seem to be willing to engage fully where on many issues, they maintain their 'no options' approach which are not conducive to making progress.

"We assume that this is a strategy to escalate as many of the issues to ministers. There seems to be a reluctance by our partners to engage on many of the issues of key concern to the developing countries," she said.

On the management of the process, she said the proliferation of facilitation, informal and spin-off group meetings that take place concurrently on the same issues, and the multitude of spin-off groups on various aspects of the same subject matter created difficulties for small delegations. She appealed to the COP Presidency, Co-Chairs and the Secretariat to re-look at how meetings are scheduled. (See TWN Paris New Update No. 5: *Delegates under pressure as negotiations reach frenzy mode.*)

With regard to the facilitation and informal groups, she noted that there still appeared to be inconsistencies in approach. The Group, she added, is concerned that the work in some of the groups is not time-bound and too open-ended to ensure a result.

"Some facilitators are apparently allowing new text to be introduced and are referring to old submissions by

Parties, whilst others are not. There is a risk that this could lead to a proliferation of new proposals and the text ballooning.

“The G77-China is showing constraint, we need the Presidency to appeal to Parties not to follow this path. We need to streamline the text and reduce options at this time,” Mxakato-Diseko emphasised.

She warned that the fragmentation and simultaneous convening of groups are putting pressure on the transparency and inclusiveness of the process. The limitation of seating in the Contact Group also raises this question (each delegation is allowed 3 members to be in the room).

Accordingly the Group made the proposal discussed above.

Malaysia speaking for the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC) said as an integral part of the G77 and China, the LMDC supported completely the concerns and proposal by Ambassador Mxakato-Diseko on behalf of the Group.

It said the pace of the negotiations is punishing and hectic, giving the example that in that afternoon alone over the one issue of mitigation there were 3 meetings at the same time. Stressing that a durable agreement cannot be sacrificed at the altar of expediency, Malaysia appealed to the COP21 Presidency to ensure that no Party leaves the process with “a bad taste in their mouth”.

Malaysia further reminded the Co-Chairs of the LMDC’s earlier request to allow for observers in the spin-off groups where a lot of the work is taking place. It said that the Co-Chairs had promised to deal with a technical fix so that spin-off groups’ work can be televised in an overflow room (as is the case with the Contact Group) and this promise should not be looked upon as an empty gesture.

To this, Co-Chair Ahmed Djoghlaif (Algeria) said he would never accept that the ADP will close with a bad taste.

He said further that the ADP should endeavour to finish on Saturday (5 December) and he shared the concern of proliferation of meetings.

“We take this opportunity to convey to all of you especially the small delegations our deep gratitude for your understanding. We heard the G77 and China’s request for a compilation and we hope it is not a burden for the Secretariat,” said Djoghlaif.

“On the legitimate concern about observers, we had looked at all possibilities but it is impossible. You would have seen that we made a point to hold a

Contact Group (meeting) every morning and evening. I have never seen such transparency of negotiations of a legally binding document being televised ... everything will continue to be transparent,” he added.

(Many observers familiar with other UN processes in the overflow room were very surprised at Djoghlaif’s statement. Those who had participated in the negotiations of the Nagoya Protocol on access and benefit sharing under the Convention on Biological Diversity noted that in that process observers were present in informal meetings. In the case of the ADP, at issue is the transparency of the spin-off groups as the televised proceedings are those of the Contact Group.)

The **European Union** said prospects for an agreement are very good, alluding to the clear signal from the number of leaders and the more than 180 Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) as an unprecedented achievement.

Though political will is there, it feared that Parties are struggling to capture the complex agreement in text and that Parties are going into the second week with too many options. It said the very difficult task increases the risk of a short agreement with modest outcome on issues, stressing that the EU wants a strong agreement on all issues but it does not seem like we are on track for a text to be delivered to the President on Friday for political agreement.

Responding to Ambassador Mxakato-Diseko, the EU said, “From our side, we feel we have engaged constructively. We certainly want a strong outcome on finance. We sometimes found that we have bridging proposals with other groups but we felt lack of engagement. It is incumbent on us to find compromises.”

The EU said it did not hear everything of the proposal of the G77 and China, but it sounded like a helpful step forward. It agreed that compilation text is useful, stressed the role of the co-facilitators, and said that the suggestion for cross-cutting issues to be addressed by the Contact Group was a good one.

Guatemala representing the Independence Alliance of Latin American and Caribbean (AILAC) said it fully agreed with the production of a compilation text by Thursday morning but would like to go beyond that to ask co-facilitators to prepare bridging text for further work by Parties.

Switzerland in reacting to the G77 and China said sometimes when there is a problem in a partnership, before blaming others, we should look at ourselves in order to strengthen and enhance the partnership.

Each of us have to look at what can we do to speed up the mode of work.

It agreed that the G77 proposal would provide a new text that is clearer with options and that cross-cutting issues could be moved to the Contact Group.

Sudan representing the African Group in supporting the G77 and China proposal, said it is very important to give more time to cope with the dynamism of the negotiations with multiple spin-off groups.

The Group said it is important to address cross-cutting issues such as differentiation and legal form, and that these are causing difficulties in the proceedings of the spin-off groups, adding that addressing these will help us unlock consensus.

Norway said a compilation text is a good starting point and supported AILAC's proposal for co-facilitators to capture bridging text, noting that co-facilitators could identify the landing zones.

"We have two Co-Chairs who know where our wishes are and they could reflect and send a note to the COP Presidency. That could be one way to capture the good sentiments that we cannot capture in the text," said Norway.

On extending the ADP process beyond Saturday (5 December), Norway expressed caution over opaqueness, and said it is very critical to know who is in charge and when the Presidency will take over.

Maldives speaking for the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) fully associated with the G77 and China saying that the Group's proposal is definitely a first step. AOSIS is equally worried about the pace of work and the proliferation of spin-off groups dealing with the same issues, making it difficult for them to engage. Maldives urged the Co-Chairs and COP Presidency to look into this carefully.

Saudi Arabia speaking for the Arab Group also supported the G77 and China, and said we came here prepared to work with the text from October, had engaged and had restrained themselves from adding new insertions and brackets. It recalled that in the October ADP meeting, it was agreed that no new text or brackets should be added in Paris. Though it is the right of Parties to do so, the Group had hoped that this would not happen but "we see other Parties put in more text and brackets, dividing the different views further and further. This is not healthy for the process, adding more pressure, psychologically and emotionally. We hope to see the intensity of the negotiations

lowered and substantive progress in the remaining short period of time."

The United States agreed that progress is mixed and that it makes sense to have a compilation text in the morning (of 3 December). It agreed to use the insights of the facilitators that were gained from their leadership, to produce bridging proposals and efforts to characterise the options so that over the course of next week these would help in the decisions and solutions to problems that we would like to solve.

In terms of approach, it said there is no time for process fights and we need to engage in substance.

(According to several negotiators, the lack of a credible process and good faith would undermine efforts for a fair agreement. The United States have been inserting considerable new text. Among the most contentious is the proposal of the Umbrella Group, which includes the US, that would turn around the UNFCCC financial commitments of developed countries: "*As part of a shared mobilization effort, Parties should...enhance the scale and effectiveness of climate finance by mobilizing climate finance from a wide variety of instruments and channels, provide, when in a position to do so, support for developing countries in need of support...*")

This would mean that developed countries' commitments are diluted to a 'mobilization effort' and provision of finance will be when they are 'in a position to do so').

Mexico expressed concerns about the pace of work especially in mitigation and finance, urging the co-facilitators to help.

In response to Norway's proposal to draw on the wisdom of the Co-Chairs for a reflection note, Ambassador Mxakato-Diseko said "we don't think that at this stage that will be useful".

On bridging proposals by co-facilitators, she suggested that they could be captured in a separate document as a tool to assist Parties.

In concluding the stocktake, Co-Chair Djoghlaif congratulated Parties for an intense engagement that was never seen before. He said Parties will have the compilation text at 8 am and the text will reflect the work status as of 9 pm (2 December), and the co-facilitators will assist where they can. The spin-off work will finish at 6 pm and the Contact Group will take stock from 7 pm.

Meanwhile, the COP President's consultations with negotiation groups have begun this morning.

Developing country negotiators set out their views on Paris agreement

3 December, Paris (T Ajit) — Developing countries outlined their expectations of the Paris agreement at a side event organized by South Centre and Third World Network on 30 November during the ongoing twenty-first session of the Conference of Parties (COP21) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in Paris.

The delegates who spoke at the meeting included Juan Hoffmaister, coordinator of adaptation and loss and damage for 134 countries under the Group of 77 and China (G77 and China), Su Wei (head of the Chinese delegation), Ravi Shankar Prasad (Indian delegation) and Gurdial Singh Nijar, spokesperson of the Like Minded Developing Countries (LMDC).

Hoffmaister presented the state of play on adaptation and loss and damage negotiations and also traced the history of how adaptation has been dealt with in the past. The other delegates stressed on the historical responsibility of the developed countries for having caused the problem of climate change and said that the principles and provisions of the Convention should be the bedrock of the Paris agreement. Another common message was that differentiation between developed and developing countries should be reflected in the Paris agreement and decisions.

According to **Su Wei**, it is very important for Paris to reaffirm the very strong message that climate change is an imminent threat to humanity. “It is very important to recall the causes of this problem. It is because of the historic responsibility and accumulation of greenhouse gases by developed countries in 200 years of industrialization, but the impact is on all the human beings of the planet.

“We need to make this effort for an international climate regime, for UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol and the process we have developed through Bali, Copenhagen, Durban, Lima and Paris. All these decisions have to be implemented effectively. The objective of Paris is to implement the UNFCCC. It has to be guided by the principles and provisions and common but differentiated responsibilities and

implement the various commitments. That is the objective to enhance the implementation of the Convention,” he said.

Su Wei said further that Paris is a very critical juncture in the longer process to address the common challenge of climate change. There is a need to speed up efforts and do what we can to enhance actions that will be implemented after 2020.

“We also need to ensure that all the decisions should be implemented, in particular emphasizing the need, urgency for enhancing the pre-2020 implementation, for mitigation, adaptation and means of implementation. Paris needs to resolve the necessary financial support for technology innovation for developing countries,” he added.

On the finance commitment of developed countries, Su Wei said that the US \$100 billion a year by 2020 is far from being implemented and that it needs to be done. “The basic facts do not change. The problem has been caused by developed countries. They need to take their historical responsibility into account and take the lead in reducing greenhouse gases, while also honouring their commitments. Differentiation has to be reflected in both process and final outcome in Paris,” he stressed.

On the Heads of State and Government event, Su Wei said that the presence of 150 world leaders would give a political momentum to speed up and promote negotiations, “although we recognize there are large differences in the text. After hearing the leaders, the pressure is high on negotiators to find necessary and ambitious solutions here in Paris.”

Responding to questions from the media on China’s position on loss and damage and long-term goal, Su Wei said that China stands with other developing countries on loss and damage and that it will continue to support those issues.

On long-term goal, he said that there is wide acceptance of the temperature target of well below 2°C to address the challenge of climate change. “What is important for implementing that long-term goal is we

need to reflect our determination and common understanding and real actions. What is important for Paris is to set the world on a more sustainable, climate resilient, low-carbon development path,” he said.

Ravi Shankar Prasad said that India is looking at a just, equitable and ambitious Paris deal. “We have been very consistent that any outcome must be based on the Convention and has to be based on the principles and provisions of the Convention. In this aspect, we are looking at all aspects of the Durban mandate (mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology, capacity building and transparency). Principles like common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) must inform these elements,” said Prasad.

Prasad also said that the developing countries’ INDCs (intended nationally determined contributions) are ambitious. “The level of ambition and kind of action that developing countries projected (through the INDCs) is for all of us to see and in many of the analyses we see from the NGOs they have remarked that the projected actions of developing countries are more ambitious and they are on the right track to combat climate change,” he said.

Prasad also said that while the INDCs are not enough to keep the world on a 2°C trajectory, developed countries must take the lead in these efforts. “That is one of the starting points. A large number of developing countries have been taking action. The full incremental cost of climate change actions need to be met by developed countries. And we have come down to figures like US \$100 billion (a year),” he said.

Prasad also commented on a recent report by the OECD (Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development) that claims that US \$62 billion (in 2014) has been mobilized. “We are not amused by the OECD report (claims) ... It is for anyone to see that these are not new, nor additional. These are not over and above ODA (official development assistance) and there is complete lack of clarity about sources and uses of funds.”

Stressing on the importance of pre-2020 action, Prasad said, “We are very consistent and we want that pre-2020 action must form part of the Paris agreement. We must not let these five years slip by. This must be embedded in Paris. There has to be a revisit mechanism and there has to be amplification of the Kyoto targets. On the means of implementation, the kind of finance, technology and other support that was to be provided needs to be delivered,” he said.

(The second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol for emissions reduction by developed countries in Annex I of the UNFCCC has yet to enter into force due to failure of major developed countries

to ratify the amendment to the Protocol for that purpose.)

Prasad also said that India supports the concept of aggregate global stocktake and how best any gap resulting thereof can be approached.

On the mechanics of what will lead to an agreement in Paris, Prasad said, “The French (COP) President has said that the agreement must be based on climate justice and we must take into account the historical responsibility of the developed countries. He also said that there has to be a financial mechanism for developing countries from developed countries. If this approach is followed, we should have an agreement.”

Responding to questions, Prasad said that India is very much supportive of loss and damage in the Paris agreement. “India has a large coastline and we have a large number of inhabited islands. We face similar problems, which the AOSIS (Alliance of Small Island States) also face. We need to properly anchor loss and damage in the agreement,” he said.

On the long-term goal, Prasad said that Parties are aware of what was agreed in Cancun (COP16 in 2010). “What paths countries choose will be articulated through their INDCs. These INDCs will give a roadmap in terms of the long-term trajectory for the future. We see the panning out of these paths. We are not supportive of any prescriptions of what these growth paths should be because these are nationally determined.”

Prasad further reiterated that historical responsibility is taking into account the entire spectrum. “It starts from 1850. We are not singling countries here. What individual countries do will be decided by them but the fact that those historically responsible have caused this problem, is indisputable,” said Prasad.

Continuing the conversation further at the side event, **Gurdial Singh Nijar** said that Parties are here to implement the Convention, but there is an attempt to dismantle the fundamental precepts upon which the Convention is based. “There is an attempt to say that CBDR is something of the past. It does not exist. There are signs that economy-wide targets must be shifted over to developing countries. This is disturbing and the consequences are serious. There is a debt that is owed,” he stressed.

Explaining attempts to erode differentiation, Nijar said, “If you look at the provisions, when you look at peaking, developed countries have already peaked. What does that imply? Now it is for developing countries to peak. The atmospheric space has been taken up and now developing countries have to reduce. This means serious consequences for developing countries. If we have to reduce in a drastic way our emissions, we have to cut back in a drastic

way the handling of our communities and issues such as food security. Article 2 of the Convention makes it very clear. You are undermining the construct upon which the Convention is based,” he said.

(Article 2 reads: The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.)

On the importance of means of implementation, Nijar said, “We have to attend to adaptation. There are extreme weather events. That is why we say there has to be means of implementation, which is diluted in the draft Paris agreement. When there is a catastrophe that results in phenomenal deaths and damage, money has to be diverted for that purpose.”

On technology he said that it is in the hands of the developed countries. “Under the CBD (Convention on Biological Diversity), there are provisions that IPR (Intellectual Property Rights) must be protected but provided for preferentially or there exist concessional provisions of accessing the IPR, and where necessary the financial mechanism has to fund. Here we have Article 4 of the Convention. Despite that, developing countries have taken on the task of submitting INDCs. Some of them have gone further and have given absolute economy-wide targets,” he said.

(Article 4 operationalises CBDR by setting out the differentiated commitments and obligations of Parties, including the promotion, facilitation and financing of the transfer of, and access to, technology and know-how by developed countries to developing countries.) Nijar also said that there was no use telling developing countries that the agreement will be durable and let’s be on a journey together, when the starting points for developed and developing countries are different. “This reality has to be embedded,” he stressed, also warning against dividing developing countries with the promise of money. “We heard money will be given to the LDCs (Least Developed Countries). What is the signal that is being sent, that you will carve out a special group among the developing countries? It is not helpful to draft concepts that are alien to the Convention,” he said.

Hoffmaister commented on the treatment meted out to adaptation, pointing out that adaptation has been the forgotten child of the Convention for a very long

time. “There has been general animosity towards wanting to talk about adaptation and it has often meant that when you talk about adaptation, it means no mitigation. The Convention has been trying to catch up. On paper, we have made great advances, but getting to implement those has been a challenge,” he said.

Planning is an imperative for adaptation, but we cannot stop there, Hoffmaister said, adding that resources and general support for adaptation have been lagging behind. Referring to the Copenhagen Conference of Parties, he said that once a COP session closed without the adaptation group being present there. It is not an issue of whether it is more important than mitigation. We have to do both. We need to start paying a lot of attention to adaptation.

“People being affected are very far away from these tables. They have very few resources to do much. The key thing is we want to know where we are going. To just simply say, enhance your resilience is not enough. We need to know what temperature we are adapting to,” he said.

On what is key for adaptation in the Paris agreement, Hoffmaister stressed on the importance of the Cancun Adaptation Framework and the need to anchor existing institutions in the agreement.

“Given the fact that we have moved so little in this process, we want to make sure we don’t erode some of the things we have achieved in the Cancun Adaptation Framework. It contains some remarkable elements. It is helpful to orient global action to adaptation. We are trying to build on so that this agreement will be a plus version of that framework,” he said.

Hoffmaister also said that there is need to go beyond cooperation. There is no choice but to adapt. For adaptation to be left under the multilateral process as a matter of cooperation is simply unacceptable. “We are doing a lot despite limited resources. We have seen this through the INDCs. An incredible number of countries have presented information on adaptation; that should tell us something.

“With the recognition that we need to have assurances that we will communicate that information, that we will be part of the regime, that we won’t be forced to deal with a whole new framework. Countries should have the flexibility to have an adaptation component in INDCs or NAPS (national adaptation plans) or whether they want to communicate what they do,” he said.

Hoffmaister also commented on the meager support given to adaptation. “Support for adaptation has been lagging behind. Of the current climate flows, 11-18 per cent flows to adaptation. It is quite an issue. We are seeing a lot of reluctance to take more concrete steps

to ensure the 50-50 balance between allocation to mitigation and adaptation becomes reality,” he said, On institutions, we want them to continue, said Hoffmaister. “We want assurances of that in the agreement. The LDC Expert group for instance has played a vital role. It finds itself in a humiliating position of justifying its existence every three years. We are tired of that. We want to give leadership to the Adaptation Committee and recognize its role. The role of the Green Climate Fund will help us stay true to the agreement,” he said.

On loss and damage, Hoffmaister said that G77 and China is truly committed and is speaking with one voice. “Not recognizing loss and damage in this agreement is the equivalent of following the path of climate denial. We want to see a mechanism that will evolve, a mechanism that addresses some of the issues that are in the frontlines such as permanent and irreversible losses,” he said.

“There are certain things you cannot adapt to. When your island is under water, when aquifers suffer from saline intrusion, there is nothing you can do. There are slow onset events. We need something to help us address permanent and irreversible losses,” he stressed. Hoffmaister also said that the world would have to deal with the new notion of environmental refugees as a consequence. “We are not prepared to cope with internal displacement. We are not willing to cope with social destabilization,” he said.

Also present at the side-event as speaker was Mariama Williams of South Centre, an intergovernmental organization based in Geneva, who presented her analysis of the OECD report. She pointed to problems such as developed countries not wanting to have a proper definition of climate finance and that they should not be diverting ODA as climate finance. “How do you count loans as climate finance?” she asked.

Adaptation Fund ‘in danger’; Kyoto Protocol in bleak state

Paris, 4 December (Marjorie Williams) – While attention at the ongoing climate talks is focused on a “new Paris agreement”, the state of the Kyoto Protocol of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its implementation entities is bleak.

Parties at the ongoing eleventh session of the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP11) were informed of the perilous state of the Adaptation Fund, which is facing serious challenges of sustainability, adequacy and predictability of funding due to challenges in the carbon market and the voluntary contributions by developed countries. The Fund is “in danger”, according to the CMP11 Vice-President.

The systemic failure of the carbon market also posed serious challenges to the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which has had to reduce its operations by one-third and lay off 15 staff members.

Parties were also apprised of the dismal status of the ratification of the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol: as of 30 November only 55 acceptance instruments were deposited with the depository leaving 89 instruments of acceptance outstanding for the coming into force of the second commitment period of emissions reduction under the Protocol.

All these emerged at the CMP11 meeting on 2 December.

Consequences of carbon market failure

Adaptation Fund in danger: The Adaptation Fund, according to the report presented to the CMP by the Adaptation Fund Board President, allocated US\$ 321 million which benefitted over three million women, men and children in developing countries is now, in the words of the CMP Vice-President “in danger and must be saved”.

This remark was in response to the presentation of the report of the Adaptation Fund Board under agenda item 7 of the CMP11. The Fund faces the challenge of sustainability due to the collapse in the carbon market and lack of funding by developed countries. The Fund, which is in high demand, particularly for its readiness funding, was recently independently evaluated and lauded for its pioneering work on direct access.

The independent evaluation praised the Fund for delivering on its work and making an essential contribution to adaptation activities. The Fund was also cited as a learning institution, whose approach is in line with the latest thinking and which has made major advances in climate finance and works coherently with UNFCCC guidelines and national adaptation plans.

The Fund’s Board has set a goal of mobilising US\$160 million for the period 1 January 2014 – 31 December 2015, but remains US\$78 million short of target. It has been determined that the Fund requires about US\$8 million per year to ensure sustainability.

Recently, Luxembourg and Sweden made pledges but this is not sufficient for sustainability. Thus the Adaptation Fund Board is seeking a COP decision/mandate for formal linkages with the Green Climate Fund (GCF) possibly linked to paragraphs 33-34 of the Governing Instrument of the GCF.

A draft decision presented in Annex 1 of the report of the Adaptation Fund focused attention of the COP and Annex I Parties on measures for the diversification of revenue stream of the Fund.

In concluding the agenda item on the report, the Vice-President established a Contact Group co-chaired by Richard Mungi of Tanzania and Herman Sips of The Netherlands to work on the request to explore operational linkages between the Adaptation Fund and the GCF. The Contact Group will work until 9 December.

Staff lay-off at the CDM: Item 4 of the CMP11 agenda dealt with the CDM that is now in its 14th year of operation.

In the discussion of the *Annual report of the Executive Board of the clean development mechanism to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol*, it was noted that the CDM is in a bad state of affairs with the Executive Body of the entity forced to reduce its programme by one-third including the laying-off of 15 staffers, due to the continuing disastrous state of the carbon market.

The deteriorating status of the carbon market and low level of use by Parties have led to low demand and low prices for the certified emission reductions (CERs) produced by CDM-registered project activities and programmes of activities. As a result, the Executive Board has tried to increase demand with measures such as the launch of an online platform for the voluntary cancellation of CERs.

[In Doha at COP18, the European Union announced that it would prioritise CDM projects for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) due to the geographic imbalance in the distribution of CDM projects. CDM projects naturally are drawn to locations with high mitigation activities, which is not the case for LDCs, SIDS and most African countries. Observers have remarked that the EU's announcement may have turned out to be gratuitous, as SIDS, LDCs and African states will not benefit from a declining carbon market.

Many civil society organisations have also remarked that reliance on the carbon market is fraught with challenges and thus there should be more caution with over-expectations of carbon markets as a solution to financing activities to address the climate challenge.]

Challenges to increasing Annex I mitigation ambition in pre-2020 period

Under agenda item 2(e) on *Status of ratification of the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol* of the CMP11 agenda, it was noted that there are 192 members to the Protocol and 144 are needed for the official

implementation of the Doha Amendment. But with less than 50% of Parties having ratified the Doha Amendment, things are looking extremely dismal for mitigation ambition in the pre-2020 period. This state of affairs led to the call by the Vice-President of CMP11 for the ratification as soon as possible.

In a related agenda item 8 on *Report on High Level Ministerial Roundtable on increased ambition of Kyoto Protocol Commitments*, China battled alone for the formation of a Contact Group to work further on the issue and to have concrete results that would raise the ambition of the pre-2020 pledges/targets of Annex I Parties (developed countries and countries with economies in transition). Arguing that the Kyoto Protocol is an important part of the Durban Package, China fought to overcome the objection of the European Union (supported by Australia and Norway) to the Contact Group.

(Under the Durban Package, the Ad hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) comprises two workstreams: workstream 1 on 'a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force' that will enter into force for the post- 2020 period, and workstream 2 on a decision for pre-2020 climate actions.)

Though the CMP11 Vice-President initially ruled in favour of the Contact Group, the EU subsequently raised objection to its establishment, arguing that the process has ended and that the CMP plenary should simply take note of the report without further consideration.

After China's strong insistence, the Vice-President proposed that Paul Watkins of France lead an informal consultation to find a way forward.

Many observers in the room commented on the lack of responsiveness to the issue of the Kyoto Protocol and increasing the pre-2020 ambition by the numerous African and SIDS delegates in the room, though the Protocol had been such a strong rallying cry for the Africa Group, the LDCs and AOSIS in previous years.

(Edited by Chee Yoke Ling)

G77 frustrated at refusal of developed countries to negotiate key issues

Paris, 4 December (Chee Yoke Ling and Meena Raman) – The Group of 77 and China are deeply frustrated over the refusal of some developed countries to engage in negotiations of the Paris agreement on the issues of importance for developing countries. They also complained that negotiations on several key issues were being conducted in bad faith.

These concerns were expressed at a press conference on afternoon of Thursday (3 December) convened by the Group and at the contact group meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) held in evening of the same day.

At the press conference, Ambassador Nozipho Mxakato-Diseko of South Africa, speaking as Chairperson of the Group provided her impressions on the status of on-going negotiations of a legal agreement and key decisions in Paris.

“It is impossible for our Group to understand why certain countries are refusing to engage in the negotiations on some of the most important issues that would empower developing countries to cope with climate change and to put forward their best effort to contribute to the global response.”

She pointed to the fact that the text that is currently being discussed is littered with “no text options” on precisely the areas that are most relevant to empowering action by developing countries, namely means of implementation support for developing countries (financial resources, technology transfer and capacity building), adaptation, loss and damage and response measures.

She informed the media gathering that the G77 and China has therefore decided “to convene urgent bilateral meetings with the Parties concerned to convey our concerns and to impress upon them the need to enter the negotiations on these issues and to remove all their ‘no text’ proposals.”

Meanwhile, at the Thursday evening ADP contact group stocktake session, the continued refusal of some developed countries to engage on crucial issues of vital importance to developing countries was brought to the open. created a crisis in the negotiations as regards adaptation.

Juan Hoffmaister (Bolivia) who is the **G77 and China coordinator for adaptation and loss and damage**, expressed profound disappointment over what he saw as “bad faith negotiating”. He explained that in the spin-off group, despite working very hard to bridge proposals between developed and developing countries, the G77 and China “was misled”. “Every paragraph of our proposals was rejected and in some instances, old text from the ADP session in June were being reinserted.

On adaptation finance and support, Hoffmaister lamented that texts were put in brackets and the G77 was told that the issue will be dealt with elsewhere. When Parties were negotiating the section on adaptation finance, the option of having ‘no-text’ on the issue was inserted by a developed country.

(According to several sources, the United States and Australia were responsible for bracketing ‘support’ in the draft article on adaptation.)

Hoffmaister expressed frustration that this stance was most “discouraging” and made conditions hard for engagement and amounted to “bad faith”. He said it appeared that that there was little desire for developed countries to address the concerns of the poorest and most vulnerable in the process and that this was not right.

Tuvalu, speaking for the **Least Developed Countries** at the ADP session said that Parties had yet to discuss the issue of loss and damage and expressed fear that what was happening in the negotiations on adaptation showed that adaptation was being held “hostage” to the issue of loss and damage.

Malaysia, for the **Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)**, echoed the concerns raised and said that on all issues of importance to developing countries, there are options by developed countries for no texts. On issues of importance to developed countries such as in mitigation, there has been engagement. The LMDC said that “we will not allow the early harvesting of matters” and urged the ADP Co-chairs and the COP Presidency to ensure “parity in the pace of negotiations and for a stepwise approach.”

The **European Union**, in response to concerns raised by developing countries at the ADP contact group said that it had shown flexibility and had made a large number of bridging proposals which represented compromises. It also expressed concerns that developing countries had also presented ‘no text’ options on issues of importance to the EU and there was no issue about early harvests. It urged Parties not to get into “tit-for tat” negotiations.

(An examination of the text shows that the ‘no text’ options of developing countries have been on the table from the beginning, and it is several developed countries that are at this late stage inserting their ‘no text’ option.)

At the conclusion of the ADP contact group meeting, the ADP Co-chairs proposed that the compilation and streamlined text (of the work by Parties which were agreed to in the spin-offs) will be provided to Parties in morning of Friday, 4 December and the co-facilitators will also present proposals for clear options that will be reflected in a separate document.

G77 and China press conference

At the press conference earlier in the day, Ambassador Nozipho Mxakato-Diseko sounded the alarm that some developed countries are attacking the core principles of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), such as equity, historical responsibility and differentiation of action and support.

Stressing that failure in Paris is not an option for the members of the Group, she expressed strong concerns that the Durban mandate for the negotiations “is not being respected by all Parties and we are witnessing repeated attempts by some developed countries to rewrite or reinterpret the Convention”.

Mxakato-Diseko said that “We have now entered the last few days of a four-year long negotiation process that began at the Durban COP in 2011,” stressing that “The purpose of this negotiation process ... is to enhance action under the existing Convention.”

She expressed confidence in achieving this objective, underscoring that, “This confidence in a successful outcome to the Paris Climate Change conference is based on the reality that failure is not an option for our members for whom climate change is an issue of vital importance, or in the case of our low-lying islands a matter of national survival. It is also firmly based on the encouraging and inspiring messages we heard from the unprecedented gathering of world leaders on the opening day of this meeting.”

“However,” said Mxakato-Diseko, “I also need to convey to you that members of the Group of 77 and China are well aware of the challenges we face and that there are concerns over both the process and the substance in these negotiations. We have intervened as a Group on many occasions this year and at this conference to try to adjust the process and to speed up the negotiations. We have taken a leadership role in the hopes of securing the shared objectives of all Parties.”

She went on to explain that the basis of the concern of the G77 and China is that “the Durban mandate is not being respected by all Parties and we are witnessing repeated attempts by some developed countries to rewrite or reinterpret the Convention. They are attacking the Convention’s core principles, such as equity, historical responsibility and differentiation of action and support.”

Mxakato-Diseko said further that, “The climate change regime is based on the need for developed countries to lead and all developing countries to undertake actions with empowering support. This basic tenant is as relevant today as it was when the Convention was adopted in 1992. This is because even after all these years all our members face pressing socio-economic challenges and acute vulnerability to climate change.

“Despite the considerable development gains we have made in the short time since decolonisation, none of us can truly say that we have achieved the status of being fully developed – a privilege our negotiating partners have enjoyed for a considerable period of time.”

She emphasised that “It was in recognition of this unchanged reality, as well as the equally important need to unlock the mitigation potential of developing countries, that the Durban agreement was premised on three equally important and mutually dependent pillars, namely: 1) developed countries should honour their existing commitments under the Convention; 2) a second commitment period to the Kyoto Protocol should enter into force; and 3) a new legal instrument would be adopted under the Convention that is applicable to all Parties.”

According to Mxakato-Diseko, “the Durban agreement was historic because it unblocked an impasse that had hampered action on climate change for many years. It offered a consensus on the way forward that would balance the interests of developed and developing countries and achieve the objective of the Convention to stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations in order to limit dangerous climate change within a timeframe to allow ecosystems to adapt.”

Moving on to the context of the current negotiations as these reach their final stage, she said that, “with only a few exceptions, developed countries have neither honoured their existing commitments, nor even provided a clear roadmap on how they intend to do so in the remaining years before 2020. They are silent on the support they will provide post 2020.”

(The ADP has 2 workstreams: workstream 1 is tasked to produce ‘a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties’ to apply post-2020; while workstream 2 is tasked to produce decisions to enhance pre-2020 actions, especially raising the level of ambition of developed countries.)

“The leadership we were all counting on has not been translated into action on the ground and the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol has also not yet entered into force,” said Mxakato-Diseko.

She further stressed that, “This is not a mere political statement, it is a reflection of a harsh reality that many developing countries have not received the support they require and are entitled to receive under a legal agreement (the UNFCCC) to help them cope with the calamities caused by a rapidly changing climate that are occurring with increased frequency and severity. All

too often we have had to respond to crises without the assistance of developed countries by using our own scarce domestic resources or with voluntary help from fellow developing countries through South-South solidarity.”

Mxakato-Diseko also said that, “There are direct implications of non-compliance with climate change commitments for basic human rights and environmental integrity. Climate finance and other means of implementation are therefore not regarded by the international community as voluntary charity or ODA (overseas development assistance), but as a legal requirement as they are vital tools for climate action and survival.”

“For its part,” Mxakato-Diseko said, “the G77 and China remains fully committed to addressing climate change under the UNFCCC. The impressive number of ambitious Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) that have been submitted by developing countries to date further testifies to the commitment of developing countries to contribute their fair share. Most of our members have submitted INDCs that include both mitigation and adaptation components and have announced very ambitious pledges, even though no guarantees of support have been forthcoming.”

She concluded by saying that, “The Group has demonstrated unprecedented unity and has shown leadership in these negotiations, both on process and on substance, as the generator of most of the proposals and negotiating text that are currently under consideration for the Paris Agreement and supporting COP decisions. We intend to continue this constructive role until we secure our shared objectives.”

Differentiation between developed and developing countries still relevant, say developing countries

Paris, 4 December (T Ajit) — The world has not changed since 1992 and differentiation between developed and developing countries continues to be relevant through common but differentiated responsibilities, the bedrock of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

This was the resounding message from several developing countries in a rich exchange on differentiation on 3 December at the contact group of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP).

The contact group saw deep division in views over differentiation and how the Paris agreement should reflect differentiation in each of its elements (mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology, capacity building, transparency).

Developing countries underscored the importance of historical responsibility of the developed countries in causing climate change and called for the agreement to be based on equity and common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR). Developed countries also said that they are for differentiation, except that it must be reflected in a ‘dynamic’ manner since the world has changed.

Developing countries gave a strong counter to the argument that the world has changed since 1992 (when the UNFCCC came into existence).

Speaking for the **Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)**, Malaysia said some things have not changed. “Historical responsibility and historical debt has not changed,” it said. Referring to the developed countries, Malaysia said, “You grew to this level of prosperity because you burnt fossil fuel at an unabated rate. You created that situation which has created this problem for us. You created the problem and now you say that we want you to share—on an equal basis—the

responsibility.”

“The division of the world in terms of poor and rich has not changed. We represent half the world. We (the LMDC) have two-thirds of the poor in our part of the world. That has not changed. If this has not changed, we have to look at the Convention, which looks into these realities,” stressed Malaysia.

Continuing with its powerful intervention, Malaysia added, “You are trying to freeze the development pace of developing countries. This is the message we want to give you. We don’t want to persuade you. You won’t be persuaded. You talk of countries like India, China. Do people stop industrialization that meets the needs of the country? Do people stop eating? These are the hard truths. There has been no change in the world.”

Malaysia also said that developed countries were resiling from their commitments. “You signed on these agreements. You signed on the Convention. It was in 1992. You acknowledged historical responsibility. You acknowledged differentiation. You acknowledged a way out of the situation, but now you are resiling from your obligations. You assumed legally binding obligations, which you have not fulfilled. You took on obligations under the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, but you did not fulfill them. You refused to commit to the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. You committed to the US \$100 billion (a year by 2020), but where has the commitment been realized? It has not been realized. When you took on these obligations, the world had not changed, but you say the world has changed now when we want to do the Paris agreement. Is this to deflect the responsibility you took upon yourself?” asked Malaysia.

“You have taken up all that space and asking

us as developing countries to reduce emissions to fulfill the remaining space. There are serious consequences; we have to continue with our growth and if we want to do that we have to cut back on industrialization. We are prepared and committed to do that, but it is conditional upon support. That is differentiation too, especially since there is an obligation upon the developed countries to provide funds. That is Article 4.7 of the Convention. It has not been fulfilled.

In response to developed countries' claims that they are pro-differentiation, Malaysia said, "You are not prepared to take on the obligations. Everywhere, where there is differentiation and means of implementation (in the negotiations text), you have introduced brackets. We see obstructions everywhere. You say developed countries must take the lead, but developed countries bracket this in the text. Means of implementation is always bracketed. Where is the sincerity?"

Malaysia then referred to a recent [review](#) of INDCs (Intended Nationally Determined Contributions) by a group of civil society organisations and said, "CSOs have done a review. It shows that developing countries are doing their fair share, while developed countries are far away from the fair shares from the historical responsibility and equity perspective. You are not even meeting your obligations now. So, we have this situation where we have to meet the obligations." It called for having the obligations very clear, that there are obligations of different nature and of a different order for developing countries. "Yes, you determine yourself, but what is the nature of your obligation? This obligation we are going to craft has to be based on equity and historical responsibility," it emphasised.

Malaysia also raised the issue of observer participation in negotiations that the LMDC has been persisting on since the October Bonn session of the ADP when observers were excluded from spin-off groups. "That is why we want them (CSOs) to be inside, because they are an invaluable source of assistance, especially to developing countries. But you have for one reason or the other not included them," said Malaysia to the ADP Co-Chairs.

Malaysia's intervention drew a huge round of applause in an overflow room where the contact group was being televised to observers

and government delegates.

Venezuela said it is annoying to hear that the world is not the same and presented arguments to support its statement. "It is the same world in that it still does not agree on historical responsibility. It is the same world where developing countries lack support on finance from the developed countries. It is the same world where the will to get away from the Convention has not changed. Besides, the needs of developing countries for development have also not changed," it said.

There is a lack of understanding on the part of the developed countries of developing countries' needs that got the world where it is, said Venezuela adding that the developed countries' lack of engagement had not changed. "The INDCs show that we will head to 4°C, which does not serve the purpose of the agreement. The purpose is to contain the temperature (rise). We have 17 per cent of the population consuming 80 per cent of the energy. Differentiation is at the core of our right to carbon space to fight poverty and to develop. Equity is about the distribution of the carbon space to develop. The few that ruled the world have consumed what was supposed to be consumed by everyone," said Venezuela.

Strengthening its case for differentiation, Venezuela said further that this is not an approach for just cooperation. "This is a binding approach. You are being forced by law to provide support to developing countries for this purpose. This is not about countries in a position to do so," it said.

(In the negotiations text, the finance section is peppered with terms such as 'countries in a position to do so'. According to some developing countries this dilutes differentiation since the developed countries have a legal commitment to provide means of implementation to developing countries.)

India said that Parties should be cautious with phrases such as 'willing to do so or in a position to do so' because it is difficult to identify with these. "Plus, in the articulation of annexes, historical responsibility cannot be negated," it said.

China added that they did not want new ideas such as 'Parties in a position to do so' or 'willing to do so'. "If you look at the Convention, developed countries are the ones in a position to do so, but they are not willing to do so," it said.

Developed and developing countries were also divided over how differentiation should be reflected in each of the different elements (mitigation,

adaptation, finance, technology, capacity building, transparency) of the agreement.

Developed countries were of the view that for mitigation, there was no need to reflect differentiation as the INDCs had established self-differentiation and countries would take action as per their national circumstances. **The United States** for instance said that in mitigation, the context was nationally determined and no one was telling the other what to do. **New Zealand** added that it did not see the need for differentiation in adaptation, since it is a national issue.

According to the **European Union (EU)**, for mitigation, the agreed concept was self-differentiation, which was implied in the INDCs. It said that the agreement must give a top-down component to the bottom-up approach and countries move towards an economy-wide target over time. On finance, those in a position should do more than what they are required to do under the Convention, it said. On transparency, the regime had to reflect the different capability of countries, which was why they were in favour of a common system “with flexibility around the kind of methodologies”. “It was a common system that reflects different national circumstances,” the EU added.

China counter responded by saying that the Convention itself contains the principle of CBDR and also reflects the provision through annexes. “The only way we can reflect the CBDR principle is to implement the Convention by our enhanced actions,” it said, stressing that to anchor and reflect CBDR in the text, we need to reflect CBDR at the very beginning. “We have to ensure that the purpose of the agreement is to enhance the implementation of the Convention. That’s why the LMDC made a very good proposal for the general part, the very famous *2bis* provision, where we highlight the very important provision of Article 4.7 (of the Convention). We need to reflect Article 4.7 throughout this agreement. We agree differentiation should be treated differently in the different elements of the agreement. That is because in the Convention, we have different provisions for mitigation, adaptation and means of implementation.”

China elaborated that for mitigation, although Parties are doing their INDCs, which are comprehensive, it should be reflected as developed countries and developing countries in different types of commitments. For adaptation, support should come from developed to developing countries. For finance, technology and capacity building, it is important that developed countries commit to provide means of

implementation support to the developing countries. “We cannot accept new phrases such as Parties willing or able to do so,” said China.

“For transparency, we don’t see a common or unified transparency system. Differentiation between developed and developing countries should continue to be there. Flexibility should be with developing countries, not to all Parties. There should be no common principle of general guidance on accounting. On compliance we should have a differentiated compliance regime. The legally binding should not be mitigation centric and it should be legally binding for all the elements. For pre-2020 action, we expect developed countries to take the lead, in particular under the Doha Amendment (on Kyoto Protocol’s second commitment period of emissions reduction) and Bali Action Plan,” China added.

Sudan for the African Group clarified that national circumstances and self-differentiation do not mean the same. “National circumstance means a Party does what is nationally determined. That should not equate to self-differentiation,” said Sudan.

Highlights of the exchange

Speaking for the **African Group**, **Sudan** proposed a structure for paragraphs pertaining to obligations by Parties, where articles on mitigation and finance define the level of precision and legal rigour appropriate for developed countries, framed as ‘all’. In the same paragraph, provide for the flexibility (in a position/willing/national circumstance) for developing countries. There needs to be further flexibility for Africa, LDCs and SIDS. This is in the context of no backsliding and progression.

It also said that the Group does not find it useful to engage in a toxic discussion on the annexes (of the UNFCCC). “Let’s leave them as they are. The solution we are looking for is not doing away with the annexes, but in implementing the annexes. Since the agreement is under the Convention, its principles and provisions apply. A world with no classification will not keep the world safe,” it stressed.

Sudan also said that national circumstances and self-differentiation do not mean the same. National circumstance means a Party does what is nationally determined. That should not equate to self-differentiation.

Speaking for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), **Tuvalu** said words such as ‘those in a position to do’ so would allow evolution in the thinking. It called for dividing the world into

developed countries and those willing to do so, while recognizing the special circumstances of LDCs. It said it had problems with self-differentiation in mitigation and called for higher standards for the developed countries. It also said that a unified system in transparency would put significant burden on developing countries and that it sees the need for differentiation in finance.

Speaking for the Independent Alliance of Latin American and Caribbean countries (AILAC),

Colombia said that since the world will continue to change, there was a need for dynamic differentiation. The agreement should be collective and reflect differentiation in different articles. It said that the preamble should have the language CBDR and respective capabilities, in light of different national circumstances. In mitigation, there is no need for differentiation as it is self-differentiation through INDCs. Adaptation is inherently self-defined. For means of implementation, the agreement could reflect CBDR along with those willing to do so, which could be defined. For transparency, there was a need for common but flexible framework for those with capacity needs. It also said that there was no need for differentiation in the global stocktake and called for a common facilitative mechanism.

India said the Convention recognizes that developing countries are still growing and their emissions would grow to meet the sustainable development requirements and growth requirements. “Safeguards are there in the Convention, so when we talk about differentiation, we look at how the Convention has articulated it and whether we can start from there. The first starting point is whatever the Convention has provided for should continue and how it can be enhanced in the Paris agreement,” it said.

Most developing countries have submitted ambitious INDCs and that is a clear reflection of how developing countries are willing to assume a greater responsibility as they evolve in the timeframe, said India. There is no denying the fact that countries are taking more responsibilities, but that does not negate the leadership role of developed countries. Differentiation must apply to all pillars of the ADP. They have been reflected now but the question is our willingness to engage and see how differentiation will apply, it stressed.

The way forward is that Parties start with what is provided for in the Convention and how countries see their responsibilities, India said, adding that, “We find that the INDCs is the first starting point of how developing countries see their role that they can

address combating climate change”. India hoped “the global stocktake and various mechanisms will help us in ensuring that enhancement of action within the system is possible and it will ensure we are on a better trajectory to tackle climate change.”

China said there is very little money under the (UNFCCC) financial mechanism for developing countries, and that is why we have to do South-South Cooperation. As the analysis of many of the NGOs point out, our INDCs are much more ambitious than that of developed countries,” it said. “At this point of time, we don’t want new ideas such as Parties in a position to do so or willing to do so. If you look at the Convention, developed countries are the ones in a position to do so, but they are not willing to do so. What do we do? Put them through a compliance committee? No, the Convention does not talk of a compliance committee. Some Parties are not members of Kyoto Protocol, which has a compliance committee,” it said.

Saudi Arabia said there is an attempt to change the established fundamental precepts of the Convention. “CBDR is linked to equity. When we talk of capacity, the measure is not the volume or size. The measure is the pinch, the pain and the price to deliver. How much of the pain you have to go through to adapt to climate change. Developing countries are in dire need to secure sustainable development and eradicate poverty. We need to look at these,” it said.

“Our INDC showed with good faith what we can do. The argument does not hold when you talk about countries in a position to do so. It is as if you are saying that, ‘We don’t trust you. We don’t believe your INDCs. You are willing to do more but you did not do more. What kind of argument is that? There are a lot of developing countries that can do something as per their national capacity, and what they can do with support. Provision for vulnerable countries and the LDCs are well articulated in the Convention. Look at Articles 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10. All these speak to the vulnerability level.”

Referring to the European Union’s statement (see below), Saudi Arabia added, “We have been hearing a lot about decoupling. It has a price. It needs know-how. How can you decouple without support? You want us to go buy from the private sector at the market price so that we pay for the responsibility that you should bear?” it asked.

On finances, Saudi Arabia said, “Where is support on the table? We have created institutions such as the Standing Committee on Finance and the Green Climate Fund (GCF). What do we have in the GCF?

I can tell you exactly where it is headed. The CTCN (Climate Technology Centre Network) is a marketing arm for technologies coming from developed countries. We need to disseminate technologies.”

“We are ready to engage. If you want to operationalize differentiation, let’s take INDCs as it is. Do not count on us to fill the gap. It is your responsibility. As far as MRV (measurement, reporting and verification) and transparency is concerned, you have the capacity to do that. Developing countries don’t. We cannot live with anything that is intrusive or prescriptive,” said Saudi Arabia.

Algeria said that Parties are guided by the fundamental principles and provisions of the Convention, in particular CBDR and the historical responsibilities of Annex I Parties. Any modification would mean Parties would have to review and adjust previously adopted decisions. “If we agree on any change, we will need to forget the Convention.”

On progression, Algeria said that in submitting INDCs, non-Annex I Parties have shown their willingness and their shared efforts to combat and respond to climate change. How can we commit to a progression concept when it will be the first time for our countries to engage in mitigation? How do we know what our economic development and trends will be in 2025? It is risky to put the concept of progression in the agreement. Progression needs to be affirmed for developed countries since they have the experience. For developing countries we need an assessment of how we implement our contributions.

On legal form, Algeria said that it is of the view that they need a legally binding agreement but they would not be comfortable to have a legally binding agreement that contains some issues that are legally binding and some that are not.

On transparency, it said that a very good system of International Assessment and Review for developed countries and International Consultation and Analysis for developing countries had been decided upon and that the process must be given a chance. It is not wise to have a uniform system. The INDCs of many countries are conditioned on receiving finance and technology. Without this it will be very difficult to comply with the INDCs.

Pakistan sought explanation for the number of brackets in the text around the Convention. It is important to address differentiation but let’s not do it in a way that changes the meaning and brings in new interpretations (of the Convention).

Brazil said Parties should refrain from repeating CBDR RC in every paragraph, but that colleagues should not also bracket CBDR RC in places it really belongs. Differentiation should not be seen as an ideological issue. It’s the type of global problem we face. It’s not abstract. There is no incentive for developing countries to increase their ambition. It’s not enough to just state the principle of CBDR. It will be worse if the principle is stated and the provisions of the agreement do not reflect that, said Brazil adding that the agreement should not allow new obligations for developing countries while giving more flexibility to developed countries. We need developed countries to state that they are willing to take the lead but this is bluntly refused each time it is mentioned, it said. This creates insecurity among the developing countries. We are entering a regime where more is expected of us. This is not fair.

Nigeria stressed on differentiation and said countries had different national circumstances. Language such as position to do so meant additional obligation on developing countries. We are saying that we are willing to do so if we have the capability to do so.

Kiribati stressed on urgency and said Paris should incorporate justice, equity and urgency and that was the kind of differentiation it was looking at in the agreement.

Mexico said that Parties were building a durable agreement that is different from 1992 and which would be different for decades to come. It said that for finance and provision of support, developed countries should take the lead but that it is fundamental to invite others too. It is important to ensure that all developing countries receive support, and recognize that there are special circumstances for LDCs and SIDS.

The EU said that a lot of countries have decoupled and that establishes that one could develop significantly without adding emissions. It said that the world was highly differentiated and with very different national circumstances. The world has to reflect this difference in the agreement.

The US said it supports an agreement that reflects differentiation and that addressing the issue in an “intelligent” way would allow Parties to craft an agreement in a durable way. In terms of language, it said it supports CBDR RC, in light of different national circumstances. The US added that this is intended to say that countries have different contexts and they should be acting with the different contexts

in mind. “We don’t intend to backslide or retreat from what we intended to do. We will live up to our obligations and play a leadership role going up to 2020,” it said.

The US also said that bifurcation does not address countries’ various circumstances, but it does not require they do more than they can. It said that in mitigation, the context was nationally determined and no one was telling the other what to do. In mitigation, developing countries would be eligible for support for implementing their contributions, it said. There are questions on specific formulation, but that is clear. The LDCs can provide contributions when they can and that is clear.

In transparency, there is provision for flexibility for countries to take into account their capabilities and we will come forward with capacity to help countries.

On finance, it said that it would provide “robust finance”, developing countries would be the recipients and that it was not seeking to change the paradigm. However, it also said that countries in a position to do so did not mean legally binding arrangements for countries to provide finance.

Instead it should be seen as an encouragement and an invitation at best.

New Zealand said the idea of the agreement is to meet the ultimate objective of the Convention and one that is defined by rules and flexibility. It said there is no need to specify differentiation in mitigation, as the mitigation contributions are nationally determined. It said that it is willing to explore provisions on no backsliding. It also said that the agreement must build in provisions for progression to economy wide targets. For transparency, all Parties to the agreement would need to report and be reviewed on progress they are making, which had an implicit idea of no backsliding. It said that while developed countries were not resiling from their obligations and the leadership role they have, “such support also needs to come from those able and willing to do so”.

Japan said that Annex I alone could not address the challenge of climate change and the system of annexes did not reflect the reality of the present times. It also called for expanding the donor base with respect to finance.

Smooth transmission of text for agreement - but far from consensus

Paris, 7 December (Hilary Chiew and Meena Raman) – Negotiations of the Paris agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has moved to a process under the Presidency of the Conference of Parties.

Four years of work by the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform on Enhanced Action (ADP) was formally ended on Saturday, 5 December. The ADP was tasked with producing “a protocol, another legal instrument or outcome with legal force” under the Convention. However divergences among Parties remain deep so the draft agreement text is far from a consensus stage.

On 5 December the ADP transmitted the text titled “Draft agreement and draft decision on workstreams 1 and 2 ... contained in annex I” to the Conference of Parties (COP). It also transmitted the text contained in annex II, the reflections note of the ADP Co-chairs that reflects the textual suggestions made during the contact group meeting on 4 December. The draft agreement is 21 pages while the accompanying draft decision is 20 pages.

(Workstream 1 worked on the draft agreement for the post-2020 period and an accompanying decision, and workstream 2 worked on pre-2020 action.)

At the COP plenary on Saturday evening, French foreign minister Laurent Fabius who is the COP21 President set out the process for the next phase of work, starting on Sunday, 6 December. He proposed to Parties that it will be one single open-ended body to carry out the consultations to make progress of the text of the agreement and to facilitate compromise; the body will come out with a document which will go the COP for adoption on 11 December respecting strictly all the procedures.

He will preside over this group which is called the Comité de Paris (Paris Committee).

Fabius said that he will convene this committee at least once a day, if necessary more often than that. Ambassador Laurence Tubiana could represent him as necessary and each delegation can be represented there at whatever level they wish.

He said that the draft agreement would be the basis on which Parties will begin work in the COP. He also stressed inclusion and transparency, saying that the Comité de Paris proceedings will be transmitted to the screen of the conference site so everyone can follow unless the committee will decide to do otherwise.

(Developing countries have been persistently calling for civil society observers to be present in informal meetings or be able to view these on screen. In the COP process proposed by Fabius, only the Comité de Paris will be open for viewing.)

There is considerable work to be done in the next few days but Parties were comfortable with the transmission from the ADP. The controversial Copenhagen COP session in 2009 that did not respect United Nations procedures continues to haunt Parties, and there have been previous COP experiences whereby the chairs of some working groups had transmitted text 'under their own responsibility' that were not Party-driven text despite protest from Parties. This time in Paris, Parties were assured that what they view as a Party-driven text which is owned by all, with all the positions in place, was transmitted to the COP for further work.

The following Minister-led informal consultations under the Comité de Paris took place from Sunday afternoon (6 December):

- Support: means of implementation (finance, technology, capacity building)
- Ambition, including long-term goals and periodic review
- Differentiation, in particular with regard to litigation, finance and transparency
- Acceleration of pre-2020 action (Workstream 2, excluding pre-2020 Finance).

According to sources, it was unclear how the process will bridge differences and ensure a Party-driven process. Many in the corridors were wondering who is actually drafting the new text that is supposed to be made available to ministers on Wednesday, 9 December.

Minister-led informal consultations will continue on the support cluster all day today (7 December). Listed in the daily programme are also meetings titled “Facilitators conducting bilaterals” on all four clusters.

The Comité de Paris will meet in the evening at 7 pm and is expected to shed more light on the clarity of the process. With just a few more days left, there is great anxiety as to whether the outcome will be balanced and acceptable to all.

The COP21 session is meeting from 30 November to 11 December.

Highlights from COP plenary (5 December)

At the COP plenary on Saturday evening, COP21 President Fabius proposed a process for the next phase of work under the Comité de Paris which was accepted by Parties.

In his opening remarks he said that during the short week that began on Sunday (29 November) all Parties had worked enormously to come up with more concise wording to reduce a number of options and as a result there is a new negotiation basis accepted by everyone and which contain many compromise solutions. This draft represents progress but everyone will acknowledge we still need to go into depth and need to make things concrete by Thursday (10 December).

He said we must find the political agreement that we can build on the formula that we all use which is ‘ambitious and balanced agreement’.

Fabius said that the Comité de Paris will respect 3 principles: (1) Nothing will be agreed until everything is agreed; (2) Inclusion of all Parties; (3) the rule that he believes will be

‘unprecedented’, where proceedings will be transmitted to the screen of the conference site so everyone can follow unless the committee will decide to do otherwise.

He said further that the committee will determine when the text can be transmitted to a review group that will revise the legal points and language, adding that it is essential to have this review carried out so that that text can be finalised within the deadline.

In order to go forward to make headway, Fabius proposed four informal working groups to be set up on the cross-cutting issues from which the results are very important for obtaining agreement. To make swift progress, he said, a number of ministers have been asked on behalf of the Presidency to lead on those topics.

On Monday (7 December) he will open the first meeting of the Comité de Paris and the first facilitators will be able to put forward their first conclusions and after that exercise the political agreement will be translated into concrete text proposal. The committee will ask the facilitators to prepare text that they are responsible for.

To ensure transparency of the entire process, Fabius said, he will have regular check up on where things stand, there will be opportunity to see where we stand, what progress has been achieved, and can be pragmatic and adapt and have regular stocktaking.

On the group for legal and language, he proposed a main team of 11 representatives, two from each regional group of the UN and one to represent small island developing states, with two co-chairs. This group will recommend text to the committee; their deadline will be Thursday; and if accepted their changes will be incorporated into the text which will be submitted to the COP on Friday. Parties were invited to put forward their nominations for this group before Sunday, 5 December.

Fabius stressed in closing that this agreement is something that we simply cannot postpone; there is exceptional momentum for many reasons that we manage to secure here in Paris; while we talk, greenhouse gases are still being emitted so we must succeed and succeed here. He added that it is not a question of the (COP) President on one side and Parties on the other side; we must move in one direction and pull all our efforts in order to succeed.

Parties were then invited to make their statements.

Speaking for the Group of 77 and China (G77-China), South African Ambassador Nozhipo Mxakato-Diseko while acknowledging that the ADP has now concluded its work with a text that is Party-owned and that is now the basis of further negotiations, she pointed out that submissions made by members of the Group on missing elements of the draft Paris Outcome were not reflected in the revised document (FCCC/ADP/2015/L6/Rev.1/Add.1).

“We would therefore appreciate it if these proposals could be included in the reflections note and released as a Rev.2 text (of the Paris Outcome) with those comments and proposals included,” she requested.

She said Parties now enter the next and final phase of work under the guidance of the COP Presidency and the Group is ready to engage, stressing the importance of clarity and predictability of the process.

Acknowledging Minister Fabius’ proposal on the way to move forward for the new phase of negotiation, Ambassador Mxakato-Diseko noted that the process, therefore, should be clear and transparent, inclusive and Party-driven.

“The format you suggested is similar to the one followed in Durban, which proved to be a useful format that will enable us to have the much needed and urgent discussion on cross-cutting issues that we have been calling for. These cross-cutting and highly political issues will need Ministerial discussion. We also need a central place where there can be an overview of progress made across all areas.

“We remain open to the Presidency’s suggestions how we can use different modalities for different issues. However, we note that the utilisation of facilitation, spin-off and informal, informal groups, although with varying degrees of effectiveness, proved to be useful tools for the development of text and we should use such tools,” she added.

Ministers, she said, must engage on political issues and make the necessary policy decisions. On the basis of these discussions, they should instruct their negotiators to develop text reflecting their instructions.

“As Ministers start working, we must ensure that there are no parallel processes. There cannot be a

situation where negotiators and Ministers are working on the same issues at the same time in parallel,” she cautioned.

Underscoring that at this historic moment where all Parties will take a significant step forward in the fight against climate change, she said Parties must remain focused on what they agreed in Durban.

“The G77-China wishes to re-emphasise its position that the Paris outcome must be under the Convention and in full accordance with its principles and provisions, in particular the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.

“The purpose of the Paris Outcome is to enhance the implementation of the Convention and must not replace, rewrite or reinterpret the Convention and it must also be fully in accordance with the Durban mandate,” she added.

She also said the core elements mandated by the Durban decision (mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology development and transfer, capacity-building and transparency of action and support), as well as loss and damage and response measures must be addressed in a comprehensive and balanced manner, both in the agreement and in the COP decisions.

She further said adaptation and mitigation must receive the same priority. These must be supported by finance, technology development and transfer and capacity-building by developed country Parties on a scale that matches the level of action required to achieve the objective of the Convention as set out in Article 2 of the Convention.

In this regard, Ambassador Mxakato-Diseko said, “we urge developed country Parties to take the lead through undertaking ambitious emission reduction commitments and providing enhanced finance, technology development and transfer and capacity-building support to developing country Parties for their ambitious mitigation and adaptation actions.”

“We also wish to reiterate our position that a fair and ambitious outcome of our work here in Paris must address both pre-2020 ambition of actions and support, as well as the post-2020 agreement,” she said, adding that the Group is ready to negotiate and work as fast as possible on the basis of the text produced by the ADP.

Malaysia representing the Like-minded Developing Countries (LMDC) responded to the refrain of the Umbrella Group that ‘the world has change’ (see Umbrella Group’s intervention below) and cautioned that this could jeopardise the success of the Paris COP.

Expressing deep disappointment with the repeat of the refrain in the open plenary, the LMDC spokesperson Professor Gurdial Singh Nijar said the Group looked upon its (negotiating) partners to engage in a spirit of mutual respect for developing countries’ concerns.

“Our concerns are real. For that reason, Mr President, we will be placing a great deal of confidence in you to ensure that this refrain that the world has changed ... this refrain must be changed because this is very critical to the success of a Paris Accord, Paris Agreement, Paris Protocol and what have you,” he appealed.

Referring to his intervention at the ADP closing plenary in the morning in which he had laid out clear statistics that showed that developing countries are racked by extreme poverty, he said the refrain of ‘the world has changed’ is intended to change the basis upon which the Convention has been founded on, i.e. equity and historical responsibilities.

“I think we are being set upon to change our economic pathway and the way we deal with our poverty eradication. We have extreme poverty. For example, China and India’s per capita income is very low. For them not to proceed on the pathway of progress and industrialisation means the per capita income has to be reduced even further.

“We cannot accept starvation as a price for the success of this agreement. I think our partners have to begin to understand that and we had laid forth the statistics and I can provide more and current statistics ... we asked that as much as we agree to abide by best available science in understanding the long term global goal and individual efforts to deal with climate change, we ask our partners to listen to our concern,” he added.

The LMDC’s spokesperson said developing countries have extended their hands and laid out their cards. “Our pathway will be affected ... don’t you hear? Don’t you read and internalise those statistics? So we appeal once again and hope this has been significantly shown through our conduct in this week, that we are genuine in addressing climate change but at the same time, it has to be

done in the context in which the Convention itself is framed.”

He said developing countries have submitted Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) and shown that they are prepared to do emission reduction, noting that some have a huge unconditional component and there are conditional components that would require support on the basis of common but differentiated responsibilities.

“My comment is taunted by the fact that some of our partners see it fit in this public fora to say again that the world has change ... yes, the world has changed but not in the way you intended to use it perhaps as a subterfuge to undermine the basic precept of the Convention,” he said, “We cannot accept that because to accept that is to destroy our society. And that we cannot do.”

He said the Group which represented at least 50% of the world’s population is happy to see the COP Presidency take charge, noting that in the short interactions, Minister Fabius has shown himself to be extremely amiable.

“You listen to us and you respond to us. Even in the short accidental meeting that we had in corridor, you showed yourself to be open and amiable in a fashion that inspires confidence in our group that you will lead us to success,” said Prof. Gurdial.

On the mode of work prescribed by the COP Presidency, he sought clarification if Parties will be making text changes, debate and finalise text up to a point in the informal groups before the text gets to the main group which has been referred as the Paris Committee, the Paris Group and the Central Group at different time (of Minister Fabius’ statement) and if these nomenclature or technical terms refer to the same thing.

He asked if there will be further discussion and negotiation of the text when it goes to the Paris Group (Comité de Paris), noting that this is small but significant matter that requires some reflection and the COP President can clarified them before the start of the process on Sunday (6 December).

He also assured that the LMDC will cooperate entirely as it has done in the past four years and generate as much goodwill as possible.

He recalled that not long ago, there was great deal of publicity in the press that the Group was not willing to move, adding that the press is controlled

by press barons that do not come from the developing countries.

However, he hoped that the COP Presidency has been appraised of the fact that actions speak louder than words, adding that the Group has always tried to engender a spirit of goodwill, participated in actions that urged for the text to be provided and negotiations can begin.

(At the closing plenary of the ADP earlier in the day, Prof. Gurdial urged Parties to look at the best available social science evidence on whether the world has or has not changed. Citing a UN report, he said inequality among countries has persisted and in some cases amplified. He said that countries and peoples are being left behind ... participating at the margin of the global economy. Many developing countries are confined to be trapped in low or middle income level.

"In 2010, high income countries accounted for 16% of the global population that enjoyed 55% of global income. Low income countries accounting for 1% of global income contained 72% of the global population," he pointed out.

On absolute per capita income, he said the gap is quite incredible in that the per capita income gap between high income and low income countries increased from US\$18,000 in 1980 to close to US\$32,000 in 2014.

He further said over 1 billion people continue to live in poverty. Even the foremost developed among the developing countries like Brazil, South Africa and China accounted for 39% of the 1 billion extreme poor.

Looking at climate change figures, Prof Gurdial said the carbon space and vulnerability space depict the same figure where countries that are least responsible are the most affected and bear the brunt today like flooding, storm and drought.

He said according to a rating agency analysis of climate vulnerability of nations, North America and Western Europe are least vulnerable but most of South Asia and Southeast Asia are highly vulnerable.

"The modern day reality has not changed and yet you urge upon us to bear equal responsibilities in terms of finance and response to climate change.

Therefore, he said the LMDC suggested that Parties navigate away from this dangerous zone where Parties tried to fit the so-called modern day

reality through nice-sounding words like 'Parties in a position to do so' that sound acceptable but has to be in the context of historical responsibilities and equity so Parties can really move ahead to meet this global response in a responsible manner.

"While we speak about the age of unprecedented prosperity, we also speak of unspeakable deprivation around the world and the principle of CBDR as a collective enterprise must remain a bedrock that is the fulcrum upon which the Paris agreement must be based," he stressed.)

Representing the Alliance of Small Island States, Maldives is pleased with the ADP text but noted that there is considerable work ahead.

"It has been proven many times in this process that maintaining transparency in the final week is essential. At every point, every Party must feel ownership of the text if we are to succeed.

"Now that we are embarking in political discussion, Ministers must be afforded opportunities to engage with each other as much as possible and ensure that parallel process does not interfere with their engagement," it cautioned.

It recalled that Parties has the historic opportunity before us but mindful that chance like this has slipped away before and stressed that effectiveness and fairness must not be sacrificed for the sake of political expediency.

The Paris agreement must be a balanced package that include meaningful outcome of workstream 2 and all the six elements of the Durban mandate and that loss and damage is a separate and distinct issue.

It sought clarification on where the orphan issue of adaptation and loss and damage will be addressed. It also wanted to ensure that there is space to discuss the outcome of the 2013-2015 Review which it deemed is appropriate in the context of the ambition discussion, in particular a space to anchor the below 1.5 degree Celcius goal that many hold so dear.

Sudan speaking for the African Group welcomed the successful conclusion of the ADP which produced a text that is acceptable to all Parties but noted that it is understood that the draft Paris Outcome is not the best text that Parties had hoped for.

However, it is sure that all Parties could appreciate the sensitivity and complexity of the issues involved in this particular text, noting that the Group has some important issues that been left out but hoped that in the course of negotiation in week two, it will be able to address them.

However, Sudan stressed the need for the process since Durban (COP 2011) to continue to be inclusive, open and transparent and encouraged the COP Presidency to provide further clarification and consult with Parties on possibility to make further improvement, adding that the Group would remain open and constructive to assist the process for a successful outcome.

“We would like to stress the need for ministers to engage in political issues and provide negotiators to reflect on the agreement and understanding that is reached on the text in an efficient interface between ministers that are considering political issues and negotiators that are addressing drafting issue while avoiding parallel processes.

“We would also like to reiterate that the Paris Outcome is under the Convention and is to enhance the implementation of the Convention in particular mitigation, adaptation and finance that is key to success in Paris in addition to technology development and transfer, capacity-building and transparency of action and support,” it emphasised.

Saudi Arabia speaking for the Arab Group said Parties are working in a delicate process and the Group endorsed the COP Presidency’s vision and seek his support to maintain balance and parity in the progress of different issues.

“We look forward to your guidance of an inclusive process that all groups of country counts and consultation must include all groups of countries. We need to hear and listen to all Parties,” it said, adding that it hopes that Parties can restrain themselves and refrain from inserting additional text and introduce new concepts.

Guatemala speaking for the Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean said the draft Paris Outcome contained the positions of all Parties and can be used as basis to finalise the negotiation for a Paris agreement that is a legally binding instrument and applicable to all.

It also said the next few days are critical and at the same time could be productive of this lengthy process if Parties maintain focus on an ambitious

agreement to address the challenges of climate change.

“We would like to appeal to all to work according to the principle of transparency and trust which was reaffirmed by both the Presidencies of Peru (for COP20) and France.

“This is our text and it should be our ability to listen and articulate our needs and national capacities based on global objective which makes it possible to reach an ambitious, sustainable and legally binding agreement,” it added.

It is pleased with the modality of work outlined by the French Presidency which allow for dealing with the cross-cutting issues throughout the elements of the agreement such as differentiation and financing.

It said a legally binding agreement that points towards achievement of a long term goal with temperature rise below 2 degree Celcius are the two key concepts to a climate change regime that is lasting and ambitious to ensure global development that is low in emission and ensure climate resilience.

Representing the Least Developed Countries, Angola regretted that the composition of the open-ended legal and language committee (proposed by the COP Presidency) was decided based on the rule that decided the composition of the bureau of the COP.

It pointed out that it is common practice to include an LDC representative in the committee. (Angola was referring to the 11 representations in the committee which are allocated according to the five UN regions with one representation each from the Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 countries and one representation from small island developing states.)

Nevertheless, it welcomed the proposal on the way forward and the mode of work outlined by the COP Presidency.

China in supporting the statements of both the G77 and China and the LMDC, also supported the statement of LDCs.

It welcomed the ADP Co-Chairs’ work in producing a draft Paris Outcome which will be the basis for further negotiation under the COP next week and reiterated its unreserved commitment to work with the COP Presidency and all Parties to

reach an equitable, ambitious, comprehensive and balance agreement under the Convention.

“An ambitious Paris Outcome should not focus solely on mitigation. It should not be a mitigation Paris Agreement but should also address the other important elements in a balance and comprehensive manner in particular to address the balance between mitigation and adaptation and key issues particularly for developing countries to access the necessary finance, technologies and capacity-building support.

“We support the mode of work suggested by the COP Presidency and believe the work in the following week is crucial for success and that it is fundamental that negotiation process should be open, transparent, inclusive and party-driven.

“We emphasise that the Paris Outcome must be under the Convention and be in full accordance with all its principle and provision in particular the equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. The purpose of the Paris Outcome is to enhance the full, effective and sustained implementation of the Convention and not to rewrite, renegotiate or reinterpret the Convention,” it added.

China urged developed countries to take the lead in implementing economy-wide quantified emission reduction targets and provide finance, technology development and transfer and capacity-building support to developing countries under the agreement while developing countries will enhance their diversified type of mitigation efforts and adaptation actions.

It also believed that ambition and effectiveness will be achieved with maintaining the difference between developed and developing countries in each elements and the Paris Agreement should provide for Parties to regularly prepare, communicate and implement their enhanced commitments and actions according to Article 4 of the Convention.

It further highlighted the need for increasing the pre-2020 ambition by developed countries to build trust for all Parties and called for a strong, comprehensive and meaningful agreement with a view to lay a solid foundation for post-2020 enhanced actions.

Marshall Islands said it came on a mission to safeguard its future and it wants an ambitious, science-based agreement that gives every country

a pathway to survival. To do that, it said the Paris Agreement must deliver five key things.

It must response to the existential threat facing the most vulnerable by anchoring the 1.5 degree Celcius temperature goal, noting that the recent review of the long term goal found that 1.5 degree Celcius is much safer and still feasible to achieve.

It said a strong, long-term decarbonisation goal towards phasing out fossil fuel and carbon pollution by mid-century is needed. The agreement must have a regular five-year political moment for countries to come forward and ratchet up their ambition in which by 2020, world leaders need to be back at the table to revisit their targets or risk putting the temperature goal out of reach.

It also want to see a serious reckoning with longer term and irreversible effect of climate change in the form of ocean acidification, loss of coral reefs and loss of territories. And finally, we need to see some strong commitment and political assurances on long term climate finance.

“As powerful as it was at that time, the US\$100 billion promised in Copenhagen is now tainted for what some feels as creative accounting and failure to prioritise assistance for the most vulnerable. This has continued to scratch away at the bone of trust so our partners need to quickly put their finance card on the table,” it added.

It called for necessary global action and not to see the negotiation as competition against short-term national interests as Paris is much bigger than that.

It also said while Durban mandate is to develop a new legal agreement and not to unravel the principle and provision of the Convention, but at the same time we are not here to point fingers, lay blame, categorise and divide.

Australia speaking for the Umbrella Group said it stands ready to work with all Parties and offered its full support to the French Presidency to deliver a strong outcome.

It wanted a new agreement that is ambitious and credible with established strategy to keep global temperature rise below 2 degree Celcius.

“Let us be clear that we stand by our obligation under the Convention but the world has changed since 1992 and our common approach to address the common challenge of climate change must evolved accordingly.

“As developed countries, we will continue to lead but to address the challenge of climate change we must see all Parties act in consistence with their different national capacity. The Paris Agreement must reflect this ... setting a course for all countires to progress in the same direction over time,” it added.

It said the Group recognises many partners’ continued needs for climate finance, capacity-building and technology transfer support.

“Our commitment to ensure this support continues to flow is demonstrated by pledges made in recent weeks. We want to underscore the role that sub-national governments, civil society organisations and businesses play as part of international climate change response,” it further said.

(Concerns are high among many developing countries and observers that developed countries are regressing from their legal commitments under

the UNFCCC to provide finnacial resources and instead are enbracing voluntary and unaccountable “partnerships” with a strong focus on the corporate sector.)

On workstream 2, the Group is hopeful of an outcome to strengthen the link between Parties’ activities under the Convention and the actions taking place on the ground.

It is pleased with the ADP in delivering a text that is Party-driven and Party-owned and that we have before us major political options for ministers to be resolved in week two and assured that it will work with all Parties to find compromises that will secure an ambitious outcome.

It is also hopeful of reaching positive outcome of negotiation carried over from the subsidiary bodies including on capacity-building, the 2013- 2015 Review and Response Measures.

(Edited by Chee Yoke Ling)

COP21: Great start, but how will it end?

by Martin Khor*, 7 December

-- As the climate conference in Paris enters its second and final week, can it reach an agreement when so many tough issues remain to be solved? --

The climate change conference in Paris had a grand start last week, with high profile speeches from host French President Francois Hollande, US President Barrack Obama, Prince Charles and many other leaders.

Immediately after the opening, the negotiators got down to work and they have not stopped. They realised that their task, to produce the Paris agreement on climate action after 2020, is all important, whatever good rhetoric the political leaders may come up with.

At this half way mark of the two week conference, there is no certainty that a final deal can be reached. The conference, known as COP21 (21st Conference of the Parties of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change), is scheduled to end this Friday but could stretch till Saturday or even Sunday.

The consequences of not reaching an agreement, after all the expectations and the prompting from over 130 heads of government and state in the first two days would be catastrophic, politically and psychologically.

Paris is touted as the “last chance” to save the world. Climate change is the biggest threat to humanity’s survival. Most leaders gathered at the COP have come to believe this, and certainly the scientists and NGOs who have been pushing the climate agenda for decades.

So the odds are that by hook or by crook a deal will be struck and COP21 will have to produce a Paris Agreement (the core outcome) plus an accompanying Decision to adopt it and other Decisions on a range of issues that do not make it

into the Agreement.

And yet the final solutions appear so far away as the nearly 200 official delegations struggle to get their views referred to and their “red lines” (points that cannot be compromised) respected.

In this second week, the French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius in his capacity of President of the COP will be taking over the process of running the conference – bridging the remaining differences and finding the final language that everyone can live.

As usual the United States has set the tone on some of the contentious issues. One of the most complex issues is whether the agreement will be legally binding.

The US team quietly made known that it cannot have a treaty that internationally binds its emissions reduction pledge, otherwise that will have to go to Congress for approval, and it will not approve.

A solution will thus be found that the Paris agreement will be binding as a framework and in procedural matters (including that countries submit pledges that are subject to review), but the actual numbers will be placed in another document and not be subject to being legally binding.

That may be a neat hybrid solution, but it would not fool the world that this is a really legally binding agreement, as the “nationally determined contributions” of the countries would really be voluntary in nature.

But if the US is to come on board, this is what its domestic politics demands, and in the end everyone will bow to the inevitable.

Another big issue is the finance and technology that the developing countries demand to enable them to switch to a low-carbon economic pathway.

The Chair of the G77 and China, South Africa’s

Ambassador Nozipho Mxakato-Diseko said at the opening that “Nothing under this Convention will be achieved without the provision finance and the transfer of technology which are crucial elements of the Paris outcome.”

The Group wants a substantial scaling up of finance from the 2020 base level of US\$100 billion with a revision upwards every 5 years, while ensuring that the finance is new and additional, with an equal allocation between adaptation and mitigation.

While French President Francois Hollande in his opening speech had indicated empathy for the developing countries’ insistence on finance, other developed countries especially the US do not want anything specific on finance in the core agreement, and especially that developed countries are to be legally bound in providing support.

Being a super sensitive issue, finance is likely to be a make or break issue in the final days.

Even more complex and systemic is the contentious matter of “differentiation.” Both the Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi highlighted “common but differentiated responsibilities” (CBDR) as did many other leaders, but this term is really taboo for the US.

It wants countries to take on similar, not differentiated responsibilities. If the Paris agreement gives up on differentiation, it would really go counter to the Convention and imperil the developing countries.

The foundation for differentiation is that the developed countries have to do more in mitigation as they contributed most of the stock of Greenhouse Gases in the atmosphere that cause climate change, and they also have to provide funds and technology to the poorer countries.

This has been long been accepted, and is structured into various parts of the Convention, and should

be so in the Paris agreement. But in recent years the US and its allies have challenged the principle and want the Paris agreement to be different.

This conflict on differentiation was again evident in the first week’s negotiations in Paris, especially in mitigation, transparency of actions and even finance.

The need to combine environment and development concerns was explicitly clarified by India. Mr Modi said 300 million had no access to electricity in India which should not be deprived of the right to use its coal, which India has in abundance. Coal is the cheapest energy source.

At the same time India will strive to have 40% renewable energy in its energy mix by 2030, and Modi together with Hollande launched a global alliance of 120 countries to promote solar energy.

Another issue that will go to the wire is “loss and damage”, a concept now recognised but not yet operationalised in the Convention. Developing countries want the Paris agreement to recognise that it is legitimate to support developing countries with funds for rescue and rehabilitation necessitated by climate change related events such as typhoons, heavy rainfall and drought.

This is an emotional issue especially for vulnerable countries. But developed countries do not want to fund “compensation” for this loss and damage.

These are some of the “sticky issues” that remain to be solved. The French are in charge this week to find the magic landing zones for these issues. Keep your fingers crossed that in the end a good and fair agreement will be reached. Whether it is adequate to win the fight against climate change is another huge issue, which will no doubt keep the debate going after Paris.

*Martin Khor is the Executive Director of the South Centre

Call for Party-driven, text-based negotiations for Paris agreement

Paris, 8 December (T Ajit) — Many developing countries called for Party-driven, text-based negotiations in an open setting during the first meeting of the ‘Paris Committee’ held on Monday, 7 December.

During the meeting which was held in the evening of Monday, Laurent Fabius, the French Foreign Minister and the UNFCCC’s COP21 President, took stock of work of the minister-led informal consultations which began on Sunday, 6 December and outlined the mode of work for the rest of the week.

At the COP plenary on Saturday, 5 December, Parties had agreed that one single open-ended body would be established called the ‘Comité de Paris’ (Paris Committee), to carry out the consultations among Parties to make progress on the 21-page text for the Paris agreement which was transmitted from the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform on Enhanced Action (ADP) and to help facilitate compromise. The Paris Committee will come out with a document which is expected to be adopted by the COP on Friday, 11 December.

During the Paris Committee meeting, Fabius said that the ministers who were appointed as co-facilitators would continue to consult and listen to groups of Parties. “Work would intensify on 8 December and based on that, the facilitators, supported by the Secretariat and the Presidency, would propose a clean text with fewer options, which the Parties would need to look at collectively,” he added. He reiterated that while there was a need to make headway, he would ensure the process continued to be Party-driven.

In the report back of the minister-led informals,

the ministers concerned said that they had sensed a great deal of convergence among Parties on various issues and also informed the Paris Committee that they had conducted several bilateral meetings with Parties and regional groups.

Speaking for the **Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)**, **Malaysia** said that after the bilateral meetings and the reflections by the co-facilitators, the next stage would be to have a reality check and to ensure, on a group basis (instead of having consultations in bilaterals), that the reflections of the co-facilitators capture the comprehensiveness and balance of the discussions.

Malaysia said that “we should have a wider group to look at their ideas of convergence and we should move to text-based negotiations or text-based reflections.” It added that the LMDC had made very specific inputs into the text and instead of talking conceptually, the Group had made very specific inputs into the text. Malaysia stressed that a great deal of goodwill was being built, which was a good signal for the prospect of concluding work favourably.

(According to sources, the discussions in the minister-led informals have remained at the conceptual level rather than text-based negotiations.)

Cuba said Parties should move to a higher level of consultations and negotiations to avoid delay. Waiting till 9 December (Wednesday) may mean that Parties are racing against the clock. “It could happen tomorrow (Tuesday) and not in bilateral consultation formats,” said Cuba. It called for more open processes and stressed that that was the only way Parties would come to a collective agreement. It called for the plan of 9 December (of

coming out with a text) to be moved to 8 December.

Cautioning against parallel processes, **Venezuela** also stressed there should not be bilateral meetings. Venezuela also sought clarity on when they would get the text and who was drafting the text. Like Cuba, Venezuela also said that the text needs to come out on 8 December. **Egypt** also wanted to know who would draft the text.

Tuvalu sought prior notice with regard to the bilateral meetings. **Georgia** also called for the participation of all the Parties in the process. Speaking for the **Independent Alliance of Latin American and Caribbean countries (AILAC)**, **Guatemala** said that the INDABA process worked in South Africa and that it would work in Paris. It stressed on the need to find common landing ground.

Marshall Islands, however, expressed concern about the LMDC proposal and said that they had passed the point for such procedures. It said Parties need to trust their ministers and the Presidency to help deliver an agreement.

Speaking in its national capacity, **South Africa** proposed that textual options must be developed based on ministerial consultations and with the help of the co-facilitators of the ADP. South Africa called for such textual proposals to be discussed in an open-ended forum for the ministers to consider their options by Wednesday, 9 December so that the legal and linguistic committee could complete work by Friday, 11 December.

The European Union said given the complexity, line-by-line negotiations was not feasible. It said that it could not allow process issues, which had been a block at the negotiators' level, to block progress on what the ministers could do.

COP21 President Fabius said that he had heard all the proposals and that they would have to be efficient. He said he would like the drafting to

begin at some point and would look for a solution that could be applied to all. He also said that there would be another session of the Paris Committee in the afternoon of 8 December, where further details on the mode of work would be proposed.

Fabius further said that consultations on adaptation and loss and damage, led by ministers from Bolivia and Sweden, would begin on 8 December. He outlined that there would also be facilitations on cooperative mechanisms, led by Canada and on forests led by Ecuador. Their co-facilitators' names would be announced soon, he said. A working group on response measures would also be created, Fabius said, adding that the work would be intensifying this week and that he would appoint more facilitators, depending on the need.

Report-back on minister-led informals

Four groups were [launched](#) on Saturday, 5 December after the ADP handed over its work to the COP21 Presidency. The four consultation groups were on support (means of implementation—finance, technology development and transfer and capacity building) facilitated by ministers from Gabon and Germany; differentiation, with regard to mitigation, finance and transparency, facilitated by ministers from Brazil and Singapore; ambition, including long-term objective and periodic review, facilitated by ministers from Norway and St Lucia; and pre-2020 action or Workstream 2, facilitated by ministers from Gambia and the UK.

While the ministers reported back to the Paris Committee on progress made in the informals, they also said that they had had a number of bilateral meetings with Parties and regional groups. The [reports](#) from the minister-led informal consultations are available on the UNFCCC website:

http://unfccc.int/meetings/paris_nov_2015/in-session/items/9320.php

New text for Paris outcome to be released

9 Dec, Paris (Hilary Chiew and Meena Raman)– With just less than three days left to conclude the Paris agreement under the UNFCCC, a new version of the outcome document will be issued by 1pm today, 9 December.

Outlining the next steps of the open-ended *Comité de Paris* or the **Paris Committee** at its second meeting, the COP21 President, French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius proposed to reconvene at 5pm on Wednesday, 9 December to gather Parties' initial reactions.

(On Saturday, 5 December, Parties had agreed that one single open-ended body would be established called the '*Comité de Paris*' to carry out the consultations among Parties to make progress on the text for the Paris agreement [which was transmitted from the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform on Enhanced Action] and to help facilitate compromise).

"After the first exchange, we will immediately organise the necessary consultations, to be held in the evening and until the next day, on pending issues. The objective is to present a final text within the set deadlines for a formal adoption by the COP on Friday 11 Dec at 6pm," he told a packed plenary convened at 7pm on Tuesday, 8 December.

He said the new version will allow Parties to take a board view of the balance that needs to be found across all elements and hoped that a significant number of brackets will be removed, noting that a number of political issues will require broader discussions to ensure a coherent result.

Report backs from the ministerial led conclusions clearly revealed that divergences continued to remain on the issues of 'differentiation' (on whether and how obligations between developed and developing countries would be differentiated under the new agreement), 'loss and damage' (as to

whether there should be any reference to liability and compensation) and pre-2020 actions (related to the accelerated implementation of current commitments of developed countries under the Convention and Kyoto Protocol). [See below for further details].

The COP 21 President said that he "will ensure that this cleaner version of the text, to be provided to you at 1pm tomorrow, is indeed based on the Ad hoc Working Group of the Durban Platform for Enhanced Actions (ADP) text and respects the balance sought by all Parties."

"It is on this basis that we will collectively negotiate the final version of the text of the agreement and the decision. It will be an important step in the process, I hope, but of course not yet the final result of the negotiations," he added.

Minister Fabius further informed that the notification on the open-ended group of legal and linguistic experts has been issued and the secretariat is in the process of receiving nominations from the regional groups for the eleven representatives who will be ready to get to work once the Paris Committee passes the text onto them for their examination.

The group will be jointly chaired by Jimena Nieto Carrasco (Colombia) and Peter Horne (Australia), he said, adding that the mandate of the group is technical and under the authority of the Paris Committee.

"It is not to renegotiate substantive aspects of the text," he assured.

The proposal was accepted by several negotiating groups and individual Parties which expressed that they looked forward to the cleaner version of the text and the opportunity to assess it.

South Africa speaking for the Group of 77 and China said it looked forward to the text and is of

the view that it should be based on the Draft Paris Outcome and the ministerial consultations conducted since Sunday.

“It is important that this text be Party-owned and therefore Parties need to have the opportunity to assess the text. In this regard, we request that ample time be allowed for regional and negotiating groups to consult on the text before the text can be considered by the Paris Committee.

“We recognise that time is very limited, but we believe that allowing time for proper consultation will in fact save time and facilitate reaching agreement,” stressed Edna Molewa, the South African Minister of Environmental Affairs.

Malaysia representing the Like-minded Developing Countries (LMDC) drew attention to the report of the ministerial consultation on ‘acceleration of pre-2020 action (workstream 2) which showed divergence of position and the inclusion of ‘no provision’.

Its spokesperson, Prof Gurdial Singh Nijar warned that the G77-China has participated in this pre-2020 discussion and has put forward provisions that are constructive, hence, the ‘no provision’ inclusion would have serious implications.

He said workstream 1 outcome will depend on workstream 2 which is a process that could clearly show what developed countries are doing in meeting their pre-2020 commitment.

“Given the significance, we feel confident that under your leadership ... with a nudge or two, you will relax tis ‘no provision’ position. We trust and rely on you to conclude workstream 2 that will spell completeness for the Paris Agreement,” he stressed.

He expressed its appreciation of the COP Presidency efficient responses to the Group’s concerns on ‘process issues’ raised at the 7 Dec Paris Committee meeting, noting that the consultations are ‘largely more transparent and effective and allow more groups to participate effectively’.

Prof Gurdial also pointed out that the clear criteria of transparency, inclusiveness and no surprise set by the COP President were being realised but cautioned that the test of this criteria is at the final critical hours.

“How we carry through these elements for a successful conclusion of the Paris Agreement is the real test. As they say, the test of pudding, lies in the

eating’, said Prof Gurdial, adding that that is the Group’s unequivocal expectation of the process.

Representing the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), Maldives said the time is ripe to produce a new version of the text based on the ADP draft Paris Outcome. In doing so, it urged the COP Presidency to take into account the special circumstances and special needs of the small island developing states.

It also stressed the importance to give Parties the opportunity to reflect on the new text and allowed for sufficient time so that everyone is confident with the final outcome, noting that it is also confident that transparency and inclusiveness will be maintained in the final days.

Angola speaking for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) highlighted ‘the need to keep in mind expression temperature goal that is responding to what science recommend’, adding that ‘it is heartening to know that there is emerging consensus on that target’.

It expressed its full support for a cleaner version of the text and looked forward to align it further to achieve an outcome in Paris.

China said it will study the cleaner text (when it is made available) and would table its constructive proposals for a successful conclusion and agreement.

The European Union supported the process forward presented by the COP Presidency, noting that the informal consultations were conducted in transparent and inclusive fashion and that Parties must maximise use of remaining time for an ambitious agreement.

Australia speaking for the Umbrella Group supported and endorsed the plan for the new text and it looked forward to deliver an ambitious, clear and implementable agreement.

Report-back on minister-led informals

In the report back from the ministerial-led consultations on the issue of ‘differentiation’ led by Izabella Monica Vieira Teixeira, Minister of the Environment of Brazil and Vivian Balakrishnan, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Singapore, Balakrishnan said that “differentiation is a key political issue that pervades the entire structure of the proposed agreement. We have been having a series of bilateral consultations throughout the day and it is very clear that the fault lines remain. We will be working with Presidency and secretariat tonight to crystalise in the text that will be

presented tomorrow the fault lines and leave the choice to the Parties,” he said. He added that “Parties are not yet ready to place their final positions on the table.”

In their report back on ‘adaptation and loss and damage, Swedish Minister of Climate and Environment, Åsa Romson, and René Orellana, Minister for Planning for Development, Bolivia reported that in terms of ‘loss and damage’ (Article 5 of the agreement), “there is no clear landing ground yet, as liability and compensation are red lines for Parties. How to strengthen institutional arrangements for addressing loss and damage is also being deliberated.”

They also said that there are “a number of cross-cutting outstanding issues where we believe resolution in other parts of the agreement could facilitate finding consensus, including for example, references to a temperature goal, vulnerability, or

to common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.”

On pre-2020 actions, Amber Rudd, Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, Department of Energy and Climate Change of United Kingdom and Pa Ousman Jarju, Minister of Environment, Climate Change, Water, Forestry and Wildlife of the Gambia reported that on the issue of accelerated implementation, “Parties engaged further on this question, however there remains a divergence of positions, and some Parties noted that their position was to have no provision on this matter.”

The reports from the minister-led consultations are available on the UNFCCC’s website: http://unfccc.int/meetings/paris_nov_2015/in-session/items/9320.php

New revised text for Paris outcome to be issued

Paris, 10 December (Meena Raman and Hilary) – A new revised text on the Paris agreement will be released for the consideration of Parties sometime late afternoon of Thursday, 10 December.

This was made known to Parties by the President of the 21st meeting of the Conference of Parties (COP21) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

COP 21 President, French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius, announced his intention to issue a new revised text at the close of open-ended informal consultations that started at midnight on Wednesday and went on till 5 am. The consultations were closed to observers.

As of the time of writing, the new text is yet to be out. Parties are waiting anxiously to see how the divergent positions over very key issues such as differentiation, ambition (on the long-term global goal), mitigation, finance and loss and damage are going to be reflected in the new text.

With just a little more than a day left before COP 21 is expected to conclude, there is a race against time. Thus far, the French Presidency has been getting kudos from all Parties about the transparency in the process with a Party-driven approach.

However, concerns are mounting if this will remain so, as the clock ticks and the French have to deliver a successful outcome on Friday, 11 December.

Earlier in the day, hard copies of an initial revised version of the draft Paris Outcome was distributed to Parties in the plenary hall following a short meeting of the Paris Committee at 3 pm (two hours after the scheduled time of 1pm). Participants of the COP 21 swarmed the document centre to obtain copies of the 3 pm text.

Fabius said the text strived to reach compromises, which are emerging but is not to prejudge the remaining options in the text. “It is to enable us to have an overview of progress made and to help us focus now on the open questions that still need to be settled at the political level,” he stressed.

He said the shortened text which now stands at 29 pages with a three-quarter reduction of brackets showed progress were made (14-page draft agreement and 15-page accompanying draft decision). He adjourned the meeting for Parties to study the new text and consult among themselves and announced that the Paris Committee will reconvene at 8 pm for Parties to give feedback and he would propose a way forward.

The Paris Committee meeting reconvened at 8 pm on Wednesday to take stock of the ministerial-led consultations, which were conducted throughout the day.

A lengthy session ensued, where numerous Parties took to the floor to express their initial reactions where Parties generally accepted that the new text is a good basis to proceed with negotiations (see reaction of Parties below).

Following the interventions, Fabius said that although progress was made in many areas, more work needed to be done and he urged Parties to work through the night to make swift progress. He then proposed the ‘indaba-type’ consultations (referring to a round table format that was introduced in South Africa in 2011 at COP17) and the parallel open-ended informal consultations.

He urged Parties not to reopen the compromises found so as not to go backward but to look at issues where political decisions are needed as he aimed to issue a new iteration and improved text of the Paris Outcome, which he described as the

penultimate text, later in the afternoon of Thursday, 10 December.

As of midnight of Wednesday, there were open-ended ‘indaba-type’ consultations on differentiation, support and ambition, chaired by Minister Fabius.

In parallel, open-ended informal consultations on loss and damage, cooperative approaches and mechanisms, forests, and the preamble, were held, involving the corresponding facilitating ministers and was coordinated by Minister Manuel Pulgar Vidal, the Peruvian COP 20 President.

According to several sources who were in these meetings, negotiations were not happening, in terms of what Parties could give and take. Most Parties were reciting their positions and speeches. Very few Parties suggested bridging proposals, which came mainly from developing countries. It seems that no one was seen taking notes and concerns were abound as to how Parties’ views were being reflected and taken into account for the new text.

The sources informed TWN that Fabius had said that the text has to be good and that Parties must not only look at red lines but also the green lines, and that this is how the French Presidency intends to proceed.

Reactions of Parties to text released on Wednesday (9 December)

Following are the highlights of the intervention by groupings and selected individual Parties.

Speaking for the Group of 77 and China, South Africa said the Group studied the text carefully and consulted with its members and wished to highlight some initial observations, which are not to be regarded as an exclusive list of the concerns of the Group.

South Africa Minister of Environmental Affairs Edna Molewa said the Group is concerned about the steady delinking of the text from the Convention and a dilution of its principles.

“In this regard, the framing of Parties’ commitments in many places in the text is not properly differentiated. There are also numerous inconsistencies in the text between the Convention’s language and the new draft text,” she noted.

Regarding adaptation, she said “we are concerned that key adaptation proposals from the Group do

not appear in the new text. We trust that we will be able to engage further on this critical issue for developing countries.”

In the paragraphs dealing with the provision of the means of implementation, the Group does not see adequate reassurances that its actions on mitigation and adaptation will be sufficiently supported in the post-2020 period.

“In particular, we are concerned that there does not appear to be a long-term vision on the provision of support, nor strong legal commitments for developed country Parties to provide finance, technology transfer and capacity-building. There is no assurance that there will be predictability and scalable funds.

“It is not clear how the institutional mechanisms will be linked in order to deliver the necessary level of support. We also need to find a way to provide for the continued operation of and delivery by the Adaptation Fund, the Least Developed Country Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund,” she stressed.

On capacity-building, Minister Molewa said the Group is concerned about the lack of differentiation in the new text.

On loss and damage, while acknowledging that there will be further consultations to advance on this issue, she said the Group reiterates its position that the issue should be a separate article in the agreement. The article must be clearly bounded by the principles of the Convention, particularly common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR & RC) that addresses the permanent and irreversible impacts of climate change and a permanent institution is needed to deal with loss and damage arising from the adverse effects of climate change.

The Group is also concerned that the issue of unilateral measures have been omitted from the text when it is a principle of the Convention and stand ready to work on language for this matter.

Despite these concerns, Minister Molewa said the Group is of the view that the text is a good basis on which to continue our negotiations and on which a new iteration can be issued tomorrow.

She said the Group believes that addressing the key political and cross-cutting issues of differentiation, ambition and finance will unlock progress and enable many other issues to be resolved and brackets to be removed.

On issues where consensus is within reach, the Group is of the view that further informal consultations would be helpful to resolve outstanding matters, and she reiterated that it remains important that the process of negotiations be open, transparent and Party-driven.

Representing the **Like-minded Developing Countries (LMDC)**, **Malaysia** said the new text “must seem to be balanced” as Parties across the divide also have concerns, noting that the LMDC is concerned that issue of unilateral measures “has been cleaned-out” and items like carbon pricing had remained.

Prof. Gurdial Nijar urged the COP President to be proactive and to capture the essence of the Parties’ various positions but be mindful of the fact that they were human beings who are prone to misjudgement and wrong interpretation and hoped that there would be some mechanism to capture accurately and faithfully the gist of the presentations by the Parties.

Nijar stressed that “CBDR is the bedrock of the Convention ... we are not here to embowel the principle but to enhance the implementation of the Convention.”

“We have to remind our partners that developing countries, poor as we are, we been dealing with climate change in these past many years in our own way and unfunded, despite the existence of the Convention, because the promised funding under Article 4.7 of the Convention never came or came in such paltry dribbles,” he said.

Nijar further warned that if there is no progress in workstream 2 (on pre-2020 action), there will be no progress in workstream 1 (on the post-2020 agreement).

“They are interlinked. If you want us to do away with the fundamental construct ... if you try in any way, directly, indirectly, obliquely (to do so), we will have no choice but to resist because we need our policy space to eradicate poverty and ensure food security.

“We cannot accept subterfuge of (the narrative of) a changing world when the world still remains the same,” he stressed.

On long-term temperature goal, **India** said it is deeply sensitive to the demands for higher climate ambition. “I understand fully the demand for mentioning 1.5 degree C as we also have over 1,300 islands. However, a 1.5 degree C goal would require developed countries to massively reduce

their emissions and massively scale up their financial support to developing countries. This is not happening,” stressed its Minister of Environment, Forests and Climate Change **Shri Prakash Javadekar**.

He said India is not suggesting that Parties remain stuck to the past but must look forward and move steadily. But, he said a durable agreement cannot be crafted by diluting historical responsibilities or by putting the polluters and the victims at the same level.

Towards this, he underscored that the agreement being crafted must carefully balance climate ambition and the principle of differentiation. “Both are equally important. We cannot have one without the other. It needs to be reaffirmed upfront in the agreement that it is under the Convention and in accordance with its principles.

“Its objective is to enhance the implementation of the Convention across all its pillars. This is crucial. The principles of the Convention must be stated correctly without any unnecessary additions,” he said, adding that the agreement must also meaningfully operationalise differentiation across all its elements, which is not clear in the current draft.

Minister Javadekar further said that India is in favour of a robust transparency mechanism that applies not just to mitigation but all other elements, in particular finance.

The transparency mechanism, he stressed, should cover all countries, in a differentiated manner. Implementing the current system, which has not yet been made operational, he added, is an essential component to build capacity and experience in developing countries. A transition period is therefore needed before changes could be made.

On finance, Minister Javadekar said it is deeply disappointing that on the one hand developed countries are not fulfilling their obligations and on the other hand, they are trying to shift their responsibilities to developing countries themselves where there is no indication of scaling up of finance nor a clear roadmap.

Maldives speaking for the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) in offering its initial reflections said temperature goal of below 1.5 degree C should be reflected clearly in an operational manner under Article 2.

Regarding adaptation, it would like to see the link with the CBDR principle and not to create undue

reporting burdens; that loss and damage should be maintained as a separate article and the special circumstances of small island developing states (SIDS) should be reflected in relation to financial provisions.

Representing the Caribbean Community, Barbados said holding temperature rise to 2 degree C is not acceptable and preferred 1.5 degree C. It also urged that already agreed COP decisions on forests be recognised and anchored in the agreement as an accepted mechanism.

Angola speaking for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) considered the new text to be a very good basis to conclude the work in Paris with areas that needs improvement. It trusted the COP President to engage Parties in a transparent and open manner on the outstanding issues and guide them towards a balanced agreement. It looked forward to continue engagement in a time-bound manner for a new iteration of the text by 10 December.

Representing the African Group, Egypt believed that the indaba process will be useful to unlock key political issues and would benefit from an inclusive drafting process. On adaptation, it said the key element for a global goal for adaptation is missing and cautioned against the missing reference to the special circumstances of LDCs and SIDS.

Guatemala speaking for the Independence Alliance of the Latin America and Caribbean said the new text is adequate to move towards the final stage. It believed that adaptation is a strategic area of climate actions for developing countries and to bear in mind the need of developing countries that are particularly vulnerable.

Saudi Arabia representing the Arab Group said it cannot accept any goal that threatens the sustainable development, or ability to eradicate poverty and ensure food security for its people.

Australia speaking for the Umbrella Group said the text is a step forward but significant work remains. It has serious concern about balance as choices made do not reflect consensus and would not lead to agreement in a range of issues. It said the Group has assured developing countries that the developed country Parties will continue to lead and the agreement must incentivise all Parties to do their best. It said Parties must set clear direction of travel and not bound to a static category.

The European Union said many options crossed the Group's redlines while some were lost from the new text. It said failure to address the issue of an ambitious mechanism of a five-year revisit signals low ambition for a Paris Agreement.

It saw bifurcation language throughout the text which is not consistent with this Paris Agreement noting that developed countries will have obligations up to 2020 but in post-2020 'parties in position to do so' should also join (in assuming obligations).

It said the text is not suitable for a line-by-line negotiation and it is time to resolve in a package and it looked forward to resolving the outstanding issues in the process proposed by the COP President.

Representing the Environmental Integrity Group, Switzerland said the text as a whole is not balanced especially in the article on finance. It said several developed countries and groupings had worked hard to find solution and made compromised proposals to show utmost flexibility to identify common landing zones.

China speaking for BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) said the current text is an open and balanced text as would serve as basis for further negotiation to find a common ground to reach an agreement.

Second version of Paris Outcome text issued – but a deal is still far away

Paris, 11 Dec (Meena Raman and Hilary Chiew) – The second version of the draft Paris Outcome was presented to Parties at the end of a brief meeting of the Paris Committee under the UNFCCC on evening Thursday, 10 December, by COP21 President, French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius.

The first version of the draft Paris Outcome, encompassing the post-2020 agreement and an accompanying decision which includes decisions relating to pre-2020 actions, was issued on Wednesday, 9 December. The new iteration of the text, which was initially scheduled to be provided in the afternoon of 10 December was only made available at 9 pm.

At this fifth meeting of the Paris Committee that was established on Saturday (5 December), COP21 President Fabius said after significant work and a series of consultations, Parties can now move to a decisive step.

Together with the Secretariat, he said, the text was prepared to reach balance, impartiality and reconciled positions. The text is shorter although brackets remain around complex issues, he said, citing issues of finance, differentiation and ambition which will see more consultation in these final hours of the COP.

(The new text was reduced from 29 to 27 pages of which 12 pages contained the draft agreement and 15 pages were allocated to the accompanying draft decision.)

“Compromise does require us to forget the ideal solution for everybody. That is the work we have now ... we are close to the finishing line and we

must find common grounds. In other words, time to come to an agreement,” said Fabius.

He then proposed that Parties study the new draft and consult with other Parties over the next 2.5 hours which will be followed by consultations similar to the setting on Wednesday night. He said he will chair the ‘indaba-type consultations’ which he named ‘indaba of solutions’ where he urged Parties not to present statements but to provide compromise solutions.

He also said in the event when there are persistent differences, the facilitating ministers will be asked to meet at a corner of the room or in a separate room and to report back to the indaba within 30 to 45 minutes.

After this final round of consultations, the COP21 President hoped to present a final version of the text on Friday (11 December). He hoped Parties will agree to this method of work in the final hours to complete the final lap that separates them from a legally-binding, ambitious and fair agreement that the world is expecting.

At 11.30 pm, the COP 21 President convened the indaba consultations, which was closed to observers.

According to sources, the consultations revealed that several developing countries, including China and India raised their concerns over the dilution of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) in the draft agreement as reflected in the obligations of Parties. They made proposals to address their concerns.

However, sources said that the United States, represented by its State Secretary, John Kerry, supported the agreement, saying that

differentiation was reflected, through the notion of ‘self-differentiation’ as represented by the intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs).

It seems that he stressed that the new agreement was a “monument to differentiation.” Kerry was reported to have regretted the “situation” of the US where there could not be a mandatory system (for emission cuts) and for finance to be legally binding.

Sources disclosed that divergences continued with developed countries stressing that the ‘donor base’ of those contributing to climate finance should be expanded to include developing countries, with references in the draft text to the mobilising of climate finance “as part of a shared effort by all Parties”. Developing countries, on the other hand, could not agree to such proposals in the text.

Information provided to TWN revealed that developed countries also expressed that they are unable to commit to a quantified number for finance in the agreement. Several developing countries indicated that developed countries were breaking away from their obligations under the

UNFCCC; one developing country said that the issue of finance could be a make or break for the Paris deal.

With the help of facilitators, breakout groups on differentiation, ambition and finance were held with Parties trying to find solutions.

According to sources, Parties expressed their red lines, which clearly reflected continued divergences over the issue of differentiation and its application as regards the various elements, especially in relation to mitigation, finance and transparency.

The consultations ended at around 5.30 am, on Friday, 11 December.

The COP President informed Parties that there would be a “slight delay” in the conclusion of the COP with a final text to be presented on Saturday morning, 12 December, and for its adoption sometime in the afternoon. (The COP was scheduled to close on 11 December.)

Whether and how compromises will be reached remains a challenge.

Paris Agreement adopted after last minute 'technical corrections'

Geneva, 14 Dec (Meena Raman and Hilary Chiew)
– The Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was finally adopted evening of Saturday, 12 December, after four years since the launch of the process to develop the legal instrument under the Ad hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP).

The adoption of the Agreement was heralded as “historic” by President of the 21st meeting of the Conference of Parties (COP21) to the UNFCCC, French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius, as well as several countries that spoke at the final plenary.

However, there was some disquiet over how the Agreement was adopted in the final two hours, which marred the process, which until then, was viewed as exemplary since the Copenhagen fiasco (where the Danish COP Presidency tried to impose a deal struck behind closed doors between a few countries upon all Parties, leading to the collapse of the talks).

The French Presidency sought compromises among Parties over polarised positions between developed and developing countries, especially in the areas of how differentiation was to be reflected in the agreement, as well as finance and ambition (in relation to the temperature goal).

The concern was over some “technical corrections” which were presented orally by the Secretariat to the draft agreement at the meeting of the *Comité de Paris* (or Paris Committee which was responsible for finalising the agreement) prior to its transmission to the COP for adoption, which convened immediately after and was gavelled through by Fabius, in what seemed to many observers as a very rushed adoption.

When the Paris Committee convened on Saturday, 12 December at 5.30 pm to transmit the draft

agreement for adoption to the COP, it was not until 7.15 pm that the meeting actually began and the Agreement was finally adopted.

The draft agreement was distributed to Parties earlier in the day at around 1.30 pm, following the convening of the Paris Committee by the COP President at around noon, where he informed Parties that the draft agreement was the best possible balance that could be struck and that it was a “delicate balance”.

The French President, Francois Hollande and UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon were also present and made speeches at the noon meeting of the Paris Committee, in what appeared as an effort to cajole all Parties to adopt the agreement without further changes.

There was thunderous clapping in the conference hall even before Parties had seen the text, let alone adopt it.

Fabius then informed Parties that the Paris Committee would convene again at 3.45 pm, after Parties had a chance to see the text. The Committee finally convened around 5.30 pm.

When Parties gathered for the final Paris Committee meeting at 5.30 pm, many were wondering why the meeting did not begin.

News was abuzz that the United States (US) had issues with the draft agreement.

This related to Article 4.4 of the draft agreement as regards ‘mitigation’ and which reads as follows: *“Developed country Parties shall continue taking the lead by undertaking economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets. Developing country Parties should continue enhancing their mitigation efforts, and are encouraged to move over time towards economy-wide emission reduction or limitation targets in the light of different national circumstances.”*

According to sources, the US wanted the word “shall” in the first sentence to be replaced with the word “should”, so that developed and developing countries will be treated in a like manner legally. Instead of raising the issue from the floor of the plenary, the US request was accommodated by the COP Presidency by what was termed a “technical correction” and the word “shall” was then replaced with “should” in the Article which was read out by the Secretariat.

This approach was not viewed favourably by some developing country Parties, although this was not expressed during the COP plenary, given the rousing and jubilant mood in the hall with thunderous clapping and standing ovation over the adoption of the Agreement.

Spokesperson for the **Like-minded Developing Countries (LMDC)**, Professor Gurdial Singh Nijar spoke to TWN later over this marring of the process. He explained that on the morning of 12 December, when the LMDC met with the Presidency, the latter pointed out some key elements of the text which seemed to have accommodated somewhat the LMDC redlines especially in relation to differentiation between developed and developing countries. The COP Presidency read out orally to the LMDC representatives the contents of Article 4.4 as was presented to the Paris Committee prior to the ‘technical correction’.

“We found the text (in this regard) a little convoluted, but we felt we could consider it. We agreed with it and so did the Group of 77 and China,” said Nijar, adding that “we felt there was balance and our red lines were somewhat preserved. Then when we went to the hall, we were shocked to find that the US was objecting to Article 4.4. They came up with this incredulous thing that it was a mistake. The European Union approached us and said that there is a problem and asked us if we could change the ‘shall’ to ‘should’. When we asked them why, they responded that the Americans had told them that if the word ‘shall’ was introduced, the Congress would not pass it. We said that we have done so many things to get the US on board and they were diluting everything. In this case they were diluting something which was our super-red line.”

Nijar said further, “We said if the US has a problem with Congress they have to sort it out. Then we said fine; we can consider this and let the US raise this problem from the floor and resolve this. It was holding up the meeting. They were

trying to suggest that we were the ones holding up the process. We said no and that we were ready to approve the draft. If anyone had an objection with the text, they must raise the issue and get the Presidency to resolve it and we were happy to participate in any resolution. Before that, there was no indication from the US delegation of this problem. Suddenly the meeting was called and the decision was gavelled. The French Presidency then asked for the editorial mistakes to be read out and then the applause started. Nicaragua was raising its flag and shouting to be heard but they were ignored and the gavel came down and their voice was lost in the applause.”

[Article 4.2 of the UNFCCC states: “The developed country Parties and other Parties included in Annex I commit themselves specifically as provided for in the following:

(a) Each of these Parties *shall* adopt national policies and take corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate change, by limiting its anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and protecting and enhancing its greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs. These policies and measures will demonstrate that developed countries are taking the lead in modifying longer-term trends in anthropogenic emissions consistent with the objective of the Convention, ...” (Emphasis added).

This includes policies and measures adopted by regional economic integration organizations, i.e. the European Union.]

Following the adoption of the Agreement, several countries spoke, including Nicaragua.

Nicaraguan Minister Paul Oquist expressed surprise that the COP21 Presidency did not acknowledge his country, despite him raising his flag before the closing of the Paris Committee. He said he wanted to take the floor before adoption of the Agreement.

“The agreement weakens multilateralism in particular for small countries. (Therefore) it dilutes the value of the agreement. I did not intend to block the agreement but rather to work to fine tune. I wanted to make suggestions on some cross-cutting matters which have to be corrected to move forward for humanity. I wanted to explain why we are not able to support the consensus,” said Oquist.

Nicaragua supported the goal of limiting future temperature rise to 1.5 degree C. He said that the

results of the intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs) lead the world to 55 gigatonnes (Gt) of emissions in 2030 rather than 40 Gt that is necessary to achieve the 2 degree C target. “We need to go further because the level of ambition is leading to a 3 degree C world,” said Oquist further.

He also recommended the deletion of paragraph 52 in the decision text in relation to Article 8 of the Agreement (on loss and damage) which reads: *“Agrees that Article 8 of the Agreement does not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation.”* (This clause was introduced by the US as a quid pro quo to have ‘loss and damage’ anchored in the Paris Agreement).

“This would mean giving 3 degree C temperature increase to our grandchildren and they are not able to ask for compensation and we strip them of any legal rights for legal action for the liability of other countries that caused the damage,” said Oquist.

To this, COP21 President French Foreign Minister Fabius simply said Nicaragua’s statement will be included in the report of the meeting.

South African Minister of Environment, Edna Molewa said that the text is not perfect, but believed that it represents a solid foundation from which we can launch our enhanced action with renewed determination. She added that the Agreement is balanced and the best that we can do at this historic moment and was a turning point to a better and safer world. It should be recognised that the Paris Agreement represents a major leap forward for developing countries, creating new legal obligations that they did not have before, she said.

“Again, developing countries have been asked to take this leap without the firm commitments to provide the support that will enable us to contribute our fair share. For our efforts to combat climate change to be successful, it is critical that developed countries significantly enhance the ambition of their actions and ensure that the enhanced actions of developing countries are adequately supported. In the build-up to this conference we have noticed and welcomed the pledges of support made by a number of developed country Parties. This support has to be sustained if we wish to have any meaningful action,” said the South African Minister further.

Molewa also said that “the closing of the pre-2020 ambition gap is essential and the work of the COP in this regard must remain our focus. We have

been focusing strongly on the creation of a post-2020 climate agreement and therefore spent less time on major tasks that would enhance our implementation pre-2020. We must now refocus our attention to the urgent tasks at hand. A number of key issues related to the COP finance agenda unfortunately could not receive the appropriate consideration, particularly issues related to long-term finance and the guidance to the Standing Committee on Finance. We expect to come back in Morocco (the venue of the next COP) with substantive discussions on increasing finance ambition pre-2020,” she added.

Indian Minister of Environment, Forests and Climate Change Prakash Javadekar said that the Paris Agreement acknowledges and recognizes the development imperatives of India and other developing countries. The agreement supports their right to development and their efforts to harmonize development with environment, while also protecting the interests of the most vulnerable, he said.

He also said that the agreement had unequivocally acknowledged the imperative of climate justice, and has based itself on the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR). The agreement also acknowledges the importance of sustainable lifestyles and sustainable consumption patterns, he added.

The Minister said India was happy that the agreement differentiates between the actions of developed and developing countries across its elements. “India has consistently said that the path to climate ambition must be paved with equity. I am happy that the Agreement has recognized this,” said Javadekar.

He added that while give and take was normal in negotiations, India was of the opinion that the agreement could have been more ambitious. “We share the concern of several friends that this Agreement does not put us on the path to prevent temperature rise below 2 degrees C and that the actions of developed countries are far below their historical responsibilities and fair shares. We have in the spirit of compromise agreed on a number of phrases in the Agreement,” said Javadekar.

China’s Vice-Minister of the State Development and Reform Commission, Xie Zhenhua welcomed the adoption of the Paris Agreement. Acknowledging that the agreement is not perfect and there are some areas in need of improvement, he nevertheless said it does not

prevent us from taking the historical step forward. “The Paris conference is a critical point in the global effort against climate change. Its success is critical to the global future in response to climate change and achievement of a sustainable future. After relentless efforts, the Paris Agreement that we achieved today is an agreement that is fair and just, comprehensive and balanced, highly ambitious, enduring and effective with legally binding force. It reflects a strong and positive signal that the world is going to achieve low carbon, green development and sustainable development,” he added.

Xie further said the Agreement is based on the UNFCCC and is built on a series of achievements such as the Kyoto Protocol and the Bali Roadmap following the principle of CBDR and respective capabilities, fairness and justice. It intends to further enhance the comprehensive, effective and sustainable implementation of the UNFCCC, he said stressing that enhancing ambition in the pre-2020 is compatible with actions post-2020.

“It is our hope that all Parties implement the outcome of the Agreement and to be better prepared for the entry into force of the Agreement. I hope all will take active action in enhancing efforts before 2020 and I would like to emphasise the need for developed countries to honour their commitments in providing finance, technology transfer and capacity-building to lay down a solid effort for enhanced actions after 2020,” said Xie.

US Secretary of State, John Kerry said the Paris Agreement “is a tremendous victory that will empower us to chart a new path”. He said that it “will help the world prepare for the impacts of climate change that are already here and also for those we know are headed our way inevitably. We reached an agreement that if globally implemented will help us transition to a global clean energy economy and prevent the worst devastating consequential climate change from ever happening.”

Kerry said that, “we are sending a critical message to the global market place. Many of us here know that it would not be governments that actually make the decision or find the products, or the new technologies... it will be the genius of the American spirit; it will be the businesses unleashed because 196 nations are saying to the global business that we need to move in this direction that will create the research and development and the next great products that will come and change our lives,” he added.

Kerry also said, “we took a critical step forward but what we do next, how we implement our targets and build this agreement and how we strengthen it in times ahead ... that will determine how we actually address one of the most complex challenges humankind has ever faced.”

Australia speaking for the Umbrella Group said congratulated the COP21 Presidency for producing the global agreement that created the global framework for all nations to play its part to ensure safe and prosperous world for future generations.

“Our work here is done and now we can return home to implement this historical agreement. This is a pivotal moment of new global agreement which will see all countries committed to taking ambitious steps in accordance to national circumstances and capabilities.

“It certainly does not include everything that we envisage but it does give us the strategy to work together over coming years and decades to build strong and effective actions that the world needs. The Agreement is clear that we will do this on the basis of actions by all in line with national circumstances. Each country will progress our efforts to the best of our capabilities and no countries will step back,” it added.

It said the Agreement critically provided for all Parties to come back every five years to update on their emissions reduction efforts and ensure Parties build ambition over time and 2020 will be a key moment for this, adding that the Agreement delivers a strong transparency and accounting system which will establish a common basis for all countries to track their efforts, building in flexibility for countries with different capacity, recognising that countries may cooperate through international mechanism to achieve high mitigation ambition through market and other means.

It further said that the Agreement confirmed that developed countries will continue to lead in providing support for climate actions and recognise the important role that others can play in mobilising support and financial flows for low emission and climate resilient development initiatives.

The European Union noted that the Agreement is a real feat of the COP21 Presidency in holding a fragile balance. It said that this is a landmark agreement, adding that Europe is strongly committed to its financial commitments and to translate the Agreement into concrete actions to transform societies.

(With inputs from Indrajit Bose.)

(Further articles on the Paris Agreement will follow.)

3. ECO



ECO has been published by Non-Governmental Environmental Groups at major international conferences since the Stockholm Environment Conference in 1972. ECO is produced co-operatively by the Climate Action Network at the UNFCCC meetings in Paris, France during the November/December COP21 meeting. ECO email: administration@climatenetwork.org • ECO website: www.climatenetwork.org/eco-newsletters • Editorial/Production: Linh Do

LE TOUR DU COP

Bonjour and welcome to the 21st edition of Le Tour du COP!

Participants in Paris have two weeks to show the world what they're made of. ECO welcomes the ADP's early start and expects governments to treat COP21 as a turning point, where they agree to a transformation that is much faster; just; and has the needs of the most vulnerable at its core.

~ECO's ultimate guide for winning the race~

Well-built Cycles: As any bike rider can tell you, increasingly ambitious cycles are essential for reaching the finish line.

ECO urges countries to adopt a Paris Ambition Mechanism that ensures that the overall ambition across all elements is assessed and **scaled up** in 5-year time frames. Contributions should be regularly updated to be in line with the 1.5-degree C limit, on the basis of regular science and equity reviews.

Current INDCs should be reviewed and ratcheted up as soon as possible, and well before countries begin implementation in 2020.

Long-term Goal: To maintain the right speed and direction, you need to know your final destination. ECO expects governments to agree to a 1.5°C temperature goal and operationalise it with a long-term goal of full global decarbonisation and 100% renewable energy access for all by 2050.

Finance: Securing the yellow (or should that be green?) jersey requires teamwork. This kind of collaboration can be fuelled by establishing collective targets for financial support to be set by the CMA every 5 years, with distinct targets for adaptation and mitigation.

Developed countries and other countries that are in a position to do so (because their levels of capability and responsibility are comparable to developed countries) would commit to contributing to meeting these targets.

Adaptation: To stay in the race for a climate-safe planet, we must be resilient by scaling up adaptation action urgently.

The Paris agreement must adopt a global goal that advances adaptation and builds resilience for all communities and ecosystems. It should recognise that higher temperatures will require greater adaptation efforts. Achieving the adaptation goal is a common responsibility, and will require support to developing countries.

Loss and Damage Action: A durable climate regime must be able to respond to the impacts of climate change that can't be prevented through mitigation or adaptation. The Paris agreement must be equipped with a separate provision on loss and damage, with robust institutional arrangements and financial support to vulnerable developing countries to address these kinds of impacts.

Pre-2020 Action and Support: If you stay too far back in the pack, at some point you can't make up the distance needed to win the race. The future of our planet is too important to risk waiting too long to make our move. Immediate action is needed to address the ambition gap. ECO urges developed countries to implement, accelerate and strengthen their pre-2020 commitments, while all countries cooperate to do more.

Through a strong Workstream 2 decision, governments must also agree to create a menu of workable policy options to scale up action. To maintain momentum, two high-level champion positions should be created and filled with leaders with a profile capable of incentivising high-level cooperation built around the good ideas coming out of the TEP. The champions should also coordinate the development and scaling up of mitigation and adaptation initiatives by matching good ideas with necessary means of implementation. These initiatives should be presented at annual high-level meetings, which can also review future progress.

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Crucially, developed countries must present a plan on how they are going to meet their \$100 billion promise, how to improve the imbalance between mitigation and adaptation, and specifically how support from public sources will increase until 2020.

Transparency and Integrity: The Tour has seen its fair share of unsportsmanlike conduct. To keep all Parties on their best behaviour, the Paris agreement should contain a **strong** transparency framework, including MRV, to maintain trust and ensure transparency of action and support.

The new agreement must also ensure emissions reductions are real, additional, verifiable, and permanent; avoid double counting of effort; are supplemental to ambitious national mitigation; contribute to sustainable development and ensure net atmospheric benefits.

Respect for Human Rights: Good team leaders look after their people. For the Paris outcome to promote effective climate policies that benefit those affected by impacts of climate change, it must include an operative, overarching reference to human rights.

On this road through many negotiations, we have made it through some difficult stages and the finish line for an agreement is in sight. The pieces needed for a strong outcome in Paris are within reach. It is now up to our leaders to finish strong and deliver the result our world so desperately needs.

SPECIAL EVENT INVITE

The Paris Agreement: A Springboard for transformative change?

Please join Climate Action Network International in discussion how the Paris agreement needs to kick start short- and long-term transformative change of economic systems nationally and globally. In this side event, Climate Action Network and country delegations will outline the key components for achieving adequacy, ambition and overall fairness in Paris, and provide an outlook on how the Paris Agreement can form the springboard for transformative change that the world needs.

When: 30 Monday, 1500-1630

Where: Observer Room 01

RULES RULE!

In your country, does traffic drive on the left or the right? Imagine a road filled with large trucks, driving at uncontrollable speeds, on both sides of the road, and you're in the middle of it all – on a bicycle. Exactly! When rules aren't clear or don't work properly, the most vulnerable that suffer most. That's why ECO is a great fan of transparency and rules, especially on measuring, reporting and verification (MRV).

The Paris agreement should enable a transition towards a common and robust transparency framework for action, and for support by developed countries; with finance and capacity building for all developing countries who need it, to enable this transition. Clear rules will also support a strong Paris Ambition Mechanism. This transparency framework needs to be tiered and dynamic to recognise differing capabilities while progressing towards common accounting and MRV, and include clear criteria to prohibit double counting. The agreement should also elaborate the information requirements for future INDCs.

Traffic rules help you to know what to expect from others on the road. Clear rules also incentivise good behaviour because everyone can see if they aren't followed. Or what else will stop a truck from pushing you and your bike off the road?

Transparency and accountability are vital to build trust between Parties. It is also needed to assess progress, account for action and make others accountable, and to ensure that climate actions implemented are the right ones for ecosystems and people. That obviously applies to mitigation, finance, adaptation and any other commitments too.

Travel safely!

PLAY IT STRAIGHT ON WORKSTREAM 2 AND ADAPTATION

The dynamic, lovable beast we know as Workstream 2 is our best apparent opportunity to bend the emissions trajectory downward by 2020. It has also been a beacon of hope that Parties can work together to develop climate solutions. Also, some of these solutions, such as renewable energy and energy efficiency, have massive co-benefits beyond emission reductions.

Over the past year, the scope of Workstream 2 has widened. It expanded beyond closing the pre-2020 emissions gap. Discussions now also include addressing the pre-2020 ambition gaps on adaptation and finance, and should include means of implementation. On the face of it, this is a good thing. There's much immediate need for adaptation action, and an equally substantial need for support. Focus from Parties could help accelerate overall action in these areas.

Even so, some nights, especially after the Bonn intersessional, ECO has laid awake concerned that discussions on adaptation might be used by some to slow down overall progress on Workstream 2. Progress on both adaptation and closing the pre-2020 emissions gap are critical to the fate of the vulnerable. And, refreshingly, Workstream 2 largely has been a space where Parties have worked constructively, rather than played games. This should continue.

By avoiding duplication and properly placing the Adaptation Technical Examination Process within the decision text, Workstream 2 can provide an important contribution to adaptation in general, while also keeping our eyes on that looming emissions gap.

A BETTER WORLD IS POSSIBLE

Now, more than ever, an ambitious Paris agreement can be a sign that a better world is possible. The new climate agreement must show solidarity with those on the frontline of climate impacts. These communities have suffered: 30,000 people are killed each year in disasters that are related to climate change.

Loss and damage is crucial for vulnerable countries and existential for some. Fourteen countries included loss and damage in their INDCs: Barbados, China, Costa Rica, Dominica, Gambia, India, Malawi, Myanmar, Philippines, Sierra Leone, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Vietnam and Zambia. In Myanmar's INDC they outlined the terrible damage that Tropical Cyclone Nargis caused in 2008: 138,000 people were killed, and infrastructure was devastated with a damage bill of US\$4 billion, causing long-term socioeconomic impacts to the country.

At the last negotiating session, the G77 suggested a compromise (Article 5, Option 1) that would establish a solid basis for addressing loss and damage including a displacement facility for people forced from their homes due to climate change. Knowing that compensation was a no-go area for rich countries, developing countries excluded it from their proposal: a difficult decision, but one that demonstrates a spirit of compromise and good faith.

On the other hand, the extreme position from the US, Japan, Canada, Australia and Switzerland of no reference to loss and damage in the Paris agreement (Article 5, Option 2) is not an option if we want a fair agreement.

ECO looks forward to the EU showing solidarity with vulnerable countries, and joining them in reaching a compromise. Staying on the sidelines until the last moment, which is fast approaching, is playing a dangerous game. It failed at Copenhagen, and could fail again at Paris. Remember, Heads of State, we are listening to you today!

FORM OVER SUBSTANCE IN THE FINAL TECHNOLOGY TEXT?

ECO has a sense of déjà vu when it comes to technology in the Paris agreement. As in Cancun, Durban, and all the way back to Marrakech, the technology text and decision seems doomed to repeat history: choosing new technology institutions rather than real, substantive commitments.

The current agreement text removes all substantive commitments found in the original Geneva text, in favour of vague statements in optional paragraphs 7.4 and 7.5. The proposed decision text focuses primarily on technology needs assessments (TNAs). Only in paragraph 50 does it include specific commitments by developed countries on intellectual property (IPRs) and financial support.

History suggests that:

- 1) Substantive commitments are likely to be limited to TNAs unless developing countries hold strong on demands for finance and policies and measures to be included in the decision text;
- 2) Developing country demands for technology support and policies will be traded for institutional changes and the development of the technology framework .

The largest amount of technology text is aimed at the establishment of a new technology framework, to be developed by the new Intergovernmental Preparatory Committee (IPC) and adopted by the CMA at its first session. What this framework will entail remains unclear, but references to the 4/CP.7 framework suggest it will address: technology needs assessment, technology information, enabling environments, capacity building and mechanisms for technology transfer.

History also shows that TNAs were the only elements of that framework properly implemented. Enabling environments in developed countries were never addressed and remain a subject of contention. The institution established by that framework, the Expert Group on Technology Transfer, was specifically prevented from engaging in implementation and was largely considered ineffective.

Given this history, ECO hopes that Paris will break with this history by producing real substantive commitments on technology development and transfer, rather than weak institutional outcomes.

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READY FOR CLIMATE ACTION NOW. WILL YOU WALK WITH US?

Melbourne, Australia; Quezon city, Philippines; Cairo, Egypt; Apia, Samoa; Tokyo, Japan; Kathmandu, Nepal; Wellington, New Zealand; Majuro, Marshall Islands; Dhaka, Bangladesh, and many more.

Over the weekend, hundreds of thousands of people marched in the streets calling for climate action. And those who couldn't march, including here in Paris, were represented by friends across the world. Others, including Pope Francis, sent their shoes to represent them.

The power of this unprecedented citizen mobilisation is surely so strong that it will penetrate these arcane UN halls.

It is up to you, delegates, to both live up to this demand for climate action from your citizens – embracing ambition and the common good – and also to build in community-driven solutions. Enhancing education, access to information and meaningful public participation would recognise the importance of these engaged citizens. It would also ensure that climate action reflects the needs of local communities, and the transition already underway.

ECO is grateful for the leadership of the Dominican Republic in promoting these crucial elements and expects all countries to rally in support of them.





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1.5°C Means Serious Long Term Goals

This week is kicking off with a major focus on vulnerable countries and resilience. As Obama's opening speech said, 'no nation large or small, wealthy or poor is immune to the impacts of climate change'. That is why today's declaration by the Climate Vulnerable Forum (CVF)—a platform of 20 countries whose people, economies and ecosystems are at risk of irreparable damage as a result of rising temperatures—is of huge importance.

These 20 countries have not only pledged to fight for climate justice, but also to demonstrate how such justice can become a reality. Making 1.5°C real will require a clear and rapid transition away from fossil fuels. It means that countries must agree to decarbonise globally and transform to a 100% renewable energy system by 2050. It also means a Paris Ambition Mechanism that will ensure targets are reviewed before 2020 and then renewed and revised upwards

on a 5-year rolling cycle—to keep survival and a just transition within reach. It requires richer nations both to fulfil their promise of providing US\$100 billion of climate finance by 2020 and to take the lead in making this the floor for future support for mitigation, adaptation and loss and damage.

ECO wholeheartedly supports countries' demand to limit the global temperature rise to no more than 1.5°C. If our goal is not to secure the survival of whole countries, then what is it? This is a simple moral imperative that should unite us all.

If ECO had only one wish, it would be that the voices of the most vulnerable should resonate through the negotiating halls of Le Bourget and their demands be supported and championed by all Parties, especially the EU, US, and other countries that pride themselves on being partners in global solidarity.

Dead Heat in First Fossil of the Day Awards of the Paris Climate Summit



As world leaders up the ante on the opening day of the Paris Climate Summit, the first place Fossil of the Day award is a double-act. New Zealand claims a top spot for rather hilariously, or not, urging countries to phase out fossil fuel subsidies while shelling out big bucks to prop up fossil fuel production, to the tune of US\$80 million.

Prime Minister John Key showed a degree of hypocrisy by claiming, at a Friends of Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform event, that New Zealand is a leader on fossil fuel subsidy abolition—despite the country's fossil fuel production subsidies increasing seven-

fold since his election in 2008. His phony grandstanding came just a week after claiming that New Zealand 'doesn't need to be and shouldn't be a leader in climate change'. Are you getting mixed signals too?

Joining New Zealand on the winners podium (drum roll please) for a First Place Fossil Award is Belgium! With environmental leadership as murky as a tall glass of Weisse beer, its four regional governments from four different parties are still bickering over how to implement the EU climate and energy package since 2009. Today, Belgium is lagging behind on their carbon pollution reduction and renewable energy targets. Because of this bickering blocking a Belgian climate agreement, the country also lags behind in providing sufficient and durable climate finance. The severe state of gridlock in the Belgian environment office makes ECO wonder if some of the political bigwigs are having 5 boxes of Guylian Chocolates in one sitting whenever progress is to be made. That probably also led to the Environment Minister missing the train to Paris. Why? Because the government was negotiating the restarting of old nuclear power plants that were canned over a year ago.

And look, only a couple of hours after receiving the Fossil, Belgium reached an agreement. Not one on climate, noooo. One on more old nukes for the coming decade. Belgium is moving...backwards.

Will Rich Countries Answer Africa's Adaptation Call?

One message that transpired from Monday's leaders' event was that developed countries claim to have a lot of solidarity with vulnerable countries. Good. ECO assumes they are now planning to turn warm words into action—and answer Africa's call to double the share of adaptation finance in overall climate finance, from today's 16% to 32% by 2020, a call first heard at the pre-COP a few weeks ago.

This would lead to US\$32 billion a year by 2020 for adaptation, within the \$100 billion promise, so (good news) no new money would have to be found. Rather, such a target would be a qualification of the \$100 billion promise, and likely find support among vulnerable countries from all continents and contribute to the building of an alliance of ambition here in Paris.

However, when ECO spoke to developed countries about this, some offered rather lame excuses (so much for solidarity). One negotiator said setting such a target was too prescriptive—as if developing countries haven't been asking for increased adaptation finance for ages. Another tried to dodge the challenge, claiming there are not enough adaptation projects in the pipeline, although admitted that if poor countries would be provided with readiness and capacity building support, that pipeline would get clogged in no time, and demand for finance would skyrocket.

To be clear, needs are much higher than \$32 billion a year. Adaptation costs in developing countries alone are set to rise to around \$500 billion a year by 2050, even in a below-2°C scenario. Against this, Africa's call seems rather modest, actually; getting 50% of the \$100 billion by 2020 channelled to adaptation would be more appropriate, ECO thinks.

In any event, adopting such a pre-2020 adaptation finance target would be a political move—of which the next two weeks will require quite a few. Answering Africa's call on adaptation finance might turn out to be one of the easier ones.

Fast for the Climate

ECO is happy to see that 'Fast for the Climate' is back at the climate talks. ECO is sure that readers will remember Warsaw, when former Filipino climate ambassador Yeb Saño's impassioned speech sparked a movement of thousands to abstain from eating for periods of time to demand climate action.

Fast for the Climate has taken quite a journey around the world, even reaching the far away of Tuvalu, where they fasted during the Lima COP. ECO even heard about how a different person has fasted for the climate every day since the Lima COP, up to the start of Paris.

Today, Fast for the Climate has grown to 10,000 people worldwide. It includes people from all walks of life and many religious backgrounds. Tonight, when they break their fast, these 10,000 people will feast together in celebration of how their actions have brought awareness to their call for a 100% renewable world by 2050, in solidarity with vulnerable countries, robust support to poor countries, addressing loss and damage—and for us all to rethink our lifestyles and lead by example.

If people from all religions, continents and backgrounds can come together to fast, can't the world's leaders also stand together to make this COP the one moment in his-tory where the world started to get serious about dealing with climate change?

Shipping & Aviation: Elephants in the Room

The sense of momentum that kicked off the COP Monday seems to have left out two major sources of emissions: international aviation and shipping. Emissions from these sectors fall outside national targets and are therefore separate from the INDCs submitted to-date. So, while most countries have come forward with pledges, these sectors are not included in those contributions.

If aviation and shipping were a country, they would be a top ten emitter, with their emissions expected to grow a whopping 270% by 2050. This would undermine efforts made by states and other sectors, whilst making the 1.5/2 degrees C objective almost impossible to achieve. This should not be an option. These sectors also pay zero tax on their fuel. This is a fossil fuel subsidy that is partly responsible for driving their emissions growth.

Two UN agencies are responsible for regulating emissions from these sectors—the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) for shipping and the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) for aviation. Since Kyoto tasked them with limiting or reducing emissions from these sectors, their emissions grew instead of decreased—80% between 1990 and 2010, compared to 40% for the rest of the global economy.

The Paris Agreement needs to provide ICAO and IMO with the momentum and ambition that they are so woefully lacking. It should require them to set emissions targets in line with their fair share of the 1.5/2 degree target. It should ensure these targets and efforts are subject to the same review processes that will be created to review national efforts. Ending their tax-free fuel status is also a no-brainer. It can provide climate finance while at the same time driving efficiency gains in these sectors.

Later today, ICAO and IMO will present their failed efforts to SBSTTA. It will be another recital of green washing, excuse making, and inaction. Let's make this the last COP where ICAO and IMO turn up without doing their homework. They are the climate "elephants in the room". Let's use the agreement to end their special (polluting) status.

Visit www.elephantsintheroom.eu for more information.

Do You Recognise Me?

On the first day of any COP, ECO always finds itself wandering the halls, orienting where the best coffee is, or where the plenaries will be. It goes without saying that ECO is pleased to see old friends and familiar faces working towards a safer climate future. But, with so many people in Le Bourget, there were certainly a few moments today trying to place people. Is that the Guardian reporter, or the delegate from India?

This is also sometimes the case when looking at the many pieces that will make up the Paris package. For example, most people see the Lima Paris Action Agenda (LPAA) as a forum to bring together state and non-state actors to accelerate cooperative climate action.

Yet, from another perspective, the LPAA could also be seen as something else—the first test for a more permanent high-level action agenda that Paris should establish. A permanent high-level engagement platform would be a key element of a strong Workstream 2 decision. As proposed by AOSIS, this action agenda would be led by two high-level champions, who are prominent global individuals with the stature and connections to rally the world to close the emissions gap to 1.5°C. Given the important example the LPAA would set, it needs to get off on the right foot. This would start with excluding initiatives involving fossil fuel companies. And areas like energy efficiency, renewable energy, cities and forests (which all currently have a prominent space in the LPAA) should continue to be the focus of the permanent action agenda.

To ensure that we have an action agenda in 2016, which focuses on transformational outcomes that help close the gap, the Workstream 2 decision should set a clear criteria for future initiatives. Additionally, there should be provisions to track progress and hold stakeholders accountable for making progress after the cameras and lights go off.

So, as you watch the LPAA action days this coming week, remember that there is more than meets the eye.



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1.5: Possible Ambitious Required International Success

Yesterday's Joint Contact Group on the 2013-2015 review saw Saudi Arabia—supported by its shadows Oman and China, attempt to block clear conclusions from ADP and COP's two years of excellent work on the long-term goal. Worse, those countries are trying to prevent progress towards a COP decision on strengthening the limit for acceptable warming, which has its foundations in the robust climate science contained in the Structured Expert Dialogue (SED).

The SED found that the previously accepted 'guardrail' opinion, that 2°C of warming is safe, is inadequate. Now we know that the line of defence must be set lower. Yesterday, many countries—including the members of the Climate Vulnerables Forum—echoed that concept in an impressive declaration, calling for a warming limit of 1.5°C.

2°C of warming would result in catastrophic impacts on sensitive global ecosystems. Arctic sea-ice will disappear, glaciers will melt, and ocean acidification will destroy coral reef ecosystems. In other words: disaster for the climate and disaster for our planet.

The good news is the SED concluded that keeping warming well below 2°C is still possible through deep emission cuts. These cuts can be achieved through full decarbonisation of energy systems, along with scaling-up of low-carbon energy technologies by approximately 90% by 2050. ECO expects that parties will want to demonstrate unambiguously—through a COP decision—that they take science seriously and that the Paris agreement will build on the basis of the outcome of the SED.

A Different Differentiation

If we don't honestly and courageously deal with the differentiation challenge, we're going to get a low ambition agreement.

Self-differentiation is not good enough. Neither is political differentiation that reflects only power and negotiation games. In submitting their INDCs, developing countries have made the first move to progress beyond the Kyoto categories set out in 1992. Developed countries should acknowledge this shift and respond

Where Is the Bridge Builder?

Yesterday, the Climate Vulnerable Forum declaration sent a resounding call to make the 1.5°C target real. Today, we continue to focus on the reality of climate impacts.

Developing countries are at risk of acute climate damage and enormous adaptation costs. The European Union has a major role to play in ensuring the Paris agreement is fair and strong on this crucial issue. The EU has traditionally been a bridge builder in the negotiations. The EU needs to put its engineering skills to work. The EU should work closely with CVF countries to build unity and improve climate ambition.

That means ensuring the Paris outcome truly supports countries to be resilient to climate impacts. A long-term goal on adaptation and a commitment to setting 5-year quantified financial targets are core elements. Our global resilience depends on the long-term target we set, so decarbonisation by 2050, and rapidly increasing ambition until we get there, are essential.


No one is immune to the impacts of climate change. EU citizens are already experiencing severe floods and heat waves. In the last 30 years, Europe has seen a 60% increase in extreme weather events. Even in the EU, the poorest suffer most. Global solidarity must start in Le Bourget—ECO is looking to the EU to bring us together.

by constructively addressing differentiation in regard to mitigation, finance and transparency, to ensure an equitable agreement.

We need a dynamic approach to differentiation that is sensitive to changing levels of development and capability. We need a robust agreement that equitably closes the mitigation and development gaps. That agreement must reflect specific differentiation in each element.

Climate Vulnerable Forum Shines with Bold Call for 100% Renewable Energy

To be Fossil-worthy, you must be cowardly. You must shake with a limp wrist. So yesterday we didn't give out a Fossil. We gave a Ray of the Day.



Despite the name, we do not give Rays out every day. It's only given when extraordinary things happen. Monday night at 6pm, there was a high level meeting of 43 nations from the Climate Vulnerable Forum (CVF).

They made a bold, ambitious declaration to do something amazing. The CVF declared that they will aim to achieve full decarbonisation of their economies and run their countries on 100% renewable energy by 2050! In doing so, these countries have decided not to play the victim. They are showing the kind of leadership the rest of the world can learn from. They are leading the way in setting course for a safer world with only 1.5°C of global warming. This declaration is so big, so bold, that it makes lots of the other countries look like...fossils.

Let's hear it for the countries of the Climate Vulnerable Forum!

Truly Transformational: African Renewable Energy Initiative

The Africa Renewable Energy Initiative (AREI) was launched yesterday, representing a breakthrough on renewable energy development. AREI could help Africa leapfrog into low-carbon development. As one African dignitary said at the launch: 'Sunshine should do more than nourish our crops, it must power our homes.'

The goal of AREI is to build at least 100 GW of new and additional renewable energy generation capacity by 2020, and 300GW by 2030. That's double the entire current electricity generation in Africa, which is roughly 150GW!

AREI shows what can be achieved when there is political will and collaboration among key stakeholders. The African Ministerial Conference on the Environment, the New Partnership for Africa's Development, the African Group of Negotiators, the African Development Bank and UNEP have all worked together to bring this initiative off the ground. ECO can only hope that this Africa-grown initiative will receive the financial and technical support it deserves from developed countries.

ECO remembers when the idea for a renewable energy initiative in Africa was first proposed in a Technical Experts Meeting. We hope that yesterday's launch will inspire similar ambitious action in other countries and regions, as well as broad support for an action agenda in the ADP. AREI is a perfect example of what ECO loves: transformative initiatives that contribute to closing the emissions gap, while realising development co-benefits. Workstream 2 could help launch other such initiatives and match them with finance and other support to ensure that they can be scaled up, replicated and tracked.

Agreements and Disagreements

A permanent Action Agenda building on the lessons of the Lima Paris Action Agenda could narrow the gap between current emissions trajectories and those required to limit global temperature rise to below 1.5°C.

Some of the elements of such a permanent Action Agenda seem to be falling into place. Nobody disagrees about the importance of closing the gap or of identifying menus of good policy options that could be scaled up or replicated. Nobody disagrees about the benefits of involving non-state actors. There is a growing consensus that we need to appoint two high-level champions to facilitate the development of initiatives that help to close the gap.

However, it gets murkier from there. Though developed countries can and should launch unilateral and cooperative actions with their own resources, developing countries will require additional finance and technological support to take extra action. Yet some parties seem to think that this should not be discussed.

Similarly, it is clear that climate change impacts are increasing and that we need to develop additional initiatives to scale up adaptation actions. Yet, the fate of a Technical Examination Process for adaptation is still hotly debated, and here too some Parties do not want to discuss ways to increase support for adaptation.

ECO would like to remind Parties that the real measure of success for Workstream 2 will be whether it helps us to address climate change in the short term. This can only be done if developed countries increase their targets and if enough financial and technological resources are made available for mitigation and adaptation action on the ground.

Loss and Damage: On the Brink of Disaster or the Verge of a Solution?

ECO was pleased to hear so many Heads of State recognise that climate change is already resulting in severe impacts. Leaders of the most powerful countries acknowledged the existential threats to the most vulnerable. ECO hopes that negotiators are listening to their bosses.

If not, loss and damage will be a sticking point for negotiations this week. We are sure that many ministers will not be happy when the new text on Saturday looks just like the current one. That is, one 'non'-option to exclude loss and damage completely, and one option for a 5-paragraph comprehensive loss and damage mechanism under the agreement.

If negotiators are in fact listening to their bosses, they can make substantial progress on loss and damage this week. They need to elaborate further options to address L&D within the Paris agreement, combined with immediate steps to address key concerns through the COP decisions.

There is no obstacle to putting institutional arrangements in the Paris agreement. Negotiators can also leave open the possibility of future amendments. Either way, negotiators can make progress. There is no time for brinkmanship.

Worrying Gives Us Wrinkles. Give Us Money Instead.

The anticipation of what leaders would or would not announce on climate finance had our hearts pounding. Yesterday calmed some of those nerves. Hot on the heels of Canada's pledge, other countries joined the party, making commitments to the Least Developed Country Fund. Norway, Sweden and Spain also increased their climate finance commitments.

That's not a bad start. But ECO doesn't want to come to every COP to worry about donor countries committing to much needed climate finance.


Developed countries could ease ECO's nerves by guaranteeing predictability, adequacy and clarity of their financial pledges, as they scale up climate finance to US\$100 billion annually by 2020. This is particularly urgent for developing countries that need to prioritise adaptation while facing a shortfall in financial support.

ECO urges developed countries to build on the climate finance momentum generated on Monday, not just through COP21, but also to 2020 and beyond. Strong language around credible, adequate, and predictable finance in the Paris agreement would smooth our wrinkles and unfurrow our brows.

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Cycling Together

ECO has no doubt that parties came to Paris with the best of intentions, and are keen to make sure we stay below 2°C. The party spoiler is that we've been warned that we are on a more-than-3°C track. And ECO knows that even 2°C is too much. How can we increase the stakes to avoid settling for a 3°C world? ECO believes that many Parties, especially developing countries, can and are willing to go further than their current INDCs. But many will need extra support to do that.

The facilitative dialogue described in Paragraph 20 of the COP Decision Text is a great place to start influencing current INDCs before 2020.

After developed countries increase their pre-2020 ambition, wouldn't it be so much more interesting and effective if all countries come up with improved INDCs? Developed countries would lead the way with mitigation, and support developing countries by identifying additional conditional contributions they could make with such support. This would be the embryonic beginning of a 5-yearly process that links the gears of finance cycles closely to those of

mitigation reviews. The finance cycles would set targets for support in 5-year intervals, while the mitigation review cycles would start with the revision of INDCs and need to happen as soon as possible before 2020. Mere 'preparation' of subsequent INDCs is not enough—the current initial commitments must be revised and resubmitted to put us onto a 2°C path and keep 1.5°C in reach.

If ECO had a magic wand, it would make the same cycle apply to the identification of adaptation finance needs and set 5-yearly targets to meet them. This 'axle of ambition' would connect cycles of mitigation and adaptation, accelerated by finance and linked to the adequacy of mitigation ambition. This process should continue through the Article 10 post-2020 global stocktake, starting in 2023 and repeating and scaling-up every 5 years until a robust long-term goal is met. This sturdy connection allows these wheels to move fast—we're talking Tesla on the Autobahn.

Insure Loss and Damage in the Paris Agreement

Delegates, as you must be aware by now (although some of you do show some need for additional lessons), loss and damage has a range of elements, including slow onset and extreme events, and financial and non-economic elements. And loss and damage will impact the poorest worst.

ECO welcomes insurance initiatives, such as the G7 initiative and boosters from the US, and acknowledges that regional insurance initiatives CCRIF and ARC have provided benefits to countries in those regions. However, we feel it imperative to remind Parties that insurance is not a cure for all loss and damage.

ECO dares you to try to take out insurance for desertification. Or for rising sea levels. No insurance in the world will cover you for such slow onset—and permanent—impacts. And for the extremely poor, private insurance is not an option. Who on earth would expect poor and vulnerable people to pay for dealing with all the climate impacts they didn't cause?

ECO can already make some suggestions for elements to complement insurance: support to assess and plan for livelihood transitions, and address relocation needs to enable communities to rebuild, and not only physical infrastructure. In the face of relocation and loss of cultural and historical heritage, we should support post-disaster situations and reform humanitarian affairs to fit a world increasingly impacted by climate change.

The current text proposal on a process to explore irreversible and permanent damage seems like an opportune place to evaluate these elements and more that would complement insurance in the coming years. ECO hopes the proposal will stay alive long enough to fulfil this function.

The Right(s) Call

ECO has enjoyed hearing Parties' visions for the new agreement. Especially those that highlighted the need for an agreement that supports human rights, including the rights of indigenous peoples. ECO loved hearing from Parties who said that a Paris agreement will only be successful if it's rooted in gender equality and intergenerational equity, delivering food security, ecosystem integrity and a just transition with decent jobs.

The Philippines, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, and others (including Canada—welcome back!) recalled that human rights are at the core of the UNFCCC. These champions are working constructively to engage other countries and help sketch a positive shared vision for the future.

But ECO is disappointed that other countries do not want to be champions for human rights, and have expressed the opinion that human rights must remain non-operative. These non-champions refuse to recognise that an agreement neglecting human rights will struggle to garner the public support needed for its implementation.

ECO doesn't want to believe that the EU is not strongly committed to the principles of human rights. But so far they have shied away from expressing unequivocal support for operative references. With many champions already standing for this issue, how long will it take for the EU to get its act together and choose to join the progressive countries? As a key player in this discussion, surely the EU will not want to go down as a fence sitter when the fate of such crucial principles is being decided.

While we're speaking of non-champions, ECO wants to drop a note to Australia, New Zealand, Switzerland and the US. We're wondering if you will you follow Canada's Northern Light or go down a much darker path, stripping the agreement of what we all know is inalienable?

ICAO and IMO:

Hiding from Their Responsibilities in a Bunker

You've heard about the Fossil: even with HUGE emissions, ICAO and IMO's contribution to COP21 are all recycled promises, delivered to the SBSTA.

The agreement must send ICAO and IMO a clear signal—they have to do their fair share to help us stay below the 1.5 or 2°C limit. They must increase their ambition, and deliver targets and measures that reduce emissions.

ICAO has launched a process to agree on a global market-based mechanism by next year. ECO will be watching to see if they get the job done, and include a mechanism to increase their ambition over time. It's time for you to deliver. You're the elephants in the room of these climate negotiations, and it's time for your special status to end.

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Dirty Shipping and Aviation Set for Collision with Fossil Awards

Not a Party, but two international organisations received the First Place Fossil today: the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO).

Put your tray tables up and close the port holes—IMO and ICAO have the same emissions as Japan and Germany combined! These emissions are currently exempt from inclusion in the Paris agreement and IMO and ICAO are doing their worst here to keep it that way. Yet without action, emissions from bunkers will grow 270% by 2050—sinking any chance of limiting temperature rise to safer levels.

International shipping and aircraft enjoy tax free fuel to the tune of over 60 billion bucks, yet don't want to contribute to climate finance. No wonder the Foreign Minister of the Marshall Islands called the IMO Secretary General 'a danger to the planet'.

Coming in hot with today's Second Place Fossil of the Day award is Turkey. While other developing nations like Mexico, the Philippines and the 43 members of the Climate Vulnerable Forum are bringing lots of positive leadership to the table, Turkey is making a goose of itself.

It's pretty clear Turkey's role at these discussions is aimed at extracting as much climate finance as possible. However, its INDC suggests that Turkey's contribution is a 100% increase in greenhouse gas emissions (on 2013 levels)! You could call that money for nothing.

An EU of (WS)2 Minds

Did you know ECO can be in several rooms at the same time? Usually, ECO finds this quite helpful. Sometimes, though, it just leaves us thoroughly confused.

Take the case of the EU yesterday. In the contact group discussions, the EU stressed that Parties' targets are not strong enough and ambition needs to be increased to respect the 2°C guardrail, suggesting textual changes accordingly. ECO could not agree more on this point. In a different room at exactly the same time, the CMP was meeting, and ECO heard other Parties stressing that targets are not strong enough and ambition needs to be increased to respect the 2°C guardrail. So Parties suggested a contact group to consider pre-2020 targets and guess what: the EU forcefully rejected this proposal, even though they supported increasing ambition just down the hall.

Can you please just make up your mind?

Now, the EU might be concerned that a CMP contact group would only look at commitments under the KP, meaning those of a limited number of developed countries and not all Parties. If that were the case, ECO would be even more confused. Why has ECO not heard any support from the EU for a process on accelerated implementation in the Workstream 2 negotiations, which would be exactly the forum to discuss this?

We all know emissions need to peak before 2020 to stay below 2°C, so ECO hopes it will hear the EU and other Parties who opposed the CMP group (looking at you, Norway and Australia) support this process in the Workstream 2 decision today.

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Lame Danes Win Fossil for Undermining Ambition



Oh, Denmark! In a not too distant past, Denmark was an inspiration to many—setting ambitious targets and rolling out renewables such as wind energy. But today we are not talking about great Danes, we are talking about lame Danes. That's because today the Danish government is aiming to cut climate targets and shrink climate finance contributions.

The new minority Liberal government of Denmark came into power in July and clearly thought there was too much climate leadership going on. So they decided to dial it down—waaaaay down.

As negotiators in Paris worked to deliver a durable and ambitious climate regime, Danish Environment Minister Lars Christian Lilleholt declared his preference to scrap Denmark's ambitious carbon reduction target of 40% by 2020. This signalled his government's intent to put the handbrake on Denmark's ambition, even as other countries around the world take the opposite approach and gear up to accelerate the transition to a renewable energy future.

While looking to cut their own ambition, the Danish government seemed to want to restrict the ambition of developing countries as well. The new government has a steady stranglehold on climate finance—squeezing the budget from an initial 500 million Danish Krone, which is around 72 million US dollars, to only a projected 39 million US dollars next year. Skammeligt!

Phasing Out Ambition?

Whispers echo around Le Bourget about a group of countries trying to phase out ambition in the finance text. Yes, you read it here first. As ECO was beginning to believe countries had finally caught onto the importance of phasing out financial support for dirty fossil fuels, we're hit with an unpleasant surprise.

The key text for phasing out international support for dirty energy (which Parties call high emissions investments) has just come under fire by some countries, including Saudi Arabia and Argentina. Esteemed delegates, ECO is shocked as you are. With the urgency of the climate crisis, can we really afford to continue fuelling the fossil fuel industry that's driving our climate to destruction?

ECO thinks not. If Parties really want to increase climate ambition through finance, they should stand firm and commit their governments to joining the global divestment movement.

Take note Saudi Arabia, Argentina and their supporters: Governments and institutions all over the world are speeding ahead to shift financial investments away from dirty energy. Sobeprepared to fight off a tide of climate action.

Memo to other Parties: Keep up the fight and lead by example. Your citizens, businesses and investors will thank you for it—not to mention future generations.

We must divest from fossil fuels.

The Core of Article 6

ECO is worried that the lengthy conversations about future contributors to climate finance may be helping developed countries avoid provisions today for more adequate and predictable support. Because, with time running out, ECO is fearful that Article 6 may be reduced to little more than a compromise on differentiation, a bit on ex-ante information (the draft para on this, let's face it, is just re-hashing stuff from previous COP decisions), language on ex-post transparency, and perhaps a reference to the global stocktake.

This would be unfortunate. ECO has always seen Article 6 as one that an ambitious agreement needs in order to ensure future financial support for those countries that need it. Para 10 (option 2) does exactly that. The text suggests the periodic setting, review and adjustment of collective goals for the provision of support. ECO would love to see these few words, originally inserted by the G77 in October 2015, become the operational core of Article 6. Setting such collective goals, for instance, in 5-year cycles, perhaps backed by individual countries' plans outlining how they will contribute, would greatly increase predictability. It would enhance adequacy, too, if such goals were linked to support requirements hinted at by developing countries in their current and future INDCs.

And yes, differentiation needs to be fixed. If ECO had its way, of course, Annex 2 countries would be required to enhance the implementation of their obligations. And other countries with comparable levels of historic responsibility and economic capability would indeed be in a position to complement such efforts.

Feeding the Climate Talks

Once upon a time, ECO thought Parties recognised the impact of climate change on food security and the importance of letting people know that they might starve if they don't address warming. Unsurprisingly (given that the IPCC's latest report speaks to this issue), 60% of the INDCs mention 'food security'. So, it's disappointing for ECO to learn that while food 'production and distribution' has popped up in the agreement 3 times, food 'security' is absent from the operative text. Perhaps Parties need a refresher on the difference between food security and food production?

World Bank and FAO reports clearly state that hunger is not a problem of food quantity, but of regular access to enough nutritious food. And access is different from distribution. It refers to having sufficient resources at all time to obtain appropriate foods for a nutritious diet whereas distribution refers to being able to transport food from one place to another. Really, Parties: emphasising 'food production and distribution' is so old fashioned that it's a throwback to the 1990s.

ECO has heard rumors that the Paris Agreement can't reference food

security because it is a sector – as in agriculture, forestry, and fisheries. ECO is happy to state that this is not the case. As per the recently released SDGs, food security is now a global development goal: Goal 2 aims to end hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition, and promote sustainable agriculture. On the other hand, food production is a sector.

Lastly, ECO is aware that 'food production' is mentioned in Article 2 of the UNFCCC. So, why repeat it? ECO has heard that some Parties are afraid to introduce a new concept in the Paris Agreement. Be assured that food security as a concept was agreed and defined at the World Food Summit in 1996 so it is UN agreed language that Parties can use.

ECO therefore calls on Parties to enter the 21st century and anchor food security in the Paris Agreement. It is time to recognise that ending hunger is not simply a matter of production and distribution – but a question of dignity.

Integrating Integrity

There are wide ambition and resilience gaps between where we are and where we need to be to ensure a liveable world for ourselves and our descendants. There is scant room for false starts, such as project implementations that won't deliver on their promise. Or worse, projects that do more harm than good.

How can we avoid such pitfalls? The answer lies with that special ingredient, Environmental Integrity. ECO looks at the results of some early implementations and finds much room for improvement. First, implementations must not conflate the environment with just emissions reduction, but instead consider the whole dimension of biodiversity and ecosystems. Second, they must add the social dimension.

ECO thinks that considering Environmental Integrity when devising

implementations would help to solve important problems. Though some might question the meaning of 'Environmental Integrity', ECO suggests you look no further than the concept's context within bodies such as the Sustainable Development Goals and Green Climate Fund. Both embrace Environmental Integrity within their objectives and guiding principles.

For the Paris agreement, we recommend the perfect location: the inclusion of Environmental Integrity in Article 2.2 as an overarching principle. This article shows us a clear way forward. And why stop at Environmental Integrity? The Parties need to understand Environmental Integrity in a broader context to achieve real transformational change. This broader context includes human rights, gender equality, indigenous peoples' rights, intergenerational equity, a just transition and decent work, food security and ecosystem integrity.

Unstructured Indecision

ECO is distraught that the 2013-2015 review, which included the 'Structured Expert Dialogue' (SED), could not come to a conclusion after its three years of work. Saudi Arabia (speaking for the Arab Group, China and India) tried to secure agreement only on procedural conclusions, instead of the actual substance within the Joint Contact Group. What's more, Saudi Arabia objected to the draft decision taken. This prevented the group from actually recommending appropriate actions on the key messages highlighted in the SED.

ECO also noted that this draft decision still contained many brackets: three options remained on whether the Long Term Goal should be strengthened from below a 2°C goal to 1.5°C. Not allowing a text going forward on such a substantive process and serious matter, not delivering on the mandate of the review to which everyone agreed to, is a serious signal.

Now it is up to the COP Presidency to take the result of three years of intensive work in its own hands and ensure that the SED's conclusions are made more visible in the UNFCCC negotiations next week. ECO calls

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on Parties to agree to procedural conclusions and the draft decision in COP, even though they might not share the same position on all the issues being addressed.

The Not-So-Golden Ratio

What does Notre Dame de Paris have in common with the Green Climate Fund? Sadly nothing. The golden ratio, so beautifully on display in the cathedral's architecture, is nowhere to be found when fossil fuel subsidies are compared to Green Climate Fund pledges.

Ratios have been on ECO's mind ever since a stroll to Notre Dame. So ECO despaired when it discovered a ratio that was totally out of whack. Analysis released yesterday shows that the ratio of fossil fuel subsidies to Green Climate Fund pledges from 8 key countries is 40 to 1!

You read that right. Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States provide a total of roughly US\$80 billion per year to support fossil fuel production, but have only pledged a combined total of \$2 billion per year to the Green Climate Fund.

That ratio unsettling. It also pushes the climate talks in exactly the opposite direction of progress. While finance negotiators wander the halls looking for more finance to offer up, billions of dollars are being sucked away to support dirty fossil fuels.

It's time to #StopFundingFossils and start funding the solutions!

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Staying Below 1.5°C Is Not Just About Science. It Is a Moral Imperative.

All countries questioning the urgent need to include a long-term goal to keep temperatures below 1.5°C should check their conscience.

For countries that have suffered the wrath of climate-related extreme events due to the current 1°C temperature increase, any attempt to negotiate a further increase in temperature is a violation of the right to life of many human beings and threatens the existence of ecosystems and species. Countries that have already been impacted by the hazards of climate change often do not have the time to adapt. They

are therefore at risk of loss and damage. Their realities must be reflected in the Paris Agreement.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, in recognition of the risks faced by its member countries, is calling for accelerated investments in disaster risk reduction and adaptation. Support for inclusive resilience and risk management needs to be scaled up. It also needs to be sensitive to gender, culture and the needs of the most vulnerable. This is what ECO calls for in the decisions on loss and damage and adaptation for COP21.

Changes in the global climate system have already triggered enormous hazards. These have cost thousands of lives and put significant assets at risk in the most vulnerable countries. The scientific community responded to the calls of civil society organisations and the vulnerable countries, particularly the Climate Vulnerable Forum, by assessing the feasibility of keeping the temperature rise below 1.5°C through mitigation. ECO says that to hold your head high at COP21, you need a clear conscience. We will be watching for bowed heads in Le Bourget.


Game Over For Hot Air?

ECO understands that several Parties are trying to get the high score for the new video game CAPMAN—our cute climate superhero fighting against Hot Air villains. Today's winners are five EU countries (Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom) that decided to remove hot air by cancelling 634.9 million surplus units (AAUs) from the Kyoto

Protocol's first commitment period. They also promised to cancel significant additional amounts from the period up to 2020. These units result from the countries overachieving their Kyoto targets. Cancelling them is a welcome contribution to pre-2020 ambition.

The Kyoto Protocol is suffering from an 11 gigatonne hot air loophole. Under the current rules, the surplus AAUs cannot be used after 2020. However, there is still a risk that the use of other out-of-date carbon units, such as carbon offsets, dilute post-2020 mitigation efforts if Parties would allow them to be carried over.

ECO hopes that, in the race of who takes the most carbon out of the game, today's initiative will be extended to all surplus units that could harm post-2020 climate commitments. The Paris Agreement should incentivise climate actions that are new, additional and not recycled from the past. Actions that are new, additional and not recycled from the past.



Norway, the Human Rights Fossil

Sometimes even the most dedicated of Parties find it difficult to see the forest from the trees. Norway in particular claims to be a human rights champion, but refuses to include language in Article 2 that would protect human rights. This includes the rights of indigenous peoples, gender equality, intergenerational equity, a just transition, food security and the integrity of ecosystems.

Norway and the US claim these points have nothing to do with the purpose of the Paris Agreement. What a step back from the integrated agenda adopted in New York in September! How will governments eradicate poverty, promote social justice and tackle the climate crisis if they refuse to adopt a coherent approach?

Instead, they have suggested that human rights should not be an overarching principle. Tell us, Norway and US: which aspect of climate policy is not relevant to human rights?



'Limiting' Bunker Emissions? That's Oh So Kyoto!

ECO couldn't be more pleased that, following Wednesday's 'Fossil of the Day' award for IMO and ICAO, language on shipping and aviation emissions made it to Friday's draft. But really, why hasn't someone killed off that Kyoto-era reference to 'limitation or reduction' of their emissions? The term 'limitation' allows for continued emissions growth, rather than the absolute cuts needed to stay within the remaining global carbon budget.

Emission reductions are needed from both these sectors, whose emissions fall outside of INDCs, if the long term goal of the agreement

is to be achieved. And we know that there are many ways to reduce their emissions without harming trade.

At present, ICAO may only address post-2020 emissions, and IMO won't even set a target! 'Limitation' will give ICAO and IMO a green-light for business-as-usual.

So, negotiators—just whip out that Kyoto-era 'limitation' language, replace it with a clear call for IMO and ICAO to make a fair contribution to reducing emissions in line with keeping the temperature increase under 1.5°C, and request them to be part of the Article 10 global stocktake.

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Saudi Arabia Wins Big In Fossil Awards

The Fossil of the Day Awards, as presented at last night's ceremony:

'Today's first Fossil of the Day Award goes to...Saudi Arabia! The Saudi delegation here in Paris is doing its best to keep a meaningful mention of the 1.5 degree global warming limit out of the agreement. The Saudi's are trying to torpedo three years of hard science, commissioned by governments, that clearly shows 2 degrees warming is

too much for vulnerable communities around the world. Saudi Arabia is fighting tooth and nail to ensure the Paris agreement basically says, "thanks, but no thanks" to 1.5 degrees warming. A dishonourable mention also goes to India and China who are also trying to sink a safer temperature target, and the Arab Group for standing silently behind Saudi Arabia - despite the fact that people in all these countries stand to suffer as a result of their actions.

Our second Fossil is a joint award that goes to three stooges, Norway, the USA and Saudi Arabia...again. These jokers are threatening the heart and soul of the transition to a renewable energy powered world we want and need. They are blocking the essential elements of a just transition: safeguarding human rights, increasing food security, protecting ecosystem integrity, promoting intergenerational integrity,

and increasing gender security. Wait...that's not very funny. It would be great if some of the ambitious nations in the Arab Group - we know you are out there - would step up and tell Saudi Arabia that no-one is laughing.

For our third and final Fossil of the Day award we nominate Saudi Arabia, AGAIN! Their delegation seems to be happy locking us all into a world that will warm by around 3 degrees, way above any levels deemed safe by scientists. They are blocking a review of national climate action plans (known in UN-speak as Intended Nationally Determined Contributions or INDCs) in 2018 or sooner, that would allow all countries to boost their ambition and bend the curve of warming further away from catastrophic levels. In doing so they are a ball and chain on the collective ambition of more than 150 countries who have submitted their INDCs.'





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Non, Je Ne Regrette Rien

*Non, Rien de rien
(No, nothing of nothing)
Non, Je ne regrette rien
(No, I regret nothing)*

Dear Ministers: Welcome to Paris. As you have no doubt already seen, negotiating texts have been prepared for you. A bit chaotic perhaps, but good enough, and all the options are on the table.

You also have probably realized that two very different deals could be assembled out of these options. The first deal might be called the no-regrets deal. That's the deal that allows all of us to leave Paris with a fighting chance to keep warming to 1.5°C.

The other deal that could be pieced together out of these options is often referred to here in the hallways of Le Bourget as the 'minimalist deal'. But it might be more accurately called the 3-degrees deal.

ECO wants to make sure you leave COP21 with zero regrets, content and with the knowledge that you have done your utmost to deliver an ambitious and equitable outcome that addresses the needs of the most vulnerable.

There are many tell-tales for recognizing the 3-degrees deal. The most telling point might be the proposal that we don't return to the table to assess our progress and ramp up ambition until 2024. Under this deal, we accept the INDCs as the most we can get at this point, and we look to ramp up our efforts in 2030. Under that timeline, we'd be folding our cards and giving up on limiting warming to 1.5 (or even 2) degrees.

The mitigation ambition of the agreement, and the long-term direction of travel, needs to be anchored through a 1.5 degree target. 1.5°C as a direction of travel is pointless if we don't have the vehicles to make the journey. The Paris agreement has to include provisions that enable a consistent increase in ambition towards achieving the long term goals embedded within the agreement.

To avoid travelling too far down the wrong path, we need to accelerate our effort to move off the 3-degree pathway. Provisions within the agreement should synchronise, assess and ratchet up Parties' various commitments in 5-year cycles, including by matching conditional INDCs with means of implementation. All these provisions should build from the accelerated implementation within the pre-2020 period by revising and improving existing INDCs by 2018 at the latest. Taking stock of where we are every 5 years would provide the necessary flexibility in the regime to change course if needed. The stocktake should not just be oriented towards implementation. It should also inform future commitments. The scope of the stocktake needs to incorporate all elements of the agreement to get a truly holistic picture.

If we want to get onto the pathway that holds temperatures well below 2 degrees, we have to provide long term certainty on finance. This agreement can help provide that by setting collective targets for the provision of financial support that should be set and updated in 5-year cycles, with separate targets for mitigation and adaptation. The provisions must provide clarity on how developing country contributions are defined

and progress to give the confidence to enhance ambition.

And speaking of adaptation, we must ensure we don't leave anyone behind. Adaptation goals must be part of a Paris agreement to keep people and planet safe in the view of rising impacts. Adequate support is required to deal with them. This agreement must also increase adaptation finance with an improved balance between mitigation and adaptation finance, aiming to reach a 50:50 balance by 2020 under the US\$100 billion pledge.

Loss and damage must be anchored as a stand alone issue in the agreement. A robust institution is vital to develop approaches to address permanent and irreversible impacts and also coordinate the increasing climate-induced displacement.

Finally, none of this works without provisions that enable greater transparency-of action as well as support. Support and capacity building on MRV is a necessity in this regard; methodologies must be scientifically credible and fair.

The two deals are clear. We can have the no-regrets deal or we can have the 3-degrees deal. The question now becomes: Who will bring us to the no-regrets deal?

Ministers, for all of us to be able to look our children in the eyes, we must be able to demonstrate that we are taking care of their future, not just getting through today.

Car ma vie, car mes joies

(Because my life, my joys)

Aujourd'hui, ça commence avec toi

(Today, it begins with you)

OIL LOVERS WIN FOSSIL. MALAYSIA HONOURED.

Venezuela and Saudia Arabia received a fossil Saturday night for opposing decarbonisation in a crucial contact group.

Malaysia and LMDCs earned an Honourable Mention for championing civil society participation.

Read more at <http://climatenetwork.org/fossil-of-the-day>



Transparency: Just a Castle on a Cloud?

The French government made a commitment to civil society: this would be a transparent and participatory COP. Instead, from day one we have been banned from meetings where decisions are actually made.

Civil society's role is to shed light on this process, to ensure that our governments protect their people's best interests—not the interests of corporate lobbies resisting the transition.

Negotiating behind closed doors undermines the ability of civil society to ensure the accountability of governments and the UNFCCC process, thus pushing for a fairer and more ambitious agreement. It also adversely affects developing countries, which rely on civil society for technical support they cannot otherwise afford.

Behold, there is at least one defender. ECO is grateful to Malaysia for speaking on behalf of the Like Minded Group of Developing Countries, for its consistent call for greater transparency in this process. The EU, US, Australia and other industrialised countries are a different story. Not only have they failed to challenge the closed-door policy, they have hidden behind it.

We demand access to the negotiations.

SOS: Save Our 2050 Strategies

To keep global temperature increase to 1.5°C, and avoid the worst impacts of climate change, decarbonisation is an urgent need. We need national plans firmly set in place that focus on near-term action, coupled with long-term decarbonisation. Furthermore, climate resilience will help to avoid locking in high carbon infrastructure and address climate vulnerabilities.

In Cancun, Parties agreed that they would create low-carbon development strategies. ECO and others are again promoting this implementation tool. These plans must be a durable element of the Paris outcome, in the core Agreement, and not end up in the decisions. Of course, developing countries

must be provided with support to create and implement their strategies.

In these nationally appropriate strategies, countries should lay out a trajectory for decarbonisation by 2050, with indicative targets for 2030 and 2040. Details of the policies and measures to achieve low carbon and climate resilient development for the next 5 years should be aligned with the cycles in the UNFCCC.

Focusing on national implementation will also ensure that the plans are appropriate for each country's special circumstances. By doing this, we can ensure that there is confidence that all countries are participating.

Below 1.5—to Stay Alive

Last week's Joint Contact Group (JCG) on the 2013-2015 review failed to come to a single conclusion on its three year work, which had included the 'Structured Expert Dialogue' (SED). SED's findings were: 1) We are not on track to a 'below 2°C path'. 2) 2°C warming would be dangerous. 3) Keeping warming to below 1.5°C would avoid many disastrous impacts.

ECO points to the need to include the 1.5 degree goal in the new agreement based on common but differentiated responsibilities and strong financial support and technical assistance to developing countries. We are also seeing intriguing shifts. The EU said in

SBI last Friday that limiting warming to 2 degrees is not enough for vulnerable countries. Germany, France, Italy and Australia have announced in the last days that they want a 1.5° goal to be included in the agreement.

Article 3.3 of the Convention requires precautionary measures, and 'where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason' not to act. So let's act! Over to the COP President to take the results of these excellent three years of intensive work and make the conclusions public and official to COP.

The Gap In the Text

ECO is disappointed that Parties seem to have all agreed on the 'no text' options for the following numbers:

The emissions gap: [The emissions gap in 2020 is estimated to be 8-12 Gigatonnes] [The emissions gap in 2030 based on the current INDCs is estimated to be 12-18 Gigatonnes]

The adaptation gap: [The Adaptation finance needs alone will be USD 150 billion per annum by 2025 (even if we were on track for 2°C) yet the starting point for climate finance in 2020 is only USD 100 billion per annum]

The finance gap: [Recent analysis by the International Energy Agency finds that we need up to \$2 trillion annually worldwide by 2035 for the energy transition. This will require at least \$166 billion in public finance per year]

These numbers are real, even if they do not appear in any text. Without a strong process to address these gaps, the Paris outcome will be little more than an agreement to leave the leaders

of 2030 with an insurmountable challenge. Instead, the Paris outcome could ensure that the gaps are filled:

1) Parties should agree to a five-year cycle where intended targets (for finance and mitigation) and contributions (for adaptation) are submitted well in advance of each commitment period. These intended targets should then be collectively reviewed against equity and climate science with ample time to improve their efforts.

2) More important, we cannot wait for the next round of INDCs to be developed to increase ambition. Parties must agree that they will revisit their INDCs, from the perspective of science and equity through a facilitative dialogue in 2017 or 2018 so that they can work together to increase these pledges before implementation begins. For such a review to succeed, finance commitments and adaptation contributions need to be part of the consideration.

LPAA: No Gate Crashers

Saturday was the Action Day—a big party to celebrate initiatives by non-state actors, subnational entities and national governments. While ECO would like to dance the night away with some guests that promote real solutions benefiting people and climate, like renewable energy and energy efficiency, ECO would hate to have gate crashers. That includes false solutions and greenwashing big polluters, such as Total and other members of the Oil and Gas Methane Partnership.

Companies and initiatives that are not serious about the transition to a world without fossil fuel emissions simply should not be part of the LPAA, and business as usual in any of the 12 sectors of the LPAA is not acceptable.

Initiatives should have to provide real and significant benefits, in terms of emissions reductions or enhanced resilience. They should set themselves specific and measurable commitments and be willing to follow up on them with regular reporting. ECO wants to stress that initiatives also need to respect principles such as human rights, environmental integrity, and food sovereignty. Such criteria should be enshrined not only in the LPAA, but also in the Workstream 2 decision to inform high-level events in the future. And without a bouncer (ombudsperson), it won't be much of a party.

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Heal the Adaptation Text

Prevention is better than cure when it comes to illness. So, it is crucial to scale up on climate change adaptation to reduce its harm.

As negotiations gain speed, ECO is not at the operating table, but would like to share some thoughts on key remaining topics. ECO is happy to see that some brackets were removed before the text was sent to the ministers, but many vital issues remain. ECO believes in the value of a global adaptation goal that includes the vision of protecting people, livelihoods and ecosystems.

The Paris Agreement should also build up a meaningful link between mitigation efforts and required adaptation actions. ECO is concerned that the relevant language is bracketed. It's a common sense relationship: less mitigation equals more climate change and higher adaptation needs.

ECO is impressed that many countries have

submitted an INDC component on adaptation. Building on this, Parties should agree that every country needs to submit some form of adaptation communication, with flexibility on the 'how'. ECO's view is that there is a benefit in a regular communication of planned adaptation actions, in conjunction with mitigation cycles, as is one option in the text.

Every country should promote the integration of climate risks into policies and planning, based on the agreement in the SDGs. This does not undermine the entitlement for financial support for vulnerable countries. Oh, and not to forget, for adaptation appropriate to the challenge, financial support must be scaled-up massively, based on the existing and continued Convention obligation for developed countries. But as a matter of solidarity, other capable countries' support will increasingly help to close the adaptation gap.

The US, Its Silent Allies and the Compensation Phantom

ECO thinks there is quite enough to be dealing with at the moment without adding in non-things. So, we are getting tired of increasingly hearing that the US is pushing for specific language excluding liability and compensation behind the scenes, making it easy for other countries that want the same to play the silent partner.

Let's rewind a bit. In a loss and damage special edition of ECO last June, we supported LDC's calls for compensation language in the text. However, in a laudable response to concerns expressed by the US and other developed countries about this language—and in a powerful display of unity—the G77 agreed to remove this language from the text.

That really should have been the end of the story. Rather than seeing it as the constructive bridging proposal that it was, the EU stonewalled; others stayed silent, while the US, having wanted to exclude the text entirely, is now pushing for specific language in the text to exclude compensation and liability.

Are there legal reasons to do this? ECO says no. The lack of reference to compensation in both the bridging proposal and compilation text means, well, no reference to compensation. The language, with its talk of exploration and approaches, is far from anything that could be relied on to establish liability on a legal basis.

So let's be very clear—the rationale for this

Show Love for the Adaptation Fund!

The Adaptation Fund (AF) is a UNFCCC success story: more than 50 adaptation projects are currently underway in Latin America, Africa and Asia, providing support to vulnerable people.

However, the AF operates under a high level of uncertainty. While more and more countries put forward project ideas—the last board meeting has seen an unprecedented amount of proposals—the AF will run out of money as early as 2016 with the resources available today.

Countries need to follow Sweden's pledge of US\$17.5 million and help the AF to meet its fundraising target of \$100 million in 2015.

While cash is required in the short term, countries also need to define a long-term perspective. Strengthening the AF in Paris would be a big help for supporting vulnerable people and countries. It would also safeguard one of its unique features—its ability to multilaterally harness alternative sources of finance for developing countries—as an option for the future.

language is rooted in politics, not law. And it seems that other developed countries, like the EU and Australia, are standing silently behind it.

ECO's message to these countries is clear: if you want to avoid liability for loss and damage, agree on strong mitigation, finance and tech transfer targets, so that your impact on the rest of the world is reduced. You must also support adaptation and loss and damage. You can show your goodwill by being constructive and engaging with what is on the table. Recognising responsibilities, including moral ones, is not a sign of weakness but a sign of true strength.

The Lovely, Lovely Land

You won't solve climate change without forests. But, amid all the potential to address climate change from the land, we need to watch our step.

Land is not only about forests and mitigation. It's where food is grown, homes are built, cultures are rooted, water cycles are nurtured, and where biodiversity works its magic. *ECO takes a deep, calming breath, visualises waterfalls, diverse forests and birdsong. Ahh...*

Among exciting whispers of growing climate ambition, ECO wants to make sure that the lovely land that we all rely on is not accidentally trampled on in the rush to stay below 1.5°C. Climate approaches that would leave communities landless and nations hungry—for example by afforesting over hundreds of millions of hectares of African farmland—would undermine the purpose of the whole UNFCCC.

ECO reminds Parties that we need to watch our step when it comes to land. There hasn't been much time this week to talk about this properly.

Fortunately, lots of good work on land has been done in other relevant international processes. We need a mandate in the decision text to develop principles and establish guidelines to ensure that actions in the land sector are in line with all relevant obligations, rights and best practices, and that mitigation supports, rather than undermines, key obligations and social protections.

This will help us to keep that discussion alive as we strengthen the Paris outcome towards 2020. By doing so, we can make sure that your full belly, your favourite forest hike, and your 1.5°C target can all be secure in the decades to come.

'[Monday's] first place Fossil of the Day Award goes, once again, to Saudi Arabia! In the high-level Ministerial discussions Ali al-Naimi the Saudi Oil Minister (come again?) said we cannot discriminate between clean and dirty fuels, a statement that fundamentally undermines what everyone is trying to achieve at the Paris Climate Summit.'

This statement totally ignores the science that says we have to keep 2/3rds of fossil fuels in the ground to prevent catastrophic climate change and fails to acknowledge the reasons for the shift to renewable energy that is happening around the world. The Saudi's have attempted to block a meaningful long term goal that could serve as a guiding light

ECO's Idea on Funding for Loss and Damage

ECO understands that the rich, polluting countries are not keen to put money on the table to help vulnerable, developing countries affected by climate change. ECO heard of a very attractive mechanism that could lower their bill—let the industry most responsible for climate change pay for the damage their product is causing.

Fossil fuels are responsible for roughly 70% of emissions. Just two of the biggest fossil fuel companies – Chevron and ExxonMobil – made US\$50 billion in profit last year.

Coincidentally, that's probably how much loss and damage LDCs are facing right now.

Collectively, all vulnerable countries face \$100 billion in loss and damage, the same as the annual profits of the top 13 fossil fuel companies. On top of these obscene profits, Chevron is planning to spend \$35 billion exploring for new, completely unnecessary sources of fossil fuels.

Idea: make the fossil fuel industry pay a levy into the loss and damage mechanism. Problem solved.

Crystal Ball of Climate Finance

Running from one meeting room to the next and eating many a crêpe must be tiresome for ministers. But fear not, ECO is here to summarise the crucial things on climate finance for our new arrivals.

If ECO had a crystal ball for climate finance in future years, this is what it would show:

1. Climate finance needs a level of certainty. In a post-2020 world, this could be met by setting collective targets for financial support. To keep us on track, these targets should be reviewed and updated every five years, with separate targets for mitigation and adaptation. This leaves no room for error in our crystal ball predictions.

2. Developed countries should continue to lead the way in providing financial support after 2020. In fact, ECO's crystal ball foresees that starting with at least US\$100 billion annually provided by developed

countries.

3. The crystal ball envisions the growing role of other countries, with an accent on South-South cooperation, to complement developed countries — based on comparable responsibilities, capabilities and stages of development.

4. Flows of finance that align the goals of the Convention. In other words, moving all money out of dirty, polluting energy and into low-emission, climate resilient actions — something we can all look forward to.

Last but not least, there's our forecast for the years before 2020. Our crystal ball has indicated that adaptation finance needs to take higher priority in these years. The figure \$50 billion is floating in front of us. Something to seriously consider this week.

So go forth, ministers, and make these predictions a reality.

Oil Minister Wins Fossil Award for Saudi Arabia



for the fossil fuel phase out and a shift to 100% renewable energy for all. On top of all this Saudi Arabia pushed back on a 1.5C degree temperature target - despite the climate impacts already being felt across the region.


On a positive note we have a Ray of the Day to award to the Philippines for taking the stage during today's Ministerial statements, soon after Saudi Arabia, to promote a meaningful long term goal to stabilise global temperatures and to decarbonise our economies. Strong stuff, well done!

The USA gets the second place fossil for its moral high ground being lost and damaged. Climate change is an existential threat for

many of the most vulnerable countries already facing loss and damage. Despite this, these countries have been negotiating positively and in good faith. Ahead of Paris they took compensation off the table, removing it from their proposal, knowing that rich countries would not agree to compensation.

Yet the US keeps banging away at the issue of compensation. Outrageously it is now insisting that vulnerable countries take compensation off the table for all time and never bring it up again. This flies in the face of basic fairness and the whole concept of negotiating. Face the issue on the table not your bogey-man, United States.'

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Shuffling Deck Chairs on Iceberg-free Waters

ECO is concerned to see that the L.6 adopted ADP text leaves open the option of continuing to generate and trade offset credits. To keep global average temperature increase to 1.5°C or less—and ECO is excited to see support from new quarters on this imperative—we should phase out all fossil fuel emissions no later than 2050.

Using offsets is like 'shuffling deck chairs on the Titanic'. Delaying action might be OK for ships sailing in iceberg-free waters. But iceberg-free waters are what we're in Paris to avoid. And offsets effectively reduce the ambition of the cap they are applied to. The INDCs already place us on track for a world that's 3°C


warmer (hence icebergs unlikely). Weakening their already woeful ambition would put us at even greater risk of climate catastrophe.

If markets are to be used for mitigation purposes, ensuring environmental integrity and contributions to sustainable development are imperative. Trading should be under ambitious caps, expressed as multi-year national carbon budgets. Credits should be real, permanent, supplemental, verified and ensure no double counting. Shares of proceeds would help to create needed new and additional climate finance.

The Clean Development Mechanism created structures that could

transform it from an offset mechanism to one that acts as a channel for climate finance. This would give wealthier countries an MRV-able channel to contribute to their climate finance obligations and help countries in need of support achieve mitigation outcomes. It would also reduce some risks of double counting. The private sector could still contribute in a spirit of corporate social responsibility, but, again, as climate finance instead of offsets.

We need real emissions reductions brought about through transformative change. There is just not enough room in the remaining global carbon budget to waste time shuffling offset credits.



New Zealand's Shell Game

New Zealand will devote NZ\$20 million to research methods for reducing its agricultural emissions over the next four years. Prime Minister John Key announced this news last Monday at COP21. Agriculture accounts for half of the country's total emissions.

What the Prime Minister failed to mention was that, earlier this year, AgResearch cut a net 56 jobs, including researchers in the area of greenhouse gas emissions. AgResearch is the agricultural research institute owned and funded by the government. This funding shortfall was approximately NZD\$5 million in 2015. Over four years this would – wait for it – add up to NZD\$20 million.

At the time those cuts were made, the Science and Innovation Minister was quoted as saying, 'AgResearch has seen significant change in its areas of research that people value,

and what I mean by people I mean the sector that pays for their research...So some areas that were perhaps very important 10 or 15 years ago have less support these days'. Here's hoping the money is applied in time to reemploy New Zealand's researchers before the country falls even further behind in mitigating its greenhouse gases.

John Key wants to look like a climate champ, but simply moving money around isn't going to cut it. The climate isn't a shell game. Perhaps you could try again by supporting the Pacific Islands, New Zealand's neighbours, in their push for a 1.5°C long-term target. Or by upping New Zealand's pitifully low 2030 emissions reductions target. Or, at the very least, by implementing a plan to reduce the 50% of New Zealand's emissions that do **not** come from agriculture. So many options!

Rising Ambition Must Lift All Boats!

And planes, too! ECO is thrilled that Parties are coming around to a target of 1.5°C. But how would we all feel if we got back home and realized — oops! — we left out two huge emitters? International aviation and shipping emissions are equivalent to the carbon emissions of the UK and Germany, are not included in national targets. These emissions are expected to grow up to 270% by 2050. Leaving them out of the agreement would be letting efforts to keep temperature rise under 1.5°C just float on by.

ICAO and IMO are the right UN agencies to regulate these sectors. But, they need to step up their ambition quickly. They can, and must, tackle bunker emissions in a way that accommodates equally both differentiation and the principles of non-discrimination under which these agencies operate.

All aboard for 1.5°C!



**We'll Be Back
Soon...**



Norway's Human Rights Record: Not a Fjordgone Conclusion

As the president of the Sami parliament of Norway, Aili Keskitalo, spoke at the High Level Segment of COP, ECO was dismayed to learn that the Norwegian Environmental Agency just doomed a world famous fjord by approving the annual dumping of two million tons of waste from a planned copper mine in the Repparfjord. This mine will open in Sapmi, the region of Norway's indigenous people. Both the Sami parliament and environmental organisations are fighting the plans, as the mining waste will be deposited in spawning waters of cod and other fish stocks crucial to coastal fisheries.

Much ink has already been spilled in ECO about Norway and its lack of support for human rights in the text. ECO notices an unsettling echo of Norway's harmful attitude on the international stage in its domestic treatment of indigenous communities.

Yet more harm may be done from the waste dumping at Repparfjord. Pollution from the copper mine will breach allowed limits for heavy metals and constitute a toxic cocktail of various contaminants. Microscopic particles

spreading through the water will also harm the threatened Atlantic salmon in what is classified as a 'National Salmon Fjord'.

Many now argue that the Norwegian Environment Agency has abandoned its role as an environmental regulator. The Agency is giving the green light to one of the most environmentally harmful industrial projects in Norwegian history, despite professional objections and warnings, on the grounds that the social benefits outweigh the negative consequences.

Unfortunately, Norway is doing more to damage its own natural heritage. In April, the Norwegian government gave permission to dump millions of tons of mining waste in the Førdelfjord, on the west coast of Norway. Today Norway is the only European country—and one of only five countries in the world—that still allows sea dumping of tailings.

Norway continues to position itself as a leader on climate, but its environmental and human rights record leaves much room for improvement.



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Midnight in Paris, and the Morning After

The appeal of Paris, the City of Light and Love, is enormous. Up to 40,000 people came here to claim their fair share of the Paris Agreement. But the story of Paris is not only a story of love and light. In recent weeks, Paris has also shown its resilience in the face of terror. ECO wishes to remember the lives lost in Paris, Beirut, and countless other tragedies.

We need to lift the veil of romantic mystery surrounding the draft Paris Agreement and the package of decisions. On this morning after, ministers have to look each other in the eye over breakfast, in the bright light of day, and remember they are now in this relationship for the long haul. The text presented on Wednesday afternoon by French Foreign Minister Fabius, based on the work of the ADP and after four days of consultations among governments at the total exclusion of civil society, resembles a weak pre-nuptial prepared by lawyers, not a strong declaration of love. It starkly lays out important choices that need to be made **today!**

We urge all to accept the science: staying below 1.5°C is critical to avoid the high risks for people and nature associated with any higher warming. ECO says: support option 3 in Article 2 and set a collective long term goal of full decarbonisation by 2050 (Art. 3.1 option 2). The existing INDCs are not enough to avoid dangerous warming. Good intentions need to be matched by concrete actions and commitments. Simply asking for ambitious

climate action is not enough. Finance needs to be mobilised and provided, not bracketed. ECO supports Article 6.4 option 2. Firm commitments of [more than] 100 billion [US\$] beyond 2020 are what enables those least responsible to deliver on the promise of INDCs.

In the absence of absolute targets and compliance, country pledges need objective international review. Such a review should be on the basis of equity as well as responsibilities and capabilities. How this important review, which is urgently needed to ensure the ambition gap is closed, became merely a facilitative dialogue in 2018/2019, cannot be explained. We urge you to return to the table with a real mechanism to increase ambition on all fronts—mitigation, adaptation and means of implementation—by 2018. Doing that can create the basis for a transparent MRV system that all countries trust. Trust that is currently lacking. Another close look at the implementation of pre-2020 commitments will also help build trust. Without enhanced action before 2020, the door to a 1.5°C pathway will close.

The largest bulk of emissions from international shipping and aviation was entirely omitted from the text, but wasn't forgotten by ECO. As these emissions are outside the purview of the INDCs and growing rapidly, a failure to address them could undermine other efforts. Address bunker emissions in the Paris agreement.

Ensure resilience can be achieved in the Paris Outcome through strong provisions on adaptation. Don't confuse loss and damage with adaptation. All elements of Article 5 need your support—displacement, permanent and irreversible damage and finance—without fighting the non-existent bogeyman of compensation (which no Party has put on the table here).

Finally, we should protect people by ensuring human rights, including the rights of indigenous peoples and gender equality, and protect the integrity of ecosystems. Climate technologies need to be of the highest social and environmental integrity. Doing so will encourage far more than [50] [60] countries to ratify the Paris Agreement. It can thus enter into force and facilitate early action, which is essential to avoid dangerous warming.

Dear lovers, the time for playing games is over. After four years of talks, these stark choices are all that remain. The warm words and sincere pledges by heads of state need to be turned into legally binding commitments. Dear Ministers, your people—children and grandchildren, farmers, workers, nature lovers, faith leaders and so many more—ask you to at least give all of us a chance to survive.

Fluctuat nec mergitur

*"Elle est agitée par les vagues,
et ne sombre pas"*

*"She is tossed by the waves,
but does not sink"*

Holiday Plans Until 2023/24?

ECO was excited to see emerging convergence among Parties on five-year cycles in the new text. But ECO has one simple, but very important, question: **when does it start?** We are not on track to stay below even 2°C. We also know that without increasing the ambition of INDCs before implementation in 2020, the 1.5°C door will rapidly close.

We need a review of INDCs in 2018 and a re-submission pre-2020. Yet paragraphs 24 and 25 set the date for submitting or updating INDCs at 2020 or 2021. These paragraphs only do half the job. Those with 2030 targets are invited to 'confirm or update' them, but those with 2025 targets seem to be off the hook. Their 2020-25 efforts get no mention and instead they are invited to put forward a new (2030) target.

The first round of review would have to happen before 2020, so we can update insufficient INDCs that currently lock us into a 3°C pathway. The current weak 'facilitative dialogue' in the decision text has to be strengthened. To allow for this first round in 2018, we should also look back and assess how well developed countries have implemented their pre-2020 commitments through a process of accelerated implementation. If we want to make the 5-year cycle more effective, it should consider not only INDCs but also means of implementation.

Another important question: does the stocktake influence individual countries' targets? From that perspective, we are very sad to see 'ex ante' review disappear from the text. ECO hopes that delegates are not planning too long a holiday. You all deserve nice holidays after this hectic conference. But get the world back on track first.

[and equity].

However the chips finally fall, the viability of the Paris Agreement will critically depend on its ambition mechanisms. The need for this is agreed. Unfortunately, agreement in principle is not enough. To stay below the 1.5°C limit, at least two additional and very specific things will be needed. The first is equity assessment of individual national pledges. The second is a post-Paris, pre-2020 'political moment' in which the Parties can finish building out the core mechanisms of the Paris Agreement.

Such a political moment is almost in the cards, though a few words need to be added to the facilitative dialogue paragraph (para 20) to empower the dialogue to inform the review of not only future but also current INDCs. Moreover, the all-important words "and equity" should be added here, just as they appear in the global stocktake article (albeit still bracketed). Also, the scope of this dialogue should be expanded to reach beyond mitigation. This dialogue could take place in 2018 or earlier, so let's just call this moment '2018' for now.

What must happen between now and 2018? First, developed countries must continue to deepen their contributions, upping their pre-2020 ambitions and meeting the \$100 billion goal. Second, the conditional pledges in the first round of INDCs need to be addressed. In particular, developing countries, especially those with inadequate capacities, must be supported as they seek to clarify their conditional INDCs. Critically, conditional INDCs must be 'matched' with the support that's needed to animate them. This, more than anything else, would increase trust in 'the process' and provide the incentives that low-capacity countries need to confidently commit themselves to ambitious zero-carbon transition plans.

A Fashionable Trend

ECO noticed that a small but potentially mighty paragraph that would scale back international public financial support for high-carbon fossil fuels has taken a beating.

Prior to being discussed behind closed doors yesterday, Article 6, paragraph 7 aimed to ensure international public finance was not

Third, middle-income developing countries must be incentivised to take ambitious actions over time. Here, ECO is thinking of taking explicit account of their development needs and evolving capabilities. This essentially means taking advantage of the brief period between Paris and 2018 to begin a serious debate about the objective criteria for CBDRRRC that we need to support dynamic, equity-based differentiation. These criteria must be debated, and reflected upon, so that we can finally develop a shared understanding of equity indicators and equity reference frameworks.

An important element of trust building is closing the finance gap. Raising ambition over time will require clarity on how countries with capabilities comparable to those of developed countries contribute to the finance flows. Although it is fine to say that, for example, only the developed countries will contribute to the first \$100 billion, this is not a rule that will scale to the challenge of providing the second \$100 billion, nor the third...

The differentiation challenge can no longer be pushed aside. Not if our claims to support a 1.5°C pathway are more than rhetoric. If we're to have any real chance at staying below 1.5°C, all countries must increase the pace of their transformation. The wealthy countries must lead by increasing their ambition. The emerging economies must follow soon, leapfrogging to very low-carbon and zero-carbon development paths. By so doing, they will define steps that all countries can follow, as they find the ways and means needed to do so. This is the real challenge of differentiation, and it requires bravery on all sides.

used to fuel (pun intended) the very problem this entire agreement is trying to solve: the climate crisis. In the new text just released, it is clear that what is now Article 6, paragraph 4, option 3, fell victim to Parties pandering to the interests of big oil, coal and gas.

This text is not about dictating domestic development choices: it is the no-brainer that

Facilitate the Facility

If you wonder why vulnerable developing countries have demanded a Climate Change Displacement Coordination Facility ('Facility'), the 22.5 million people displaced annually by weather related disasters since 2008 are happy to remind you. The Facility, as a placeholder for adequate institutional arrangements, could begin with a focus on closing knowledge gaps by collecting, sharing and managing relevant information on displacement. It could then expand its work to build Parties' own capacities to address displacement, facilitate voluntary migration, and encourage participatory and dignified planned relocation as a last resort. The Facility could also provide a space to convene and collaborate between UN agencies, as well as international and regional organizations, governmental initiatives and civil society concerned with climate-related displacement and migration.

Some remain concerned that this facility would be duplicating activities of other UN agencies, such as the UN Refugee Agency and the International Organization for Migration. However, these agencies strongly advocate that this is not a duplication at all. They call for the creation of a Facility to reinforce and sustain their work.

As highlighted by the the Nansen Initiative Protection Agenda, endorsed by 110 Governments this past October in Geneva, there remain many gaps. These include legal protection, institutional arrangements and knowledge and data collection. States should remember their past commitments to address this issue, and create this Facility as a convening space to catalyse action and fill these noted gaps.

says that all-too-scarce international public financing should be used to solve the problem, not make it worse. Countries have just a couple of days left to make sure that big polluters don't leave their dirty fingerprints all over this deal. It is high time to follow the advice on the stylish scarves that many seem to be sporting and #StopFundingFossils.

UN Human Rights Day

Sixty-seven years ago today, the international community convened in Paris to sign the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This historic document, and the treaties that grew out of it, set forth the minimum rights essential for a life of dignity for all people, including children, indigenous peoples, workers, the promotion of gender equality and the guarantee of food security around the world. The ministers and secretaries assembled here must fulfill this legacy. Let today be the day countries act to protect against the human rights impacts of climate change and climate responses.

Climate change is the human rights challenge of the 21st century. Integrating human rights into climate action helps protect the rights of those affected the most by its severe impacts. To date, a group of countries led by Mexico, Chile, Costa Rica, the Philippines and Peru is paving the way on these issues here. Civil society calls upon ministers to act now to protect those most vulnerable and least responsible for the effects of climate change.

How to secure the protection of rights in the agreement

1. Include cross-cutting references to human rights in the operative text of the agreement.
2. Spell out all elements of the solidarity package: rights of indigenous peoples, gender equality and the full and equal participation of women, intergenerational equity, a just transition of the workforce that creates decent work and quality jobs, ecosystem integrity and resilience, and food security.

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'Round Midnight

As ECO went to press, the Comité de Paris had just resumed its work again. The outcome of the final round of negotiations is still uncertain. That need not stand in the way of a hard-nosed analysis of the new text, though, with the really big issues still left to be decided. Overall, ambiguity is the mot de vogue with several decisions still bracketed yesterday now 'simply' postponed. ECO makes a final plea to ministers and their heads of state, who will be asked to weigh in at the last minute:

Ambition

Parties chose to land in the 'well below 2°C' zone, while still pursuing a 1.5°C warming limit. This is, however, not compatible with GHG emission neutrality somewhere in the second half of this century. Full decarbonisation, with no tricks (like non-permanent offsetting and geoengineering), is needed and should be what those who claim to be ambitious fight for!

Differentiation

The endless variations in the new text trying to reframe the Convention's preambular 'common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and their social and economic conditions,' [ECO's emphasis] are a reflection of a genuine global struggle to come to terms with new realities. ECO does not romanticise the past, nor ignore historical responsibilities. The Paris Agreement can only deliver on its goal if all respect the Convention in full.

Finance

Which brings us to means of implementation. The floor of US\$100 billion seems to now be established. But the agreement does not enough to 'shift the trillions.' ECO believes the Paris Agreement sends a signal to investors about the long-

term direction. It pays lip service to setting a carbon price. Yet, Parties are about to fail in their duty of care, which would make them commit to finally end all fossil fuel subsidies, stop financing carbon-intensive investments or indeed commit to divestment.

INDCs

That the current INDCs, many of which are conditional on adequate international support, are not enough to limit warming to well below 2°C, let alone 1.5°C, is acknowledged and shockingly taken for granted. For now, there is no plan to close the resulting gap. We do not need to wait until 2018 for the IPCC to tell us that the pathway we are on forecloses limiting warming to 1.5°C. Independent assessments have already shown that developed countries in particular are lagging behind. The facilitated dialogue in 2019 merely opens the door for countries to rethink their lack of ambition. In 2025, ECO does not want to be looking back on the Paris Agreement, and with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight judge that this was a grave error. The five-year cycles of updating and enhancing ##### (shall we just call them NDCs?) can start immediately upon entry into force.

Loss and Damage

The fight for loss and damage continues in dark corners of Le Bourget. To the most vulnerable, we say: Stay strong! To the blockers: You let the genie of liability and compensation out of the bottle. Please put it back in, as nobody is calling for it in this agreement.

Transparency, MRV and Compliance

After a decade of building confidence and trust through these talks, the Paris Agreement still reflects the fear that transparency on implementation and meaningful review of

outcomes could be punitive. Shining a light is something ECO has done since 1972. In light of the bottom up character of the INDCs and the facilitative nature of the proposed review we urge all to lighten up and embrace transparency.

On a related note, ECO always understood the Durban mandate was 'to develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties,' to mean an international agreement would have some teeth. Simply put: the bracketed wording on 'compliance' needs to be included in the Paris Agreement.

Human Rights

ECO is shocked that countries have surgically removed human rights from the core climate change agreement.

A broad coalition of civil society organisations and indigenous peoples have come together to collectively support joint text for Article 2, the heart of the agreement. All attempts were made to keep it simple for Parties. Instead, civil society's voices are being ignored. You forgot that you represent us. You forgot that your job is to speak for us.

President Hollande: When you said that 'COP21 would be a new step for human rights', what exactly did you mean?

ECO praises Mexico and other champions for their work in promoting human rights in the operative text of the agreement. We owe it to the world's vulnerable—those least responsible for and most impacted by climate change.

Today, Friday, a new moon will rise over Paris. ECO still has hope it will mark a new era. The change that is needed takes all of you. Soit brave!

An Ounce of Prevention Is Worth a Pound of Cure

Some countries (including Saudi Arabia) have questioned the scientific basis for the need to limit temperature increases to 1.5°C. ECO would like to remind everyone, but especially these countries, that Article 3.3 of the Convention (remember it?) states that 'Parties

should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimise the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures'. ECO calls upon Parties to enhance their implementation of the Convention to fulfil this agreed mandate.

Carbon Markets: All Cards on the Table

The new draft text still features brackets around the sustainable development mechanism provision. Decisions to be made in the next 24 hours include whether offsetting will be allowed (please, NO!), whether developed countries will be able to play the offset generation game, accounting rules, guiding principles and a share of proceeds for climate finance purposes.

ECO suggests:

- **Disallowing the use of offsetting.** To achieve the 1.5°C goal, we need to focus on emissions reductions
- **Enhancing inclusion of 'environmental integrity'.** by inclusion of the additional principles, real, permanent, verified and supplemental for any international exchange of mitigation outcomes under this mechanism
- **Elaborating how to avoid double counting.** ensuring a corresponding adjustment by both Parties for an exchange of mitigation outcomes covered by their ###
- **Establishing eligibility rules to**

participate in carbon markets. If offsetting is to be allowed (against ECO's stern advice) developed countries should definitely not compete with developing countries for project financing. It would be inequitable. Use of international credits should be supplemental to ambitious national action. Only countries with absolute, multi-year targets (budgets) should be allowed to engage in markets

· **Achieving sustainable development.** Given the goal of the mechanism is to support sustainable development, there should be a work program agreed to develop modalities for sustainable development indicators and a 'do no harm' assessment.

· **Creating new and additional climate finance.** Agree a share of proceeds on all use of markets including in 3.20 (and ideally universally)

· **Achieving net atmospheric benefit.** Any new offsetting mechanism (still not listening to ECO??) should reduce emissions through the cancellation of a share of credits used.

Checklist for 1.5°C

ECO is happy to hear so many Parties supporting a 1.5°C temperature limit. To see if these Parties are serious about 1.5°C, ECO will be looking at the following points:

first round of review in **2018** to improve **current INDCs** of developed countries and enable implementation of conditional INDCs of developing countries

stronger action before 2020, including enhanced implementation of pre-2020 commitments


long-term global goal of phasing out all fossil fuel emissions by 2050 leading towards 100% renewable energy with access for all

review of INDCs and means of implementation every 5 years

provision of adequate and predictable finance



PARIS CLIMATE DEAL: LEADERS DECIDE ON WHO NEEDS MOST SUPPORT



INDCs Crossroads 2018...

Let's Agree We're Lost and Damaged

The negotiations on the Paris Agreement have reached crunch time, and ECO is concerned that the crucial issue of loss and damage might be crunched at the last minute, as the Thursday text contains several options on loss and damage. ECO is hearing that there have been some constructive discussions in the last days. At the same time, some Parties are insisting on red lines on aspects that others have not even put to the forefront.

Just a reminder what we are talking about: In broad terms, loss and damage is harm resulting from climate change that cannot be adapted to. That's why we don't think it makes much sense to deal with it as a subset of adaptation, although there are linkages. Extreme weather events like hurricanes and floods are what catch the greatest attention in the media, but it also includes 'slow onset

events' like sea level rise, which are likely to make life worse for many more vulnerable people over the coming decades than extreme weather. It also covers permanent events like loss of land.

Loss and damage is of current and growing importance, which makes it a vital component of a climate agreement that sets the framework for the future. As far as money is concerned, it will definitely be needed, but there is no need—and this speaks in particular to the USA, Canada, as well as the EU, to trouble yourselves with discussions about compensation, although it was not mentioned in the previous agreement drafts. There are lots of issues that don't relate to money that are of equal importance. For example, setting up a climate displacement facility and helping the millions that will be

Response Measures: Lost in Transition

Developed countries in the Convention must 'take into consideration' the impacts of the 'response measures' [in 4-2-8(h) and 4-2-10]. An interpretation is that victims of mitigation measures such as energy efficiency or alternative energy policies in the North could be compensated for decreased sales. This idea, regularly put forward in the UNFCCC by the Saudi Arabia, is mostly seen as an insult to vulnerable countries such as SIDS, where impacts of climate change are of a much greater magnitude.


Now that a wave of energy transition is sweeping the world, with 100 big cities and 43 vulnerable countries committing to 100% renewable energy, and insistence that oil should stay in the ground, no Party can be seen as responsible for lost sales of oil products. Markets, recent technologies and individual actions by citizens or businesses are responsible for this development, not Parties.

This concept shouldn't be a laughing matter anymore. Diversification by fossil fuel dependent industries or countries is not only necessary for the climate. It also makes business sense. A new article in the draft (4-9-e former 4-9-f in L6), applicable to all Parties, insists on 'resilience of socio-economic systems' and on 'economic diversification'.

Fortunately, some progress is being made on this unilaterally. Saudi Arabia's GDP (market exchange values) in 2014 was about US\$753 billion; the value of its total export was about \$373 billion, of which oil alone stood for \$285 billion. The value of oil revenues has declined to only 38% of its GDP. Saudi Arabia should be proclaiming its success, and showing others how to diversify their economies in such a way. The Saudi example demonstrates that there is no need for Article 3.15's cooperative mechanism to address the adverse effects of response measures.

displaced or forced to migrate due to climate change, plus generally advancing the issue under the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM).

NGOs are united in our call for both the WIM and loss and damage to be anchored in the Paris agreement. This is not, and has not been, an excessive ask by vulnerable developing countries. So, countries, get on and agree on a landing zone that gives affected people the assurance that the loss and damage they face will not be ignored, and start building up the international response, including through the WIM. The future governing body will have freedom to find new or additional answers, if required. The Paris Agreement is crucial for changing course. Do not let the perfect be the enemy of the good.



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Ambition: Don't Leave Paris Without It

As we move into the final hours of the climate negotiations here in Paris, the outcome could go one of two ways. We will either achieve a Paris agreement that accelerates the transition to a global economy based on 100% renewable energy, allows us to avoid the worst impacts of climate change, and helps vulnerable countries cope with the impacts they are already experiencing. Or we will leave Paris with a least common denominator agreement that sees important elements left on the cutting room floor. ECO insists that ministers overcome their differences and work together to craft the ambitious, effective, and balanced agreement that the world expects, needs and demands.

Such an agreement must include a reference to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 degrees and a long-term goal that makes it clear to investors, businesses, and citizens that the fossil fuel age is over, and the transition to the age of renewables is unstoppable. It must include five-year cycles for review and revision of INDCS, with the first review by the end of this decade. With continued declines in the costs of renewable energy and efficiency technologies, all countries should be in position to increase the level of ambition of their initial INDCs before they are finalized in the new agreement. This will be facilitated by greater clarity and predictability of post-2020 developed country climate finance, supplemented by voluntary contributions from developing countries who wish to make them.

The Paris agreement must also address the needs of vulnerable communities already experiencing the impacts of climate change. It must increase the share of public climate finance going to adaptation activities and help countries deal with loss and damages such as the

cost of dealing with sudden disasters like typhoons and slow-onset impacts like sea-level rise and drought.

Getting such an agreement over the next 24 hours requires some shifts in the negotiating positions of a number of countries. ECO wasn't in the Indaba last night, but we have been informed that the United States, Japan and the EU took a very hard line on several aspects of climate finance, especially on short term collective goals. Leaders from these countries called for a strong Paris agreement; their ministers and negotiators must be more forthcoming on the climate finance issues if we're going to achieve such a result.

ECO is told that a number of developing countries, including India and China, pushed back against some of the good language in the most recent text on issues including the long-term goal, five-year cycles, and independent verification of national reporting on emissions trends and actions. China and India are both taking impressive actions at home, and their leaders have acknowledged the urgency of acting on climate change. Both countries must work in the last hours in Paris to find acceptable compromises on these issues. They are essential elements of any agreement that strives to hold global temperature increases well below 2 degrees C. Turkey proposed deletion of language on developing countries providing climate finance on a voluntary complementary basis," apparently because Turkey itself isn't willing to do so. And Russia objected to the reference to 1.5 degrees C, calling it arbitrary.

We're informed that Saudi Arabia played an especially unhelpful role in last night's Indaba sessions by, amongst other things, trying to weaken the temperature

goal, delete references to the need for global peaking of emissions, and drop the paragraph urging countries to reduce support for high-emission investments. This behavior must stop, or the Saudis must finally acknowledge that they are placing their short-term financial interests above the long-term survival of vulnerable communities and their own citizens.

In sharp contrast, ECO hears that a number of countries, including Angola, Brazil, Egypt (on behalf of the African Group), Mexico, Nigeria, and South Africa, played very constructive roles in last night's negotiations, striving to find bridging solutions to some of the difficult issues. We thank these countries for operating in this spirit, and urge others to join them.

Last week, the more than 150 world leaders here in Paris projected a sense of urgency and a clear commitment to reach an ambitious and equitable agreement – one that will give the world hope that we can come to grips with the mounting climate crisis and leave our children and grandchildren a livable planet and a safer cleaner future. ECO calls on ministers and negotiators to operate with the same sense of urgency and commitment, and to bring a strong agreement to tomorrow's closing plenary—one that addresses the well-documented ambition gap between the temperature limitation goals and aggregate emissions reduction commitments and that assures vulnerable countries that they will receive the help they need to cope with the increasingly serious impacts of climate change.

In the months and years to come, Paris will either be seen as a transformational moment, or as a tremendous missed opportunity. The outcome is in your hands; please choose wisely.

Cheat Sheet for Putting Us on the Path to a Safe, Just Climate Future

TO KEEP!

TO BE IMPROVED!

Ambition Mechanism	* Look at INDCs in 2019/20 (paras 20, 23, 24) with 5 yearly stocktaking of actions (Art. 10) * Submission of new NDC every five years on common timeframes from 2030 (Article 3.8 and 3.9) with no backsliding (Art. 3.3) and each new NDC "should" be a progression over the previous one (Articles 3.6)	* Delete "in the period after 2025 and 2030"; current INDCs need to be improved (para 17) * Facilitative dialogue (para 20) to happen in 2018 to give clear guidance on scaling up INDCs. * Parties to revisit and revise upwards their 2030 targets (para 23, 24)
Equity, Fairness and Differentiation	* Differentiation reflected in Operative Articles, a good starting point * Article 2 in context of CBDR & RC * Global stocktake in context of equity and science	* 2bis must not be deleted * Progression text should mention both CBDR&RC and stages of development to achieve balance Article 2: the Paris Agreement should be "implemented on the basis of" equity, CBDRB, and national circumstances * Article 3.1 also mention stages of development.
Human Rights and Environmental Integrity Principles	* Environmental Integrity and avoidance of double-counting (Art. 3.12, 3.20); no double-counting in 3terr. * Technology Needs Assessment, including socially and environmentally sound"" criteria (D.77(d))	* Human rights, gender equality, just transition, the rights of indigenous peoples, food security, intergenerational equity, in preamble (10/12), in operative Article. * Cooperative approaches (Art. 3.20) lacks requirement that emissions reductions are real, additional, permanent, verified.
Mitigation in the Agreement	* Reference to peaking as soon as possible in a differentiated fashion (Art 3.1) * Operationalisation of the temperature goal with a formulation which points to zero fossil-fuel emissions (Art 3.1) * Development of National Long-Term Low-GHG Strategies	* Clear 1.5°C goal * Identifying support for conditional actions in developing country INDCs Long Term Goal: From GHG neutral to full decarbonization proposal (Art. 3.1). * Address emissions from international shipping and aviation
Pre-2020 Action	* Improved technical process, high level events and champions for both mitigation and adaptation with support can trigger new and additional action. (paras 118-140) * Recognition of the need to accelerate implementation of 2020-commitments (para 124)	* Indication that existing efforts and commitments will be scaled up pre-2020. * Criteria to ensure quality and integrity of actions (paras 118, 129, 130) * Clarity on pre-2020 finance (remove brackets around para 123)
Adaptation	* Adaptation goal (4.1) Link to mitigation * Inclusion of adaptation and adaptation support in stocktake	* Strengthen link to mitigation in decision text * Clear quantitative adaptation finance number for pre/post 2020
Loss & Damage	* Stand alone element that needs finance, is different from adaptation and process to deal with permanent and irreversible damage * Displacement coordination facility	* Delete language ruling out compensation and liability (Art. 5.3)
Finance	* Scale up from floor of US\$100 billion, and shifting trillions paragraph in purpose section * Establish that every 5-years quantitative goals on financial resources are set, to assist developing countries (Art 6) * Clarified accounting of additional funds in para. 65.	* No clear accountability for future finance targets - creative fudge on differentiation in finance provision/mobilisation
Transparency & MRV	* Whichever option (Art 9.1) is decided (differentiation) on a new transparency framework is established that covers both action and support * (Art 9.7) recognises that independent review of the information is important * New framework recognises flexibility for developing countries is needed (Art 9.2)	* No clear accountability for future finance targets - creative fudge on differentiation in finance provision/mobilisation
Legal	* Compliance wording in article 11 needs to be maintained * Entry into Force double trigger, prefer option of 55% of parties/GHG. * Binding language to be maintained on commitments	